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Abstract 
 
The thesis develops a Central Americanised model of regional integration by 
building on neofunctionalist concepts through the use of a constructivist 
approach. Distortions, strategic modification and stagnation phases of integration 
in that region are conventionally attributed, often implicitly, to the 
“unwillingness” of the governments. The problem with this approach, however, 
is that it neglects the role of what I identify as Normative Elites in the process. In 
order to overcome this limitation, the thesis formulates the concept of Social Will, 
conceptualised as the interplay of the ideas, identity and interest of the Central 
American normative elites—and it refers to the predisposition or disinclination of 
these elites to support the integration process. The formulation of social will 
leads the analysis to re-conceptualise the interaction between the state and 
normative elites. This reconsideration necessitates the elaboration of modified 
models of socialisation and norm diffusion—which I label Ideational Drive and 
Circumscribed-Statist respectively—to reflect certain Central American 
specificities.    
 
Empirically, the thesis assesses the existence and role of both political will and 
social will in Central America by using discourse analysis of a series of 
interviews and detailed readings of published position documents. Regarding 
political will, it identifies a latent integrative strategy and a significant ideational 
convergence among the participants in the study. It concludes that indeed in that 
region there is a fair degree of political will. This conclusion is partially 
supported by the uncovering of Constitutional Regionalism, or the constitutional 
bestowals of special citizenship status on nationals of other Central American 
countries, and the inclusion of specific constitutional provisions conducive to 
integration.  
 
The thesis contemplates the existence of social will at two points: the reactivation 
of the Central American integration process during the 1990s, and in the 2005-08 
period. In the first instance, the thesis identifies the leading role that normative 
elites, through economic groups, played in the reactivation of the process. In that 
sense, it argues that at that time there existed a degree of social will. In the 
second instance, the thesis identifies discursive differences among normative 
elites. One discourse conceives of the region from a Central Americanist view 
striving for the development of the region and crucially, its people. The other 
discourse is Instrumentalist aiming at improving the region’s competitive 
positioning in the global economy. This ideational incongruence signals a limited 
degree of social will. The thesis concludes by arguing that partial social will 
delimits and imposes meaning on the spaces wherein the political will could 
thrive. Hence the process experiences distortions, strategic modifications and 
stagnant phases. 
 
 
   
 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is about regional integration in Central America.1 It aims at advancing 
our understanding of regionalism in that area.2 The thesis is, in addition, about 
regionalisation3 because that region, despite failed attempts and disruptions to the 
process, seems reluctant to refrain from following integrative impulses. These 
impulses have a long history: there have been more than 30 failed unionist 
initiatives in 188 years of independent history. During this period the ideal of 
union has remained as a recurrent theme experiencing a process of 
metamorphosis from the political idealism of the nineteenth century (e.g. the 
Greater Republic of Central America, 1895-1898) to the economic pragmatism 
of the second half of the twentieth century exemplified by the Central American 
Common Market, CACM. (See appendix I for a complete list of integrative 
attempts). While the current initiative, the Sistema de la Integración 
Centroamericana (SICA),4 has produced a limited increase in intra-regional trade, 
there is little progress toward integration. SICA includes a comprehensive 
regional institutional framework—including a regional parliament and court of 
justice. Regional decision making, nevertheless, remains at the national level 
allowing the participant states to protect their local interests rather than advance 
regional interests. How might we understand the cyclical “decline,” reactivation, 
                                                 
1
 Central America refers to the countries that traditionally constitute the sub-region: Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Under the Spanish empire, these countries 
were administered as a unit, the General Captaincy of Guatemala or the Kingdom of Guatemala 
(which also included the province of Chiapas now a Mexican state). Following independence 
(1821), and after a brief annexation by Mexico, these countries (with the exception of Chiapas) 
remained as a unit under the United Provinces of Central America (1823-1838). In recent 
integrationist schemes in the area other countries have begun to participate; for example, 
Dominican Republic and Panama.  
2
 To avoid redundancy I use the terms regional integration and regionalism interchangeably. 
3
 Regionalisation refers to the process of regional construction through interactions among actors.  
On regionalisation see Hettne (2005). 
4
 The Central American Integration System. 
   
 2 
distortions and strategic shifts experienced by the Central American integrative 
process?  
I argue that the nature of Central American regionalism can best be 
understood by analysing the role of what I label “normative elites networks” and 
the exercise of their power through “Social Will.” These elite groups are built 
around family and kinship, and function as platforms from which members can 
exchange economic, political and ideological power. This exchange produces a 
fair degree of “normative” power5 which in turn enables the elites to establish 
intersubjective elements (e.g. norms and rules) that determine what constitutes 
the region. In order to reach such intersubjective congruence, social will is 
essential: the ideas, identity and interests of the elites must converge favourably 
around the integrative process. If a high degree of social will exists, then the 
regional process is likely to be further advanced. Conversely, if social will is 
minimal, integration is likely to experience a stagnation phase or a strategic 
alteration. This argument requires revisiting the interactions between the state 
and elites in order, first, to theorise about the existence of normative elite 
networks, and second, to theoretically elaborate the social will concept. The aim 
of these tasks is to “localise” regional integration theory to better reflect the 
Central American context.   
 
Trends in the Study of Central America  
It is important to note that currently only a few studies (Bull, 2002, 2004; Grugel 
and Payne, 2000) on regional integration in Central America adopt a critical6 
                                                 
5
 On normative power, see Adler (2005: 178-179), Guzzini (2005), and Manners (2002) and 
(2006). 
6
 By “critical studies” I mean studies that engage the underlying assumptions of conventional 
analyses. For example, studies that question and/or elaborate on assumptions such as “constraints 
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approach to their subject. Some studies remain “a-theoretical” and confine 
themselves to identifying multi-level governance trends in the region.7 Others 
take an approach that presupposes a fair degree of economic determinism that is 
overly concerned with integration as a mechanism for economic development or 
for exploiting regional advantages.8 By doing so, these studies neglect the role of 
elites in the process and remain focused on the role of the state because, in their 
conceptualisation of regionalism, what is required for the advancement of the 
process are successful governmental policies. Throughout I refer to this 
understanding of the process as “statist view” or simply as the conventional view.    
Such an approach may be misleading because it portrays integration as 
merely tantamount to economic integration and does not fully capture the 
existing “unionist” foundation: Integration is conceived of as an “economic 
construction” rather than as a subtler and deeper “social construction.” Thus, 
regional integration has a supply and demand “logic” (Mattli, 1999) and, in order 
to be successful, requires the implementation of economic policies that lead to 
structural reforms and macroeconomic stability and at the same time reduce 
sectoral deficiencies which hinder economic growth (Shams, 2003: 13). If 
regional integration is to greatly benefit the participant countries then it is logical 
that the process advances to higher levels. What this analysis misses, however, 
are the intersubjective dynamics among the different social actors within the 
                                                                                                                                    
on power,” “retrain by social relations” and “real sources of power” which current analyses of the 
Central American region incorporate; also, studies that question and/or elaborate the 
“modernisation” premises that permeate notions of the state (e.g. corporatism) and regional 
integration in general (e.g. pluralist societies) which tend to “upload” a specific image onto 
Central American regionalism. 
7
 Centeno and López-Alves (2001) note a similar trend. In Latin American studies in general 
there is a tendency towards the study of “non-elites and social theory” seeking comprehensive 
“social knowledge of the poor and marginalized” and by confining themselves to such studies 
neglect “those who, for better or for worse, make decisions, [those] organizations that define 
policies, and those who implement them” (Centeno and López-Alves, 2001: 16). 
8
 See for instance Bulmer-Thomas (1996, 1998, 2000, 2001), Bouzas and Ros (1994), Caldentey 
del Pozo (1998), Gauhar (1985), Rodas-Martini (1998, 2000) and Sanahuja Perales (1997, 2007).   
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process; and how these dynamics construct integration and thus the region. 
Therefore, the analyst is forced to lump social relations into supply and demand 
logic neglecting what is behind the economic interests of those making the 
demands and what it is that hinders the ability of the supplier to meet such 
demands.  
The underlying economic determinism of the statist view of the process is 
evident when studies explicitly state that regional integration is an “economic 
endeavour” (Malamud and de Sousa, 2007: 108). This view effectively 
disregards cultural factors apparently disconnected or minimally employed in the 
rational economic space by, for example, emphatically denying a driving role to 
the formation of a common identity in favour of “the convergence of interests” as 
driver (Malamud and Schmitter, 2007: 9). When regionalising demands do 
emerge from ideational factors beyond the economic they are dismissed as 
“cognitive dissonances” expressing the wishful thinking of the speaker 
(Malamud, 2005a: 422-423). Even observers who study the role of “ideas” in the 
region conceive of the process in economic terms. 9  The downplaying of 
ideational factors originates in an ontological position wherein regional 
integration functions merely within the economic realm from which ideas other 
than economic ones cannot be articulated and thus become meaningless. If the 
ontology of regional integration is conceptualised within the social realm, then 
identity and ideas matter just as much as interests. In such conceptualisation, for 
example, it is possible to contend that Central America exists because there is a 
                                                 
9
 For example, while tracing the historical interactions between Latin America and the US within 
the regionalist efforts and the “ideas” behind those efforts, Fawcett (2005: 42; emphasis added) 
argues that the current integration initiatives are united by “a broad commitment to open as 
opposed to closed regionalism, and a concomitant consensus regarding economic and political 
objectives. None of this implies homogeneity… Rather it represents a continuing effort to 
maximize relative advantage.” 
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fair proportion of Central American actors who search for the region’s identity 
and, in doing so, become “identical” or share the identity from which Central 
America comes into existence (Ramírez, 2000: 117).     
The purely economic position of conventional Central American 
integration studies leads the observer into a conundrum. If the process is mainly 
economic, and socio-economic groups are by nature rationalistic in their 
demands, how can we understand the very apparent shortcomings of economic 
integration in Central America? From the statist view, the key to understanding 
this phenomenon is in the analysis of the supply side of the process: in the role  
and power of presidents (Malamud, forthcoming); in the preferences of 
governments (Sánchez, 2003b); in the efforts of the political elites to gain 
legitimacy for particular policies and to rearrange the role that the private sector 
plays in their national economies (Perales, 2003); in the opportunistic behaviour 
of the political elites in opting for integration whenever they foresee economic 
gains (Genna and Hiroi, 2004); or in the convergence of the strategic interests of 
the regional partners although, admittedly, the socialisation of executive officials 
play a partial role (Gomez Mera, 2005). While it is recognised that the power of 
the presidents or political elites is restrained by “the hidden” and “real sources of 
power” (Malamud and Schmitter, 2007: 25) or by “their political economy” 
(Sánchez, 2003b: 31), these sources, nevertheless, are scarcely—if at all—
analysed.   
This tendency, I argue, is the result of an underlying set of assumptions 
originating in modernisation theory. Despite an apparent consensus on the 
overrating of modernisation theory, the premises of that theory are nevertheless 
employed as  organising principles (Knight, 2007: 104). Indeed, those observers 
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who question “modernisation” (e.g. Whitehead, 2006) appear to see the need to 
“force” the evidence in order to reconcile it with that theory. In this sense, the 
conventional view of the Central American process is underpinned by 
assumptions about the rationalisation of the state. Political elites are conceived of 
as isolated from the rest of society and other elites are split into functional groups 
in ways that weaken the power of those elites vis-à-vis the state. Elites are also 
conceived of as performing a pluralist task: they become pressure groups and 
thus are assumed to be constraints on the power of the state. Power, therefore, is 
assumed to be widely diffused in society and hence it is possible to search for 
multilevel governance tendencies in that region. If elites become more prominent 
in state matters, then it is argued that the state is being privatised. Elements of the 
political culture that could allow those elites to influence the state directly are 
thus neglected.    
Few Central American integration studies venture into the analytical 
terrain of questioning the social interactions from which the “sources of power” 
that constrain the states emerge: the terrain of those who make the decisions. 
Observers who undertake such a task struggle to reconcile the underlying 
assumptions about modernisation and cultural continuities. Bull (2004), for 
example, recognises that at the Latin American level, the state presents modern 
and post-colonial characteristics, and that in the regional process personalistic 
and clientelistic relations through policy networks play a determining role. For 
Bull (2004: 12), “corporatism is weakened” in Latin America but the “technocrat 
[sic] logic clearly coexists with personalistic relations between business and state 
representatives.” Bull (2004) indicates that market reforms have given certain 
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social segments privileged access to policy makers. Hence, the state has been 
recently privatised (Bull, 2002).10  
The implication of such an argument is that market reforms originated in 
the state which, in turn, grants policy influence to elites. The power of those 
elites to originate policy, however, should not be underestimated. For example, 
while historicising the Latin American economies Montecinos and Markoff 
(2001: 107-108) have noted that “the relevant economic ideas” of the post-great 
depression reforms (e.g. import substitution industrialisation-ISI11) originated not 
“in the ideas of politicians nor economists” but primarily in those of 
“businessmen, including export-oriented landowners who pragmatically seized 
the available opportunities.” What makes the market liberalisation reforms of the 
1980s-1990s different from those of the 1930s? It seems to me that an underlying 
modernising logic is at play: oligarchic states have disappeared and have been 
replaced by “modernising” states (Whitehead, 2006: 114). Hence the power of 
non-state elites to dictate policy has been minimised, if not completely eradicated. 
When confronted with non-modern tendencies, the analysis brackets out those 
tendencies by merely recognising that there are personalistic and clientelistic 
relations involved in political processes and moves onto “modern” spaces of 
analysis.   
This modernising tendency drives the efforts of adventurous observers to 
link the region’s elites to an emergent “transnational managerial class” (Bull, 
2004: 12). This analytical concern to embed elites within the globalisation 
                                                 
10
 Similarly, while analysing market liberalisation reforms at the Latin American level, Teichman 
(2001) identifies the role of “policy networks” and their influence in political processes through 
their interactions with the state. For Teichman (2001: 9) market reforms although originated by 
state actors have given powerful members of the private sector direct access to policy elites. 
11
 ISI refers to the establishment of national industries behind protectionist measures (i.e. tariffs 
and quotas). 
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process leads observers to neglect the embeddedness in family and kinship 
networks of the social interactions they correctly identify. The analysis focuses 
on the role that technocrats play in linking the region’s private sector and states 
with international institutions through personalistic and clientelistic relations 
based on friendship, trust and loyalty. The analysis thus becomes “modernising” 
because it divides the elites into functional groups and assumes that technocratic 
elites are a new breed that have first expropriated the state from the bureaucracy 
and second, personalised the society-state relations. What are the sources of the 
technocrats’ power? How are they able to achieve such tremendous power?  
The study of Central American regionalism, in other words, is somewhat 
predisposed to engage in rationalistic and modernising attempts at explaining the 
process. Such efforts rely upon a series of what Lustick (1997: 176) refers to as  
“negative heuristics,” or questions which scholars opt “not to be able to ask.” 
Rosamond (2006: 518) has commented that “bounded knowledge” (i.e. 
disciplines) tends to “reify their objects” and at the same time reify “themselves 
to the extent that their internal criteria for the judgment of rigour and excellence 
became dynamic contributors to their reproduction regardless of whether or how 
their objects of study are changing.” Moreover and importantly, in some 
“aggressive” instances disciplines upload or “normalise” a given “image of the 
ontology” of their object of study into the conventional or mainstream 
disciplinary literature (Rosamond, 2006: 518). This appears to be the case in 
regionalism studies in Central America. Negative heuristics lead the observer to 
accommodate a presupposed set of assumptions (e.g. elites can be neatly 
categorised functionally) about the integrative process which in turn imbues 
regional integration with a particular nature (e.g. multilevel governance, 
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pluralism) disregarding along the way factors such as cultural continuities that 
may help us further our understanding of the process. 
For supporters of the conventional view of Central American regionalism, 
the inclusion, or even mention, of family and kinship networks as I propose in 
this study, may seem anachronistic. Those networks are conceived of as 
something historical (i.e. belonging to the past) and hence their importance for 
the present is greatly underestimated. 12  And yet, there seem to be cultural 
continuities in the region: kinship relations play an important role in policy 
development (Bull, 2004; Teichman, 2001). In addition, it could be the case that 
bringing these networks to the fore creates methodological difficulties. How can 
we assess their influence? How can we establish kinship relations among, say, 
the president of a country and a bank director? Those difficulties are exacerbated 
by a lack of quantitative means to assess the power of oligarchic groups and the 
sources and nature of that power (Dosal, 1995: 4). The lack of reliable data 
necessary to deploy sophisticated quantitative models and techniques which 
allow for rigorous theory testing contribute to what seems to some an atheoretical 
trend in the study of the region (Centeno and López-Alves, 2001: 14). The study 
of family and kinship, thus, may be perceived as a compounding problem.  
Yet, one notices that a shopping plaza built by one of the most powerful 
Salvadoran and Central American business families (Roble Group, Poma family) 
was inaugurated by El Salvador’s former President Saca, and those who attended 
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 Others have thoroughly discussed and critiqued Weber’s ideas underlying the exclusion or 
“privatization” of the family from modernization/the modern state (Yanagisako, 2007; Farrell, 
1993; Sabean and Teuscher, 2007). In this sense, Yanagisako (2007: 45) indicates that in the 
European context, the decline in the thesis of  kinship may be better understood as discursive 
practices through which elements perceived to be signs of the decline or otherwise of the social 
significance of kinship, are selectively identified and decontextualised from the complex set of 
ideas and practices: kinship analysis is a “selective process.” I argue that the role of family and 
kinship networks is thus historicised. 
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the ceremony included another three of the country’s former presidents,13 and 
also the president of the Supreme Court and the president of the National 
Assembly (EDH, 2004). Current studies, seemingly, simplify such an issue by 
assuming that these relations are constraints on presidential power. However, 
there is a need to theorise such relations beyond the economic power involved in 
them, and beyond the personalistic/patron-client (or anti-modern) line of thinking. 
Simply put, there is a need to theorise the “normative power” dimension that 
those relations implicate. 
The underlying obsession of regionalism studies with a modernising 
economic rationale could be overcome by opening up these studies to the “wider 
social sciences” (Rosamond, 2007: 38). In this sense and by analytical necessity, 
the study of regional integration in Central America developed in this thesis 
becomes an inter-disciplinary endeavour building on the theoretical formulations 
of history, sociology, political psychology and cultural studies, among other 
disciplines. I propose to build just such multi-disciplinarity at the junction of 
regional integration studies, more specifically neofunctionalism and 
constructivism. The former identified a series of cognitive and ideational factors 
that were essential for its model (Rosamond, 2005), but that, as a result of 
methodological restrictions and ontological assumptions discussed in detail in 
chapter one, it was not able fully to apprehend. The latter offers insights which 
enable us to identify the origins of social constructs and to reveal the socially 
constructed nature of normative structures that are conceived of as given  
(Barnett, 2002: 101). Based on this junction, in what follows I strive to contribute 
to theory building within the study of regional integration in Central America. 
                                                 
13
 Former presidents Cristiani, Calderon Sol and Flores. 
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With this aim, I question certain basic negative heuristics assumed by regional 
integration studies: the concentration of power in the presidents’ hands, the 
theoretical “capitulation” of traditional oligarchic groups through an analysis that 
conceives of the region’s elites in functional terms and their analytically 
neglected role in integrative processes. 
I argue, in this context, that regional integration presupposes a process of 
social elaboration. The meaning of what constitutes the region guides the actions 
of regionalising actors. Thus, discursive practices, by communicating collective 
meaning, define and constitute a given region. Within such practices, ideas and 
interests interact to influence the regional discourse. In the process, the latter 
constructs, deconstructs, and reconstructs regional identity. Region and identity, 
however, are mutually constitutive: the territorialisation of identity embeds the 
region in the collective meaning; at the same time, identity constructs the 
boundaries that establish the region. It becomes first, a quasi-nationalistic 
discourse that enables actors to imagine their community; and second, a social 
reality. Central America is, then, a social construction wherein the interplay of 
ideas and identity leads social forces to constantly reproduce the region. 
Interpreting the region in this way enables us to go beyond “cognitive 
dissonances” and to understand why the idea of integration has been so persistent 
in the region’s history, indeed has functioned as the centripetal force of its 
politics.  
 
Objectives, Main Argument, Key Concepts and Contributions  
There are two interrelated objectives in this study. The first is to “localise” 
regional integration theory. Regionalism studies approach Central America 
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normatively. The old regionalism—specifically for this thesis, 
neofunctionalism—imposes on that region a largely Euro-centric model in part 
by assuming the ontology of the process to be pluralistic. Despite emerging as a 
school to overcome such “flaws” present in the old studies, new regionalism 
studies upload meaning to the region through a series of multilevel governance 
assumptions that imply a pluralistic structure and which only partially, at best, 
reflect the Central American socio-political context. In this study, I strive to 
avoid such imposition through the “Central-Americanisation” of integration 
theory by remaining attentive to specificities or area specific conditions, and 
incorporating these specificities into the integration model I develop.  
The second objective of the thesis is to revisit and adapt neofunctionalism 
to the Central American context.14  The original models of neofunctionalism 
identified a series of ideational elements that seemed fundamental for the study 
of integration as a socio-political process. However, the models assumed an 
ontological position incompatible with those elements. Despite the fact that 
values were argued to play an influential role in the formation of regional 
preferences —and by arguing thus neofunctionalists endogenised interests—
regional integration remained an interest-driven process. This incompatibility led 
to methodological concerns and limitations: neofunctionalists found it difficult to 
operationalise the ideational elements they had themselves identified. Another 
issue for neofunctionalism was its reliance on pluralism: the process was thought 
to be dependent on the role of a plurality of pressure groups which did not fully 
fit regions beyond Europe. Later, efforts were made to reduce the role of 
pluralism (Rosamond, 2005: 241). Nevertheless, the latest attempts of the 
                                                 
14
 Others have underlined the current relevance of neofunctionalism for the study of integration; 
see e.g.  Rosamond (2005)  and Schmitter (2005). 
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neofunctionalists (Haas, 2004; Schmitter, 2004) make regional identity 
dependent on socio-political pluralism. In assuming such pluralism, elites are 
split into functional groups, thus diminishing their power in relation to that of the 
state. This is an issue in the Central American context because, as I attempt to 
show, elites in that region converge in normative networks.  
These aims lead me to several interrelated theoretical contributions. First, 
I localise regional integration theory by revisiting the interactions between the 
state and elites. I attempt to reinsert and better account for the neglected, if not 
downplayed, role of Central American elites in the process through the 
formulation of two concepts: normative elite networks and social will. I elaborate 
my proposition of the existence of normative networks by revisiting the 
interactions between the state and elites. I conceptualise social will based on the 
premises of neofunctionalism—specifically on Haas’ “community sentiment” 
(1958) and Schmitter’s “elite value complementarity” (1971b)—through a 
constructivist approach. The Central Americanisation of integration theory also 
directs this study to question and modify current socialisation models and norm 
diffusion mechanisms as those models seem unable to fully apprehend the 
interactions between the state and elites which I identified through the normative 
networks concept. Just as in regionalism studies, those models are underpinned 
by modernisation or pluralist assumptions. They presuppose the state to be 
“relatively” independent from its social context. Norm socialisation, for example, 
depends on the pressure that the activist puts on political elites. Building on 
existing models I elaborate, therefore, a model of norm socialisation and a norm 
diffusion mechanism which I label “ideational drive” and “circumscribed-statist 
mechanisms” respectively. These models allow for the incorporation of the 
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normative elite networks’ role through the exercise of social will within the 
integrative process. The aim of these theoretical contributions is to produce a 
richer understanding of the socio-political processes implicated in the Central 
American regional integration process. 
There are, in addition, methodological and empirical contributions in this 
study. Methodologically, I attempt to overcome the limitations of 
neofunctionalism by utilising a constructivist framework that employs discourse 
analysis. For example, conventional integration models15 assume that political 
elites promote regionalism because of self-interest and, hence, that their support 
for the process may be limited. However, the methodology I employ allows me 
to identify a latent ideational integrative strategy among members of the political 
elites interviewed. Finally, constructivist approaches often neglect the role of 
economic agents and understate their impact in social processes (Klotz, 2001). 
By focusing of the role of economic elites within normative networks in the 
construction of the Central American region, I attempt to provide a way to begin 
addressing this trend. 
My main argument is that the understanding of the limited successes, 
disruptions, and strategic shifts experienced by the Central American process can 
be furthered through the analytical inclusion of the existence and role of a 
background condition, what I label social will. I define social will as the 
predisposition or disinclination among normative elites to support the 
advancement of an integrative process. Social will emerges from the 
convergence of the ideas, identity and interests of the elites. If at a particular 
moment there is a high degree of social will, then regionalism is likely to 
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 See e.g. Genna and Hiroi (2004), and Perales (2003).  
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advance. Conversely, when social will is minimal, the process is likely to 
experience disruptions, stagnation and strategic shifts.  
This proposition requires several definitions. First, I understand regional 
integration as the inclination of a group of states to delegate political authority to 
a regional centre. Second, I understand an elite as a societal group that “devotes a 
comparatively high proportion of its assets to guiding a process and leading other 
units to support it” (Etzioni, 1965: 26). By doing so, elites provide continuity to 
the social order (Keller, 1963; quoted in Kadushin, 1968: 688). Elites are 
normative when they possess a fair degree, albeit to varying levels, of the three 
sources of social power: political, material (i.e. economic) and ideological. Third, 
elites converge through family and kinship networks wherein they are able to 
“exchange” one type of power for another. Such an exchange allows the elites to 
accumulate the necessary power to generate or render legitimate certain norms or 
both. Possessing only one dimension of power may limit such normative ability; 
having material power, for example, does not necessarily translate into the ability 
to generate rules that affect the majority of society. That power is normative 
because it results in subjective changes (e.g. what is considered as the region) 
and ultimately leads to social outcomes (e.g. the advancement of regionalism). 
Fourth, differing from the conventional view and accounting for Central 
American cultural continuities, I conceive the business, political, technocratic 
and bureaucratic and traditional landed elites to be embedded in normative 
networks.16 From this structure, the state and state politics are enmeshed by a 
network of informal relations wherein normative power is exercised. The 
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 However, because of the pervading functional division of elites in the literature, wherever 
necessary for conceptual clarity, I employ the term “social” or “normative” to differentiate those 
members of normative elite networks who are not members of the state from those who are; that 
is, from political elites. I further discuss this issue in the caveat section of this chapter. 
   
 16 
predisposition among normative elites towards integration (i.e. social will) 
emerges as their ideas, identity and interests converge around regionalism 
whether in favour of it or otherwise. 
This is not to argue that the region’s elites are fixed or lack dynamism as 
networks allow them to revitalise themselves by incorporating new members. 
Neither is it to argue that the Central American elites are a cohesive whole. 
Rather, it is to conceive of the region’s elites as interconnected in a web of 
relations that allows them to converge upon and, subsequently, normatively 
influence state policies. By doing so, I question the conventional view’s negative 
heuristics, which leads me to elaborate the ideational drive of norm socialisation 
and the circumscribed-statist diffusion mechanism. The former proposes that 
norms need not be “nice” and, thus, the moral pressure that societal actors exert 
on political elites in existing models—and the implicit shaming if norms are not 
adopted—is not essential for the construction of regional integration. 
Socialisation, I argue, occurs through an ideational “struggle” articulated in a 
“consultation” process among members of normative elite networks; norm 
adoption may be the result of pressures exercised by social elites on political 
elites. Conversely, norm adoption could be the result of proposals originated 
among political elites which, nevertheless, would be empowered by social elites. 
The state seems thus delimited by normative elites because those elites play a 
determinant role in the empowerment of particular norms. In this respect, I 
conceive of the state as a dual structure: first, as an institutional (for lack of a 
better term) space in which de jure power or that obtained through electoral 
means is exercised; second, as a socially constructed space wherein normative 
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power is articulated through a web of social networks and from which the state 
emerges enmeshed.  
 
Why Central America? Case Study Selection and Methodology 
There is evidence to suggest that the statist view of the regional process is too 
simplistic. Seemingly, Central America’s long record of integration, its struggle 
for unification, shared history and culture yields a binary identity (i.e. 
national/regional). 17  The idea of union, in other words, is to a great extent 
embedded in the ideational structure of the region’s political culture and Central 
America as an all encompassing identity remains as a centripetal force. This 
binary identity has, first, allowed integration ideals to survive and evolve in 
different forms (e.g. economic and political); and second, contributed to the 
persistence of integration and to the patchy and hectic nature that characterises 
Central American regionalism. Evidence of this binary identity may be found in 
what I label Constitutional Regionalism, or the constitutional bestowments of 
special citizenship status on nationals of other Central American countries, and 
the inclusion of specific constitutional provisions conducive to integration.  
The national constitutions of El Salvador (ALES, 1983: art. 90), 
Guatemala (CCRG, 1985 [2002]: art. 145) and Nicaragua (ANN, 1987 [1995]: 
art. 17) establish that all nationals born in other Central American countries are 
their citizens by birth or origin.18 In addition, the constitutions of the majority of 
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 Waisman (1998: 149) similarly discusses what he labels accumulated collective identity: past 
predominant identities could be “buried” in the general consciousness but they do not completely 
disappear. When dominant identities lose legitimacy, their “buried” counterparts are combined 
with new elements and are “resurrected.” 
18
 To obtain citizenship Central Americans are required only to reside in these countries (no time 
specified). In Honduras, Central Americans can acquire citizenship by naturalisation after one 
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Central American countries make reference to reunification. The Constitution of 
Honduras states its “faith” in the “restoration of the Central American union” 
(ANRH, 1982: Preamble). Similarly, article 150 of the Guatemalan Constitution 
establishes that the country “must adopt measures” that lead to the “partial or 
total, political and economic union of Central America” (CCRG, 1985 [2002]). 
Likewise, El Salvador “favours the reconstruction partial or total of the Republic 
of Central America,” be this integration in “unitary, federal or confederate” form; 
to this end, it shall “encourage and promote the human, economic, social and 
cultural integration” of the region (ALES, 1983: art. 89). Correspondingly, 
Nicaragua “privileges regional integration and advocates the reconstruction of 
the Grand Central American Patria” (ANN, 1987 [1995]: art. 5). 19  This 
constitutional regionalism is reflected in the treaties that established SICA. For 
example, article 4:d of the Tegucigalpa Protocol (SICA, 1991) declares that one 
of “the fundamental principles” guiding regionalism is “Central American 
solidarity as an expression of the region’s interdependence, and common origin 
and destiny.” Seemingly, thus, it is appropriate to argue that embedded in the 
ideational structure of the region is the objective of achieving reunification. More 
importantly, in the ideational structure of these countries, the region is not in 
question: Central America is capable of acting as unit. Constitutional regionalism 
also brings into question the hypothesis (Sánchez, 2003b) that what is lacking for 
the advancement of regionalism is the willingness of the region’s governments 
(that is, political will) because the inclusion or maintenance of such integrative 
                                                                                                                                    
year of residence (ANRH, 1982: art. 24.21); in Costa Rica, the time requirement for 
naturalisation is five years (ALRCR, 1949 [2007]: art. 14.12).  
19
 Constitutional regionalism is also present in the constitutions of the Central American 
“newcomer” countries, Dominican Republic and Panama. The constitution of Panama states that 
the country supports Latin American integration (ALRP, 1972 [1994]), and that of Dominican 
Republic advocates the “economic solidarity” of the region (ANRD, 2002). 
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elements in the constitutions requires a fair degree of willingness among political 
actors.20 
Constitutional regionalism could indeed be a powerful mechanism to 
advance the process. And yet, when compared with the regionalist record, it 
seems that its impact has been minimal. These incoherent trends open analytical 
spaces for conceptual elaboration and theoretical development. Central America, 
in short, provides us with “fertile grounds” to further develop regional integration 
theory as arguably, other factors have overpowered the intersubjectivities that 
these countries share. 
I have indicated that these overpowering factors are best conceived of as 
social will: the normative elites’ predisposition, or disinclination, to support 
regionalism which emerges from the convergence, or divergence, of their ideas, 
identity and interests. This implies that integration in Central America can be 
best understood by the analysis of the interplay of the social and the political 
within normative networks; by extension, a struggle in which the former 
discursively superimposes itself on the latter. How could these dimensions be 
empirically assessed? Disposition implicates a degree of willingness to support 
or advance the process; hence my use of the label “will.”  The interplay can thus 
be analysed through two dimensions: political will and social will. This division 
may seem counterintuitive because my main argument rests largely on the 
premise that elites, political and social, are intertwined in normative networks. 
The division may also be interpreted as incorporating the functional division of 
the elites I am striving to critique. However, to empirically split them in a 
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 Critics may argue that constitutional regionalism is nothing more than a historical “souvenir” 
from the colonial and immediate post-colonial period. However, it is intriguing that in almost two 
centuries of independent history such powerful constitutional articles have survived constitutional 
reforms and regime changes, not to mention coup d'états and revolutions; and leftist and rightist 
regimes. 
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counterfactual exercise grants this study analytical leverage to “test” different 
“explanations” of the process.  
This exercise is designed to reinforce my argument by allowing for the 
appraisal in the current context of Haas’ (1967: 341) dictum that what is lacking 
in the region is an integrative strategy and the political will to sustain it. Also, the 
exercise enables this study to assess the hypotheses that the “unwillingness” of 
governments delimits integration (Sánchez, 2003b), and that governments 
impose their vision on the integrative process (Sánchez, 2003a). The 
counterfactual exercise, in short, allows for the assessment of the commonly held 
statist view of the process and makes it possible to “test” my conception of a 
process underpinned by social will. First the exercise enables me to assess the 
comparability between the political elites’ discursive practices and the trends 
established in the process. Does the process reflect the ideas projected by the 
political elites? If the conventionally statist view has significant weight for our 
understanding of regionalism, then we should find that the members of the 
political elites participating in this study offer opinions and ideas parallel to the 
current nature of the process: the insertion of the region into the globalised 
economy and the exploitation of its competitive advantages. If, on the contrary, 
we find that political actors assume a discourse that contravenes such position, 
then perhaps other factors are determinant for the process. Second, the 
counterfactual exercise also allows me to “test” my proposition that the state is 
delimited by normative elites through social will. If the political elites advance 
ideas, or if their identity reflects, integrative impulses not so dominant in the 
process, and simultaneously, social elites present discursive practices that reflect 
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the current integrative trends, then, it is the latter elites’ “normativeness” that 
impacts regional strategies.   
 
Identification of Elites 
The identification of Central American political elites is relatively 
straightforward because one can study the role and attitudes of those state actors 
directly involved in the process and of members of political parties in general. 
The “sample” for the analysis of political will, thus, includes members of 
political institutions (national and regional) such as National Assemblies, the 
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN, in its Spanish acronym), and 
leading political parties of the countries members of SICA. (I discuss the sample 
in more detail in the introduction to chapter four).  
To identify the normative elites, or their representatives, capable of 
exercising such a complex construct as social will, or such prerogative over 
regionalism, is more difficult. In this respect other observers, neofunctionalists 
and proponents of new regionalism studies, have asserted the business groups’ 
fundamental role in integration.21 Torres Rivas (1993: 103) in the context of 
CACM, identifies “the coalitions” between the “business sector elite” and the 
“public service elite.” Grugel and Payne (2000: 205) argue that Costa Rican 
business groups have developed a strategy of “interpenetration with the 
governments” through which they influence regional policies and even “use the 
state” to advance their interests. Similarly, Bull (2004) contemplates the role 
regional business organisations (RBOs) play in the integration process. While 
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 See for example Haas (1958) and Mattli (1999). See also Schneider (2001). 
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Miller (1999) identifies the historical significance of business associations for the 
exercise of elite influence on government policy.  
In the same way, in chapter two I identify a close relationship between 
family and kinship networks and the business sector. There is evidence which 
suggests that regional business associations play an important role in the exercise 
of the elites’ normative power, as the former facilitates the participation in the 
integrative process of the latter. For example, the reactivation of the integration 
process during the early 1990s followed models developed by RBOs. (I present 
evidence to support this argument in chapter five). In addition, I have identified a 
fundamental trend: six of Central America’s presidents in the period between 
1997 and 2008 have held positions in, or are members of, RBOs. For example El 
Salvador’s former President Saca was president of the Federation of Private 
Enterprises of Central America and Panama (FEDEPRICAP),22 and Honduras’ 
President Zelaya was a member of the board of the Honduran Council of Private 
Enterprise (COHEP) affiliated to FEDEPRICAP. (See table 2.1 for a complete 
list).23 It thus seems appropriate to study the role of the business elite as a faction 
of the normative network in the process. The “sample” for the assessment of 
social will, then, will include members of the following RBOs: FEDEPRICAP, 
the Federation of Central American Industrial Chambers and Associations 
(FECAICA),24  and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the Central 
American Isthmus (FECAMCO),25  which are the largest RBOs. In addition, I 
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 Federación de Entidades Privadas de Centroamérica y Panamá, FEDEPRICAP. 
23
 There are other presidents from the region with possible links to RBOs but the available 
evidence is not clear. In Guatemala, Óscar Berger Perdomo (2004-2008) and Álvaro Arzú 
Yrigoyen (1996-2000). In El Salvador, Alfredo Cristiani Burkard (1989-1994) and Armando 
Calderón Sol (1994-1999). In Honduras, Ricardo Maduro Joest (2002-2006). And in Nicaragua, 
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1997).   
24
 Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones Industriales de Centroamérica, FECAICA. 
25
 Federación de Cámaras de Comercio del Istmo Centroamericano, FECAMCO. 
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assess social will through a detailed reading of regional strategy papers and 
reports published by regional and national business associations. (I discuss the 
“sample” in more detail in chapter five).  
 
Method: Discourse Analysis and Interviews 
The methodology I employ to carry out that assessment is based on discourse 
analysis. In the practical sense, discourse is the set of ideas and values presented 
in written, spoken, or other text forms and which are used by actors to persuade 
others of the legitimacy and appropriateness of their policy programs (Schmidt, 
2002a: 169, 2002b: 210). Discourse enables individuals to think, to communicate 
and to act (Hunt and Purvis, 1993: 485). Discourse, however, has a more 
fundamental function for the present study. My argument suggests that Central 
American elites are capable of accumulating and exercising normative power 
over the regional process. Normative power, in turn, implies the ability to 
influence the behaviour of actors through norms (Diez, 2005: 616). Such 
influence leads to the emergence of new meanings conceived of collectively and 
discursively: new meanings result in values and attitudinal shifts which are 
articulated through discourse. I thus understand discourse to be constructive and 
consequential (Potter and Wetherell, 2002). Through discourse actors produce 
and simultaneously experience reality as “solid and real” (Phillips and Hardy, 
2002: 1-2), and are able to maintain, sustain and modify “social borders, 
hierarchies, institutional formations and habituated patterns of behaviour” 
(Lincoln, 1989: 3). Specifically, discourse, via language, enables actors to 
construct, describe and explain social processes; to express beliefs and attitudes 
towards such processes, and to make sense of their experiences within those 
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processes thereby assigning meaning to social reality. In short, discourse 
empowers actors to position themselves in the social world, and to articulate new 
norms and values relevant to the historical process in whose construction they are 
actively involved. Considering such an essential role of discursive practices in 
the construction of social phenomena, it seems that the use of discourse analysis 
imbues this study with a powerful hermeneutical toolkit to further our 
understanding of the social construction of Central American regionalism.    
The discourse analysis I propose is designed to identify, through a two-
stage approach, the manner in which actors assign meaning to, and perceive their 
role within, social processes such as regional integration. The initial stage is 
based on a tri-dimensional perceptual model proposed by Fairclough (2001: 244). 
The first dimension is that of the representational, or the manner in which 
individuals represent the processes and institutions; do regionalising actors 
perceive Central America and its regional institutions as capable of action? The 
second dimension, valuing, refers to the characterisation of regionalism in the 
actors’ narrative; do they perceive integration as imperative for the region? The 
final dimension, identifying, captures the construction of the self and the other; 
do actors consider themselves Central Americans?  
Personal narratives are the fundamental “meaning-making” units of 
discursive practices (Reissman, 2003: 341). Thus the second stage of the analysis 
is composed of two further phases that concentrate on the actors’ narrative. The 
first phase is that of a syntagmatic analysis which focuses on the structure of the 
narrative: how the narrative is told (e.g. its complications and turning points) and 
how these structural elements lead to the re-imagination and reordering of events 
and experiences (Candida Smith, 2003: 357-360). The second phase of this stage 
   
 25 
is that of the paradigmatic analysis. The latter traces recurrent discursive motifs 
or themes such as points of view, ethical evaluations, and self-representations 
(Candida Smith, 2003: 357-360). On the one hand, my aim in the syntagmatic 
analysis is to identify “key events” in the narrative of the participants and by 
doing so uncover the existence of regional “myths.” Such identification is 
important as those myths serve as “reassurance” for the identity dimension of our 
analysis. For example, a recurrent reference to actors historically considered as 
“unionist” may help us assess the depth of a shared identity. On the other hand, 
with the paradigmatic analysis, I aim at identifying and examining discursive 
regularities across different narratives as it is from these patterns that the 
collective meaning of social phenomena, and thus its construction, materialises. 
Regularities in narratives delimit what is socially possible and permissible. More 
importantly, they reflect the adoption of new, or the transformation of current, 
norms by a given society, and the subsequent, ideational and value shifts in the 
predisposition toward a particular social phenomenon. For example, political 
elites may constantly and systematically include in their narrative a particular 
discursive regularity such as “we believe that integration will alleviate social and 
economic inequality.” If this is the case, perhaps political elites are attempting to 
make the integrative process attractive to the general population thereby gaining 
some leverage over rival normative elite factions. The following table 
summarises the discourse analysis I employ in this study.  
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Table 0.1. Summary of Discourse Analysis 
Representational Representations of the processes and institutions
Valuing Characterizations of regionalism 
Identifying Construction of self and "other"
Syntagmatic Analysis of  the narrative's complications, key elements, events and turning points and 
how these structural elements lead to the re-imagination and reordering of events and 
experiences. 
Paradigmatic Assement of discursive regularities across the narratives as it reflects the adoption of 
new, or the transformation of current, norms by a given society, and the subsequent, 
ideational and value shifts in the predisposition toward a particular social phenomenon
Panel A: First Phase
Panel B: Second Phase
 
Source: first phase, Fairclough (2001); and second phase, Candida Smith (2003). 
 
The discourse analysis employed enables this study to deal successfully 
with the methodological shortcomings encountered by neofuctionalism. It 
enables this thesis to operationalise the intersubjective elements identified by 
neofunctionalism but which those models could not fully capture.    
Interviews are entry points into an individual’s narrative (Candida Smith, 
2003: 349). Furthermore, they provide a semantic space in which the intersection 
of socio-historical processes and personal experiences open up the possibility for 
a greater understanding of the subjective basis of, and changing preconditions 
(e.g. norm adoption) for, social phenomena. In this study, I conduct a series of 
interviews that attempt to “uncover” in the participants’ narrative their regional 
ideas, identity and interests, and how the interplay of these factors shape their 
willingness to proactively participate in the integration process and thus affect its 
outcomes. Interviews are in depth and unstructured: they are conducted in an 
informal and conversational manner in order to create and maintain an 
environment that stimulates respondents to reflect upon the larger historical and 
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social meaning of integration, and to share their experiences and perceptions of 
the regional process. In the participants’ discourse: do they consider integration 
indispensable for their interests? Do they assign certain powers to regional 
institutions in order to advance or protect their interests? Do participants 
advocate particular ideas or concepts that are compatible with integration (e.g. 
regional projects)? Do they transmit the idea of a regional community by creating 
an “other”? Do they utilize regional symbols in their discourse? Such are the 
questions that guide the interviews. Whenever in-person interviews are not 
possible, I distribute a “questionnaire,” that is, a set of open questions among 
participants. Of course, for the sake of consistency, this questionnaire is guided 
by the same questions as the interviews. Through those questions I attempt to 
entice the “questionnaire” participants to voice their underlying vision, opinions 
and perceptions regarding regional integration.  
Interviews for this study are carried out under conditions of 
confidentiality and for this reason I omit the participants’ names. (I discuss this 
issue further in chapters four and five). The interviews are held in Spanish and as 
such the textual citations included in the empirical chapters are my translations. 
A caveat in this matter: I strive to remain “truthful” to the opinions of the 
participants and thus not to interpose meanings to their narratives. 26 
Consequently, for the most part I attempt to avoid including long textual citations 
and to cite textually only keywords, key terms or short expressions that seem 
fundamental for the successful uncovering of the discursive dynamics through 
                                                 
26
 I am concerned with what in translation studies is identified as “equivalence:” the translated 
text presents identical sense/meaning in both languages. Equivalence occurs at different levels 
which include linguistic, grammar and the stylistic. My concern is that the larger the segment of 
narrative translated, the greater the possibilities to err against equivalence. On the problems of 
equivalence in translation, see Lederer (2003) and Bassnett (2002). 
   
 28 
which the interviewees construct the Central American region. I present, 
however, excerpts of the interviews (in Spanish) in appendices VII and IX. 
The “data” collected through the proposed research design will facilitate 
the systematic assessment of the ideas, identity and interests that constantly 
interplay in order to construct the intersubjective structure that leads to the 
willingness to empower the regional integrative process.  
 
General Caveats 
Before proceeding, three clarifications seem pertinent. First, throughout this 
thesis, as may be by now apparent to the reader, I draw on literature about Latin 
America as a region and, in the case of the regionalism material, on literature 
discussing other regional initiatives in that region (e.g. MERCOSUR). There are 
two reasons for employing such a strategy. First, currently only a handful of 
observers attempt to theorise the Central American regionalism (e.g. Bull, 2002, 
2004; Grugel and Payne, 2000; Sánchez, 2003b). Most studies undertake an 
economistic approach to the process (e.g. Nicholls, 1998; Rodas-Martini, 1998; 
Rodlauer and Schipke, 2005); precisely the trend I am striving to critique. With 
regard to that, the literature in Spanish that I draw on may seem limited to the 
reader. This is because most literature written in Spanish is overly focused on 
integration as a mechanism to achieve economic development, or institutional 
reform or strengthening; in this respect it suffices to browse the Revista de la 
Integración y el Desarrollo de Centroamérica27 (BCIE; any issue) to determine 
that literature’s underlying economic determinism. (See also e.g. Caldentey del 
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 Journal of Integration and Development of Central America is published by BCIE, Banco 
Centroamericano de Integración Económica (the Central American Bank of Economic 
Integration). 
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Pozo, 2001, 1998; Chamorro Marín, 1998; Herrero Acosta, 2004; Rodas-Martini, 
2000; Sanahuja Perales, 1997). The deterministic aspect of the “Central 
American” literature represents a limitation for this study because it restrains the 
space for innovation through which to attain the necessary critical engagement 
which will in turn lead to conceptual elaboration and theoretical development.  In 
short, critical studies solely focussed on Central America are limited, at best. 
Hence the need to broaden the sources used to include “external” literature. 
The risk of generalisation is involved in such analytical strategy.28 This is 
not my intention. I am attentive to the risks involved but strongly argue that there 
are clear advantages in employing such a strategy. Critically engaging the Latin 
American literature allows me to incorporate more, and more relevant, available 
theoretical work which will open up spaces for elaboration of the concepts and 
theory building seemingly necessary for furthering the understanding of Central 
American regionalism. My use of Latin American 29  literature could also be 
justified by indicating that Central America is part of Latin America 
geographically (Phillips, 2004), and in other dimensions such as intra-regional 
cooperation and interactions, and in perceptions of it by “outsiders” through 
policies such as those of the UN.30 Also, it is undeniable that Central America 
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 Critics could point to the “distinct national histories” of the region’s states (Mallon, 2002: 20). 
Or, the “different “natural endowments, levels of development,” in addition to differences in 
“institution building and regime formation” (López-Alves, 2000: 2). 
29
 The term Latin America is used to include the British ex-colonies and current dependencies in 
the region; the French ex-colonies and overseas departments (i.e. French Guiana, Guadeloupe, 
and Martinique); the Dutch former colonies  (i.e. Suriname, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba); and the 
US dependent territories (i.e. Puerto Rico and Virgin Island). To this list, Knight (2007: en. 3) 
adds parts of the southwest of the US and Whitehead (2006: 9) adds Miami. Others seem to 
equate Latin America solely to South America as they differentiate “Latin and Central America” 
in their discussion; see e.g. Serrano (2005), Hurrel (1992) and  Lievesley (1999: 163). They do so 
despite the fact that historically Central America has been considered part of Latin America. For 
a thorough discussion of the geographic demarcation and competing classifications of Latin 
America see Atkins (1999: 28-31) and Phillips (2004: 29, 32-33). 
30
 For the importance of such dimensions in determining what constitutes Latin America see 
Atkins (1977: 10-13, 1999: 32-33). For an assessment of the characteristics of what constitutes a 
region see Thompson (1973). 
   
 30 
and the rest of Spanish speaking countries of Latin America share a colonial 
history and culture from which emerged intersubjectivities such as elements of a 
common identity31 which are the fundamental objects of study for this thesis.  
The second caveat refers to the “Normative Elite Networks” concept in 
relation to functional elite labels commonly used. Central to the main argument 
of this thesis is the proposition that the functional division of elites manifests a 
set of assumptions originating in modernisation theory and in dominant 
paradigms such as pluralism and corporatism. I contend that such categorisation 
neglects the overlapping membership among elites and the existence of 
normative elite networks in Central America. Functional terms such as 
“oligarchy” “private sector” or “business elites” are widely used in the literature 
and by the participants (interviewees) in this study. It is thus difficult, at points, 
not to employ functional labels. This practice may seem to go against my critique 
of the use of functional terms. And yet, their use seems “inescapable” when 
reviewing the literature. In the empirical chapters (four and five) I deem that the 
use of functional elite labels is to an extent necessary in order to “respect” the 
discursive practices of the participants as they use those terms recurrently. In a 
sense, the widespread use of functional identity sheds light on the embeddedness 
of the modernisation/pluralism discourse I am striving to question. Throughout 
this thesis, therefore, I strive to use functional terms only when reviewing 
others’—observers’ and interviewees’—arguments and statements.  
While the most accurate descriptors of the phenomenon I am attempting 
to identify are “normative elite networks” redundancy leads me to employ 
variations of the concepts: normative elites or normative networks. The revisiting 
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 For Blakemore and Smith (1976: 569-570) affinities among these countries are such that 
“comparisons between them are more revealing than contrasts.” Latin America, they argue, is an 
instance of “diversity within a general unity.” See also Atkins (1977: 12).  
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of elite interactions that shape state options and ultimately policies is also a core 
component of the thesis. I am thus led to isolate—although they converge in 
networks—political elites from normative elites and hence occasionally I use the 
term “social elites” to refer to elites not belonging to political elites. The 
following table presents several of the functional terms commonly used in the 
literature and the normative elite networks label and its synonyms.  
 
Table 0.2. Commonly Used Elite Labels and “Normative Elite Network” 
Descriptor 
Elite (Functional) 
Designations Widely Used in 
the Literature 
Descriptors in this thesis
Oligarchy
Dominant elite or sectors
Landed elite 
Private sector
Economic elite
Business elite
Industrial elite
Commercial elite
Political elite
State elite
Government elite
Bureaucratic elite
Technocratic elite
Normative elite networks and its 
variations: normative elites/ 
normative networks; social elites 
to refer to groups not including 
political elites
 
I must clarify a related and crucial point in my understanding of Central 
American normative elites: I do not purport that there is a single coherent elite in 
the isthmus. It is evident that particular groups dominate or control particular 
social spaces and that they possess different power sources. I do argue that these 
groups converge within networks formed along the lines of family and kinship. 
The convergence is synergistic and allows elites to find a degree of coherence 
regarding a particular policy-issue. For example, elite A possesses a particular 
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power resource that can be exchanged for another kind of resource controlled by 
elite B. This convergence leads to the formation of normative elite network 1. 
Elite groups C and D can begin a similar power exchange leading to the 
formation of network 2. The need to pursue a particular policy option may lead 
both networks 1 and 2 to converge in a greater network α. When other policy-
issues are at stake, networks may reform through iterations among elite groups 
resulting in network β. Networks, to put it simply, are liquid but allow elites to 
construct and present a coherent policy position. The following figure offers a 
glimpse of the complexity of normative networks. 
       
Figure 0.1. Depiction of a Normative Network  
Elite Group A Elite Group B Elite Group C Elite Group D
Network 1 Network 2 Network 3
Network α Network β
= family and kinship ties
 
The normative networks concept attempts to overcome the shortcomings 
of elite “denominationalism” prevalent in the literature: the neat division of the 
Central American elites into functional groups and the parallel neglect of the 
links that bind those groups. Normative networks allow for the theorisation of 
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those networks as mechanisms in which elites concatenate synergistically 
different resources thereby attaining normative power. While converging in 
networks, for example, elites are able to exchange political and ideological 
resources. Such exchange allows them to shape policy formation by limiting or 
expanding the norms that eventually are embedded in policies. 
The third caveat is that my argument may be interpreted as proposing that 
regional integration is a monocausal process; that is, social will is the 
explanatory variable for all aspects of integration in Central America. This is not 
my argument; I do not attempt to carry a “monomaniacal search for a master 
causal variable” (Barnett, 2002: 102). Rather, as pointed out previously, it is to 
assess social will as a background condition and as such it may be the case that 
its impact on regionalism depends on its conjunction with other factors (e.g. 
convergence of ideas with a hegemonic state). Such a multivariate analysis, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one reviews the regional integration literature; chapters two and three 
contribute towards the theorisation of regionalism in Central America by 
elaborating the core elements of the Central Americanised model of integration; 
while chapters four and five provide, through a counterfactual exercise, the 
empirical basis for the proposed argument.  
Chapter one assesses the implications of regionalism literature for the 
study of Central America. It argues that both old and new regionalisms converge 
around their understanding of their subject. On the one hand, I contend that the 
old regionalism, specifically neofunctionalism, identified several cognitive 
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factors that later were to become relevant for “newer” paradigms but that due to 
methodological restraints and assumptions about the ontology of integration, it 
was unable to fully explore these factors. On the other hand, I approach the more 
“recent” literature by organising it through the different meanings and 
perspectives of “new regionalism” studies, and assess what that literature leads 
us to conclude are the catalytic factors for integration. I observe that new 
regionalism proposes a somewhat narrow view of the process. First, and in 
disregard of their raison d'etre (e.g. to overcome the old regionalism’s state-
centrism), studies within the quantitative and qualitative meanings and within the 
exogenous perspective offer a state-centric view of regionalism. Central 
American integration is the result of the US hegemony in the region. And second, 
the endogenous perspective assumed by other new regionalism analysis searches 
for an effective multilevel governance that in the hierarchical tendencies that 
permeate the political culture of the region is hard to find. Hence, this 
perspective is left with the state as the main catalyst for regionalism. I conclude 
that this narrow understanding results from the under-theorisation of the 
cognitive elements of the process. I propose, then, that such shortcomings can be 
overcome by building on the cognitive factors emphasised by neofunctionalism 
through a framework based on constructivist premises.  
Chapter two revisits the nature of the Central American state mainly 
through the corporatist literature because, I argue, these studies seem to underline 
the functional division of the elites presupposed by integration studies. I assess 
how family and kinship networks are conceptualised within that nature. I indicate 
that the role of these networks has been overlooked because of the modernity 
assumption underpinning the analysis of the state: the premises of “modernity” 
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dictate that the family role in society diminishes as the state becomes “modern.” 
This allows for the analytical split of elites into functional groups. In the study of 
Central American integration elites are thus assessed as technocratic, business, 
industrial and the often forgotten and barely considered, landed elite. By doing so, 
the power of the elites is “weakened” vis-à-vis the state. I thus attempt to re-
examine the role of elites through family and kinship networks and theorise 
about their function within the Central American political culture. In this context, 
I argue that family and kinship networks have imbued the region’s elites with an 
intersubjective framework within which first, they achieve a degree of cohesion 
by converging around particular policy issues; second, they are enabled to 
accumulate different sources of power; and third, they are allowed to articulate 
their normative power. The elite, in turn, projects their “reality” as a guiding 
framework for society’s reality. This means that normative elites by constructing 
norms and rules are able to maintain or shift the direction of a particular policy, 
and set and influence public debates. In short, an enmeshed state structure open 
to elite normative influences is ingrained in the political culture of the region. 
Regional integration is a set of policies underpinned by institutionalised 
norms. For this reason, chapter three theorises the interplay of normative and 
political elites within the normative structure. Specifically, as current models 
seem unequal to the task of studying Central American integration, this chapter 
rethinks the models of socialisation and the mechanisms of norm diffusion. It 
does so by aiming at identifying and conceptualising the structures through 
which social will works. The chapter then elaborates on the concept of social will.  
Chapter four analyses the opinions of 56 members of the Central 
American political elite. Through such a counterfactual exercise, I uncovered 
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evidence that challenges the prevailing statist view of the process. I uncover a 
latent integrative strategy among state actors which first, goes beyond the self-
interest motivation implied by conventional studies of the process, and second, 
seems incompatible with the trends discernable in the process. The evidence I 
present first, indicates that the region “exists” in the ideational structure of the 
region’s political elites as their ideas, identity and interests interplay positively in 
relation to regionalism (i.e. there is a fair degree of political will). And second, it 
seems to corroborate my conceptualisation of the interplay between political 
elites and normative networks, and the mechanisms (i.e. norm diffusion and 
socialisation) wherein that interplay occurs. I conclude, thus, that the 
conventional view is a case of social misconstruction underlined by misread 
evidence that has been accepted as “real.”32 By doing so, that view overlooks the 
underlying integrative fabric of the political elites’ ideational structure. 
Chapter five assesses social will in Central America. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections. The first section analyses the role of social will 
in the reactivation of regional integration during the early 1990s through a 
detailed reading of regional strategy papers and reports published by regional and 
national business associations. In the second section, I assess the role of social 
will during the 2005-08 period through questionnaire responses, interviews and 
telephone conversations with sixteen members of the region’s regional business 
organisations or their affiliates. In the first section, I argue that the levels of 
social will at the time were high: the region’s normative elites seem to have 
shared, in the first instance, interests underlined by a common economic core 
(e.g. economic efficiency) aiming at country and region growth. In the second 
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 On the concept of social misconstruction see Hamilton (1996). 
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instance ideas (e.g. integration is equivalent to economic development) 
articulated through a neo-liberal model; and thirdly, an awareness of a Central 
American “self”. Thus the national and regional are inextricably linked. In the 
second section, I identify the existence of two opposing regionalist discourses: 
one that emphasises the “external market” conceiving the region as a mechanism 
to integrate the internal competing “comparative advantages” with a view to the 
“global market;” and one that is constructed around the “intra-regional market” 
as the organising economic structure and that considers as an end product the 
“region.” Based on this evidence, I argue that in the 2005-08 period, the level of 
social will in Central America was low. The “external market” discourse seems 
to be in “command.” Therefore, the focus of the regional project is, as noted by 
the participants in chapter four, “a purely economic dialogue” which follows the 
logic of “comparative advantage,” generating along the way competition among 
the countries which make up the region. As a result, the process has shifted from 
the region to external matters (i.e. free trade agreements with other countries or 
regions). The socio-political spaces opened during the reactivation period have 
been reduced and the comprehensive regional institutional framework established 
in that period has become “lethargic” without a “real presence” in regional issues.          
In the conclusion, I review comparatively the empirical findings from 
both levels of analysis; namely, political and social will. I do so aiming at 
corroborating my proposed main argument reflecting on the interplay between 
the political discourses and an imposed social discourse. I then go on to identify 
the appropriateness of my main theoretical and methodological contributions. In 
this light, I revisit the negative heuristics that I strive to challenge throughout this 
study and identify how my theoretical contributions help in overcoming the 
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analytical rigidity that those heuristics impose on our understanding of 
integration in that region. I subsequently conclude by contemplating the 
possibilities of reaching a degree of conceptual generalisation of my main 
findings and contributions within comparative integration studies. 
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Chapter 1. The Study of Regional Integration: 
Implications for the Analysis of Central American 
Regionalism 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on regionalism in Central America. In an 
attempt to identify spaces to theorise the Central American process, it also 
engages with relevant Latin American integration literature. Integration literature 
is generally divided into two schools. The first, known as “old regionalism” 
interprets integration as a logical process: a continuum in which economic 
cooperation leads to economic union and eventually to political union. The 
process is approached from two understandings: one intergovernmental and 
another driven by transnational actors.33 The second school, “new regionalism,” 
conceptualises the process beyond intergovernmentalism as a constructed 
multilayered space in which different regionalising actors struggle to impose 
their discourse on the regional agenda. 34  New regionalism rejects its old 
counterpart (e.g. neofunctionalism) on the grounds that it is “too rationalistic” 
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 It is not my objective to rehearse a review or critique of old regionalism; those theories have 
been comprehensibly reviewed by others, for example, by O'Neill (1996), Pentland (1973) and 
Rosamond (2000). My focus is on neofunctionalism and on finding elements that could facilitate 
continuities between neofunctionalism and constructivism, and on studies assuming new 
regionalism’s meanings and perspectives and their implications for the analysis of Central 
American integration. On the different approaches of the old regionalism see: on Federalism, 
Monnet (1963), Burgess (1996, 2004), Loughlin (1996), Pinder (1986), and for a review of 
Monnet’s ideas, Holland (1994, chapter one); on the Community (also referred to as Pluralistic 
and Transactionalist) approach see Deutsch et al. (1957); on Functionalism see Mitrany (1965, 
1966, 1975); and on Intergovernmentalism, Hoffmann (1964, 1995) and Moravcsik (1991, 1993, 
1995, 1998, 2005). For an old regionalism approach to Central America, and Latin America in 
general, see the volumes by Bulmer-Thomas (2001), Bouzas and Ros (1994), Gauhar (1985), and 
Wionczek (1964). 
34
 Proposals have been advanced to abolish the old/new divide in regionalism studies. Arguably 
both are parts of the same whole; they are sub-fields of the same paradigm, while they differ in 
terminology, both pursue an understanding of the same phenomenon (Warleigh, 2004). For 
Hettne (2005: 543) the “great divide” is useful as a mere “pedagogical device” to emphasize the 
assumed nature of integration and the methodological strategy for its study. See also Warleigh 
(2006) and Breslin (2008). 
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(Warleigh, 2007: 563). While the old is euro-centric, or designed mainly on, and 
to explain, European regionalism (Laursen, 2003: 3; Rosamond, 2000: 23), new 
regionalism is a reaction against its predecessor’s “original sin,” namely, “state-
centrism” (Hettne, 2003: 22). In the Central American context, logically, this 
reaction leads the analyst to search for the multilayered structure from which, it 
is assumed, regionalism emerges.   
The objective of this chapter is to argue first, that despite purported 
differences, both regionalisms converge in that Central American regionalism is 
a state-led process. Second, in the same manner that the old—through its Euro-
centrism—imposes a pluralistic ontology onto Central America, certain new 
regionalism studies “upload” multilevel governance assumptions onto that 
region’s process. The chapter proposes that this converging tendency is the result 
of the modernisation premises that underpin these studies and which lead to the 
under-theorisation of Central American integration. The chapter proposes—
following up Rosamond’s and Warleigh’s (2006: 8 and 10) suggestion that there 
is sufficient grounds for “a re-inspection, if not full scale intellectual recovery” 
of old regionalism—that the limited theorisation of that process can be overcome 
by identifying certain neofunctionalist elements which can be employed through 
a constructivist approach as the basis for a more comprehensive model of Central 
American integration.  
The first section assesses the neofunctionalist literature underlining its 
pluralistic inclinations and how those tendencies led its proponents into 
methodological difficulties which, in turn, limited the analytical leverage of their 
theories. The second section reviews those studies that assume new regionalism’s 
meanings and perspectives, and their implications for the study of Central 
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America. The focus is on what are considered as the catalytic factors for 
regionalism and how the state’s role in the process is conceived. I conclude by 
identifying certain cognitive dimensions of the neofunctionalist model and by 
proposing that those elements would help us fill the analytical void generated by 
the under-theorisation of Central American integration.  
 
Neo-Functionalism: A Reappraisal in the Central American Context 
This section argues first, that neofunctionalism’s conceptualisation of integration 
assigned a pluralistic ontology to the process. This position led the study of 
Central American integration to under-analyse the social elite’s normative role in 
the process and redirected its focus to divide the role of those elites functionally 
instead. Second, the section argues that neofunctionalism’s “rational” ontology 
delimited its epistemological toolkit leading analysts to experience some 
methodological uncertainty. 35  
Neofunctionalism conceptualises integration as a process beyond the 
nation-state wherein interest groups and technocrats are the leading integrationist 
actors. These actors pressure their governments to establish regional 
organisations which, depending on the governments’ original commitment, 
increase integrative tendencies and the number of participating societal groups 
thus leading the latter to gradually refocus their activities from the national to the 
regional level (Nye, 1971a: 195). The fundamental condition for groups to 
become regionalising actors is their capability of acting regionally independently 
of national constraints (Schmitter, 2005: 258), and to represent and promote 
some or all of “the interests of classes, sectors, professions, and causes” 
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 For an early critique of neofunctionalism, see Hansen (1969). 
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(Schmitter, 2004: 62). The process also requires “conditions of symmetry 
between the national units, social pluralism, high transaction flows, and elite 
complementarity” (Nye, 1971a: 195). From this conceptualisation emerges a 
pluralist ontology of integration.36   
The existence of what I label “normative elites” in Central America 
makes the application of this conceptualisation extremely difficult. Of course, 
neofunctionalists were aware of the region’s hierarchical nature. Haas (1964: 50) 
indicates that at the time of his writing, oligarchies ruled at the Latin American 
level. However, he quickly points to pluralising trends in the region (e.g. political 
mass mobilisation). Oligarchies were thus harmful for the integrative process 
when they controlled a government ruling “tranquil and [politically] unmobilized 
people.” Yet, Haas assumes that non-oligarchic elites were fundamental 
integrative agents. According to Haas (1964: 45-46), integration emerges from 
the “common sentiments” shared by  “small articulated elite groups whose 
expectations of a fruitful life are associated with the creation of specific 
conditions conductive to the attainment of that life,” at the forefront of those 
groups were economic elites. To put it differently, for Haas, in a given society 
there are certain groups with the power to redefine or create rules and norms that 
set the context for a specific reality. However, those normative actors are beyond 
“society” or the “state;” they are “groups with specific interests, whether 
associational or institutional, motivated by the desire for profit or the drive to 
improve the services they are called upon to administer.” Two characteristics of 
“acceptable” elites emerge from Haas’ understanding: they must be functional 
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 Rosamond (2005: 241) indicates that neofunctionalism is a “pluralist theory.” Pluralism led the 
neofunctionalists to argue that “the propensity to integrate is greater among societies that are 
characterized by pluralist complexity;” this “built-in recognition [was] later teased out” of the 
neofunctionalist model. 
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and supranational. These characteristics had deep repercussions on the study of 
integration in Central America. The analytical separation of functional elites 
from society and state meant that the technocratic elite could be conceptualised 
apart from the oligarchic groups identified by Haas as ruling the region’s society. 
This separation delimited the space of neofunctionalist analyses in which the 
Central American normative elites could be incorporated—it could not go 
beyond the recognition of the determinant power that certain elite groups 
possessed. Neofunctionalism, because of its assumed pluralist ontology of 
integration, could not contemplate the existence of networks in which the elites 
converge. 
In his analysis of CACM, 37  Nye (1967) strives to deal with the 
relationship between political elite and oligarchy by locating pluralistic 
tendencies in the region. The supranational/pluralistic ontology of his analysis 
thus leads Nye to “pluralise” Central America by searching for elements of 
pluralism in the region’s “reality.” Nye (1967: 25) indicates that “party politics 
and appeals to broader participation complicate oligarchical descriptions of 
Central American politics.” The political party system until then fully controlled 
by oligarchies was being undermined, according to Nye, by “inexpensive 
transistor radios [which] have begun to nullify illiteracy as a factor permitting” 
such control (Nye, 1967: 25). Thus, for Nye oligarchic characterisation of 
Central America would fail to account for the mobilised and urbanised masses 
(Nye, 1967: 24). Admittedly, in some countries “the military was the ultimate 
base of power” which in the past had run the countries for the oligarchy (Nye, 
1967: 25). Nevertheless, Central America no longer fitted the oligarchical 
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 For an excellent review of CACM in the 1960s, see Schmitter (1971a), Wionczek (1970), 
Fagan (1970), and Cline and Delgado (1978). For a comparative analysis of Central American 
and European dynamics, see McCall (1976).   
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description (Nye, 1967: 23). Remarkably, over 40 years later, the region’s party 
and electoral system continues to be controlled by a small group of elites who 
persistently exercise their power through the system (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2006). The region’s current “democratic” structure is at best “restricted and 
controlled,” and tellingly, the ideological premises of the elites have minimally 
changed (Paige, 1993: 38). In a sense, those oligarchic elites have outlived the 
mass mobilization highlighted by Nye.  
In the same manner that Haas analytically separates the 
functional/technocratic elites from society and the state, Nye (1967: 23-31) de-
links the Central American technocrats from the oligarchies, and the latter from 
the military, the political and the business elites. Traditional oligarchical groups 
are assumed to be on the fringes of power, and therefore Nye’s treatment of the 
relationship among the different elite groups is at best superficial. As a result of 
his original assumption that the power of oligarchies was in decline, their relation 
to the all important technocrats is mentioned only implicitly. Moreover, there is 
no mentioning of the relationship between traditional oligarchies and business 
elites despite the fact that, as one of Nye’s contemporaries asserts, business elites 
are “spin-offs” from the old oligarchy or at least shared their “traditional political 
values” (Scott, 1967: 123-124). Nye’s analytical position effectively disregards 
the probability that elites—technocratic, political, landed and business—were 
embedded in networks. Nye’s conceptualisation of social relations results from 
the pluralist “necessity” to give an “equal” footing to the different societal 
groupings. For instance, at one point, Nye (1967: 33) classifies the “traditionally 
powerful” landed elite as a mere “agricultural interest group,” despite the fact 
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that landed elites were considered to have greater political power than that 
assigned by the mere pressure group label.     
Whenever neofunctionalists recognised that “influential elites” could 
block the integrative process, then those elites were seen as “mediators” between 
governments and the general public. Influential elites functioned as preference 
and value transmitters between an unorganised public and decision-makers, and 
in that role they could halt the process (Inglehart, 1971: 164-166, fn. 111). In a 
pluralist view, thus, Central American elites could only be assessed in terms of 
their power as the preferences and values carriers of the mass public. As such 
those elites’ normative power was “exorcised” out of the analysis. Therefore, 
everything in Nye’s (1967: 30-31) analysis indicates that the power of the 
region’s oligarchies was dissipating; or that they were mere pressure groups. 
Pluralist conceptualisations of the region thus opened analytical spaces for the 
crucial role the technocrats played in the process.  
With traditional elites waning in the neofunctionalist models, integration 
was left to the técnicos (i.e. technocrats); or a type of expert-politicians 
technically trained usually in economics (Nye, 1967: 27). They were essential for 
the process because “successful integration will remain a matter of power 
through information—of tedious detailed studies more than flag-raisings” (Nye, 
1967: 62). Analysis of integration was, therefore, to concentrate on the role of the 
técnicos. Haas, for instance, focused his analysis of Latin America on the views 
of members of the United Nations’ ECLAC (Mattli, 2005: 341). Similarly, Nye 
(1967: 51-52) assigned ECLAC’s technocrats a great “power of intellectual 
appeal” in the context of Central America. 
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For Nye (1967: 27, 62-63), the successes achieved by CACM were due to 
the technocrats’ isolation from the mainstream political debate, and the low cost 
that acceding to the técnicos’ “whims” meant for political leaders. It follows that 
when integration was halted or experienced distortions, it was the state that 
delimited the process. What was lacking in the region thus was “an integrative 
strategy and the common political will to carry it out” (Haas, 1967: 341). 
Political will amounted to the political actors’ attitude of refraining from 
attacking integration because of the “existing symbols and myths,” those who 
supported regional integration did so because it was “fashionable and profitable 
in terms of reputation” (Nye, 1967: 20). This consideration seems to undermine 
the importance of those symbols and myths for a regional identity. It thus fails to 
consider that perhaps political actors’ identities were underpinned by those 
symbols and myths; and that perhaps their discourse had been stripped of any 
“real” power by overpowering interconnections of the political elites with social 
elites who circumscribed the integrative spaces available. 
The técnicos’ power, admittedly, was limited for two reasons. First, 
technocrats were “marginal members of the elite” and their power experienced 
generational decline; that is, the first generation of técnicos based its power on its 
“technical reputation” while the second generation was not fully able to convert 
“technical proficiency into power” (Nye, 1967: 27, fn. 42). The second reason, 
one implicitly recognised, and perhaps the cause of the technocrats’ generational 
problem, was that the técnicos had to accommodate “the impatient and 
distrustful” elites whose interests had to be protected (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 
729). Despite such realisation, Haas and Schmitter (1964: 731) conclude that the 
técnicos’ “social role and political power” could function as an equivalent to the 
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“the symmetrical interaction of pluralist groups” observed in Europe. Yet, this 
was unlikely because, as Scott (1967: 141) indicates for Latin America as a 
whole, functional elites (including technocrats) are “particularistic” and strongly 
linked to the “stratified class system” of the region which limits its ability to 
fostering “constructive” reforms. Technocrats are linked to elite networks based 
on kinship and family relations. As a result, the process remained embedded in 
“a complex network of particularistic relationships” (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 
731). This trend, in turn, negatively affected the process because the technocrats 
could not count on independent creative spaces for providing solutions to issues 
that may have led to spillovers38 (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 730). 
In contrast to the European experience, the technocrats’ power in Central 
America, neofunctionalists conclude, ended at the ideational level: they did not 
hold effective power to diffuse norms at the mass level. Oddly, considering the 
importance that subjectivities have in neofunctionalist models, these constraints 
on technocratic power are barely tackled in the analysis. Of course, 
neofunctionalists were aware of the differences among integrative contexts (e.g. 
Haas, 1961: 382). However, the assumed ontology of the process led the analysis 
to search for European-like pluralistic tendencies: ideas and norms generated at 
the technocratic level required the mobilisation of interests groups, if not mass 
mobilisation, in order to be socially diffused and thus internalised (see Haas, 
1958: xv); or the technocrats becoming pluralising agents. A pluralist state 
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 Spillover was the “basic [neo-]functionalist proposition” and it indicated that “tensions from 
the global environment and/or contradictions generated by past performance give rise to 
unexpected performance in the pursuit of agreed-upon common objectives” which were “likely to 
result in the search for alternative means for reaching the same goals, i.e. to induce actors to 
revise their respective strategies vis-à-vis the scope and level of regional decision making” 
(Schmitter, 1971b: 243). 
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structure which offered possibilities for such mobilisation was fundamental for 
the integrative process.  
Here it is important to look at how neofunctionalism conceptualises the 
state. For Haas (1964: 45-46), the state is “an abstraction” constituted by 
bureaucrats and other civil servants all of whom, because of the pluralistic nature 
of the system, have an input into political processes. Neofunctionalism, in other 
words, was equipped to assess the state through its formal dimension wherein 
conflict resolution mechanisms function (e.g. public sector bureaucracies). The 
other, as outlined in the introductory chapter, the socially constructed state 
structure, or the intersubjective dimension which articulates socio-political power 
relations could not be fully incorporated through an analysis that, as Haas (2001: 
23) indicates, employs “the assumptions of democratic pluralism.” 
For neofunctionalists, integration as a norm emanating from the ideas 
produced by technocratic elites must be socialised. Political elites must “learn” 
integration and subsequently diffuse it throughout society. In a pluralistic context, 
the state is a mediator of the various societal interests articulated by pressure 
groups and as such it must look for a balance among various social forces. For 
neofunctionalists thus “political leaders must find constant ways to feed the 
flame of integrationist sentiment, to make it attractive to the poor and induce the 
wealthy to make the major sacrifices in the meantime” (Haas, 1967: 343). This 
analysis was “destined” to underemphasise the role of the Central American 
normative elite networks; or perhaps, just as Nye did explicitly, to categorise 
those elites as pressure groups. Normative elites, as I propose, exercise their 
power within the socially constructed dimension of the state. Consequently, 
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neofunctionalism could not do more than admit the existence of powerful groups 
and, in some cases, mention their relation to technocrats and other political actors.    
Despite the foregoing critique, however, it is important to note that 
neofunctionalism identified elements that could help us understand the 
articulation of the normative networks’ power through the constructed dimension 
of the state. Decision-makers’ norms and perceptions were determinant for 
neofunctionalist conceptualisations of the process. In the models, for example, 
political elites assess public interest through their “internalized values and 
perceptions” (Inglehart, 1971: 162). In other words, values define the political 
actors’ preferences (Haas, 2001: 23). Values, in turn, partially depend on the 
norms that actors internalise through learning; this points to the importance of 
norm empowerment (or the incorporation of new norms into the political debate) 
and diffusion, and socialisation mechanisms for the study of integration in 
Central America. According to Checkel (1999b: 88-90) there are four such 
mechanisms. In this chapter, however, I will briefly focus on one of these 
mechanisms, the corporatist.39 (I discuss further the four mechanisms in chapter 
three). In that mechanism, state and society are connected through policy 
networks. Empowerment in this structure occurs in a two-step process: first 
“societal pressure,” and second, political elite learning. Once empowerment takes 
place norms are diffused throughout society. Seemingly, neofunctionalist models 
fit this norm diffusion mechanism. As, arguably, once pressure groups have 
converged in their regional preferences, they will put pressure on the state to 
advance integration. In this scenario, integrative processes stagnate, are disrupted 
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 The other mechanisms are the liberal, the statist and the state-above-society. 
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or experience strategic modifications because the political elites are reluctant to 
internalise new norms and/or to diffuse them.  
To reiterate, this mechanism focuses on the formal state structure. If one 
reorients attention to the socially constructed state structure, then perhaps, there 
are societal groups with normative power who could block norm empowerment 
and norm diffusion processes. Normative elites could initiate disintegrative 
processes by blocking norm diffusion or produce outright self-favourable norms. 
They could induce the mass of society into disintegrative behaviours. In short, 
normative elites possess the ability to generate social heterogeneity through the 
construction of new discourses despite the presence of otherwise homogenising 
meanings and understandings. This may help us understand why—borrowing 
Haas’ (1967: 333) commentary about Latin America in general—Central 
America is “united merely by language and religion,” yet, “for automatic 
integration this is not enough” as the historical record shows. 
Neofunctionalism deems learning essential for regional integration. For 
Haas (1976: 186-187) integration means the adoption of new policies that lead to 
a “new regional order.” Learning consists of a “redefinition of an earlier 
conception of self-interest” as a result of actors becoming exposed to a new or 
different situation, and is based on the actors’ perceived self-interests (Haas, 
1964: 48). The learning process results from access to new knowledge (generated 
by technocratic elites). New knowledge, however, requires “progressive 
audiences” open to “intellectual innovation” (Haas and Haas, 2002: 592). In the 
case of Central America, neofunctionalist analysis indicated that technocrats 
generated new knowledge but political elites were not progressive audiences and, 
as a result, the process of norm internalisation became stagnant. Thus at this 
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point learning turned problematic for neofunctionalists: the ontological fixation 
on the pluralistic working of the state in which political elites must listen to 
societal groups made the understanding of learning (or its lack) difficult to 
dissect. Why were political elites not progressive listeners? Was it, as 
neofunctionalism implied, because the cost of the process was too high for 
political elites? Ontologically, this is the logical answer as it was assumed that 
technocratic groups performed the necessary pluralistic functions and thus 
political elites were the last link in the chain. Consider, however, the following: 
what if both political and technocratic groups were normatively constrained by 
their embeddeness in elite networks? 
Thus far, in this section I have argued that the pluralist ontology of 
integration assumed by neofunctionalism did not enable its models to 
accommodate the role of what I label Central American normative elite networks, 
thereby limiting our understanding of integration in that region. In addition to 
this shortcoming, neofunctionalism experienced methodological “discomfort” in 
the study of Central America. Neofunctionalism comprised a built-in 
conceptualisation of “cognitive change” within its framework of “loyalties, 
persuasion, the evolution of expectations and interests” (Rosamond, 2005: 6) but 
its methodology focused on the rational aspects of the process. There are 
indications that neofunctionalists were aware and concerned about their methods’ 
limitations and “reliability” in terms of fully capturing the cognitive dimension 
they had identified.  
For example, Schmitter (1971b: 234) indicates that neofunctionalism 
“often scored actor perceptions of facts rather than the facts themselves” which 
improved the theory’s “capacity to observe process relations, such as learning.” 
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The successful operationalisation of those facts demanded “techniques of direct 
observation to measure not only what happened but also how relevant actors 
perceived what was happening.” Yet, these techniques did not fully enable 
neofunctionalists to conceptualise those variables. The issue is evident when 
Haas and Schmitter (1964: 714) state that “The exclusion of the conceptually 
difficult ‘social learning’ process would certainly simplify the task of analysis.” 
Barrera and Haas (1969: 159) also wonder how to assess elite complementarity, 
and propose to do so through the opinions and values held by interest groups and 
political parties “provided these are overtly expressed.” Yet, they go on to 
employ “rating by experts” signalling their hesitation about the overtly expressed 
nature of opinions. Similarly, Nye (1968: 871-873) questions measurement of 
attitudes and suggests that one could use “elite interviews, content analysis of 
periodicals or statements by leaders, and public opinion polls.” However, the 
difficulty, according to Nye, was that “reliable opinion polls” were scarce; when 
found, they were by nature inadequate. Thus, Nye concluded that there may be 
potential gaps between “attitudes and actions” and that to address this issue we 
should observe “behaviour, rather than just cost-free verbal statements.”  
Elsewhere, Nye (1967: 46-47) seems “apologetic” for his framework’s 
methodological limitations and data quality. He writes that “In the absence of 
reliable opinion polls, statements about changes of attitudes must be 
impressionistic” and also that the best evidence that could be obtained was 
“fragmentary.” Participants in his study were “chosen on the basis of their 
present or potential influence.” Attitudes were then measured by questions about 
CAMC’s effect on increased working hours, investment, new techniques, profit 
loss, access to loans, and membership in business associations. Ten participants 
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claimed to support the complete capitulation of their country’s sovereignty. 
“About twenty” were willing to support a partial loss of sovereignty while “only 
two” opposed any sovereignty limitation. The issue here is the adequacy of the 
question asked for assessing values, attitudes and learning. Questions were 
designed around economic matters and did not tap, for example, into the role of 
myths and flag-raising behaviour in attitude and value formation. Indeed the 
importance of those intersubjectivities had been disregarded by the models’ 
original assumptions. In such analysis, the importance of discourse as a reflection 
of social learning is overlooked, or to use Checkel’s (2001: 25) expression, it 
reduces discourse to “cheap talk” among “agents with fixed identities and 
interests.” This tendency could be reduced by employing a constructivist 
approach through a methodology based on discourse analysis. Such analysis 
would enable, for example, the assessment of the uses of myths and flag-raising 
as discursive acts attempting to elaborate or redefine a regional identity; that is, 
well beyond the mere expression of self-interested agents. I develop further this 
proposition in the final section of this chapter. 
In this section, my intention has not been to impose a “‘presentist’ 
reading” on neofunctionalism (Rosamond, 2005: 3). Nevertheless, in a 
retrospective exercise such as this, the risk of doing so remains latent. Rather, my 
intention has been to underline the shortcomings of neofunctionalism in 
analysing Central American regionalism, in order to highlight analytical 
openings wherein is possible to elaborate elements of neofunctionalism’s 
conceptual toolkit which are still valid for the analysis of integration in that 
region. 
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“New Regionalism” Studies: Under-theorising the Central American 
Regional Integration 
Breslin (2006: 29) has commented on the difficulties of identifying “a single 
understanding” of new regionalism: the non-existence of a schematic pursuit of a 
single explanation for regionalism does not allow for a generalised understanding 
of new regionalism. In the context of Central America, I argue that this 
tendency leads new regionalism studies back to the state as the main regional 
actor. Other observers point to two underlying themes of new regionalism studies. 
First, the understanding that “all regions are socially constructed and hence 
politically contested” (Hurrell, 1995b: 38-39). Second, the realisation that the 
process is highly complex: fluid, multidimensional, multi-actor, and multilevel 
(Söderbaum, 2003: 1). From this multidimensional conceptualisation De 
Lombaerde (2003) identifies four meanings of new regionalism. First, it indicates 
the quantitative increase of regional schemes during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Second, new regionalism refers to the qualitative differences characterising those 
schemes (e.g. focus on non-trade matters). Third, it alludes to the elaboration of 
new theories (e.g. theories of regionalism and globalisation). Fourth, new 
regionalism also denotes methodological developments such as the re-emergence 
of comparative studies. Beyond these meanings, Hettne (2003: 26) indicates that 
new regionalism must be approached from a dual perspective. First, the 
“exogenous” perspective sees regionalism and globalisation as “intertwined 
articulations, contradictory as well as complementary.” The second perspective, 
the “endogenous,” is characterized by regionalism’s assessment as a process 
shaped by a multitude of actors. With this in mind, in this section I organise my 
review of the recent Central American, and the relevant Latin American, 
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regionalism literature through new regionalism’s different meanings and 
perspectives. I do not intend to offer a critique of new regionalism’s theories per 
se but instead use its meanings and perspectives as organising principles for my 
reading of that region’s literature. The aim in doing so is to highlight the 
convergence of that literature with the old regionalism studies’ state and 
European centrism and how this tendency greatly contributes to the under 
theorisation of the Central American process. At the outset, for example, it is 
important to note that most studies on Central American integration do not take 
on the theoretical and methodological meanings of new regionalism and thus 
remain focused on the quantitative and qualitative understandings. On the latter 
meaning, in addition, scholars have elaborated three generational categories 
(which I will subsequently discuss)40 two of which they indicate are applicable to 
the European experience only. Nevertheless, a considerable number of new 
regionalism studies on Central America presuppose some of the assumptions 
implicated in these categories.   
 
New Regionalism Meanings 
New regionalism’s first meaning, the proliferation of schemes, produces a highly 
confusing picture in which Central American integration41 is underlined by a web 
of schemes: for example, El Salvador and Panama reached a bilateral agreement 
in 2002 while both were members of SICA. Presumably, the process in that 
region follows a “loose and open” but “meandering course” to which the 
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 See also fn. 42 below. 
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 At the Latin American level the proliferation understanding of the process notes a web of 
schemes with 17 intraregional free-trade/custom union agreements completed during 1991-2002 
and another six in process during the same period, not to mention several bilateral agreements 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2002: 25-26). 
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orderliness and uni-linearity of economic integration theory is not applicable 
(Van Klaveren, 2000: 140 and 153). Such an overlapping web of bilateral and 
regional agreements has been conceptualized as an “alphabet soup” (Hurrell, 
1995a: 280), or a  “spaghetti bowl” (De Lombaerde and Garay, 2006: 10). This 
conceptualisation overlooks the existence in Central America of a binary identity 
discussed in the introductory chapter: a national and regional identity in which 
the latter is activated once national problems cannot be dealt with domestically. 
Such identity may have direct effects on the patchy nature of integration and also 
on the persistence of regionalism in the area. For instance, the inability of a 
country to find solutions to an issue at the national level may trigger the regional 
identity and thus lead it to search for answers at the bilateral or regional level. If 
there is complementarity of ideas and interests between two or more countries, a 
regional agreement (e.g. involving economic, security and political aspects) is 
reached. Thus country A may have a regional agreement with countries B and C; 
but country B may have a completely different agreement with country C and D 
but not with A. Yet, A, B, C and D could be members of scheme Z. In this 
complex context, regionalism seems ad hoc but pervasive nevertheless. 
Continuing with the spaghetti analogy, by adopting a quantitative approach the 
analyst is able to see the entangled spaghetti but neglects to see the bowl holding 
the spaghetti in place.  
New regionalism’s second meaning, that of the qualitative differences 
between regionalisms, distinguishes the new from the old in terms of 
generational processes, or occurring in “waves” (Söderbaum, 2003: 3). For Van 
Langenhove, Torta, and Costea (2006: 3-5), the first generation “is based upon 
the idea of a linear process of economic integration” among states; it is thus 
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roughly equivalent to the old regionalism. Although this generation is mainly 
concerned with economic processes, its original intentions could have been 
political. This political dimension engenders the second generation or new 
regionalism, which proposes that trade and economy cannot be separated from 
society. The process thus incorporates non-economic issues (i.e. justice and 
security). This generation is a limited phenomenon of which the EU is the best 
example.42 At the Latin American level old regionalism was imported from the 
European experience (Söderbaum, 2003: 4); and the new wave originated in the 
US attitudinal change toward the region (Gamble and Payne, 2003: 54). This 
implies that Central America remains in the first generation of the process; what 
changed was the engine and drivers of integration.  
In this interpretation, at the Latin American level, integration starts from 
a point of “low economic interdependence,” a condition worsened by the 
different levels of development of the region’s countries, and also by 
geographical and infrastructure elements (Van Klaveren, 2000: 141). These 
initial assumptions effectively bracket out the intersubjective dimensions that 
underpin the regional process, and the analysis is limited to economic variables 
that overpower other dimensions such as regional identity. In addition, analysing 
Central American integration through “generations” delimits or confines our 
understanding of the process because it does not fully accommodate the 
historical lens which is so important for the analysis. Failing to do so, for 
example, does not allow us to assess the pre-1940s (i.e. pre-old regionalism) 
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 Van Langenhove, Torta, and Costea (2006: 3-5) argue that there is a third generation of which 
the EU shows some characteristics. First, in it “the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out 
of area’ consequences of regional policies are more present;” this trend is illustrated by the 
European Constitution. Second, the region becomes “proactive engaging in interregional 
arrangements and agreements.” Third regions “actively engaged at the UN level.” 
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integration record in the region; nor does it allow us to make sense of the 
recurrent integrationist efforts in that region. 
To be sure, I am not denying the importance of the hegemonic role of the 
US. Yet, assigning it almost complete credit for the regionalist experiences in 
Central America seems somewhat short-sighted. While the importance of identity 
and historical interactions among the region’s countries have been stressed by 
new regionalism scholars, 43  the depth with which these factors are treated 
analytically seems inadequate. In addition, the economistic nature of the studies44 
does not enable us to conceive of these factors in greater depth. Instead, 
assuming an economistic ontology leads observers to disregard variables that are 
apparently disconnected from economic matters; for example, to emphatically 
state that regional integration is merely the “convergence of interests” and 
downplay the importance of identity as a driving force for the process (see e.g. 
Malamud and Schmitter, 2007: 9).  
When regional discourse incorporates elements that are beyond the 
economic space (e.g. when it proposes objectives other than economic ones) it is 
simply regarded as a case of “cognitive dissonance” reflecting the expectations 
of the actors rather than the reality (Malamud, 2005a: 422-423). Demands for 
integration that are not economic, in other words, become empty words. This 
understanding is the result of the dismissal of cognitive variables through which 
those demands can be conceived of as reflecting ideas beyond economic matters. 
In any event, when the demands for integration are economic then they reflect “a 
clear understanding of the nature, limitations and potential” of a regional scheme 
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 See for example Fawcett (2005) and Sunkel (2000).  
44
 See e.g. Bulmer-Thomas (2000, 1998, 1996), Caldentey del Pozo (2001, 1998), CEPAL 
(2001), Chamorro Marín (1998), Herrero Acosta (2004), Rodas-Martini (2000, 1998), Rodlauer 
and Schipke (2005), and Sanahuja Perales (1997).  
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(Malamud, 2005a: 425). When the demands are of a different nature, they are not 
demands at all, but are dissonances that transform, for example in the case of 
MERCOSUR, the regional project into “a symbol for leftist political activism 
and national liberation ideologies.” Regional integration thus becomes “the 
dazzling dream” of those actors “who stand for progressive, developmental, anti-
imperialistic or nationalistic ideas” leading to a regionalism “fiction syndrome” 
(Malamud, 2005a: 425 and 434).   
 
New Regionalism Dual Perspectives 
Beyond the different meanings, Hettne’s (2003: 26) dual perspective, the 
“exogenous” and “endogenous” views of new regionalism, seems unhelpful in 
terms of furthering the study of Central America’s regionalism.  
The exogenous view directs the analysis first, to incorporate an economic 
rationale; and second, to the role of the US as the main regionalising engine. For 
Grugel and Hout (1999: 11-13), new regionalism is a conscious “attempt by the 
state” and “social coalitions” to impact “globalisation within the regional” space. 
Similarly, Grugel (2004b: 605) argues that new regionalism “is best understood 
as a state strategy designed to minimise risks in the uncertain conditions of 
economic globalization.” In this context, the re-emergence of regionalism at the 
Latin American level is the result of the US strategic planning which “sought 
economic re-engagement” with the hemisphere in order to deal with global 
economic tensions and new security issues (Grugel, 2004b: 605-606). Similarly, 
for Grugel and Payne (2000: 199) current regionalism occurs within the US 
sphere of influence and is qualitatively different in that it is open-market oriented 
and private sector led. Regionalism in the hemisphere is best described by the 
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concept of “political co-operation” through which the US attempts to “reposition 
itself globally,” this requires “the strategic calculations and policy decisions of 
states” involved in the process (Grugel and Payne, 2000: 200). Drivers of 
regionalism are, therefore, US hegemony and its responses to globalisation, and 
the need on the part of Latin American countries to enter the global economy 
(Grugel, 2004b: 606). 
Other observers offer an ambivalent view while attempting to 
accommodate US power within the integrationist tendencies at the Latin 
American level. Fawcett (2005: 46-47) opposes the proposition that current 
regionalising schemes represent the “North Americanization” of Latin America 
through a “US-driven neoliberal logic” because, she argues, of the “continuing 
salience of regional ideas expressed by a range of different actors, and their 
ability to influence outcome.” For Fawcett (2005: 42), then, new regionalism in 
the American continent demonstrates “an emerging normative consensus” 
between the US and Latin America with “significant” input from the latter.  
However, globalisation implies complementarity between the regional and global 
processes and thus the region is under pressure to engage US interests-driven 
initiatives (Fawcett, 2005: 44). In turn, the Latin American search for regionalist 
ideas becomes “redundant” as “all roads lead to Rome” because ultimately it is 
the US power that “calls the tune” (Fawcett, 2005: 44-45). Similarly, for Phillips 
(2003: 330; emphasis in original) the meaning of regionalism in the Americas 
cannot be captured exclusively by “the immediate interest of the US.” And yet, 
“hemispheric regionalism” is a strategy to establish “a political economy 
ideologically hospitable to the rules of the liberal game.” The “driving force” in 
this process is the US government and its aim is to entrench its hegemony. 
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Simply put, regionalism is based on US power which to a large extent defines the 
regional agenda (Phillips, 2005: 3 and 22). For the exogenous approach the US is, 
then, the main trigger of integration and other countries become mere reactive 
units. 
Ironically, this perspective reaches parallel conclusions to those of the old 
regionalism’s “original sin” (i.e. state-centrism). For the sake of comparison, let 
us review some of the arguments proposed by scholars inclined to employ “old” 
regionalism’s premises. For Pendersen (2002: 677), regionalism is best analysed 
through a “theory of co-operative hegemony” based on the interests and strategy 
of the region’s hegemon. In the case of Latin America, for example, the region is 
partially driven towards deeper integration by the US policy initiatives (Haggard, 
1997: 39). This theory argues that integration is a “grand strategy and, to the 
extent that it is successful, a type of regional order” (Pendersen, 2002: 683). In 
this context, integration has failed in instances in which “a hegemon has 
normally been lacking” (Pendersen, 2002: 678). This is a similar argument to that 
of Mattli (1999: 146-150): in the 1960s, some  Latin American schemes failed 
(i.e. Andean Pact and LAFTA) because they lacked a “regional leader.” More 
importantly, where successful (as in the case of Central America) it was due to 
the US willingness to act as an “adopted regional leader” by “easing 
distributional problems and assisting policy coordination.” A successful regional 
scheme thus requires a hegemon willing to cost the integration process.  
This argument, however, does not help us understand why the US rallied 
Central America behind the process and, at the same time, failed to do so 
elsewhere in Latin America—despite evidence that, at the time, the US within 
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the Alliance for Progress45 was willing to act as regional leader and bear the 
economic and political costs of Latin American integration in general (see OAS, 
1961a, 1961b). The quick answer to this “riddle” is to argue, as Hurrell (1995a: 
280) does, that in Central America, US “interests are most directly engaged.” 
Nevertheless, this argument neglects internal factors that facilitate the adoption 
of regional norms. Although hegemonic cooperation is important for the process 
there must be certain conditions that enable the hegemon to persuade the region’s 
states to enter a given scheme. As Nye (1967: 57), while writing at the time of 
CACM’s success asserted, external elements such as the role of the US were a 
“necessary condition” for CACM’s achievements—but necessary did not mean 
sufficient. More importantly, lacking a Central American initiative, those 
external variables would have been devoid of importance. 
Studies adopting an exogenous approach lead to the conclusion that the 
states’ rational strategic behaviour, in this case the hegemon’s,46  is the most 
appropriate level of analysis. By doing so, this perspective delimits our 
understanding of integration in Central America. State behaviour is only one 
variable in the analysis of political processes: analytical state-centrism produces 
“narrow and one-sided” studies (Gamble and Payne, 2003: 50). Old 
regionalism’s “original sin” is a sin because it erroneously confines our 
understanding of regionalism to the states’ rational behaviour. Representative of 
such misleading conclusions is that of Fawcett’s47 (2004: 444): “All regional 
activity in the Americas, whether bandwagoning in NAFTA or balancing in 
                                                 
45
 The Alliance was designed to reinforce the hemispheric Food for Peace program, and technical 
training programs. Militarily, it sought to protect the region’s countries from threats, specifically, 
from communist revolutions. For a comprehensive review of the Alliance see Levinson and Onis 
(1972).  
46
 When the US is absent as a hegemon, some studies look for a type of sub-regional hegemony 
or, in Phillips’s (2001: 579) words, “a subregional hub state.”  
47
 Elsewhere, Fawcett (2005) gives credit to regionalist ideas emanating from Latin America.  
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Mercosur, is predicated on the dominant role of the United States. The Monroe 
Doctrine has long legitimized and conditioned the US special sphere of interest 
on the American continent.”48 This conclusion overlooks, for example, the ideal 
of Union in Central America which pre-dates the Monroe Doctrine, and the fact 
that while President Monroe was developing his doctrine the region was already 
struggling to maintain the “unity” it enjoyed under the Spanish Empire. Also, can 
US hegemony help us understand the existence of constitutional regionalism in 
Central America which arguably reflects an embedded unionism? By largely 
overlooking intersubjective elements involved in the process, the exogenous 
perspective leads the analysts to attribute the successes as well as the failures of 
integration in Central America solely to the power and role of the US. 
Studies pursuing an endogenous perspective of new regionalism direct 
the analysis towards the search for multilevel societal processes in which several 
actors, besides the state, interact in the region’s construction. In this perspective, 
regionalism is a collaborative process among different societal groups that 
share—perhaps equally—the power to construct the region. Yet, in a region 
historically characterized by a highly hierarchical structure, such a search 
becomes a spiral that leads the observer directly to a state-centric understanding 
of the process. This perspective thus leaves the observer searching for an 
effective multilevel participation in Central American regionalism that is difficult, 
if not actually impossible, to find. Limited multilevel participation in the process 
is recognised by some new regionalism studies such as that of De Lombaerde 
                                                 
48
 This doctrine was developed by US President Monroe in 1823. In it he established that the 
Americas “are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European 
power,” European involvement would be considered as a “manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States” (quoted in Smith, 1996: 20). The aim was to eliminate or 
prevent European powers from challenging the US expansionist behaviour (e.g. in Florida) and to 
construct an “uncontested” sphere of influence in the hemisphere (Smith, 1996: 6). 
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and Garay  (2006: 18-19) and Gamble and Payne (2003: 52). However, it is Bull 
(1999: 957) who succinctly asserts that “the dynamism and pluralism” implied 
by new regionalism “are hard to detect” in Central America. Interestingly, Bull’s 
assumed ontology of the process and her conclusion parallel those of 
neofunctionalists: the process requires a pluralist society.  
It is worthwhile, nevertheless, to look at how endogenous studies deal 
with the absence of a multilevel dimension; and in the case of Bull, despite her 
awareness of the problems regarding multidimensionality. For example, 
according to Bull and Bøås (2003: 258), the construction of a region “is a 
political act committed by regionalising actors who seek to promote their vision 
and approach on to the regional agenda.” Multiple visions thus simultaneously 
“move” the region in several directions; and “they are best viewed as different 
layers superimposed on top of each other.” This approach “reveals other aspects 
and dimensions of regional practices and discourses than approaches which only 
see these as state-led processes implanted on objective units delimited in space 
and time by geography, culture and history.” Bull and Bøås conclude that their 
approach “makes it easier to give voice to the multitude of actors involved in the 
practice and discourse of regionalism.” Yet, by doing so, the observer uploads 
meaning onto the process: the approach opens up the necessary spaces for the 
required pluralist structure.  
The power relations implied in the process of superimposing visions (or 
discourses) are not problematised. Discursive practices are “social power” spaces 
wherein “power relations” make and sustain some discourses as dominant, which 
define and constitute the world (Weldes et al., 1999:17-18). In the context of 
integration, then, as indicated in the previous section, some regionalising actors 
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have greater powers than others. To obtain a deeper understanding of regional 
integration in Central America it is therefore essential to revisit the interplay 
between the state and elites and how those interactions are currently reflected 
within integrative efforts. It is necessary to consider how colonial institutions 
were used by elites to embed the then new state structure with their norms—a 
structure that they, the elites, came to quickly dominate—and the cultural 
continuities that have perpetuated such state configuration. 49  It is, to put it 
differently, essential to “localise” or “Central Americanise” regional integration 
theory in order to accommodate the region’s idiosyncrasies which lead to a 
particular set of interactions between the state and social elites. This is not to 
delimit integration in “culture and time” but to admit that culture and history 
have a greater “saying” about state structures and power relations than is 
generally assumed. 
Elsewhere, Bull (2002)50 hints at the relationship between the state and 
elites in the region. She indicates that it is important to provide a “realist 
approach to regionalisation with a theory of the state.” The state is seen as 
interlocutor that can encourage different “integrated business projects.” 
Nevertheless, for Bull, the state is unsuited to articulate the different political 
projects which construct the region. It seems, then, that Bull struggles to identify 
pluralistic spaces in the region’s state structure. When the search is unsuccessful, 
it is logical to deduce that the state is ill-equipped for the task. Indeed, for Bull 
(2002: 2), the region’s states have undergone a “privatization of politics” since 
the 1990s. This privatisation takes place as “political elites are increasingly 
recruited from the business elites” granting them greater access to policy-making 
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 I revise the Central American state structure in chapter two. 
50
 See also Bull (2004); in that paper, however, Bull seems more concerned with the 
transnationalisation of the state through its link with the private sector.  
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which, in turn, has modified the nature of the links binding the state and the 
private sector (Bull, 2002: 4-5). Bull indicates that the region’s states exhibit 
certain similarities with the post-colonial states in that they are dominated by 
limited elites. These elites held such power over the state by controlling the 
means of production (Bull, 2002: 4). Here we find another point of convergence 
between Bull’s analysis and that of neofunctionalists: the functional division of 
the region’s elites. 
Despite identifying the links between elites and the state, Bull detaches 
the issue from culture and history and reorients attention to matters considered 
“modern” (such as free trade and anti-development agendas) converging in 
integration and attempts to find their “voices.” Bull does not problematise the 
links between the state and elites and how these links led to the privatisation of 
politics. Bull’s analysis remains a hint at the issue: her focus on the different 
agendas forces her to lump those agendas into voices superimposed on each other 
within a socially constructed space in which the state is a static interlocutor. In 
doing so, Bull uploads a set of multilevel assumptions onto the process. The 
endogenous perspective of new regionalism thus enters the search for the hard-
to-find multilevel participation. This perspective ultimately leaves the analyst 
with the state as the only adequate explanation for the nature of Central 
American integration where in fact the state is an inadequate interlocutor for the 
many voices struggling within the process. The discursive power of those voices 
is scarcely examined51 rendering an analysis in need of deeper theorisation. 
I argue that the very binding links that Bull identifies render the states an 
unsuited regional interlocutor. The privatisation of the state is not new. The 
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 See for example Grugel (2004a). 
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Central American states were “enmeshed” by design. As the Central American 
states emerged, the region’s elites captured political, military, material and 
ideological resources.52 Over the years, as new members were incorporated into 
the elites power became fragmented. This process led to the formation of 
networks based on kinship and family relations in which elites are able to 
exchange one kind of resource for another thus achieving normative power. Such 
concentration of power has enabled the elite to “enmesh” the state in such a 
manner that the latter reflects the normative power of the former. This historical 
process has further enabled the elites to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct the 
region when their identity, interests and/or ideology are threatened by 
regionalism.53 
Table 1.1 summarises the general tendencies of the literature that 
undertakes new regionalism’s different meanings and perspective.   
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 This is what Mann (1992: 7) refers to as the “substantive sources of social power.”  
53
 In the Mercosur context, Duina’s work has moved in this historically problematising direction. 
In his comparative analysis of the EU, Mercosur and NAFTA, Duina (2004) focuses on the 
impact of the legal origins of the countries participating in a regional scheme and how the legal 
structure impacts market formation. Apparently, a shared legal tradition within a region facilitates 
a successful integration process. If so, in regions such as Central America where civil law 
tradition is prevalent, the legal structure should expedite, or at the very least, simplify the 
process; yet, considering the integrationist record, that does not seem to be the case. Another 
issue in Duina’s analysis is that he considers the legal framework as a supporting structure in the 
market construction process (Duina, 2005: 10). Thus, it seems that the market remains above all 
aspects of society. This position does not allow for the incorporation of the state nature and its 
impact on market construction into the analytical framework. Neither does it allow for the 
assessment of the preference formation of the powerful social actors so important for his analysis. 
Seemingly, it is the legal system (Duina, 2005: 7) that produces and/or changes the actors’ 
preferences. However, to the extent that actors influence the legal structure, there must be other 
factors that construct their preferences. For example, as identity and ideas interplay with interests 
they impact on an actor’s preferences. Duina, also, argues that different civil society associations 
and business groups greatly influence the regional market construction. This position effectively 
leads Duina to situate his analysis within the new regionalism’s endogenous perspective and 
assume a degree of multilevel governance. See also Duina and Breznau (2002), and Duina 
(2006). 
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Table 1.1. New Regionalism’s Meanings and Perspectives: Implications for 
the Study of Central American Integration 
Quantitative Qualitative Exogenous Endogenous
Focus
Schemes' 
proliferation
Generation/waves Complimentarity of 
globalization & regionalism
Multilevel societal 
processes
Highly confusing 
picture → web of 
schemes
Open vs. close 
regionalism
Economic rationale/US 
economic re-engagement
State unsuited 
interlocutor for many 
voices
“Alphabet soup” 1st generation  
imported from EU
US role → regionalizing 
engine
States recently 
privatized
“Spaghetti bowl” 2nd wave from US 
attitudinal change
US strategic planning Business elites/state link
“Meandering 
course” → “blurred 
subregional design"
Rational  behaviour →  
most appropriate level of 
analysis
State → adequate 
explanation for 
integration's nature
Binary identity Historical lens Domestic factors in non-
hegemonic countries 
enable hegemon to 
persuade those countries 
Historical oligarchic 
control
Integration's 
persistance
Pre-1940s 
assessment
Scarce Multilevel 
participation 
Integration's 
persistance
Some actors →  greater 
normative power
Identifies
Hardly 
incorporated
 
 
 
There is another strand of regionalism studies that cannot be easily 
situated in new regionalism’s meanings and perspectives. Those studies, 
although to some extent dealing with globalisation, are endogenously oriented, 
not in the sense of emphasising the analysis of the region’s multilevel 
governance. Rather, they focus specifically on the role of governments in the 
process. In this respect, they resemble old regionalism’s intergovernmental 
strand. Perales (2003: 75), for example, argues that international institutions such 
as common markets, are created by politicians “based on common rules and 
sanctioning procedures” in order to attain policy goals that would be impossible 
to reach without the international institution.   
Sánchez (2003b: 36) argues that regionalism is the reflection of 
governments’ preferences “constrained by domestic and external pressures.” The 
re-building of integration in the 1990s was a reaction of the governments 
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concerned with the region’s exclusion from the global world and the implications 
of that trend for the consolidation of peace and democracy (Sánchez, 2003b: 36). 
By that time, integration became a market-enlarging mechanism to ensure the 
survival of small economies and it is for this reason that Central American 
governments accelerated the revival and institutional reform of the process 
(Sánchez, 2003b: 46). Sánchez (2003b: 39) argues that the intergovernmental 
hypothesis 54  explains the institutional building that took place during the 
reactivation phase. Yet, he (2003b: 39) indicates that those institutions have 
become secretariats of presidential summits and ministerial meetings. For 
Sánchez (2003b: 39) this trend reflects the governments’ “unwillingness” to 
delegate sovereignty to regional institutions, and the “divergent interest” among 
those governments regarding the desired “level of regionness.” The integration 
system thus  articulates “the preferences and interests” of the region’s 
governments (Sánchez, 2003b: 47). 
Similarly, for Malamud (forthcoming) the key to understanding the  
successes and limitations of integration is not in the analysis of the “demand” but 
in that of “supply.” In MERCOSUR, for example, presidentialism defines the 
“microeconomic implementation” of regionalism: national businesses, if 
necessary, address issues directly with “the core of the decision-making power” 
(i.e. the presidents) rather than using other institutional mechanisms (Malamud, 
2003: 64). Decisions needed by regional “transactors” are perceived to be more 
efficiently made by the presidents (Malamud, 2005b: 139). The executives are 
able to override the veto power of other political actors (e.g. congresses) in such 
                                                 
54
 i.e. “…that governments create institutions in order to ease the intergovernmental bargaining 
and co-operation as well as to increase their leverage and autonomy vis-à-vis domestic groups 
which may not be supporters of integration and other governmental policies” (Sánchez, 2003b: 
39).  
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a manner that the presidents become “policy crafters and dispute settlers” 
(Malamud, 2005b: 140). The presidents, in short, exercise significant influence in 
the policy-making process obtaining specific outcomes (Malamud, 2003: 67). 
Regional integration is thus fostered by “presidential diplomacy” 55  or the 
“informal presidential intervention” (Malamud, 2004: 147, 149-150). Hence, for 
Malamud (2003: 64), power becomes “personalised” and the regional process 
becomes, paraphrasing O’Donnell (1994), a “delegative integration.” The basis 
of such an argument is that states are not agents of domestic social actors 
(Malamud, 2005b: 140).  Admittedly, the president does not possess absolute 
power over the regional process (Malamud, 2004: 149). Presidential power may 
be institutionally restrained (Malamud, forthcoming) and “the real sources of 
power” remain in the background away from treaties and protocols (Malamud 
and Schmitter, 2007: 25). 
Malamud (2003: fn. 10) recognises that in Central American integration 
presidential diplomacy has had a limited role. Hence, he indicates that 
presidentialism is not effective for every regional integration process (Malamud, 
2003: 69). Yet, Malamud does not address why this is the case; or why it is that 
presidentialism “works” in MERCOSUR and does not in Central America? It is 
here that the concept of normative elite networks and the role of social will in 
shaping the “preferences” of political elites becomes important in furthering our 
understanding of what Phillips (2002: 390) calls the “constituent bases of 
regionalist projects (policy ideas and state interests).” Social will, for example, 
evolves through elite interactions within networks, and when achieved—by the 
convergence of the ideas, identity and interests of elites —it articulates the 
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 On presidentialism in MERCOSUR, see also Carranza (2003). 
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normative power of those elites. In turn, social will limits or expands the policy 
options available for the pursuit of regionalism.  
To summarise, an examination of new regionalism’s meanings and 
perspectives when applied to the context of Central America, reveals that 
important aspects for the study of the region’s integrative processes have been 
barely incorporated into their analytical framework. While such studies give us 
valuable insight into the nature of integration, their analytical scope seems 
narrow. Analytical narrowness leads new regionalism studies to somewhat 
preordained conclusions shared by the old regionalism from which, ironically, 
since its inception it has striven to distance itself. Thus, the conception of Central 
American integration remains merely of an intergovernmental process and its 
engine a structure of cooperative hegemony led by the US. 
 
Intersecting Neofunctionalism and Constructivism 
This section identifies elements of neofunctionalist models that could be 
elaborated through a constructivist approach in order to overcome the 
shortcomings of neofunctionalism.  The objective is to trace continuities between 
neofunctionalism and constructivism. While neofunctionalism “has been 
misunderstood, caricatured, pilloried, proven wrong, and rejected” (Schmitter, 
2004: 45), it nevertheless elaborated conceptual elements that became key 
components for other approaches (Schmitter, 2005: 258-259). Its assumptions 
and concepts are still valuable and relevant (Schmitter, 2004: 46). Objections 
may be raised, however, as to the ontological compatibility of neofunctionalism 
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and constructivism.56 Yet, proposals have been advanced regarding the ability of 
constructivism to “seize the middle ground” and by doing so “bridge” the 
ontological gap between rational and critical theories. The “divide” is, in short, 
“real—but surmountable” (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel, 2003). Bridging it is 
possible because constructivism sheds light on analytical dimensions that in 
traditional political science were “enigmatic” (Adler, 1997b: 323).57  
Haas (2001: 22) indicates that neofunctionalism and constructivism both 
emphasize the importance of “ideas and values as explanations of behaviour” and 
it is this emphasis which establishes a direct link between neofunctionalism and 
one of the constructivist schools, the “soft rationalist school.”58 He maintains that 
these approaches share their beliefs that individuals act on “their perceived 
interests.” Actors’ interests shift when “ideas and values inspiring them undergo 
alteration”  (Haas, 2001: 27). Nevertheless, to propose the search for continuities 
does not mean that my departure point (the ontology of regional integration) is 
that of neofunctionalism. I argue that integration is a social structure and as such 
is constructed through social interactions in which cognitive and ideational 
dimensions underpin the structure. Similar dimensions were evidently 
fundamental for the neofunctionalist model (Rosamond, 2005: 14). And yet, 
because of its initial pluralistic premises and the resulting troublesome 
operationalisation of variables, those dimensions were treated by assumption, 
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 To be sure, I do not plan to engage in or rehearse the ontology/epistemology, rational/critical, 
or the institutionalisms debates. Others have done so comprehensively. See e.g. Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2001), Dessler (1999), Wind (1997) and Wæver (1996). 
57
 Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003: 8) argue that the meta-theoretical debate that limited the 
possibilities of surmounting the gap has “run its course;” and that it “must now give way to 
theoretical, methodological and carefully structured empirical dialogue.” See also Checkel (2000, 
1997), and Patomäki and Wight (2000). 
58
 For Haas, the other constructivist schools are: first, the “systemic school” which argues that 
actors’ interests are defined by their identities which are in turn shaped by the role they, the 
actors, play in the global system; second, the “norms and culture school” which maintain that 
actors’ interests are defined by the cultural context in which they live (Haas, 2001: 26). On the 
relation between neofunctionalism and constructivism, see also Haas (2004) and Diez (2001: 9).   
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were discounted, or simply could not be fully apprehended by the models. As 
such, while neofunctionalism largely emphasised the rational aspects of the 
process, the theoretical integrative models its proponents developed (e.g. Nye 
(1971b) and Lindberg (1971)) were loaded with variables that emerged from 
collective interactions. 
Neofunctionalism strove to elaborate hypotheses to foster and guide the 
further study of integration (Rosamond, 2000: 50). Its relentless pursuit of 
integration dynamics led it to uncover intersubjectivities that later other 
approaches (e.g. constructivism) would consider essential for our understanding 
of the process. In Schmitter’s (1971b: 247-248) model, “elite value 
complementarity” or “the distribution of expectations and evaluations (pro and 
con) vis-à-vis regional integration across national participant political groups” 
became a key variable. Elite complementarity was underpinned by the 
constitutive role of the elites’ ideas and interests in the definition of expectations 
and evaluations. Haas’ (1958) conditions for “community sentiment” 
incorporated a similar set of intersubjective variables. Haas (1958: 9; emphasis 
added) writes: 
 
1. Interest groups and political parties at the national level endorse 
supranational action in preference to action by their national government, or 
if they are divided among themselves on this issue…. 
2. Interest groups and political parties … define their interests in terms larger 
than those of the separate national state from which they originate. 
3. Interest groups and political parties, in their efforts at supranational 
organisation, coalesce on the basis of a common ideology, surpassing those 
prominent at the national level. 
4. Interest groups and political parties, in confronting each other at the 
supranational level succeed in evolving a body of doctrine common to all, or 
a new nationalism (i.e., “supranationalism”)…  
 
In these conditions we can identify certain intersubjective elements that could be 
elaborated through a constructivist approach in order to develop a more 
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comprehensive model of Central American integration. First, Haas’ endorsement 
indicates a change in preferences whose locus moves from the national to the 
supranational space. Preferences depend on values; the latter are influenced by 
interest (Haas’ second point). Moreover, interests interplay with ideas (i.e. 
assigned meanings), and in general with ideology (Haas’ third point) as a set of 
ideas that articulate a given society’s political and social aims. Nationalism 
presupposes the existence of a common (regional) identity. A common identity 
could lead to the formation of pro-integrationist attitudes among “social classes 
and corporate groups” (Schmitter, 2004: 63). At the same time, social classes and 
groups must coalesce around those attitudes; coalition in this sense implies 
complementarity.  
I argue that complementarity refers first, to the congruence of interests 
regarding integration among elite groups. Second, to the extent that ideas and 
identity influence the value system of an individual, complementarity 
encompasses the convergence of ideas and identity with the actors’ interests. In 
the absence of complementarity there may emerge social groups with negative 
outlooks on regionalism who could generate disruptions to the process. These 
disturbances or “internal noise” lead to disruptive behaviour that inhibits the 
capacity of governments to react to regional demands resulting in a stagnation 
phase or disintegrative tendencies (Nye, 1971b: 90). Complementarity produces 
predisposition to support or oppose (if negative complementarity arises) the 
integration process among the normative elite groups that exist in the region. It 
follows that when there is a degree of elite complementarity, arguably a degree 
of willingness to advance the process exists. This willingness, I label “social 
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will:” the convergence of the ideas, identity and interests of the elites leading to a 
constitutive role of those intersubjecitivies in the integrative process.  
Social will can be operationalised through a constructivist approach. Such 
an approach provides us with a hermeneutical methodology that enables us to go 
“deep” into the political actors’ narrative. Through discourse analysis, 
constructivism looks further than “overtly expressed” opinions. Constructivism 
could thus help us overcome neofunctionalists’ concerns about “cost-free verbal 
statements.” Constructivism enables us to capture social learning encompassing a 
process wherein actors, through discursive interactions acquire new interests and 
preferences (Checkel, 2001: 25). Normative elite networks exercise their power 
discursively. In this sense, a constructivist framework, through the analysis of 
cognitive dimensions identified by neofunctionalism, could enable the study of 
Central American integration to accommodate those networks’ role in the 
integrative process. It is hoped that the intersection of neofunctionalist elements 
and a constructivist approach in the social will concept could lead us to what 
Haas and Haas (2002: 594) call “synergistic explanatory account” of socio-
political phenomena; in this case, of Central America’s integrative process. 
The Central Americanised model of regional integration I propose based 
on that intersection can be preliminarily summarised as follows. Normative elite 
networks have enmeshed the state within its socially constructed dimension; 
those networks exercise their normative power through social will constraining 
the state as to what is integratively possible. The following figure represents this 
preliminary proposition. 
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Figure 1.1. Preliminary Central Americanised Model of Regional 
Integration  
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To render the proposed model analytically effective, first, it is necessary 
to theorise the interactions between the state and elites in order to assess the 
existence of normative networks and how state enmeshment occurs. Second, it is 
essential to determine through which mechanisms integrative norms are 
socialised, diffused and ultimately embedded in regional policies as it is in such 
mechanisms that elites interact normatively. Third, and finally, it is important to 
theorise the emergence of the medium that articulates the normative power of the 
region’s elites; that is, social will and the constitutive interactions among its 
components and how those interactions lead to integrative tendencies.   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have maintained that in the context of Central American regional 
studies, neofunctionalism was guilty of two shortcomings. Its conceptualisation 
of integration as a process beyond the nation state led its integrative models to 
interpret the state in the traditional institutional sense thereby allowing for the 
analytical separation of those institutions. This was essential because of the 
inherent pluralism in the model within which political elites, technocrats and 
pressure groups interacted to generate integrative impulses. Such a model could 
not fully account for the role of the Central American elites in the process: the 
models functionally split those elites limiting their power in relation to that of the 
state. Methodologically, neofunctionalist models were ill-equipped to fully 
capture the analytical weight of the cognitive and ideational variables that they 
had identified.  
I have argued, in addition, that the application of new regionalism’s 
meanings and perspectives to Central America has led to a somewhat narrow 
view of the process. While quantitative, qualitative and exogenous studies have 
concluded that the nature and rhythm of the region’s integration are dictated by 
the US hegemony, the endogenous perspective has been left in need of a hard-to-
find effective multilevel participation. The inability to fulfil this analytical void 
has led those studies to focus on the role of the state. New regionalism studies 
have arrived at a state-centric view of the process; coming full circle with the old 
regionalism’s “original sin.” Yet, the nature of the Central American state is 
hardly assessed. Additionally, in the same manner that the old regionalism 
attempted to find Euro-centric elements (e.g. pluralism) in Central America, 
some new regionalism studies “upload” a set of pluralising assumptions onto that 
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region in an attempt to identify the essential multilevel participation factors of 
their models, at the same time that the underlying power relations remain 
unaddressed. This fairly narrow understanding, I suggest, is the result of 
overlooking and/or under theorising the process’s intersubjective spaces. I 
propose that this analytical void can be bridged by developing a constructivist 
framework based on certain elements of neofunctionalist models. Such a 
framework will furnish the region’s analysis with a toolkit that allows for the 
incorporation of the state’s constructed structure, and the interaction of the state 
and normative elite networks within the regionalism process. In the next chapter 
I theorise that proposition. 
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Chapter 2. Revisiting the Central American State: the 
Enmeshed State, and Normative Family and Kinship 
Networks 
 
Introduction 
This chapter revisits the interactions between the Central American state and 
social elites. The objective is to bring the theoretically neglected role of social 
elites and their interactions with the state through family and kinship networks 
back into the analysis of regional integration. My purpose in doing so is not to 
carry out a literature review of the state and elites but rather to examine the 
different ways analysts conceive of the state-elite interactions. Often theorists 
approach the state through a modernisation prism which limits their studies to a 
certain sphere of analysis. Elites are neatly categorised into functional groups and 
the possibility of those groups’ convergence in family and kinship networks is 
overlooked. 59  This tendency is underlined by premises that suggest those 
networks have been eroded by modernity. The modern/rational state is implicitly 
or explicitly assumed to epitomise modernity. If certain cultural dimensions 
leading to personal interactions among actors within the state are incorporated in 
the analysis, they are conceived of as anti-modern (e.g. clientelism) or even as 
corruption disrupting the efficient functioning of a democratic state.60 Cultural 
aspects are thus dissolved into a set of functional linkages that projects mainly 
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 Studies that recognise the fundamental role of family and kinship networks at the Latin 
American level approach them historically: they are often focused on the colonial or early 
independence period. It seems that this tendency results from the perception that assessments 
with “cultural baggage” are directly “associated with the survival not only of a traditional and 
backward economic order, but also with significant remains of the colonial administration” 
(Oszlak, 1981: 9). Illustrative of the tendency to view family and kinship historically are for 
example Balmori, Voss, and Wortman (1984), Blank (1974), Lake Frank (2001) and Walker 
(1986).    
60
 See Hedetoft (2003) for a discussion of such tendencies. 
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the economic aspects of the state-elites interactions. Realising that such a 
position leads researchers to neglect cultural continuities is essential for our 
understanding of the region’s political processes.  
 Following these tendencies, models of regionalism import theoretical 
premises from the experiences of other regions without necessarily “filtering” 
them to reflect the Central American reality and thus seem incompatible with the 
region’s context. Neofunctionalist models influenced by corporatist premises to a 
great extent assume a society structured around notions of pluralism and, 
similarly, some new regionalism studies implicitly hold multilevel governance 
premises which are underpinned by democratic models of the state. Both 
approaches seem ill equipped to fully capture the dynamics of Central American 
society, since these models overlook or under theorise the interconnections 
between the state and social elites and the normative power that the latter elites 
can exercise over the state. Hence, to develop a fuller picture of the integration 
process it is important to re-examine those interactions in order to elaborate a 
Central Americanised model of integration. 
In the first section, I develop a definition of the Central American state. 
Section two assesses the corporatist 61  views of the state while section three 
considers the post-democratisation understandings of the state that underpin the 
integration theory of Central America; in both sections the focus is on the 
analytical position assigned to the family and kinship networks within those 
conceptions. The fourth section observes the resilience of those networks and 
their constant interaction with the state. It argues that networks have granted 
                                                 
61
 While my focus on corporatism may seem outdated to some critics, it is important to 
reemphasise that one of this thesis’ aims is to “reactivate” elements of neofunctionalist models of 
regional integration in order to better understand Central American regionalism. Corporatism 
seems to underpin neofunctionalism’s conception of integration and regional integration models 
that emphasise the dominant role of the executives or governments in the process. 
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elites disproportionately normative power over the political process. In this 
context, the state emerges as an enmeshed construction engrained in those 
networks. Section five develops the notion of normative elites and normative 
power within Central American political culture. Section six concludes.  
 
Defining the Central American State 
The state62  is one of the most contentious concepts in the social sciences and its 
definition a much debated topic. A simple definition is that the state is the set of 
institutions which claim sovereignty over a given territory (Hay and Lister, 2006: 
5).63 How can a set of institutions claim supreme authority? There must be a 
particular characteristic of the state that makes individuals accept its power. The 
state, therefore, must be a force. Such force is extrinsic to the will of the 
individual, but through law and regulation it is transformed from might to legal 
power, and ultimately to legitimate authority (Passerin D'Entreves, 1967: 1-2, 8). 
Prior to achieving legitimacy, it seems, individuals must consent to the rules and 
regulations that institutionalise the state. The state, thus, comprises a distinct set 
of institutions and organisations which perform the double task of defining and 
enforcing collectively binding decisions; such function, however, is “socially 
accepted” (Jessop, 1990: 341). This agreement sets and conditions the obedience 
necessary for social life (Passerin D'Entreves, 1967: 5). In this sense, the state 
regulates social interactions and by doing so sustains a particular political order 
(Pettman, 1979: 106).  
                                                 
62
 For theories of the state see, for example, the edited volumes by Hay, Lister, and Marsh (2006) 
and Hall (1994); Jessop (1990) and (2001);  and Passerin D'Entreves (1967). 
63
 In the Latin American context, Centeno (2002: 2) takes a similar view and conceives the state 
as “the permanent institutional core of political authority on which regimes rest and depend. It is 
permanent in that its general contours and capacities remain constant despite changes in 
governments. It is institutionalized in that a degree of autonomy from any social sector is 
assumed.” 
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Taking into account the main elements of these conceptualisations, I 
develop a definition of the state as a double intersubjective structure. First is the 
formal institutional/legal structure in which de jure power or the power obtained 
through electoral means is exercised. This is roughly equivalent to the 
institutional aspects that the previous definitions implied. The second component 
of the conception I propose is a socially constructed structure in which normative 
power is articulated.64 This structure differs greatly from the above conceptions 
as it refers to a dimension that they do not fully incorporate; namely, the 
interactions among elites from which the state is normatively constituted. Critics 
may argue that these interactions are included in the “obedience agreement” or 
“socially accepted” propositions referred to above. These propositions imply that 
the state has the consent of mass society with regard to its power and functions. 
In this sense, they are accounted for by my institutional structure because consent 
and agreement are implicated in the articulation of de jure power that I propose 
occurs in the institutional structure. The socially constructed state dimension I 
conceive refers to that space in which normative power is projected through elite 
interactions, and in doing so, constitute the state. My aim in developing this 
definition of the state is to theoretically isolate a particular characteristic of the 
Central American state65 which may help us further understand the functioning 
                                                 
64
 In the Latin American context, Mallon (2002: fn. 1, 1995: 10) proposes that the state is two 
dimensional and sees the region’s state as first, “a pact of domination or rule;” and second, as a 
set of  institutions which function as resolution mechanisms of “conflicts over power.” My 
institutional structure is similar to the latter dimension in Mallon’s conception. Her pact of 
domination seems to refer to mass consent. Thus it is not equivalent to my socially constructed 
structure because my dimension refers to a space in which the elites interact to normatively 
constitute the institutional structure and ultimately the state itself. 
65
 On the emergence of the Central American states, see Dym (2006); and on the relations 
between the state-social classes in the context of the 1980s’ Central American revolutions, see 
Midlarsky (1985). For the assessment of the historical emergence of the Latin American states, 
see among others, Centeno (2002); López-Alves (2000); Oszlak (1981); Whitehead (2006: 
chapter two); and the edited volumes by Dunkerley (2002), and Peloso and Tenenbaum (1996). 
For specific country studies see: López-Alves (2001), on Argentina and Uruguay; and Knight 
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of regional integration as an “intergovernmental” process. The definition of the 
state I propose enables us to conceptualise the actions of social elites in the 
integration process beyond a mere functional role. In so doing, it also opens 
analytical spaces to build a state conception that goes beyond those of 
corporatism and post-democratisation. It thus becomes the core on which to build 
a Central Americanised model of integration.  
 
Corporatism: Models and Issues 
As observers began to conceive of the rationalisation (e.g. decline of clientelism) 
of the state and the realisation that pluralist models were unsuited for the Latin 
American context, corporatism became the dominant analytical model to study 
the region as it seemed to better capture the organisation of the region’s society 
and the interactions between state and society. Generally, corporatism was 
considered as a form of structuring interest groups and exerting influence on state 
policy (Schmitter, 1993: 195). Corporatism not only referred to the state structure 
but also to the economic system, political culture, the ideology underpinning the 
structure or a particular type of society (Schmitter, 1993: 196). At the Latin 
American level, the nature of corporatism generated a debate among those who 
considered it to be a political tradition (the “culturalists”) and those who 
conceived of it merely as an interest group representation system.66   
 
                                                                                                                                    
(2001), on Mexico. For a political economy focus on the Latin American state, see Bulmer-
Thomas (1994) and Fishlow (1990).    
66
 See Collier (1995) for an excellent review of the debate, and of corporatism in Latin America. 
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Corporatism: A Cultural Tradition 
For the culturalist school,67 Latin America has its own “indigenous reality and 
historical traditions” which are reflected in, and provide continuity for, its 
political culture (Wiarda, 1974: 31). The state is corporate, highly stratified, 
elitist, dictatorial and undemocratic (Wiarda, 1973: 213). Corporatism is thus 
centred on the hierarchically structured and vertically divided system of 
corporate interests, and on elite groups which, through government links, 
incorporated new elements (Wiarda, 1973: 222). Underpinning the region’s 
political culture and institutions is a hierarchical and organic conception of man, 
society and polity (Wiarda, 1973: 210). The state prevails over private interests: 
it has the power to deny or confer legal recognition to corporate groups, it 
controls access to official funds and it provides “favours” without which sectoral 
associations are likely to be functionally limited or succumb (Wiarda, 1973: 222). 
Corporatism has provided the region’s political culture and institutions with 
mechanisms to absorb and accommodate socio-political transformation through 
controlled change by incorporating new elements into the state apparatus without 
necessarily transforming its nature (Wiarda, 1973: 209, 1981: 63). As a result of 
its inherent continuity, the state structure has been remarkably durable and 
persevering (Wiarda, 1973: 209). Such an approach to the region was criticised 
because its applicability went beyond the analysis of the state. In this view 
corporatism was not only applicable to interest politics but was also a framework 
for the analysis of Latin America, and thus it became a description and 
explanation of the region’s politics and culture (Collier, 1995: 150-151).  
                                                 
67
 For culturalist takes on Latin America see for example Bishko (1956), Dealy (1968), and 
Morse (1954) and (1964).    
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Culturalists identify the importance of values and norms in preserving the 
traditional structure and assimilating new groups into elites, and the importance 
of personal and family relations for that assimilation. However, the role of family 
networks and their interactions with the state is not fully theorised in the 
culturalist models, and thus the family becomes a metaphor: the system 
resembles a family structure.68 In addition, the relationship between elites and 
norm construction is not analysed within the models. If those networks and 
norms played a central role in the sustainability of the structure, do elites perform 
a function in norm elaboration? If yes, how do they achieve that task? There are 
other issues with the culturalist view. It argues that regimes did not become full 
corporatist regimes; instead, the latter grounded the new institutions in the 
original structure (Wiarda, 2001: 267). Despite this continuity and the socio-
economic and political power that certain elites enjoyed in the old system, elites 
are conceived of as deferring to state power (see e.g. Wiarda, 2001: 324). Such 
conceptions contradict other propositions in the culturalist analysis. In the case of 
the Central American military regimes often portrayed as a mighty entity in 
control of the state and society, it is argued that the programmes and ideology 
that articulated and justified those regimes were developed and advanced by 
business elites and religious leaders (Wiarda, 2001: 276). In addition, it is 
proposed that democratisation was achieved because of the industrial, business, 
commercial and governmental elites’ pragmatic realisation that controlled change 
was the most acceptable option after the upheavals and crises of the 1970s and 
1980s (Wiarda, 2001: 313). Such contradictory propositions lead to an essential 
question which nevertheless is not addressed by the culturalist: were the Central 
                                                 
68
 Wiarda (1973: 221) writes “The national system is often conceived of in terms of the family… 
implying strong, benevolent leadership, assigned [and] accepted duties, privileges, status, and a 
purpose greater than the sum of its individual parts.” 
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American elites deferring to state control? Or, were they through networks 
normatively influencing the state? 
 
Corporatism: A System of Representation 
Schmitter (1974) rejects such cultural conceptualisations indicating that interest 
politics of the same type occur in different cultural contexts. He (1974: 89-90) 
thus wonders “why do societies supposedly sharing the same general ethos 
exhibit such a wide diversity in interest-group values, practices and 
consequences?” Spain and Colombia are more Catholic than Portugal and Brazil; 
yet the latter two exhibit greater corporatist characteristics (Schmitter, 1974: 90). 
Culturalist propositions must account for such deviations; they need to be heavily 
supplemented (Schmitter, 1974: 90). Schmitter (1974: 93-94) goes on to propose 
a more empirically founded brand of corporatism. In that perspective, 
corporatism is “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories” (Schmitter, 
1974: 93). The state recognises, licenses and creates those functional groups, 
granting them monopoly over sectoral representation under conditions of control 
of leadership selection and demands articulation (Schmitter, 1974: 93-94). 
Empirically, only Brazil and Portugal come close to reproducing all corporatist 
dimensions (Schmitter, 1974: 94). Yet, Schmitter seems to overlook a key issue: 
if cultural conceptualisations of corporatism are not adequate, then why is it that 
the two examples that come closest to his “constructed” type of corporatism are 
culturally directly related? That is, how is the fact that Brazil is a former 
Portuguese colony related to their corporatist tendencies? If Spain is more 
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Catholic than Portugal, Colombia more so than Brazil, but Brazil and Portugal 
are more corporatists, is it not important to note that they are all Catholic and 
corporatist? In this light, the difference seems to be of degree and not of kind.   
Schmitter’s model is applicable to regions and countries beyond the 
Iberic-Latin countries. However, the different degree of state power 
centralisation in each region made necessary the elaboration of two sub-types of 
corporatism defined by the patterns through which the system evolved, and the 
nature of the distribution of power and influence (Schmitter, 1974: 102-103). In 
Societal Corporatism or that which is “autonomous and penetrative,” the 
autonomy of corporate groups attenuates the power of the state and in that sense 
is a pluralist system. State Corporatism can be, in contrast, “dependent and 
penetrated” and in it, the state possesses greater power than society (Collier, 
1995: 147); and thus it is a statist system. This model, because of its disregard for 
socio-cultural aspects, was grounded on the uni-linearity of modernisation: 
society is categorised functionally in order to find those interest groups that could 
lead it towards development. Functional interest groups became the platform for 
social interactions and solidarity, and the mechanism to strive for particular 
political objectives (Newton, 1970: 2). Considering the culturalist proposition 
that the nature of the region’s state is rooted in personalistic politics embedded in 
a highly hierarchical system, it is difficult to see how such functionality emerges 
“free” from personal relations and without resorting to socio-cultural 
elements.69,70      
                                                 
69
 This tendency may explain the issue highlighted by Philip (1980: 425): the relative silence of 
the corporatist model regarding how corporatist regimes emerge. 
70
 Elsewhere, Schmitter (1973: 205) describes the Brazilian state in a manner that seems, to a 
certain degree, parallel to socio-cultural continuity, he writes  that in the case of Brazil, “there 
exists a distinctive ‘authoritarian response to modernization.’” That response was embedded in a 
“consistent, interdependent, and relatively stable set of political structures and practices” which in 
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Attempts were made to bring socio-cultural aspects into the corporatist 
framework without necessarily adopting the culturalist position. Bureaucratic 
authoritarianism (BA) is a modified version of corporatism which reflects socio-
cultural aspects of Latin America; it refers to a state type through which the 
representation of private interests is exercised by functional organisations 
(O’Donnell, 1977: 2-5). Arguably, this corporatist model rejects the traditional-
modern dichotomy underpinning modernisation theory (Peruzzotti, 1999: 62). 
And, indeed, it allows for the incorporation of socio-cultural continuities. Yet, it 
too is inclined to concurrently incorporate certain aspects of modernisation that 
“cloud” our view of the region’s state. In that model certain groups had greater 
influence than others. What is telling and illuminating, however, is the manner in 
which the profile of the functional groups necessary to carry out a comparative 
study of modernisation is elaborated: military institutions are dominated and 
strategically managed by modern or professional officers; the old oligarchy is 
replaced by formally trained individuals (O’Donnell, 1973: 29-31). Moreover, 
the private sector creates organisations and promotes public relations activities 
geared to increasing contact among professional managers and with other 
technocratic incumbents. It is notable that the same pattern as that presented by 
neofunctionalism emerges in this corporatist model: technocrats, private sector 
and old elites are neatly organised in a functional manner.      
Power in the BA model can be articulated at two levels. On the one hand, 
the state can penetrate and thus control the popular sectors. To put it differently, 
in relation to society in general, power is concentrated in the state and popular 
sectors have, at best, minimal influence over state policy. On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                                    
turn enables “elites to manage, guide, or manipulate the transformation of economic and social 
structures at minimal cost to themselves in terms of power, wealth, and status.” 
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state and dominant sectors exercise reciprocal control over each other. State 
control over dominant sectors, thus, is less restraining than that over popular 
sectors.71 And hence, dominant sectors have extensive influence over state policy. 
The functional division prism employed by the model does not allow for a 
holistic incorporation of cultural continuities. The state could become controlled 
by dominant sectors; yet, the division of the elite into functional groupings 
makes that domination virtually impossible. By functionally splitting elites their 
power is correspondingly reduced. The BA model, thus, can incorporate the 
industrial elites as agents of modernisation but as upcoming elites their power is 
somewhat limited. And by simultaneously excluding the old oligarchy, or landed 
elite, whose power over the state is seen as a threat to modernisation, it reduces 
the possibility of proposing a return to the old feudal system.  
For this reason, corporatism and its BA variant are, to a certain degree, 
inconsistent with the Central American structure. Corporatism ignores the 
possibility that individuals can have a stake in industrial, commercial and 
agricultural sectors while also holding political offices. 72  This functional 
overlapping is facilitated by the existence of family and kinship networks which 
are incompatible with the corporatist model: analytically allowing for the 
existence of networks means limiting the role of functional interest groups in 
society, and incorporating the continuing power of elites is considered anti-
modern. Although some models do recognise that there are “entrenched 
                                                 
71
 Such power articulation is the reflection of BA’s nature. For O’Donnell (1977: 2-5), BA is 
“bifrontal” because it contains two defining elements: the “statising” dimension in which the state 
“conquers” and subsequently “subordinates” civil society organisations; and the “privitasing” 
component in which there are openings of some of the state’s institutional areas to the “organised 
representation of civil society.” BA is also “segmentary” in that its effective functioning and 
impact differ systematically along social class lines. The segmentary dimension allows the state 
to penetrate and control popular sectors. The privitasing dimension reflects an alliance that leads 
to a complex set of “interpenetrations” between the state and dominant sectors. 
72
 Hammergren (1977: 453 and en. 48, particularly) discusses elites’ overlapping membership at 
the Latin American level. 
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oligarchies” (Schmitter, 1974: 96), it is ultimately the state that imposes 
organisation on society (Philip, 1980: 426). And in some cases, the elites become 
dependent on the state for their ultimate survival (see O’Donnell, 1978: 17). The 
state therefore possesses supremacy over the socio-political structure: state 
power prevails over the power of societal groups. Corporatism thus assigned an 
unrealistic degree of independence to the state (Philip, 1980: 435).  
Such a stance is the result of the fundamental assumptions of corporatism. 
The corporate structure dissipates if first, the state becomes dependent and 
controlled by private interests, and second if the state enjoys complete autonomy 
and independence, and interest groups in society are completely subordinated to 
the state (Cawson, 1985: 19). These presuppositions effectively relegate what I 
have labelled “normative elites” (I will discuss these elites further later in this 
chapter) to the sector in which they function. While identifying those entrenched 
traditional elites, corporatism treats them as functional/interest groups with 
power limited to the economic sector in which they function. In this sense, socio-
cultural continuities have at best a minimal role in politics. Yet they give texture 
to the socially constructed structure of the state from which the decision to 
impose or not corporatist organisation on society is derived.    
 
The Post-Democratisation State Model 
Post-democratisation73 conceptions of the state (see e.g. O’Donnell, 1993, 1994; 
Panizza, 2000; Peruzzotti, 1999, 2001) further mystify the existence and role of 
                                                 
73
 By “democratisation” I mean the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratically 
elected governments that took place in most Latin American countries beginning in the late 1970s 
through the early 1990s. For a comprehensive review of democratisation in Latin America see 
Hagopian and Mainwaring (2005); on the dilemmas and prospects implicated by democratisation, 
see Cavarozzi (1992) and Karl (1990). 
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family and kinship networks. The analytical neglect of functional overlapping 
within those networks remains the trend in state models and thus the networks, as 
a type of social “glue” that enables the functioning of the political and the 
economic structures, is further relegated to “history.” Democratisation and the 
reforms that it encompassed are argued to be the product of the discretionary 
power and concentrated authority held by the executives vis-à-vis economic 
interest groups (Haggard and Kaufman, 1994: 69). The BA state model thus 
became a distinctive type of democracy, a “delegative democracy” in which 
elected presidents are entitled to govern at their discretion restrained only by “the 
hard facts of existing power relations” and by the constitutionally established 
term of office (O’Donnell, 1994: 59). The model, thus, to a large extent detaches 
the executives from social processes. In addition, technocrats are fundamental for 
the proper functioning of the model, and just as in neofunctionalism and the BA 
state models, they are analytically separated from elite networks. 74  More 
importantly, the source of the president’s discretionary power and politico-
economic preferences, not to mention the constraining hard facts of power 
relations, are hardly questioned or discussed.  
Delegative democracy is considered to be a transitional phase towards a 
fully institutionalised and consolidated democracy. Complete transition, however, 
is not guaranteed as democracy may stall or there may be a regression to 
authoritarian rule (O’Donnell, 1994: 56). In this way, Delegative democracy 
incorporates the “problematic” cultural tendencies of the region as its salient 
characteristics are those of resurrected identities (Peruzzotti, 2001: 136). This 
brings lasting cultural factors that might have historically thwarted democratic 
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 See O’Donnell (1994: 60). 
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development back into the analysis (Peruzzotti, 2001: 155). The model proposes, 
however, that rather than exhibiting constant cultural continuity, the region’s 
political culture has undergone a extensive transformation: the emergence of an 
“autonomous public opinion” and a politicisation oriented towards rights 
(Peruzzotti, 1999: 66). The region, in short, has reached a “democratic plateau” 
(Peruzzotti, 2001: 134).  
Cultural variables thus remain problematic for the analyst as they are 
conceived of as constraining modernity; in this case, democracy.75 Hence, the 
analysis is implicitly committed to modernisation principles: the feudal past has 
completely disappeared, authoritarianism has receded opening up to the 
transitional phase, albeit an uncertain one, but transitional nevertheless, to 
democracy. The assumption is that the region’s societies are traditional societies 
on the way to modernity; and for this reason, arguments that stress continuity in 
the structure rather than a uni-linear progression are quickly discarded.76 The 
state is assumed to be interest-neutral, without prejudices, and lacking its own 
culture and identity; and yet states are underpinned by cultural idiosyncrasies and 
particular normative understandings of reality (Hedetoft, 2003: 39).  
In the post-democratisation models, the state comprises three structures 
(O’Donnell, 1993: 1356-1357). First, the state apparatus: the public sector or 
public bureaucracies. This structure refers to the formal institutional framework 
of the state or the government. The second structure is ideological, in which the 
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 Haynes (2001), for example, when including the role of “traditional landed elites” in the 
analysis, considers it as a structural impediment to democratisation in the region. Haynes 
overlooks the possibility that the landed elite is interconnected with individuals perceived as 
essential for the democratisation process; that is, politicians in key positions, technocrats and 
leading figures in policy research. 
76
 For Whitehead (2006: 114) by the 1950s, the oligarchical Latin American state had 
disappeared almost completely and it had been replaced by a “modernising” state. And yet, he 
(2006: 115) points out that to reconcile the evidence with modernisation theory, “a little forcing” 
(e.g. ignoring its predictions) is needed. 
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state projects itself and is perceived as “state-for-the-nation.” This is the 
ideational structure wherein ideas that frame a society’s reality are embedded. 
Third, the legal system: a formalised set of social relations which reproduces the 
unequal power relationships that occur in society. The law is partly constitutive 
of the social order. The law, more importantly, through the constitutionalisation 
of state power eliminates private privileges detaching the state from 
particularistic social powers (Peruzzotti, 1999: 74). The law thus brings to an end 
the state modernisation cycle: personalistic politics are eliminated, political-
bureaucratic elites are now assumed to be independent, the state can now claim 
to possess a monopoly on legitimate power and hence politics becomes a 
“rational” and impartial process. Such a legal focus raises a fundamental 
question: if the state is part of the general social structure wherein it is 
intertwined in various and complex relations with society,77 is it the law that 
constitutes the state? Or, is it the constant social interplay that occurs within the 
structure that constitutes the state? Where do the norms and principles that the 
law institutionalises come from?78   
Such issues could be approached through the state structure I proposed 
previously. I have argued that the state is an intersubjective structure in which 
two interconnected spaces converge: first, the formal or legal framework 
constituted by state institutions; and, second, a socially constructed space. In 
these spaces power is projected in two forms. First, de jure power is exercised 
through the formal structure of the state. Second, what I labelled normative 
power—which refers to the power derived from the possession of material, 
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 As O’Donnell (1993: 1356) indicates. 
78
 Luhmann (1990: 200-201) argues that the law depends “on highly complex social 
preconditions that are historically determined” and which “cannot simply be assumed as given.” 
In any case, these aspects of law are well beyond the scope of this thesis; it is appropriate for 
jurists, law theorists and/or historians to explore them.   
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political and ideological resources—is articulated within the socially constructed 
space of the state. While the post-democratisation three-dimensional structure 
separates the state legal structure from its formal counterpart (i.e. state apparatus), 
I argue that they belong to the same dimension as it is in the institutional 
apparatus that the law is projected. In addition, these models establish a separate 
ideological structure which seems to parallel the socially constructed space I 
propose. However, I differ from any view which assigns supremacy to the state 
in ideological matters. I argue that both ideological and legal structures are 
underpinned by the existence of normative elites which contribute to the 
construction of the principles and norms that give substance to the formal state 
structure. To put it differently, the formal state structure is the space in which 
normative power materialises. Undoubtedly, the legal structure constrains state 
actors. Norms and values that underpin the law, however, are negotiated and 
interpreted through the day-to-day rituals and traditions of power (Hedetoft, 
2003: 37). Such articulation of power implies that the ideas, interests and values 
of elites play a constitutive role in the social interactions from which legal and 
ideological structures evolve given those elites ultimate power to shape society. 
Conceptualisations of the state that fail to incorporate the existence of networks 
whereby elites can obtain normative power and perform such a constitutive role, 
lead to the conclusion that the state is detached from the social processes with 
which it is supposed to be intertwined.      
In the post-democratisation state model, political institutions 79  are 
selective as to what agents they favour, becoming identity shapers which lead 
agents to mould their identities in order to fulfil the criteria that determine the 
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 Defined as “regularized patterns of interactions that are known, practiced, and regularly 
accepted (if not normatively approved) by social agents who expect to continue interacting under 
the rules and norms formally or informally embodied in those patterns” (O’Donnell, 1994: 57). 
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distribution of benefits (O’Donnell, 1994: 57-58). To the extent that political 
institutions are constituted by social agents, those models need to recognise that 
there are members of society who may have the power to determine the ideas and 
values embedded in political institutions. When such power is acknowledged it is 
considered as a filler of the power vacuum left by feeble political institutions,80 
and not more accurately as a power that constitutes normatively those institutions. 
Why do institutions favour some social groups and not others? Do the rules, 
norms and principles that determine social interactions emerge out of a “big 
bang” phenomenon from which autarkical institutions arise? It is important to 
emphasise that institutions are constructed on an ideational structure provided by 
social agents, and which influence how agents fare within those institutions. 
Cultural continuities play an essential role in that construction as they frame and 
mould the ideas and interests of normative agents: those social elites that shape 
the norms and principles that govern social interactions. 
Other observers acknowledge, to an extent, a degree of continuity in the 
state structure.81 Panizza (2000: 737), for instance, questions the assumption that 
economic modernisation undermines traditional social institutions and politics.82 
The adoption of liberal democratic principles did not put an end to old politics 
(Panizza, 2000: 738). Within certain limits, rather than being a limitation to 
economic modernisation, old politics have facilitated and moulded economic 
reforms. Admittedly, thus, democratic reforms may have strengthened the 
region’s traditional elites (Panizza, 2000: 763). Yet, the state is not simply 
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 See e.g. Peruzzotti (1999: 69). 
81
 For a continuity argument see also Lambert (1999: 394) who argues that in the case of 
Paraguay the transition to democracy has been characterised by “change of regime but also by a 
high degree of continuity with regards to the state.”   
82
 That is, particularist relations based on “patrimonialism, clientelism, patronage and corruption” 
(Panizza, 2000: 737). On this “traditional Politics” see among others, Powell (1970), Eisenstadt 
and Roniger (1984), Mosovich Pont-Lezica (1997), Meyer-Stamer (1999), and Lazar (2004).  
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enmeshed in old politics; nor can the state and the policies it develops and 
implements be extrinsic to the democratic context (Panizza, 2000: 760). To 
address these seemingly contradictory propositions, state models increasingly 
divide society into formal and informal sectors. Old politics have adapted to 
current social practices and operate within the informal sector of the economy in 
which individuals have fewer rights and exist mostly outside civil society 
(Panizza, 2000: 762). Old politics also help to account for the integration of state 
organizations into certain privatised “circuits of power;” for example, 
government officials converge within “drug trade” circles (O’Donnell, 1993: 
1359 and en. 8).  
This is another analytical rupturing point of the old (oligarchic) state 
system and the modern democratic state. The effectiveness of the old is relegated 
to the fringes of legality. This raises a fundamental question, if old elites have 
been strengthened by modernity, have they abandoned the old politics’ way of 
dealing with the state and thus remain focused on the informal sector? It also 
highlights the ambivalent position of analysts: as they struggle to reconcile the 
modern with the old, they tend to divide society into formal (modern) and 
informal (old) practices, in which division old politics becomes illegal.  
Parallel to such “illegalisation” of old politics, civil society is granted 
greater leverage in its interactions with the state.83 Civil society can only achieve 
greater power within a new phase of modernity in which the continuity of the 
socio-cultural factor is further relegated to the historical background that freezes 
them in time. Although the existence of social groups with exceptional power is 
again admitted, left behind in the illegal space are the old politics of oligarchies 
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 See e.g. Peruzzotti (2001: 155). 
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and their direct relationship to the state. Powerful elites are now considered fully 
functional sectors with power limited to their specific function. And yet, 
economic functional labels such as “agrarian” and “commercial” cannot capture 
the sources and degree of elite cohesion (Hagopian, 1996: 16-20). In addition, 
freezing elites and the structure they historically influenced, and in some cases 
directly designed, leaves out of the analysis the fact that civil society and its new 
found voice must nevertheless remain within and interact with a durable socio-
political structure. Such a structure, I argue, is fostered, maintained and 
perpetuated through family and kinship networks.  
 
Putting Elites Back in: The Enmeshed State, and Family and Kinship 
Networks 
The decline of kinship has become a standard to assess modern economies and 
societies: kin is perceived as a constraint on individuals attempting to build a 
self-sufficient system and hence becomes a characteristic of anti-modern 
societies (Sabean and Teuscher, 2007: 23). Modern society is assumed to be 
characterised by a division of labour that governs its functions and systematic 
reproduction through a set of social institutions that follow different logics: the 
market governs the economy; the state, politics; the church, religion, and the 
family, kinship (Yanagisako, 2007: 40-41). These modernity standards are 
followed by conceptions of the state that theoretically divide elites, and by 
default overlook the networks in which those elites are embedded. Those 
conceptions are underlined by premises that lead to the conclusion that economic 
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modernity must result in impersonal social relations.84 As the complexities of 
society increase the differentiation of its internal structure also increases. 
Institutions in this context become functionally specialised in a given task. 
Specialisation, in turn, leads the family and kinship networks to gradually lose 
functions to other institutions (Smith, 1984: 5). The modernisation process exerts 
pressure on family and kinship leading to the decline of their importance. Yet, 
evidence suggests that in the Latin American context modernisation was 
moulded to the traditional institutions and functions of family and kinship: 
individuals were affected by modernity, networks, however, were not necessarily 
destroyed (Carlos and Sellers, 1972: 113-114). 
In Central America, the embryonic forms of such resilient networks are 
found in two colonial institutions that from design enmeshed the state: the 
encomienda and the cabildos.85 Encomiendas were grants given by the Crown to 
the conquistadors. They were perpetual and consisted of the conquered land and 
the labour of its inhabitants; from these grants emerged the region’s grand estates 
ruled by the absolute power of the landowner (Wiarda, 2001: 57 and 98-99). 
During the early colonial period, these encomenderos 86  (originally 
peninsulares87) controlled the cabildos, or town councils, becoming effective 
leaders of society and transforming the councils into family-owned entities, 
providing the means of survival for large clans (Lockhart, 1985: 57). As colonial 
society grew the old elites were challenged by newcomers (i.e. criollos88). In 
these struggles, the cabildos became centres to protect the family’s interests and 
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 See Smith (1984: 3-4) and for a theoretical analysis of modernisation and kinship see Cancian, 
Wolf Goodman and Smith (1978).  
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 See also discussion in Balmori, Voss, and Wortman (1984: 27-35). 
86
 Or an individual granted an encomienda. 
87
 Peninsulares were Spaniards living in the American colonies. 
88
 Criollos or creoles refer to Spaniards’ descendents born in America. 
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privileges supposedly based on direct descent from the original conquerors 
(Wortman, 1982: 65). A position in the councils remained a symbol of power, of 
authority embedded in tradition; a position to be transferred from generation to 
generation (Wortman, 1982: 65-66). As the composition of society continuously 
shifted, it was necessary to accommodate other classes. Eventually, newcomers 
were reluctantly incorporated into the councils. Spanish merchants and other 
government officials obtained their share of power in the councils through 
marriage alliances with elite members (Wortman, 1982: 66). Established landed 
elites co-opted the rising merchant-business elements into their own networks 
and also became involved in those activities themselves, thus converging the 
older and the newer basis of wealth and power (Wiarda, 1973: 213).  
This institutional evolution signals the emergence of the networks that 
were to be so influential for modern Central American society. As elites grew 
and diversified their power became fragmented. And yet, kinship and family ties 
provided a structure in which different sources of power could be exchanged. 
Members in possession of economic power could support those with political 
power. When political power thought it necessary to reinforce the ideological 
foundation of the social structure, they could resort to members of the network 
who possessed the authority to build such a foundation; for example, members of 
the church hierarchy or academics. Networks, thus, provided the Central 
American elites with an accumulation mechanism that has resulted in normative 
power: the capacity to set norms and rules that lead to a particular social reality. 
Over the years, this exchange system has sustained elite power and the social 
structure necessary to articulate that power. 
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There are two trends that point to elite persistence in the region 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 57). First, we find the endurance of the 
economic system. Despite changes in the political structure (e.g. 
democratisation) the underlying economic structure persists. 89  This in turn 
reinforces the position of the region’s elites in the economic system. The second 
trend is elite identity. Although changes occur in the latter through the 
incorporation of new elite members, newcomers adopt the policies and practices 
of their predecessors resulting in the sustainability of the socio-political and 
economic structures (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 57). Family and kinship 
networks facilitate continuity of elite identity. Networks are interconnected 
through five dimensions: marriage alliances; business alliances; geographical 
proximity and socio-racial matters; membership of political, religious, and socio-
cultural associations; and the “making” (formación) of their own “organic 
intellectuals” who provide the ideational structure to rationalise and sustain the  
power of the elites (Casaus, 1994: 41-43). Hence, at the core of the region’s 
socio-economic structure and political institutions are prominent families; and 
their networks lead the region to a feeble or inchoate demarcation of the public 
and the private (Vilas, 1992: 309-310). 
The reciprocal exchange of resources within those networks led to 
profound socio-political and economic outcomes (Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur, 
1984: 183 and 192).90 The system became conducive to patron-client relations 
because it allowed individuals from all levels of the social hierarchy to enter the 
networks and exchange goods, services, and support on a person-to-person basis 
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 For example, the Labour market’s organisation around “repressed” wages, that is, below 
competitive levels (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 4-5).   
90
 The family and kinship phenomenon is not exclusive to elite groups. It also takes place in other 
levels of society. See Carlos and Sellers (1972), and Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur (1984). 
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(Blank, 1974: 260-261). Powerful individuals situated on the upper levels of the 
hierarchy provided tangible (e.g. economic) and intangible (e.g. political favours) 
resources to others thus accentuating the hierarchical nature of the region’s 
structure. That hierarchical nature allowed a relatively small group of individuals 
to concentrate status, wealth and power.91 The system thus became self-fulfilling. 
Continuity of the network structure does not mean that elites lack 
dynamism. On the contrary, the network structure changes constantly as elite 
members circulate continually. Alliances provide dynamism and allow these 
networks to absorb and attract new members. Economic and political trends may 
affect the power of networks, but the assimilation and accommodation 
mechanisms enable these networks to accommodate disruptions. Charismatic 
political actors could be incorporated into the networks and at times of crisis 
those actors were able to gain political power providing networks with 
continuance. Currently, professional individuals, for example in the case of 
commerce and finance, who bring in technological knowledge are integrated92 
and provide innovation that reinforces family businesses by generating new 
dynamics (e.g. multinational business). Hence, networks remain resistant to 
change because they are capable of assimilating newcomers who bring resources 
that in the long run sustain, and to an extent, provide justification for, the 
existence of the system. New members may be innovative and generate new 
dynamics that sustain a particular core of elites; but they are nevertheless 
components of networks. It is analytically inefficient to just divide Central 
American elites into neatly functional elites because this leads the analysis to 
overlook a constituting force of the region’s socio-political structure. This is not 
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 See Blank (1974) for a discussion on such exchange.  
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 On this trend see e.g. Paige (1997). 
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to argue that there is not a division of labour among elites: it is evident that there 
are elites that dominate different aspects of social life. It is to argue that the 
region is dominated by a social structure in which elites converge in networks 
that in turn enable them to accumulate normative power. It is thus important, for 
example, to incorporate business groups into the analysis—not as functional rent-
seeking pressure groups, but rather as factions of networks which exercise a 
degree of normative power in their societies.   
In the past, networks facilitated the structuring of the economy and the 
powerful associations dominant in formal institutions were made up of business 
families linked through marriages and business alliances (Walker, 1986: 18). 
Family networks provided businesses with a continuous resource pool of loyal 
labour which during critical times (e.g. economic crisis) rendered the system 
stable through continuity (Carlos and Sellers, 1972: 97). They served as an 
interface between the social and the economic, and ultimately, the political. 
Family networks were subsequently transformed into a nucleus of powerful 
business blocs through alliances. As these business blocs expanded, the family 
network acquired shares in almost all dimensions of the economy: financial, 
commercial, agro-exports, and industrial sectors. Business blocs thus developed 
into a “family-centered version of a multinational corporation” (Brown, 1997: 
102). Business groups embedded in family networks accumulated political and, 
of course, economic power becoming what an observer calls “hegemonic 
business blocs” (ECA, 2002: 595).93 
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 El Salvador offers the opportunity to easily observe this phenomenon. For example, Paniagua 
(2002), studies in detail 23 family groups in El Salvador. He demonstrates that family networks 
are the foundation of the business blocs that control the country’s financial system and have a 
considerable presence in other sectors. See appendix II for a “map” of the complex 
interconnectedness of that country’s family networks. 
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Business, commerce and industrial chambers, in the process, became 
important mechanisms in the influencing of state decisions because in many 
instances they functioned as semi-governmental institutions commissioned by the 
state to research and review economic policies (Miller, 1999: 14-15). Interest 
associations provided a channel to access power holders and thus became a link 
between private interests and the state, remaining so to the present day  (Miller, 
1999: 15). 
Within the networks, therefore, the predictions of modernisation failed as 
the different elite factions converged. Conceptualisations of elites as fragmented 
groups, then, distort our ability to observe their linkages and lead us to conclude 
that elites coexist functionally rather than to detect the interconnectedness among 
the different factions. Networks, for instance, enable political actors to interact 
with members of the business elites in an intimate setting weakening the divide 
between the public and the private. Such interactions allow for the existence of 
elites with access to strategic policy-making, elites who possess the power to 
construct consent to support those policies and in the long run to perpetuate the 
system. It is at this juncture that the state is enmeshed in normative networks. 
 
Elite Networks and the State 
There is data that suggests the intertwining of networks and the state. In 
Guatemala, a network based on family and kinship relations control the means of 
production including land, labour, and commercial, financial and industrial 
institutions (Dosal, 1995: 3). During the 1980s, eighteen notable Guatemalan 
families were linked through 155 intermarriages and  in the 1995 presidential 
elections, four candidates were direct descendents of those traditional families 
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(Vilas, 1996: 475). 94  In Nicaragua, even within the revolutionary Sandinista 
regime, offspring of “traditional, conservative families” abounded (Vilas, 1996: 
475). In El Salvador, a group of prominent families has created a “hegemonic 
block” (Paniagua, 2002; see appendix II).  
The interconnectedness of that network and the Salvadoran state is 
observable through an influential “non-partisan” policy-research organisation, 
FUSADES. 95  Among its founders are former Salvadoran presidents, Alfredo 
Cristiani, Armando Calderon Sol, and Antonio Saca (see FUSADES, 2003); all 
members of the same political party (ARENA) and of powerful business groups. 
FUSADES’ founding members also include former high ranking government 
officials (for example, Elias Bahaia of the Saca administration), who are also 
important business leaders. In addition, one can note the inclusion in FUSADES’ 
founders of Miguel Ángel Simán Dada, a director of the Central American Bank 
of Economic Integration. Interestingly, another director of the Bank’s board is a 
member of an important Guatemalan family (this will be discussed subsequently), 
Alfredo Skinner-Klée. It is also interesting to note that FUSADES’ founding 
members’ list could reasonably be perceived as a “family oriented” social club 
comprised largely of several members of several families. (See appendix III 
which presents a partial list of FUSADES founding members).96 The power of 
such a network to develop and advance implementation or to obstruct and 
prevent state policies cannot and should not be ignored.   
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 Dosal (1995: 4) notes that some families have declined but others “notably the Castillo and De 
León, have maintained their status since conquistadores Bernal Díaz del Castillo and Juan De 
León Cardona” arrived in Guatemala. 
95
 Fundación Salvadoreña Para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for 
Economic and Social Development).   
96
 The complete list of founding members is available at: www.fusades.com.sv. 
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Family networks, in addition, have produced in some instances a type of 
political dynasty. Such is the case in Costa Rica and in its relations to other 
countries of Central America. Costa Rica is considered an exceptional 
democratic case in Latin America. Intuitively, one is hesitant about the 
applicability of the “enmeshed” state argument to this particular country. Yet, 
certain historical trends suggest that Costa Rica is no exception: networks have 
been closely intertwined with the state. 97  Such interconnectedness not only 
occurs within the country but also with other networks throughout Central 
America. Here it is worthwhile to quote at length from Stone’s (1990) 
groundbreaking study:   
 
“A Costa Rican social class formed by conquistadors and their descendants has 
provided most of the important office holders there since the conquest. One 
conquistador, Cristobal de Alfaro, is forefather of all the presidents (with a single 
exception) since Independence… His family tree frequently crosses with that of 
another conquistador, Juan Vasquez de Coronado, who has generated over half the 
presidents and over a quarter of the members of congress, and was married to a 
cousin of Pedro Arias de Avila (Pedrarias), conquistador and governor of Panama. 
Vasquez’s family tree crosses with that of Jorge de Alvarado, conquistador of El 
Salvador and Guatemala, who is forefather of a tenth of the members of congress 
(some one hundred forty) in Costa Rica and was a brother of Pedro de Alvarado, 
conquistador of Guatemala” (Stone, 1990: 6-7).  
 
According to Stone, in Central America many of its presidents are the direct 
descendants of the noble colonial families; many rulers were, and remain, related 
to other presidents of the region (Stone, 1990: 3).98  
The Arenales/Skinner-Klée family of Guatemala is also illustrative of a 
network intertwined with the state. Two of its members, Alfredo Skinner-Klée 
and Alejandro Arenales Farner, are (or have been) directors of the board of 
leading corporations and of the board of the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce. 
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 See also Vilas (1996) for a discussion on the Figueres and Calderon families.  
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 See figure in appendix IV for an example of such complex interconnected networks. 
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Alfredo Skinner-Klée is a former member of PARLACEN and is also, at the time 
of writing, the General Secretary of the Reform Movement party. Jorge Skinner-
Klée and Alejandro Arenales Catalan are both former members of the 
Guatemalan Congress. Jorge is also a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Jorge 
Skinner-Klée Arenales is a former Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations, and 
former International Counsel and Alternate Delegate for the National Coffee 
Association of Guatemala. Pablo Arenales Farner has served in several consular 
positions. Four members of this family have been representatives to the United 
Nations including one former President of the Guatemalan Delegation and 
another Permanent Representative. Also, other members of the Arenales and 
Skinner-Klée law firm are (or have been) legal advisers to Guatemalan 
governments on several issues. 99  The profiles of the main members of the 
Arenales/Skinner-Klée family are presented in appendix V. 
 The interconnection of the state and networks, in addition, is thoroughly 
exemplified by the relation of regional business associations and the Central 
American presidents. It is intriguing that six of the region’s presidents elected in 
the last ten years have been high ranking members of RBOs before being elected 
presidents of their respective countries. They are also members of powerful 
networks. For instance, I noted previously that former President Saca of El 
Salvador is linked to FUSADES—a policy influential institution that groups 
several family networks. Also, former President Flores Facussé of Honduras is a 
member of an important family network that combines ownership in the 
industrial sector and the media; other members of his family also hold important 
                                                 
99
 See http://www.arenales.com.gt.  
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government positions. 100  Table 2.1 presents the list of Central American 
presidents with links to RBOs.101 
 
Table 2.1. Central American Presidents with Links to Regional Business 
Associations, 1997-2009 
President Year Country RBO Link Source
Álvaro Colom Caballeros 2008-  Guatemala Director of Agexpront and member of the 
board of the Chamber of Industry both 
associated to CACIF (FEDEPRICAP) 
http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/biografia-presidente.php
Elías Antonio Saca 2004-2009 El Salvador President of ANEP (National Association 
of Private Enterprises, affiliated to 
FEDEPRICAP) and FEDEPRICAP
http://www.casapres.gob.sv/presidente/index.htm
Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales 2006-  Honduras Member of the board of COHEP 
(Honduran Council of Private Enterprise, 
affiliated to FEDEPRICAP)
 http://www.presidencia.gob.hn/frmHtml.aspx?urlID=Biografia.htm 
Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé 1998-2002 Honduras National Association of Industrialists 
(affiliated to FECAICA) and COHEP 
(affiliated to FEDEPRICAP)
http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos
Enrique José Bolaños Geyer 2002-2007 Nicaragua Director and President of COSEP (Council 
of Privatre Enterprises affiliated to 
FEDEPRICAP) and President of 
FEDEPRICAP
http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos
Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo 1997-2002 Nicaragua Board member of COSEP (affiliated to 
FEDEPRICAP)
http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos
 
 
As we have observed, businesses are equally embedded in the family and 
kinship networks in which the state seems to be enmeshed. Nevertheless, 
business groups are continuously seen functionally as another corporate group 
dependent on the state even by those observers who argue for a culturalist 
approach to the state.102 Other analyses of business-state relations deny cultural 
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 Marcia Facussé de Villeda, at the time of writing, is Alternate Second Vice President of the 
Honduran National Congress. See 
http://www.centralamericaleadership.net/en/marcia_facusse_de_villeda 
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 Possibly, other former Central American presidents have links to RBOs but the available 
evidence is not clear; see fn. 23 for a list of those presidents. 
102
 Wiarda (2001: 324), for example, indicates that the private sector “continues to defer to the 
state… usually unwilling to challenge the state, lobby it, least of all take it on… The state 
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continuities and neglect the persistence of family and kinship networks. 
Corporatism is conceived of as enabling the state to exercise control over capital 
thereby obtaining greater autonomy (Bensabat Kleinberg, 1999). Such an 
approach to the nature of business groups circumscribes their embeddedness in 
larger powerful networks and thus inaccurately limits their power to their 
functional sector.103  
These analyses do not contemplate the possibility that the private sector 
performs an important role in the formation of technocrats—consider essential 
components of the state models they propose—and thus overlook an important 
link between the state and the private sector. Though difficult to assess 
empirically,104 it could be the case that the business elite directly or indirectly 
funds the studies of technocrats and by doing so, locks them into its networks. 
For example, the most important Central American family business groups105 
provide funding for the professionalisation (e.g. at MBA level) of their 
executives (Fonseca, 2005). It some cases these executives go on to become 
members of governments or technocratic elites. In structuring our attention away 
from such tendencies, we overlook the remarkable endurance of the Central 
American elites and the influence they may exercise over the state. State models 
that neglect or simply assume as “constraining relations” the interconnectedness 
between state and elite networks are unhelpful in advancing our understanding of 
Central American political processes. 
                                                                                                                                    
remains a godfather, patrimonialist, a dispenser of favors (gifts) and patronage, a paternalistic 
figure.” 
103
 For an approach that conceives of the business elites’ nature and roles in an strictly functional 
(economic) manner within regional integration, see e.g. Fischer (1999).  
104
 Though, perhaps we could assess it by researching the sources of funding that, institutions 
such as El Salvador’s CONACYT (National Council of Science and Technology) uses to fund 
students and where students are reincorporated into the country’s labour force upon finalising 
their studies.  
105
 El Salvador’s Grupo Roble (Poma family) and  Taca; Guatemala’s Grupo Paiz (Paiz family); 
Nicaragua’s Grupo Pellas (Pellas family); and Honduras’ Tiendas Carrión (Carrión family). 
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To be clear, I do not purport that family and kinship networks give unity 
to the elites or lead to a single elite. Rather, I argue that networks give the elites a 
recruitment pool and socialisation mechanisms through which they reach a 
degree of cohesiveness. Elite cohesiveness is reached through shared 
understandings about what constitutes legitimate public discussion, for example. 
Specifically, socialisation through networks determines the elite’s attitudes 
towards the rest of society (Martin, 1977: 147-148). Autonomous members 
constitute those networks; they are interdependent and they may have different, 
but mutually contingent interests. In this sense, there are several parallel 
networks that may compete normatively: a particular network may contest norms 
supported by another. Yet, if need be, as I will argue in the next chapter, they can 
present a harmonised position. Ultimately, networks provide a space to converge 
and exchange power sources leading to the accumulation of normative power. 
Within such weak or inchoate separation of the public and private 
dimensions, the state seems to be enmeshed. However, it has not been recently 
privatised as others argue: the state by design was embedded in a network of 
families and kinship that throughout the years has been flexible enough to absorb 
disruptions and changes, and hence to perpetuate itself. Such a position may 
parallel that of the “radical” view of networks; i.e. “embedded networks” 
(Haggard, Maxfield, and Schneider, 1997: 54-55). In that view, networks are 
considered a type of “primal social fabric” which embeds social, economic and 
political interplay. There is a valid criticism of such a view. Arguably, a 
shortcoming of this embedded networks conceptualisation is that it neglects the 
state which is considered not to participate in the establishment of networks and 
on the contrary, considers that governments are inserted into networks. As a 
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critic of the “embedded networks” proposition, Evans (1997) argues that it is 
crucial to bring back the state through the concept of “embedded autonomy:” the 
state possesses first, the “corporate coherence” required to achieve and pursue 
collective goals; and second, “dense ties” with the private sector and thus can 
develop joint public-private projects seeking “economic transformation” (Evans, 
1997: 66). If these two conditions are not met then there is a latent risk that the 
embeddedness of the state could lead to a “super-cartel” designed to protect the 
interests of its members (Evans, 1995: 58; quoted in Haggard et al., 1997).  
Such a strong objection may apply to my argument; however, I could 
highlight three points in its defence. First, I have attempted “intentionally” to 
keep the state in but at the same time to bring back in those family networks that 
had hitherto been theoretically excluded from the Central American analysis. My 
position is that the state, through the role of political elites, actively participates 
in the formation and functioning of networks. Second, Evans’ point of departure 
is precisely the assumption I have striven to critique: the implicit modernising 
content of the analysis of the state. Evans (1997: 63) argues that “Any analysis of 
government-business collaboration must be grounded in a vision of economic 
transformation.” Evans, thus, must assume the premises on which that 
transformation (i.e. modernisation) is based. A final point in defence of my 
argument: the political and socio-economic structures are co-constitutive of the 
cultural. The political regime conditions, moulds and reproduces the cultural 
foundations that underpin it (Vilas, 1996: 462). At the same time, however, 
cultural patterns and the socioeconomic structure continuously shape their 
political counterpart. Thus, their resilience 106  and flexibility must be 
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 On the Latin American structure resistance to change, Worcester (1964) is illuminating.  
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acknowledged and incorporated into our analysis of the region. Simply 
bracketing out cultural continuities impairs our understanding of Central 
American political processes.107 
It is not my intention to contend, however, that the state is merely an elite 
instrument. The state enjoys a degree of relative autonomy in certain policy 
issues. And yet, the state is a social construct that reflects the social interactions 
from which it emerges: how can we account for instances in which, as we have 
seen, the president of a country is a member of the private sector and a leading 
figure in business associations? What about instances in which the director of the 
Chamber of Commerce becomes a government minister? Are individuals brought 
into the government because they are members of those networks? How can we 
determine on which side of the dense ties advocated by Evans (1997) those 
individuals stand? 
By incorporating cultural continuities, we have observed in this section 
that the Central American state and state politics are constantly intertwined with 
family networks. This process results in a state enmeshed in a web of relations 
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 Teichman’s (2001) work on market reform in Chile, Argentina and Mexico goes against such 
a trend by incorporating “historical realities” into the study of Latin American political processes; 
particularly the “Iberian strain” of the region’s “heritage” (Teichman, 2001: 200). Teichman 
(2001: 16) conceives of a Latin American state “heavily penetrated” and “punctured” by what she 
labels “policy networks.” Those networks are “conduits of policy influence” and are based on 
“personalistic relationships” among “international and domestic actors” (Teichman, 2001: 16). In 
this policy networks concept, in the same manner that Haas and Nye have conceived the regional 
integration mechanisms, technocrats are at the core. Technocrats often possess “specialized 
academic training and bureaucratic career paths” and employ “mechanisms of political control” 
based on “hierarchy, rigidity, personalism, discretionality, and, sometimes, clientelism” 
(Teichman, 2001: 15). Technocrats build “narrow domestic personalistic support” based on “trust 
and personal loyalty with other technocrats of similar mind-set” and also “cultivate close personal 
ties with powerful members of the private sector” (Teichman, 2001: 15). Personalism allows for 
the organisation and concentration of power (Teichman, 2001: 201). Yet, Teichman falls short of 
incorporating the notion of family and kinship networks. Perhaps, this inclination is because her 
analysis is underlined by a “Weberian” conceptualisation of the state and private sector relations 
anchored on a political-bureaucratic-technocratic elite fully dependent on political elites for 
appointments within the corporatist state structure in which that elite interplays with  other 
societal groups (e.g. business and labour) (Teichman, 2001: 20). This position effectively leads 
the analysis towards the conceptions of the state that I have striven to question. See also 
Teichman (2004). 
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among normative elite groups who ultimately greatly influence state policies. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the enmeshed state.  
 
Figure 2.1. The Enmeshed Central American State  
= network members belong to state
Enmeshed 
state
Socially constructed 
state structure
Normative power
Institutional/legal 
state structure
De jure power
Elite (family and 
kinship) networks
Exchange different 
power resources
 
This argument implies that state enmeshment occurs in a two dimensional space. 
The first dimension is (for lack of a better label) “physical;” that is the 
interconnectedness between the state and family networks assessed in this section. 
The second dimension is normative and implies the exercise of the normative 
elites’ power through the socially constructed state structure. It is to the 
discussion of that normative dimension that I now turn. 
 
Political Culture and Normative Elites 
The resilience and persistence of family and kinship networks in Central 
America can be approached by using the conceptual differentiation between 
social structure and social organisation. The structure gives social life its 
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continuity while social organisation implies fluctuations and social change which 
enable individuals to pursue and achieve goals (Smith, 1984: 7).108 Structures are 
resistant and provide continuity to social arrangements. 109  Changes to the 
structure are possible; individuals may attempt to modify the structure in order to 
advance their interests. Yet, structural changes occur at a somewhat slower pace 
than alterations to their organisational counterparts. Social changes at both 
levels—structural and organisational—require shifts in different normative 
beliefs (discussed subsequently). While organisational changes in the Central 
American networks may imply shifts in behavioural standards (ranking norms), 
structural changes require shifts in the “stiffer” membership norms which imply 
the incorporation of new members into highly resistant elites.110      
From such “stiff” structure emerges a Central American political culture 
that carries, and provides the grounds for the sustainability of continuities; for 
example, the role of family and kinship networks in political processes. I 
understand political culture as first, the system of rules, norms, values and 
practices that condition and arrange how politics take place and how power is 
exercised, and second, as the particular forms of historical interactions between 
the state and the social realm (Hedetoft, 2003: 38). Such political culture is then 
ingrained in the social structure of the region, and is thus hierarchical and 
pluralistically limited, at best. It is a dynamic space in which constant social 
interactions renegotiate the rules, norms, values and practices that constitute the 
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 See also Firth (1951). 
109
 On the “stickiness” of structures see Aspinwall and Schneider (2001).  
110
 An argument could be advanced here as to the “stickiness” of the social structure: in the post-
War World II period, changes in the membership norms of some of the Central American elites 
“required” social conflicts. For example, the civil wars experienced in some of the region’s 
countries (e.g. Nicaragua) led to the incorporation of new members into the ranks of the 
normative elites. At the same time, however, the issues that led to the conflict (e.g. social and 
economic inequality) remarkably went barely addressed. 
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culture. On the one hand, rules provide the link between the state structure and 
individuals and include (but not exclusively) legal rules (Onuf, 1998: 59). Rules 
give texture to social structures as they connect the material and ideational 
elements that constitute those structures (Burch, 2002). On the other hand, norms 
are shared principles that set standards of behaviour and hence provide order to 
the system by coordinating social actions (Green, 2002: 6). When norms become 
institutionalised they provide the bases for rules. This does not mean norms are 
static; they are, in contrast, constantly elaborated (Rosamond, 2001: 202). Norms 
are constitutive of the social system, and in them, culture is set (Smith, 1984: 13). 
Embedded in this political culture is a narrower “state culture” composed of the 
informal interactions implicated in the policy and decision making processes, and 
which allows for the deployment of “subjective resources” that “neutralize, 
impact upon or transcend ‘rational authority’” (Hedetoft, 2003: 53).  
The enmeshment of the Central American state could be seen, thus, as 
normatively oriented through its socially constructed structure and made possible 
by the political culture of the region. In this ongoing social construction, there 
are groups that have greater discursive power than others. Such normative elites 
possess the ability to construct the three types of normative beliefs.111 First, they 
are able to set “ranking norms” or those norms that establish standards by which 
an individual or groups are perceived. Second, normative elites fix “membership 
norms” or norms that define standards for including or accepting individuals to a 
social group or position. The elites have the ability to restrict their ranks’ 
membership and are also flexible as regards incorporating new members into 
their networks through a variety of mechanisms. Third, Central American 
                                                 
111
 This typology of norms was developed by Cancian (1975) in her ground-breaking study of a 
Mayan community. 
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normative elites are able to set “reality assumptions” or accepted understandings 
of reality. These are assumptions that constitute reality and delimit alternative 
actions or realities (Cancian, 1975: fn. 2 in page 3). These levels of normative 
beliefs interplay constantly thereby imparting texture to the construction of social 
reality. Political patronage and controlled party systems, for example, have 
become part of the region’s assumed reality. Thus, it is expected that democracy 
in the region is less democratic than elsewhere. Yet, democracy has become a 
ranking norm through which those upholding it are prized. Democracy has a 
mere “symbolic” value as a “currency” that increases the political capital of those 
who claim to abide by it (O’Donnell, 2007: 6). Of course, access to that capital 
(i.e. membership in the elite) is highly restricted. 
The ability to construct norms in such a manner is a reflection of 
normative power. Normative power is a broader type of social power. 112  I 
understand power to be social as it is implicated in human interactions. 
Normative power subsumes the different sources of social power:113 material, 
political and ideological.114 Normative power imbues its holders with the ability 
to set the norms and rules that guide the constitution of social structures. It sets 
the core of a particular social reality by establishing the elements of meaning-
making and thus defines what is “true” or “real” and what is not. Normative 
power thus moulds and conditions reality by establishing parameters as to what is 
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 On social power see Mann (1992) and Poggi (2001). 
113
 For Poggi (2001: 18-19) material power is expressed through exchanges: what an individual 
obtains is determined by what that individual has or can do for others; political power consists in 
the ability to determine access to society’s good; ideological power is that which is articulated on 
the basis of culturally defined understanding of what characteristics and social position an 
individual needs in order to be rewarded in a specific manner.  
114
 Poggi (2001) also refers to ideological power as normative power. I have chosen to include the 
term ideological power in reference to Poggi’s work in order to differentiate it from my notion of 
normative power. The latter notion implies the possession of (and ability to exchange one type 
for another) the three types of social power elaborated by Poggi and Mann (1992), and thus 
encompasses ideological power. 
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achievable and desirable for a particular society. It allows its holders to develop, 
through ideational mediums or those ideas that are readily adopted by others, a 
given set of assumptions about reality projecting a particular reality as general. 
The hierarchical structure of the Central American society, for example, is 
generally considered as inevitable and natural, rather than as a historically and 
socially produced structure that sustains a particular way of societal organisation.  
As we have seen, there are data that point to the current existence of 
family and kinship networks in Central America. Those networks give the elites 
first, monopoly over status and prestige (i.e. ideological resources); second, the 
ability to enter alliances that become powerful economic mechanisms (i.e. 
material resources); and third, direct access to state policy making (i.e. political 
resources). Considering such factors, it seems fitting to talk about normative 
elites in the region’s context. This notion of normative elites implies that those 
elites accumulate synergistically through their convergence in networks, the 
different sources of social power. Through the possession of ideational mediums 
normative elites can convert material resources into ideological power, or 
ideological power into political power. Moreover, normative elites employ their 
power to become norm “entrepreneurs” engaging in the construction of social 
reality through the elaboration of reality assumptions whereby the existing social 
arrangements are maintained. In this process, networks function as 
“organisational platforms” wherein norms are rendered legitimate and 
prominent. 115  Normative elites empower particular norms (i.e. they become 
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 On the concept of norm entrepreneur, organisational platform and the importance of norm’s 
legitimation and prominence, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).  
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elements of debate) eventually being instrumental in those norms gaining 
acceptance or salience throughout society.116  
Networks, however, provide the elites with a cognitive dimension well 
beyond the mere organisational platform: an intersubjective framework (e.g. 
common meanings and understandings) through which they construct their 
reality attaining therein a degree of cohesion. Hence, such frameworks play a 
fundamental role not only in the accumulation and exercise of normative power 
but also in rendering elite networks sustainable. Normative power, in turn, 
enables the elites to articulate and project their reality as a guiding framework for 
the reality of society. The power of the elites, thus, is normative because it not 
only produces behavioural changes in society but also subjective shifts which 
ultimately result in social outcomes through the production of the norms and 
rules which frame what is socio-politically possible. 
Normative elites can maintain or change the direction of a given policy; 
they can set, influence or obstruct the public debate agenda. In the process, the 
state enmeshment takes place normatively. In the case of regional integration, for 
example, normative elites can generate social heterogeneity through the 
construction of particular discourses despite the well documented presence of 
integrative elements (e.g. common culture and language). Conversely, they can 
generate a degree of willingness to support aspects of regional integration thus 
facilitating the socialisation of the process.  
Perhaps, over the years the strategy to empower norms has changed. In 
the past, it was “effective” to incorporate the dominant military elements into 
family and kinship networks through marriages or business partnerships and in 
                                                 
116
 On norm empowerment see Checkel (1999b); and on norm salience see Cortell and Davis 
(2000). 
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the process advance or protect norms and principles that would perpetuate the 
socio-political structure. Currently, normative elites may establish and fund 
policy research centres (such as FUSADES in El Salvador) that empower the 
norms and principles they favour.117 Conversely, they can obstruct norms from 
gaining salience by redirecting public debate. Normative elites may fund 
scholarship schemes that select students based on their proposed studies, or their 
intention to attend particular universities that are ideologically compatible with 
the elites concerned. Perhaps, normative elites are able to influence such 
institutions by inserting in their administrative echelons members of their 
networks. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has revisited the state in order to bring back the role of social elites 
into the study of integration in Central America. The region’s elites converge 
around networks based on family and kinship. Networks enable the elites to 
accumulate and exchange different sources of power transforming them into 
normative elites. The latter exercise their power through the socially constructed 
dimension of the state, and in this manner enmesh the state in a web of 
interactions that occurs within the elite networks. The chapter thus incorporates 
the cultural continuities essential for the understanding of the region. It does not 
propose that Central America is frozen in time or that the region is backward and 
non-modern. Rather than bracketing out or assuming away those networks 
because their resilience and persistence are inconsistent with conventional 
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 As we will see in chapter five, FUSADES played a normative role in the reactivation of the 
regional integration process of Central America through the development of a highly influential 
integrative model (FUSADES, 1986) which was echoed by other regional institutions.  
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(modern) paradigms, this chapter theorises the evolution of the networks and 
their power. And in so doing, it elaborates a conception of Central American 
elites that allows for their incorporation into “modern” analyses. The elites’ 
traditional oligarchic predispositions seem to have been replaced by 
“enlightened” tendencies wherein they exercise their power not as absolute force 
but as normative elaboration. While “modernity” may have brought to the 
forefront a specific segment of the elite (i.e. the business elite), networks allow 
other segments of the elite to retain power. 
The chapter thus builds the first part of the “Central Americanised” 
regional integration model: the interactions between the state and normative elite 
networks and the enmeshment of the former within the latter. The second part of 
the model consists of the normative mechanisms wherein those interactions take 
place, and where elites exercise and articulate their normative power. The next 
chapter undertakes the theorisation of those components.  
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Chapter 3. Normative Structure and the Emergence of 
Social Will: A Central Americanised Model of Regional 
Integration  
 
Introduction 
The tendency for an a-theoretical and non-elites scope in the study of Central 
American integration leads to a limited conceptual toolkit incapable of 
completely incorporating into the analysis the region’s cultural continuities we 
observed in the previous chapter. Current frameworks, in addition, cannot 
apprehend the mediums that enable elite networks to engage in the normative 
construction of the region. To overcome these limitations, this chapter further 
elaborates that toolkit by developing the second part of the Central Americanised 
integration model. At the core of the model are the normative channels employed 
by elite networks in the exercise of their power; namely, the mechanisms of norm 
socialisation and diffusion. These mechanisms enable normative elites to 
disseminate their understanding of “reality” and ultimately embed that 
understanding in the general ideational structure. For such construction, social 
will as the articulation of the power of normative elites, is essential. The aim of 
this chapter is to set forth the steps through which elite interactions construct 
regionalism in order to derive a more comprehensive model of the process.  
With this objective, in the first section, I focus on regional integration as 
a political process wherein norms are socialised and are subsequently embedded 
in regional policies. I argue that current theoretical models of the normative 
structure seem inadequate to the study of Central American integration. For this 
reason, a socialisation model, “ideational drive,” and a diffusion mechanism, 
“circumscribed-statist,” are elaborated to obtain greater insights into the nature of 
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regional integration by allowing for the incorporation of normative networks and 
their interactions with the state into the analysis. In section two, I develop the 
concept of social will or the predisposition of normative elites to empower norms 
that may enable the state to develop policies that could advance integration. 
Based on the theoretical elaborations of this chapter, in addition to those of the 
previous chapter, section three presents the Central Americanised model of 
regional integration. Section four concludes.         
 
Regional Integration and the Elaboration of Norms 
Regional integration is a socio-political process. As such, the process defines the 
region based on a particular set of ideas, values and principles which ultimately 
are embedded in norms.118 There are in society actors, norm entrepreneurs, who 
are interested in modifying or contesting current norms (Sunstein, 1997: 36 and 
40).119  Generally, studies 120  consider as norm entrepreneurs those individuals 
who oppose current or dominant norms, and organise themselves in an attempt to 
modify or replace those norms; for example, activists. It seems that implicit in 
this view is a pluralising assumption: changes to the socio-political structure 
come about from below through the initiatives of, or the exercise of pressure by, 
civil society, transnational or domestic. Power is thus conceived to be diffused 
throughout society and the state becomes a reflector of the preferences of the 
civil society. In this view, normative adjustments take place within a multilevel 
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 For an in-depth study of norms see Burch (2002); Green (2002); Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein (1996); and Kratochwil (1989). 
119
 In this context, norms are “collectively held principles and standards that guide, prohibit, and 
render actions appropriate and provide order to the system by coordinating social actions” 
(Green, 2002: 6). 
120
 See e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001). 
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governance system in which civil society can contest the established normative 
structure. 
This view of norm entrepreneurs does not accommodate the Central 
American normative elite networks. The normative power possessed by those 
networks, implies the capacity of elites to combine material, political and 
ideological resources in a manner in which they are co-constitutive and mutually 
reinforcing. Of course, such power could be exercised as force. However, 
through its intersubjective content, normative power is a capacity for affecting 
the attitudes and behaviour of other societal groups. It allows elite networks to 
effectively establish norms and rules as to how regional integration is played out. 
The position and prestige that normative elites have in the region’s society 
enables them to construct a normative structure that is perceived as reality by the 
rest of society. They can outright manipulate meanings leading to a particular 
understanding of the region and thus greatly influence state preferences and 
ultimately policies. The members of normative networks emphatically do not 
belong to that organised society that contests the normative structure from below 
but nevertheless they act as norm entrepreneurs. 
In addition, the study of norms, surprisingly, has largely focused on the 
positive and moral dimensions of normative processes. Scholars favour the 
analysis of “progressive norms”121 because they admire certain social structures 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 403-404).122 Focusing on the not-so-nice or non-
ethical norms leads the analyst directly to the self-interest of social individuals. It 
                                                 
121
 For examples about this tendency see e.g. on human rights the volume by Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink (1999); on  apartheid (Klotz, 1995) and on the landmines issues (Price, 1998). 
122
 Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 403-404) indicate that constructivists have not investigated 
social constructions such as “xenophobic and violent nationalisms.” Finnemore and Sikkink are 
quick to indicate that there are some studies on the negative outcomes of “well-intentioned social 
construction projects”; e.g. Barnett and Finnemore (1999). However, they conclude that the 
“admiration” bias persists.   
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seems that there is a tendency to think that progressive norms emerge from 
ethical identities perhaps because the individuals advocating those norms seem 
not to profit from that support. One could wonder, what can possibly be obtained 
by advocating human rights? Behaviour supportive of such norms is thus seen as 
egalitarian, moralistic and ethical; and occasionally, it seems to go against the 
self-interest of the actors involved. Conversely, advocators of “regressive” norms 
seem to be motivated by self-interest and thus not by principled ideas. The issue 
is that self-interest, arguably, leads to relations within the material power 
structure. In this view, the latter structure seems inadequate to incorporate the 
independent role of ideas and identity in social processes. A position that 
acknowledges a predominant role of power groups in the process of social 
construction, makes the role of ideas less autonomous because it assumes that 
ideas are fixed in relations of social power (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 398). I 
differ from this position; I argue that material and ideational power are 
inextricably embedded in normative power as defined in the previous chapter. I 
conceive of interests (e.g. material preferences) as endogenous, which within the 
normative structure constantly interplay with ideas in a mutually constitutive 
relation. As I will argue subsequently, the ideas held by normative elites and 
their identity and interests constantly interact leading to normative constructions 
that articulate the power of the networks. Certain constructions are not 
necessarily undertaken or supported for material reasons. Normative elites could 
pursue them in an attempt to incorporate new ideas or redefine existing ones, 
which in turn affect their identity (e.g. place in society) and inevitably their 
interests. Power relations among certain groups at the top (i.e. elite networks), 
thus, can be conceptualised beyond a materialistic perspective.   
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Focusing on the study of progressive norms, in addition, brackets the fact 
that there are norms with limited or non-existent moral outcomes, or norms that 
do not have a direct positive outcome (e.g. regional integration) or may have a 
direct negative outcome (e.g. violent nationalism). These norms determine social 
relations, and in some cases, the assumed reality of a given society and may 
favour and benefit specific societal segments. That is to say, norms can have a 
functional character and non-ethical objectives, and in some cases may have 
negative effects on the welfare of some societal groups.123 Such outcomes may 
be perceived as beneficial for the individuals advancing those particular norms. If 
individuals’ identities so dictate it, however, their actions may originate from the 
“logic of appropriateness.”124  
I previously noted that the hierarchical structure characteristic of Central 
American society is conceived of as appropriate and even inevitable. The 
normative elites’ role is entrenched in such a social structure. Their role 
originates in an invented and largely unquestioned tradition guided by practices 
that communicate particular values and norms, and reinforce and legitimate the 
nature of the system.125 Through such a social structure normative elites perceive 
themselves as leaders of their society. Leadership in this context refers to a role 
of an “educator” who stimulates and promotes changing worldviews, and in so 
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 For a discussion of the functionality and non-ethical origins and purposes of norms see Klotz 
(1995) and on their possible negative effect on human well-being, see Sunstein (1997). 
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 Which indicates that “actions are fitted to situations by their appropriateness within a 
conception of identity” (March and Olsen, 1989: 38). 
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 This entrenchment may be the product of the social structure’s origins. Among the latter, there 
are notions of “obedience to higher authority,” and the political authority fashioned after the 
“paternalistic family model” (Wiarda, 2001: 41). It follows that Central American society is 
characterised as yielding to the will of “strong men” as individuals “trust [in] authority [is 
perceived] as the basis for actions and judgement” (i.e. authoritarianism) of those individuals 
who, in turn, accept or internalise the structure which becomes “natural rather than historical” 
(Martín-Baró, 1994: 206 and 214). On the notion of invented traditions and the tendency not to 
question those constructions, see Hobsbawm (1983); and on the transformation of myths into 
legitimate, natural and inevitable characteristics of social systems, Sidanius and Pratto (2004).  
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doing, redefines the meanings of society’s surroundings (March and Olsen, 1984). 
Normative elites can influence the knowledge that guides and shapes mass 
society’s understandings of social phenomena and thus they can influence or 
define society’s policy preferences.126 This influence, however, does not mean 
that normative elites consciously engage in manipulative and self-serving 
behaviour. Rather, normative elites undertake their social role,127 or expected 
behaviour which is legitimised by the region’s invented traditions. To reiterate 
the point, this argument does not privilege rationality, fixed preferences and 
material power over cognitive interactions. Rather, it proposes that normative 
power subsumes material power. My argument is not about the instrumental 
moves of self-conscious elites pursuing their rational preferences; it is about the 
normativeness of the power of elites. Considering that what we observe in the 
normative elites’ behaviour is their socially expected roles, perhaps their actions 
are better conceived of as socially appropriate. Nevertheless, to be sure, 
normative elites may employ their power instrumentally. 128  They may, for 
example, advance certain policies because those policies reify their position in 
society; that is, maintain their role as an essential component for the adequate 
functioning of society.129  
Norms are embedded or institutionalised in particular policies: policies 
articulate institutionalised norms. Policies encompass cognitive spaces in which 
particular meanings—or those determined by individuals or groups of 
individuals—prevail. And in this sense, elites with normative power can 
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 Berger and Luckmann (1966: 33) label these individuals as “merchants of ideas.” 
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 Social roles are the ways “in which acts conform to or violate expectations associated with [a 
given] role” (Sunstein, 1997: 46). 
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 This is not to say that structures are, as Wendt (1996: 50) puts it, “inevitably malleable” 
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influence the ideas and knowledge that underpin norms, and thus can advance or 
delimit certain policies. Those cognitive spaces are the building blocs of the 
socially constructed structure of the state. Norms must be negotiated and learned. 
This process takes place through constant interactions among elites. They 
negotiate ideas and proposals about the optimal way to approach a policy issue. 
Those ideas and proposals deemed appropriate become norms and rules and, 
ultimately, are embedded in policies. These building blocs are comprised of two 
elements. One that serves as a medium for elite negotiation and one that 
articulates the elites’ normative power as preferences or support for a particular 
policy. Negotiation channels are those of socialisation and mechanisms for the 
diffusion of norms. The articulation of normative power arises as the elites’ ideas, 
identity and interests converge and are expressed as social will towards a 
particular policy. 
The enmeshment of the Central American state has important 
consequences for the socialisation process. Regional integration is a social 
construct elaborated out of shared understandings that lead to a “cognitive 
region,” or one that is comprised of its members and keeps the meaning of the 
region constrained to a specific space (Adler, 1997a: 254). The process, thus, as 
constituted by norms must be socialised to gain salience within society:130 it must 
be transmitted throughout society and, via learning, internalised. 131  Norms 
constrain behaviour and depend on the power distribution that underpins society. 
Norms need to be empowered or become elements of debate through discursive 
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 According to Cortell and Davis (2000: 69), norms acquire salience as society develops “a 
durable set of attitudes toward the norm’s legitimacy in the national arena, such that the norm is 
presumptively ‘accepted as a guide to conduct…’ when a norm is salient… its invocation by a 
relevant actor legitimates a particular behavior or action, creating a prima facie obligation, and 
thereby calling into question or delegitimising alternative choices.”  
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modifications or shifts (Checkel, 1999b: 87-88). Socialisation, thus, is the 
switchboard through which regional policies are negotiated.  
 
The Socialisation of Norms 
There are three ideal types of the norm socialisation process: “adaptation and 
strategic bargaining,” “moral consciousness-raising, ‘shaming,’ argumentation, 
dialogue, and persuasion” and “institutionalization and habitualization” (Risse 
and Sikkink, 1999: 11). 132  The adaptation type refers to adjustments by 
governments that breach current norms; readjustments result from domestic and 
international pressures, and in them, discursive practices are not considered 
(Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 12-13). The second type, argumentation and 
persuasion, aims at raising moral consciousness (e.g. shaming) in order for 
political actors to conceive of norms as valid and significant and thus adopt them 
in their discourses (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 12-13). Finally, institutionalisation 
refers to the incremental adaptation of norms as a result of external pressures: 
higher acceptance of norms leads to a higher engagement in dialogue about the 
implementation of particular norms which, in turn, leads to the 
institutionalisation of those norms (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 16-17). These 
processes differ depending on the underpinning logic that determines social 
interactions, and rather than being fully independent they occur simultaneously 
(Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11). These are ideal type models conceptualised within 
the study of norms as moral and ethical and leading to positive outcomes. And 
thus they remain within the bias toward progressive norms implicit in current 
studies.  
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 The models also imply that socialisation occurs as political elites come 
under pressure from a multitude of non-state actors such as activists and 
members of other governments who are able to persuade local state elites as to 
the moral (or in the case of the adaptation model, the material) value of adopting 
certain norms. In this position, just as in regional integration and state models, 
there is an underlying pluralist and corporate logic at work. And hence, the role 
of Central American normative elites cannot be incorporated in these models 
because doing so reduces that role to merely one more among a plurality of 
influential actors, with their power “sectorally” fragmented. 
In order to overcome such a conceptual limitation, I propose a model of 
socialisation, the “ideational drive” (ID). In this model norms may lack moral 
content; they can have aspects considered retrogressive (e.g. virulent 
nationalism) or can be relatively neutral which could be perceived as progressive 
or retrogressive by some actors (e.g. regional integration). Under the ID model, 
powerful societal elites can be intersubjectively authoritarian and outright 
determine the adoption and content of a norm, depending on how norms affect 
them. External pressure, by activists or other governments, may or may not play 
an influential role in the socialisation process. Norms are incrementally 
internalised through an ideational “struggle,” not necessarily moral, between 
political actors and social actors (e.g. normative elites). This struggle takes place 
within the normative networks. The ID model differs from that of “persuasion” 
in that the latter implies the need to convince political leaders of the 
appropriateness of a norm by raising their moral consciousness. Conversely, in 
the ID model political elites look for the normative elites’ sanction for a 
particular norm that need not be moralistic. Hence, what we observe is not a 
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process of moral consciousness raising but a consultation process within a 
normative power structure; a process that encompasses an ideational struggle 
wherein political elites attempt to obtain from their normative networks, a degree 
of empowerment for certain ideas and proposals. Shaming is neither necessary 
nor effective in this process because in the first instance, norms are not 
necessarily progressive and thus actors need not be “ashamed” if those norms are 
not supported or breached; and in the second instance, shaming is potentially a 
behaviour-conditioning tool in the institutional (formal) structure of the state. 
The ID model functions within the state’s socially constructed dimension in 
which the effectiveness of shaming as a persuasion device is reduced because the 
public embarrassment necessary for shaming is not present. The ID also differs 
from the “strategic bargaining” model in that the latter is elaborated on the 
assumption that governments have violated certain norms and that they readjust 
their behaviour along the lines determined by external pressure. The ID model 
incorporates a degree of strategic bargaining and behavioural modifications on 
the part of political elites but these are the result of state enmeshment and 
negotiations; to emphasise the point, the “struggle” implicated in the ID model 
occurs within the normative networks that interconnect social and political elites. 
The ID model and other socialisation models are summarised in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Norm Socialisation Models 
Adaptation and Strategic 
Bargaining
Argumentation and 
Persuasion
Institutionalization and 
Habitualization
* Instrumental adjustments  
by violating governments
* Moral consciousness-
raising (e.g., shaming)
* Gradual norms adaptation * Norms incrementally internalised
* Domestic and international 
pressures 
* Need to convince political 
leaders about norms’ 
appropriateness 
* External pressures → 
higher acceptance of norms
* Ideational struggle between 
political and social elites within 
normative networks
* No considerations of 
discursive practices
* Political elites accept 
norms' validity and 
significance 
* Higher engagement in 
norm implementation → 
institutionalisation 
* Discursive practices important
* Discursive practises 
important
* Shaming not effective because its 
potential is realised in the formal 
state dimension
Norms' nature
* Norms need not be moralistic
* Political elites look for normative 
elites’ sanction of particular norms
* Occurs in socially constructed 
state structure
* Activist pressure/persuade political elites 
Underlying 
social 
interaction & 
state structure
* Occurs in formal state strucutre 
Ideational Drive
Risse and Sikkink's Ideal Socialisation Models
Characteristics
* Norms are progressive/moralistic
 
Source: columns one to three adapted from Risse and Sikkink (1999); column four, my 
elaboration. 
 
In the ID model, norms may originate in ideas and proposals of normative 
elites or may, conversely, result from initiatives undertaken by political elites 
which are ultimately empowered by normative elites. The important point is that 
political elites have relative autonomy from normative elites in certain policy 
issues. Issues, for example, that affect the social organisation may be openly 
undertaken by political elites; those that have the potential to impact the social 
structure are filtered through the ID model channels. In this model, the degree of 
salience133 that a norm reaches determines if it becomes a reality assumption in 
the ideational structure of society. In turn, the degree of normative power that the 
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 Arguably, this degree of salience could be “measured” qualitatively/discursively by assessing 
the invocation of a particular norm, by relevant actors, as legitimate behaviour or action.  
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proponents of a norm possess determines the pace of institutionalisation. 
Normative elites act not upon the “logic of consequences” but rather on the 
“logic of appropriateness” as their identity dictates their leading role in society. If 
new norms somehow protect their material interests, it is incidental.134  
Within the ideational struggle at the core of the ID model, normative 
elites can substantially influence the life cycle of norms through groups that 
compose their networks; for example, in the regional integration process there 
are particular regional groups (e.g. regional Chambers of Commerce) that are 
embedded in the region’s normative networks. Groups rooted in those networks 
express and reflect their members’ ideas, identity and interests, and could 
develop an agenda based on those intersubjectivities. In the integration process, 
regional groups may grant the normative elites access to supranational 
institutions, leverage, policy feedback, and spaces wherein they propose or 
obstruct regional new norms, or maintain and modify current norms. Regional 
groups can also be sources of ideas, knowledge and information. In an instance 
of a deviant state—a state whose normative network is resistant to particular 
norms—that  ignores proposals from normative elites, regional groups could 
translate their members’ normative power into regional power. By doing so, 
regional groups could then present as regional certain new norms or a modified 
set of norms to supranational institutions, granting in that way a degree of 
                                                 
134
 Consider for example the democratisation of the region. In Central America the end of social 
unrest was brought about partially by the actions of members of the region’s normative elite (e.g. 
Presidents Cristiani of El Salvador, President Arzú of Guatemala and President Chamorro of 
Nicaragua). The resulting socio-political stability greatly benefited the material interests of the 
elites (e.g. created the conditions for privatisation of national enterprises). And yet, the adoption 
of the “democratic gospel” was not perceived as an ideological defeat which drastically changed 
some of the fundamental reality assumptions in that region (e.g. awareness of restrictive 
dictatorial regimes and tainted electoral processes). Rather, it gave the region’s elite a sense of 
enlightenment by constructing an identity as leaders of a society on the way to a “higher truth.” 
My conception of democracy’s role in the ideational structure of the region’s elites builds on 
Smith’s  (1996: 41) argument of the “democratic gospel” which he develops in the context of the 
US “imperialistic” behaviour towards Latin American. 
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legitimacy to the elites’ proposals. Such a situation, because it jeopardises the 
credibility of its commitment to regionalism, may persuade deviant states to 
reconsider the “proposals” of the normative elites. Once norms have been 
socialised by elites, they are diffused throughout society. The channels of norm 
diffusion become thus essential for our understanding of the normative elites’ 
role in the elaboration of the normality that surrounds and legitimises regional 
policies.   
 
Norm Diffusion Mechanisms 
Depending on the domestic structure, there are four norm diffusion mechanisms 
(Checkel, 1999b: 88-90). First, the “liberal” structure in which the political elites 
are greatly restrained by the pressure exercised by domestic individuals or groups 
in the policy-making process. Within this configuration, norm-learning by 
political elites is irrelevant. Second, the “state-above-society” structure in which 
the state is free from domestic pressures and at the same time possesses a fair 
degree of control over society. In this arrangement learning on the part of the 
political elite is required if norms are to be empowered. Third, the “corporatist 
structure” political elites perform a greater role in achieving norm adjustments or 
modification than in the liberal mechanism, but they do not impose their 
preferences on society. This structure is characterised by policy networks linking 
the state and society. Society is accorded an essential role in the decision making 
process. Empowerment in the corporatist mechanism functions in a two-step 
process: first societal pressure, and second, political elite learning. In the final 
structure, the “statist,” learning by political elites is the determinant of the norm 
diffusion process. Penetration of the state by societal groups and the organisation 
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of social interests in the statist system, in comparison with the liberal and 
corporate, are weaker. In the statist arrangement there is no probability that 
societal pressure will empower norms. Hence, the state is conceived of as 
autonomous from society. 
 The liberal and corporatist mechanisms of norm diffusion reflect the 
pluralist premises that delimit our understanding of Central American integration. 
Aspects of the statist and state-over-society mechanisms seem to fit the 
conventional view of Central American regionalism as an intergovernmental 
process. And yet, those mechanisms conceive of the state as autonomous from 
the social structure wherein it must act, and from which the state must obtain the 
power to socialise norms and eventually diffuse them. To underline this point, it 
is worth assessing how observers conceptualise policy adoption in the region. At 
the Latin American level, Sikkink (1991) offers a fitting illustration of the statist 
approach undertaken in the analysis of the region’s policy making processes.135 
Policy makers, in that view, can be entrepreneurs who advance ambitious 
programmes that may go against their own political survival (Sikkink, 1991: 18). 
Policy makers and technocrats introduce new ideas, perform a fundamental 
intermediary role in the interpretation of ideas and in so doing affect the manner 
in which those ideas are received throughout society (Sikkink, 1991: 253).136 
What is plausible regarding policies is determined by the manner in which ideas 
shape the understanding of first, policy makers and second, the general public; 
when the ideas of top policy makers change, new models (e.g. economic models) 
are adopted (Sikkink, 1991: 20 and 244). Once ideas—as embedded in norms—
                                                 
135
 See also Teichman (2001). 
136
 It is important to note that Sikkink—in much the same manner as neofunctionalism and some 
new regionalism studies—approaches technocratic elites functionally thereby overlooking their 
embeddedness in family and kinship networks; that is, the normative elite networks. 
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are set in policies, the diffusion of the latter experiences a three step process: 
adoption, implementation and consolidation.  
Policy adoption in presidential systems such as those of Latin America 
depends greatly on the ideas upheld by the president and his closest advisers; 
however, policy implementation requires those ideas to be embedded in state 
institutions (Sikkink, 1991: 2). At the same time, policy consolidation depends 
on a substantial consensus and the fit of new policies with the ideologies of key 
economic and social groups. Success depends on first, adequate ideological 
conditions, how new ideas are introduced and the appropriate institutional 
support (Sikkink, 1991: 21). The second condition for success is the learning 
(which in turn functions as “the memory of the system”) experience of policy 
makers and the continuities in institutions and bureaucratic personnel which 
allows for the embodiment of new ideas in institutions and policies (Sikkink, 
1991: 24-25). Personnel continuity in this context refers to the drawing of top 
policy makers from “the same pool” who rotate in different bureaucratic 
positions thereby acquiring experience and establishing networks (Sikkink, 1991: 
25).  
The factors necessary for successful adoption are different from those 
required by the implementation and consolidation of norms (Sikkink, 1991: 249). 
Adoption requires the political entrepreneurs’ leadership and actions; 
implementation in turn requires that the ideas that arise from those actions 
become embedded in institutions; and consolidation requires that political leaders 
mobilise public support for policies (Sikkink, 1991: 250-251). At this point the 
argument leads us to a statist view: in the first instance, political elites learn new 
norms and then they are diffused throughout society. According to this 
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framework, social elites are important for the latter stage of policy adoption; that 
is, for consolidation. And yet, Sikkink (1991: 5-19) indicates that social elites 
can prevent consensus, they can veto certain alternatives, or rule out policies, 
which seems to contradict the implicit role assigned to those elites by the model. 
For the statist perspective, in short, social elites are important only for the 
consolidation stage of the diffusion process. Considering the role that those elite 
groups play in the region within the constructed dimension of the state, such a 
view seems inadequate as the importance of normative elites goes beyond (or 
perhaps comes prior to) the consolidation stage of new norms. Approaching 
social elites as normative leads the analysis to detect a greater and more 
determinant elite role in the diffusion process than the statist mechanism enables 
us to identify. (I will return to this point later).  
With this in mind, and returning to the regionalism studies of Central 
American integration reviewed in chapter one, it seems that those analyses 
undertaking new regionalism’s endogenous perspective (with a multidimensional 
and multi-participatory view) of the process fit into the liberal or corporatist 
structures. Similarly, as I indicated in that chapter, neofunctionalist models 
attempt to find pluralising tendencies in Central America by assigning an equal 
weight to the role of different societal groups in the process and dividing, thus, 
elite groups functionally. The pluralist structure that underpins such a 
multidimensional and multi-participatory system seems deficient because—
following the state conception I propose—the assumed autonomy of the state in 
political processes is limited to social organisational issues. Apparently, therefore, 
it is implausible that the liberal or corporatist mechanisms of norm diffusion 
represent Central America’s regional integration process. New regionalism’s 
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exogenous perspective attributes to the state a greater role in the process; thus it 
seemingly corresponds to the statist system. Conversely, the enmeshed state I 
elaborated in chapter two does not seem to fit too comfortably in this norm 
diffusion categorisation. The liberal and corporatist structures imply a society in 
which a multitude of pressure groups (civil society) are highly influential in 
policy making. On the other hand, the statist and state-above-society structures 
assume a relatively independent strong state. The statist mechanism rests on the 
ability of the political elite to act autonomously. In turn, this ability depends, for 
example, on the capacity to isolate bureaucracies and to recruit potential 
technocratic elites (Skocpol, 1985: 16). At the Latin American level, arguably, 
the weakness of political parties and the presidential nature of the systems grant 
greater space for interpretation and adoption of ideas and norms by policy 
makers and technocrats (Sikkink, 1991: 253). The state, in this view, is capable 
of carrying out its goals independently of any control by dominant classes 
(Sikkink, 1991: 22).  
Statist perspectives focus on the formal dimension of the state, and when 
they highlight the autonomy of the presidents and technocrats (i.e. elites are 
divided functionally), those perspectives reflect the corporate model of the state. 
This view, thus, overlooks the interconnectedness of elites within networks and 
the state’s constructed dimension wherein normative elites play an essential role 
in political processes. Considering the enmeshed nature of the Central American 
state and the existence of normative networks, the state autonomy assumed by 
the statist view seems limited. The region’s technocratic and economic elites, as 
we have seen previously, are embedded in networks. It is thus difficult for the 
state to isolate its bureaucracies and technocratic elites; and moreover separating 
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the ability to achieve policy goals from the role of normative elites seems 
difficult as well. 
In the context of Central American regionalism, it thus seems more 
appropriate to talk about a variation of a statist structure; one which I will refer to 
as “circumscribed-statist.” Within this structure, the state/political elites function 
as filters of regional norms, not necessarily going through the norm learning 
process, but searching for approval or support from the normative elites for a 
given norm (i.e. activating the channels implicated in the ID model of 
socialisation). This “consultation” process may take the form of contacting think-
tanks or other knowledge producing organisations. As noted in the previous 
chapter, such organisations may be directly linked to or embedded in the 
normative networks of the region. Hence, those organisations may actively 
promote norms and ideas that are normatively desirable for members of the 
networks, and thus, they are not apolitical and much less value-neutral as they 
engage in the production of knowledge that advances a particular notion of 
reality. Once normative networks “approve” a particular norm, the latter is 
empowered, diffused and eventually internalised by the rest of society. This 
process is characterised by three phases. First, “bandwagoning;” as the cost of 
supporting the new norms decreases, the number of political actors rejecting 
previous norms and supporting new ones increases. Second, “cascading” or the 
instance in which societies experienced rapid developments toward regional new 
norms. And third, a “tipping point” phase in which institutionalised new norms 
move the regional process in new directions.137  The different norm diffusion 
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 Sunstein (1997) develops the concepts of  norm bandwagoning, cascading and tipping point.  
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mechanisms and the relationship between the state and society are summarised in 
table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2. Norm Diffusion Mechanisms 
 
Liberal Corporatist Statist State-over-Society
Societal pressure 
on [political] elites
Societal pressure on 
[political] elites 
(primary)
[Political] elite 
learning (primary)
[Political] elite 
learning
Political elite filtering
[Political] elite 
learning (secondary)
Societal pressure 
on [political] elites 
(secondary)
Normative elites' 
approval → norm 
empowerment
State constrained 
by organised 
society
State less costrained 
→  Plays greater 
role in the process
State controls 
society
State fully 
controls society
State delimited by 
social elites with 
normative power
Bottom up → 
Individuals and 
groups play central 
role in policy-
making
Society (policy 
networks) plays  
important role in 
policy-making
Weak societal 
penetration of the 
state and weak 
organisation of 
social interests
No organised 
social interets, 
nor societal state 
penetration 
Great state penetration 
by normative networks; 
the rest of society, 
although could be very 
well organised, lacks 
normative power 
State-Society 
Links
Checkel's Original Categorisation
Domestic 
Mechanisms 
Empowering 
Norms
Circumscribed-statist
 
 
Source: columns one to four, adapted from Checkel (1999b); column five (or the “circumscribed-
statist column), my elaboration. 
 
And the following figure depicts the intersection of the ID model of norm 
socialisation and the circumscribed-statist mechanism of norm diffusion in the 
socially constructed state structure.  
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Figure 3.1. Intersection of the ID Model of Socialisation and Circumscribed-
Statist Diffusion Mechanism 
Normative elites
Empowered norms
Political elites
Norms diffused
Socially constructed state structure
Ideational struggle  norms 
incrementally internalised
 
This intersection is fittingly illustrated by the reactivation of Central American 
regionalism in the 1990s. Regional integration in the isthmus declined in the 
early 1970s. Once it began to appear that its reactivation was necessary, political 
elites strove to find the normative elites’ approval or support for re-engagement 
in the regional process. In a revealing document (FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 
1991), organisations that represent the economic interests of regional normative 
elites developed the basis for a new model of integration. In its introduction, the 
document states that the model was elaborated “as per the request of the 
Ministers in Charge of Integration, to be presented at the Meeting of Ministers 
and Vice-Ministers in Charge of Integration.” This consultation activated 
mediums represented by the ID model. Once the new norms (e.g. outward 
looking economic schemes) implicated in the new model of regional integration 
had been empowered (i.e. after normative elites had sanctioned the process), they 
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were diffused through the circumscribed mechanism. At that point, the political 
elites were able to reactivate regionalism.  
This advancement occurred in three phases. After the decline of CACM, 
the discourse of integration lost importance and to a point became unpopular. By 
the early 1990s, following a decade of civil unrest, political instability, high 
inflation rates, and decreasing exports and terms of trade, the need for socio-
political stability and market expansion could have lowered the cost of 
reincorporating integration into the political discourse (i.e. the “bandwagoning” 
phase) contributing to the reactivation of the regional project encompassing new 
strategies—such as “open regionalism”—of achieving it (i.e. the “cascading” 
phase). Subsequently, new norms institutionalised in regional policies led the 
process into new policy areas (i.e. the “tipping point” phase). For example, one 
of the early documents concerning the reactivation of integration in the region, 
the Declaration of Nicaragua (SICA, 1993: preamble), goes beyond the 
economic nature of its predecessor in the process (i.e. CACM) and declares that 
the Central American states are “one community” with the desire to “achieve 
political union” which is a “mandate” that originates in the region’s “social and 
cultural” links. At this point, integrative norms began to cascade as the region 
experienced a proliferation of regional institutions and agreements designed to 
support all the community dimensions that the process assumed. A Secretariat for 
Social Integration was established to guarantee the advancement and fulfilment 
of resolutions regarding aspects of social and cultural integration (SICA, 1995). 
In addition, issues that had until that point been generally ignored, appeared in 
the official discourse. Article three of the Tegucigalpa Protocol (SICA, 1991) 
declares that Central America, through SICA, must strengthen democracy, and 
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must attempt to institutionalise human rights and to eradicate extreme poverty; 
and tellingly, SICA must promote economic and social justice.  
In short, at the moment that integration was perceived as essential for the 
region, political elites looked for the predisposition of normative elites to re-
initiate the process. An ideational struggle took place regarding the new norms 
that were socialised and ultimately constituted the regional process in its 
reactivated form. From the willingness of the normative elites emerged a degree 
of support for new norms which allowed political elites to lead the integrative 
process to a tipping point. I label such predisposition social will. It is to the 
conceptualisation of the latter that I now turn. 
 
Social Will: Ideas, Identity and Interest  
The last component of the Central Americanised model of regional integration I 
propose is social will. We have observed the mechanisms that facilitate 
interactions among elites which lead to the socialisation and diffusion of norms. 
The normative power implicated in those interactions is articulated by social will.  
Regionalism is a social construction that emerges from interactions 
among social agents. Interactions spawn meaning systems which lead to 
collective understandings. From this emerge structural frameworks that 
constitute—and are in turn constituted by—the actors’ conceptualisations of key 
issues and by doing so affect the agent’s preferences. Social constructions are 
thus elaborated on the meaning that arises following a particular set of interests 
(Searle, 1996: 19). The impact that each societal group may have in the process 
differs greatly. In the social construction process, there are individuals and 
groups of individuals who possess the type of power that delimits the options 
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available for approaching a particular policy issue; that is, groups I refer to as 
“normative elites.” From this context, processes such as integration arise and are 
sustained; regional institutions are socially “induced” and “endorsed.”138 Within 
the integration process, actors define the region discursively exercising their 
normative power constantly. Elites interact in normative networks through the 
socialisation and diffusion mechanisms establishing, preserving or modifying 
norms which eventually affect society’s attitudes and preferences regarding 
regional integration. When considering the normative power layer within 
regionalism understood as a social construction, it seems that Central American 
integration is underpinned by the predisposition of normative elites to support the 
delegation of political power from the national to the regional. This is not to say 
that other societal groups cannot articulate their particular conceptualisation of 
the region. Of course, other groups participate in the region’s construction, but 
their power to influence norm production and sustainability, and ultimately 
policy development seems limited. 
The above argument implies that for regionalism to advance there must 
be a degree of willingness among the normative elites. This willingness, or social 
will, is the predisposition of the normative elites to support (or oppose) and thus 
empower norms which in turn may enable the state to advance, or impede, the 
regional integration process. In chapter one, I suggested that a framework that 
incorporated the intersubjectivities until now under-theorised in the context of 
Central American integration would overcome the somewhat analytical 
narrowness of that region’s integration studies. For that purpose, I proposed to 
use certain intersubjectivities highlighted by neofunctionalist models. Those 
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 The socially induced and endorsed nature of constructions are proposed by Collin  (1997).  
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models developed concepts such as community sentiment and elite value 
complementarity that implicitly tapped into the ideas, identity and interests of the 
elites regarding the integrative process. Neofunctionalist models, however, could 
not fully explore those concepts because of the limitations their assumed 
ontology of the process set on the power of social elites. Building on these 
concepts, I argue that the positive interplay of the ideas, identity and interests of 
normative elites towards the integrative process leads to an intersubjective 
congruence: a predisposition to initiate, embrace, sustain or contest integrative 
impulses. Social will, then, is constituted of three dimensions: ideas, identity and 
interests.  
 
Ideas  
Ideas are the raw material of meaning. Ideas and the context in which they 
emerge are co-constitutive. Ideas shape the ideological structure of society but in 
turn that structure limits the range of possible ideas. Through ideas, for example, 
normative elites can establish meanings that define society’s shared identity. A 
collective identity, conversely, limits whose ideas contribute to the constitution 
of the structure. The ideational dimension of social will also refers to the shared 
meanings embedded in the political culture which makes the social order 
sustainable and constructible, and thus they also posses a transformative capacity 
as they provide social actors with the means to produce new ways of interacting 
(Mittelman, 1999: 35). This capability to innovate, for example, enables 
normative elites to elaborate a particular paradigm to construct Central America 
as a more or less coherent entity.  
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Ideas are different from norms in that the latter are “ideas” that have 
attained a degree of legitimacy in the ideational repertoire of a particular society 
thus becoming a principle or standard of behavior for that society. Hence, when 
ideas shift, norms shift. Norms are, in short, entangled with ideas: ideas generate 
spaces whereby norms are constructed; at the same time, norms condition the 
spaces from which ideas emerge. Ideas enable individuals to produce a given 
representation of reality. They shape and define particular practices. In this sense, 
ideas are also inextricably linked to the emergence of given interests (Laffey and 
Weldes, 1997: 194-195). Ideational factors also shape the way in which social 
actors pursue and achieve their interests (Ruggie, 1998: 225). Thus, ideas act 
directly on material power: they mould and constrain it. Material power derives 
its aims and ultimately its legitimacy through ideational matters.  
 
Identity 
The second dimension of social will is identity which refers to the understanding 
of one’s role and place in society. Collectively, identity refers to the objectives, 
aims, and goals of a community and the necessary roles that need to be 
undertaken by its members in order to achieve them. Identities are social 
productions that give social actors a sense of belonging to a community or 
groups of individuals. Hence, they are elaborated on common ethnic background 
and language, and/or on collective myths, symbols and values. Social identities 
result in political outcomes: shared beliefs, feelings, values and cultural 
commonalities may lead the group to imagine that as a community they possess 
and can rightfully exercise sovereignty over a particular territory (Herrmann and 
Brewer, 2004: 6-7).  
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Collective identities as social constructions can be instrumentalised. The 
individual or group of individuals who determine a particular identity define the 
characteristics necessary to be encompassed by that identity and its objectives. 
Identity becomes an essential element in political process because it helps to set 
agendas through how particular roles conceive of reality. In some instances, 
those understandings become socially accepted as collective reality (Adler and 
Crawford, 2006: 15-16). A particular identity thus can condition a given set of 
interests which are perceived as the common good of society.139  
Identities have also two interrelated legitimising aspects. First, identities 
are constructed by dominant social actors in order to maintain and rationalise 
their control over other actors (Castells, 2004: 8).140 Second, identities legitimise 
the parameters set to determine who participates in political processes (Kowert 
and Legro, 1996: 453). In so doing, identities not only define who is included or 
excluded from those processes but also the profiles of social actors within those 
processes: who can act as a dominant actor and who can contest the outcomes of 
politics, for example. Such profiling leads social actors to modify their identities 
in order to fulfil the requirements of participating in the making of politics. In the 
integration process, the prerequisites to conform with the regional identity leads 
actors to adopt particular behaviours, attitudes and values that may facilitate their 
transformation into regional actors.141 Identities, in addition, play a fundamental 
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 On the constitutive role of identity in the production of  interests see Risse and Sikkink (1999), 
and Wendt (1992). 
140
 Castells (2004: 8), in addition to a legitimizing dimension, proposes a “resistance identity” 
which refers to that “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued/or 
stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the 
basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institution of society.” 
Also, there is a “project identity” that emerges when “social actors, on the basis of whatever 
cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in 
society, and by doing so, seek the transformation of the overall social structure.” 
141
 For a discussion on identity and the construction of the other, see Adler (2002), and Herrmann 
and Brewer (2004). 
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role in the perceived existence of regional institutions: the awareness that social 
actors have regarding the “entitativity” of the region, or the representation of the 
region’s institutions as real entities in the individual’s mind (Castano, 2004: 43-
44). The entitativity of a region functions as mechanism that enables the 
individuals to perceive regional institutions as capable of action, as security 
providers, and as links with societies that share past cultural experiences and 
ethnic identities (Castano, 2004: 54). 
 
Interests 
The final dimension of social will is that of interests. Interests are interconnected 
with ideas and identity. And in this respect they are endogenous: They emerge 
from and condition ideational matters. Culture, for example, delimits the range of 
possible and acceptable interests.142 They are intelligible only as ideational items 
articulated as material objects but once an actor’s interests are realised interests 
project values and ideas (Haas, 1990: 2).143 As interests evolve, they feed back 
into the actor’s identity, redefining those values and ideas. Interests, in short, are 
not fixed in the “objective/material” spaces but are cognitive and continually 
changing (Rosamond, 2002: 157).144 
An actor’s social role, in addition, affects the development and nature of 
interests, because they are mediated by that role and the norms that define it 
(Sunstein, 1997: 37). In the process, a particular set of interests is implicit in a 
given representation of “self” and, when the actors constructing the 
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 Green (2002: 6) and Weldes (1996: 280) discuss the relation between interests and culture. 
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 Hopf (1998: 176) indicates that  there are “absent” or “missing” interests or “produced 
absences, omissions that are the understandable product of social practices and structure.”  
144
 Wendt (1999) also discusses interests as cognitions, and Hopf (2002: xi) argues that “the only 
reality of interest is intersubjective.” 
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representation possess normative power, in a particular construction of “other” 
readily accepted by those others. When interests condition societal actions they 
do so through in-group (e.g. through social identities) interactions (Edelman, 
1964: 62). Interests are thus conditioned through the interplay of ideas and the 
actors’ identity. Importantly for regional integration, shared interests lead to 
feelings of interdependence which in turn direct actors to assume the 
indispensability of regional institutions thereby facilitating the “entitativity” of 
the region. Interests evoke particular mental states that may have “unintended 
consequences:” normative elites considering their interests in a materialistic 
sense, and perhaps unaware of the subjective impact of those interests, engage in 
integrative strategies in pursuit of some self-beneficial objective. The 
achievement of those objectives, however, redefines what constitutes the region 
and impacts on the Central American identity.   
The following figure portrays the emergence of social will and its impact 
on regional integration. 
Figure 3.2. Social Will: Emergence and Impact 
Ideas Identity Interest 
Social Will
Empowered regional norms  Further integration
= mutual constitution
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The interaction of ideas, identity and interests is constitutive and mutually 
sustaining, and the relationship among these dimensions is in constant flux. As 
individuals assign meaning to ideas, their interests rank ideas hierarchically by 
relevance and their identity delimits the scope within which the ideational 
meaning is shared. This interplay may also follow other patterns. A shift in a 
particular characteristic of identity overhauls interests along similar changes. For 
instance, to the extent that identity provides the basis for interests, an identity 
modification may result in a shift in interests and new ideational meanings. From 
these interactions, social will emerges as a necessary background condition for 
the regional process.  
This willingness is social because it emerges intersubjectively as meaning 
is assigned to the region. First, it emerges from the shared understandings 
produced by the convergence of ideas, identities and interests among the 
normative elites. And second, because those cognitivities must be shared by the 
rest of society; that is, they become reality assumptions in the ideational structure 
of non-normative societal groups or of society as a whole. To put it differently, 
there is a dimension of consent as societal groups accept, first, the normative 
elites’ representation of “self” as leaders of an elusive Central American Union, 
and second, internalise as their reality a particular set of reality assumptions 
defined by normative elites; for example, that Union begins from regional 
economic integration.145  
The emphasis on the essential role performed by social will in the process 
does not mean that regional integration is a monocausal process. Social will is 
                                                 
145
 My argument here parallels that of “consensuality” developed by Sidanius and Pratto (2004: 
324) in which  “‘social representations’ and social ideologies are broadly shared within the social 
system;” that is, “shared across the continuum of social power and within both dominant and 
subordinate groups alike.”  
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not the sole determinant of the process. Rather it is to argue that a positive 
interplay of certain intersubjective dimensions leads the Central American 
normative elites to construct a solid foundation from which regional integration 
evolves. If at a particular moment there is a high degree of social will, then 
regionalism is likely to advance or expand so as to encompass policy areas 
considered as fixed within the national domain. Conversely, when social will is 
minimal, the process is likely to experience disruptions and/or strategic 
modifications, if not complete stagnation. 
 
A Central Americanised Regional Integration Model 
Up to this point, my intention has been to elaborate a holistic conceptual 
machinery that enables the study of Central American integration to incorporate 
certain essential factors for the understanding of the process. Those factors, I 
noted, have been neglected by observers because they assume particular 
frameworks underpinned by modernisation premises that lead the analysis to 
overlook variables ingrained in cultural continuities which seem non-modern. I 
also noted a trend towards the lack of theorisation in Central American studies. 
This trend is the more evident in regional integration analysis, a direct outcome 
of the modernising tendencies assumed by those studies. If what we presuppose, 
for example, is an evolutionary process longing to become an entity à la 
European Union, then there is no need to theorise because there are established 
theoretical frameworks to hand. The Central American idiosyncrasies are thus 
overlooked and when it is inevitable to engage them, they are assumed to be 
aberrations from the modernising or evolutionary path: clientelistic and 
personalistic politics, if not outright illegal practices. The Central Americanised 
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model I have developed attempts to incorporate those idiosyncrasies not as 
troublesome variables but as pillars for the construction of regional integration in 
the isthmus. The following figure represents the model. 
 
Figure 3.3. The Central Americanised Model of Regional Integration 
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Regionalism is a process that affects multiple dimensions and interests 
(e.g. political, economic and social). As such, it will inevitably become 
politicised. Politicisation leads to junctures generally characterised by integrative 
stalemate. If the issues are structural (i.e. not dealing with organisational matters), 
then the options of political elites are somewhat delimited by the enmeshment of 
the state. Normative networks are, thus, activated through the ID model of 
socialisation and the circumscribed-statist mechanism of norm diffusion. If the 
normative elites’ ideas, identity and interests converge positively around a set of 
integrative norms, social will emerges. Once social will predisposes those elites 
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to approve the modified or new regional norms, those norms are empowered and 
diffused throughout society. Those norms redefine the region and the identity 
that goes with it. Countries traditionally considered as outside the region, for 
example, can become full members of the regional scheme. 
 Once the process overcomes the impasse, there are mechanisms that 
enable normative elites to monitor the process. Regional groups and associations 
embedded in the normative networks (e.g. business federations) function as 
feedback channels on the effectiveness of new norms. If strategic modifications 
to the process have negative outcomes, regional groups could hinder or change 
the direction of new norms by developing alternative schemes or strategies. 
Regional groups are also sources of new proposals and ideas for the regional 
Parliament and the General Secretariat, which in turn sustain the enmeshment of 
the state. New ideas could, conversely, emerge externally through international 
actors. They are, however, localised through the ID model. The General 
Secretariat of SICA, for example, could react upon policy ideas from 
international organisations by interplaying with the relevant members of the 
national cabinets. These interactions set in motion the normative networks. In 
turn, the channels that articulate the power of those networks are activated and 
the construction cycle begins again.   
 
Conclusion 
Regional integration is a set of complex norms that govern the conduct of politics 
regionally. These norms result from the social practices of actors. The existence 
of normative networks in Central America and the enmeshed nature of the state 
directly affect the development of regional integration. This occurs through the 
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constructed dimension of the state and the intersubjective channels that facilitate 
the interactions among elites. In this chapter, I indicated the inability of existing 
paradigms to accommodate the Central American idiosyncrasies ingrained in the 
political culture of the region which lead to the salience of elite networks and 
their ability to enmesh the state. Hence, I have attempted to conceptualise the 
channels that facilitate elite interactions; namely, the ideational drive model of 
socialisation and the circumscribed-statist mechanism of norm diffusion. These 
concepts enable the analysis to capture the normative power that the region’s 
elites possess: their ability to produce or redefine norms in order to construct or 
sustain particular socio-political structures as a “region” and which are accepted 
by Central Americans as their own.  
I have also modelled the medium that articulates such normative power; 
that is, social will: the intersubjective congruence of the ideas, identity and 
interests of the elites converging favourably, or not, around the integrative 
process. Normative elites are capable of empowering new or modified regional 
norms. Social will predisposes elites towards such empowerment. Once social 
will is articulated, the state is able to implement policies that could advance the 
integrative process or that lead to strategic shifts in its direction. Regionalism is, 
to put it differently, entangled with social will: On the one hand, if there is a high 
degree of social will, then the integration process is likely to be sustained or be 
further advanced. On the other hand, if social will is limited, integration is likely 
to experience a stagnation phase or a strategic alteration. 
The final section of this chapter completed the theoretical framework I set 
out to develop. It presented a Central Americanised model of regional integration 
that takes into account the existence of elite networks that through cultural 
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continuities—that is, the role of kinship and family relations in socio-political 
processes—have enabled the elites to accumulate normative power and hence to 
enmesh the state within the networks. The functioning of that model depends on 
the normative mediums of elite interactions— the ID model of socialisation and 
the circumscribed-statist diffusion mechanism—that this chapter developed. The 
Central Americanised model, it is hoped, sheds light on the intriguing persistence 
of the ideal of union in the region and the cyclical decline, stagnation, 
reactivation, and eventual distortions and strategic shifts experienced by the 
process. The chapters that follow turn to the empirical section of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4. Counterfactual Exercise Part I: Political Will 
and Regional Integration in Central America 
 
Introduction 
The empirical section of this thesis—the present and next chapters—engages in a 
counterfactual exercise. At the core of this thesis’ argument is the proposition 
that Central American elites converge in normative networks. It may seem, thus, 
counterintuitive to assess empirically the predisposition towards regional 
integration among political elites (i.e. political will) and among social elites (i.e. 
social will). This analytical separation may be interpreted as incorporating the 
functional division of elites I have striven to critique. To empirically assess 
integrative trends among political elites, however, does not contradict my 
conception of normative elites. It is evident that certain groups dominate 
different aspects of social life. The concept of normative elites does not propose 
that the Central American elites are a single undivided body; rather, it conceives 
of those elites as converging in networks formed along the lines of family and 
kinship relations. Those networks then become mechanisms in which elites 
concatenate synergistically different resources thereby attaining normative power.    
A counterfactual exercise is beneficial because it imbues this thesis with 
analytical leverage to “test” alternative “explanations” of the process. In this 
chapter, it allows for the appraisal of Haas’ (1967: 341) dictum that the region 
lacks an integrative strategy and the political will to sustain the integration 
process, and of the hypotheses that the “unwillingness” of Central American 
governments delimits integration (Sánchez, 2003b), and that governments 
impose their vision on the integrative process (Sánchez, 2003a). The exercise, 
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also, enables the thesis to assess the existence of elite interactions and 
consultation channels deemed crucial for the socialisation and norm diffusion 
elements of the Central Americanised model of integration, and of the enmeshed 
state.  
The counterfactual, in addition, offers the possibility—in the course of 
the present and subsequent chapter—of “testing” the existence and role of social 
will as a background condition for regionalism, and the proposition that social 
will, as an articulation of their power, enables normative elite networks to delimit 
the regional policy options of political elites. In this chapter, the exercise enables 
the assessment of the comparability between the political elites’ discursive 
practices and the dominant trends in the process. If we find that the members of 
the political elite here interviewed offer “aberrant” opinions and ideas from those 
underlining the current nature of the process—the insertion of the region into the 
globalised economy and the exploitation of its competitive advantages—then it is 
possible that dominant ideas are embedded in other factors. If the political elites 
advance ideas that, or if their identity reflects, integrative impulses not so 
dominant in the process, and simultaneously, social elites present—in the 
subsequent chapter—discursive practices that reflect the current integrative 
trends, then, it may be that the latter elites’ “normativeness” has greater weight in 
defining regional policies and strategies. 
 It is also worth pointing that the methodology adopted— previously 
discussed in the introductory chapter—in the empirical chapters offers avenues to 
overcome the limitations experienced by neofunctionalism in assessing the 
intersubjective elements that underline the discursive practices of integrative 
actors. Empirically, the thesis attempts to observe beyond the overtly expressed 
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opinions of the participants and strives to identify those discursive elements from 
which the construction of the region emerges and which remained largely elusive 
for neofunctionalist models.     
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents the study’s 
sample. Section two develops the first phase of that analysis and traces the 
representational, valuing and identifying discursive practices of the participants. 
The third section elaborates the second phase of the analysis. It does so by 
assessing the structural components of the participants’ narrative through key 
events discussed during the interviews, and the discursive regularities among the 
interviewees. The latter section focuses specifically on the implications of the 
participants’ narratives for the existence of political will in Central America and 
how those regularities fit into the regional integration model here proposed. 
Section four concludes. 
 
Central American Political Elites: The “Sample”    
Aiming at capturing the existence of political will, I carried out a series of 
“interviews” in person, via telephone and also by circulating an “open 
questionnaire” enticing the respondents to elaborate on their views and 
understandings of the integrative process. The interviews took place in three 
stages: August to October, 2005; February to April, 2007; and January to April, 
2008. The interviews were conducted in a conversational manner using a 
relatively small number of guiding questions. The sample consists of 56 
individuals from countries which are members of the System of Central 
American Integration (SICA) which includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Among the 
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participants there are a former President and a Vice-President of some of the 
region’s countries; a former President of the Central American Parliament 
(PARLACEN, in its Spanish acronym) and Vice-presidents of National 
Assemblies or Congresses; Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the legislative 
bodies’ Commissions for Foreign Affairs; Presidents and General Secretaries of 
political parties; Members of Parliament 146  and of National Assemblies and 
Congresses; and SICA Officials. Among these interviewees there are 23 political 
parties represented.  
The majority of participants spoke in conditions of confidentiality and for 
this reason I omit their names. Instead I have assigned a code to each of them: for 
example, PP1 refers to an interview with “participant-political actor number 
one.” The interviews were carried out in Spanish, and for reasons I pointed out in 
the introductory chapter (i.e. issues of equivalence of meaning in translation; see 
fn. 26), I largely avoid translating long textual citations. Instead, I textually cite 
keywords, key terms or short expressions that seem fundamental for the 
successful uncovering of the discursive dynamics through which the interviewees 
construct the Central American region. Appendix VI presents the complete list of 
participants and their respective country of origin and the institution to which 
they belong, and appendix VII includes excerpts (in Spanish) from the interviews. 
I will subject the “data” hereby obtained to the discourse analysis I discussed in 
the introductory chapter. In the sections that follow I strive to uncover patterns of 
political will in Central America through the analysis of the discursive practices 
of the elite members here interviewed. 
 
                                                 
146
 Throughout “Member of Parliament” refers to a member of PARLACEN.  
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Discourse Analysis: First Phase 
In this stage of the analysis I concentrate on tracing the discursive representations, 
characterisations and “self/other” constructions from which the participants build 
their particular reality. The identification of these elements is essential as it is 
from them that the participants “select” key events that give “meaning” to their 
“story.” Those events, in turn, become patterns that signal what is socially 
desirable or possible. In the following subsection I trace the participants’ 
representations of regionalism. 
 
Discursive Representations of Regional Integration  
All the participants represent regional integration as fundamental, important or 
necessary for the welfare of Central Americans. Regionalism is imperative and 
thus the region’s countries are “compelled” to integrate (PP1). Regional 
integration has become a “political, social, economic and cultural necessity”147 
(PP46). For members of the Salvadoran National Assembly, the region is 
“viable” only through integration (PP33); hence the process is an “exigency” and 
it is vital (PP32) for the “survival of the region’s societies” (PP30 and PP31). 
The region’s countries will not further their socio-economic development outside 
regional integration (PP16). Admittedly, integrating these countries is a 
“problematic” (PP26) and “arduous task” (PP4 and PP5). However, according to 
other participants, regional integration is “unavoidable” (PP15 and PP16). 
Furthermore, integration is a “right” of the Central American people and thus it 
should be “prioritised” by the region’s governments (PP16). In short, if the 
                                                 
147
 The “social” in the participants’ narratives relates to matters that affect the welfare of the 
region’s societies; for example, problems such as illiteracy and limited health coverage, or 
policies aiming at solving those issues. 
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region does not achieve integration, “it would not achieve the development, the 
welfare and happiness of its peoples” (PP33). No integration means “regional 
instability” (PP9). Members of Guatemala’s Congress concur and indicate that if 
integration is not achieved, the region will “experience socio-political and 
economic distortions” (PP43). Another Guatemalan deputy furthers this point by 
arguing that what is missing is a “clear integrationist consciousness as a 
mechanism to rid the region of the socio-economic issues” that it experiences 
(PP35).     
According to a Salvadoran deputy (PP32), however, there is not a “real” 
strategy about how to generate integrative impulses beyond the economic spaces. 
Integration is desirable but what is its objective? Will the process assume a 
confederation structure? This participant (PP32) argues:  
 
“…the process lacks design; there is not a plan of how to generate supranationality 
in the region. There is excessive rhetoric concerning the importance of regional 
integration, though it cannot address the fundamental question: what shape will 
integration take? What is needed is the establishment of an entity with a Central 
American personality, for instance a Central American Confederation. Regrettably, 
there is no integrationist thought aggressive enough or creative enough to determine 
what we are as a region. We have to think in terms of other dimensions such as that 
of ‘deterritorialised’ societies. Current nationalities are not explainable considering 
the territorial space of the region” (PP32).  
 
Central America thus needs an aggressive and creative strategy which assumes 
the realities of the region and that defines what the process will eventually 
achieve. 
For some participants, such a strategy could begin from the direct 
participation of the top-tier of the political parties’ hierarchy in regional 
institutions (PP5). In this sense, 42 interviewees signal that their respective 
political parties assign a degree of relevance to issues regarding integration. 
Some indicate that this relevance is apparent in the support that their parties give 
   
 160 
to the national initiatives (e.g. education campaigns) proposed by PARLACEN 
members (PP1, PP10 and PP11). Other members of Parliament indicate that they 
occupy high ranking positions in the party’s hierarchy and that in this position 
they maintain constant contact with their national counterparts (PP3). Moreover, 
it is indicated that some political parties (e.g. the Honduran Liberal Party) have 
an integration secretariat (PP9). In Nicaragua, also, there have been proposals 
among some parties to give PARLACEN members law initiative at the national 
level (PP16). Embryonic as they may be, these efforts signal an attempt to build 
an alternative regional strategy and in turn give us an opportunity to observe a 
latent willingness towards integration.   
Others disagree about the existence of such integrative inclinations. For 
example, a Guatemalan Member of Parliament (PP7) argues that the difficulties 
that integration experiences in Central America originate from the lack of interest 
that political parties show regarding the process which in turn reflects on “the 
government’s position on regionalism.” Similarly, others point out that Central 
American parties are solely focused on the national agenda (PP6 and PP34). 
They argue that this is so because the channels of communications between the 
regional and the national are at best minimal (PP50). A Nicaraguan deputy 
quickly points out that recommendations emerging from PARLACEN, for 
example, are not followed up within the region’s parties (PP50). In this regard, 
only 23 participants agree that their parties have made a fair contribution toward 
the advancement of integration. Another participant indicates that regional 
integration is not “institutionalised as a mechanism for the region’s 
development” in some of the parties’ agendas (PP34). Similarly, a Salvadoran 
deputy indicates that regional integration is not a “topic of discussion” among 
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political parties (PP32). According to this participant, it is more concerning, 
however, that a member of the National Assembly “cannot make regional 
integration an important issue on the agenda of the Assembly’s Commission for 
Foreign Relations and Integration” which supposedly deals with issues related to 
the process (PP32). And on this point: 
 
“Every political party must make the commitment to incorporate integration as one 
of the most important elements of their agendas...” (PP16). 
 
Despite a widely-held conception of the process as fundamental among 
all participants and their belief that the process is considered relevant by their 
political parties (42 interviewees), 49 participants employ in their narrative 
expressions that construct regional institutions as lacking, albeit to different 
degrees, capacity for action. The process is represented as “exclusively in 
governmental hands” (PP17). In such a process, regional institutions have “no 
teeth” and they have become “dead word” entities (PP41) with minimal impact 
on the national level (PP18, PP19 and PP22). Regional institutions have had 
“their wings cut off” and may have, at best, limited binding powers at the 
regional level but have no “intervention at the local level” (PP7). A high ranking 
official of the Honduran Liberal Party (PP47) argues that due to “resistance from 
certain political sectors” the regional process is highly deficient. For this reason, 
regional institutions remain as forums of discussion lacking any binding powers. 
More concerning for other participants is the perception of the regional 
institutions’ lack of “identity” (PP46). Those institutions, accordingly, “hide” 
themselves from the “public scene” as they are “barely” able to affect the daily 
lives of the Central American peoples (PP6). Regional institutions have not been 
able to “generate the dynamics through which they could become the vanguard 
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of the process” (PP50). It is indicated that the lack of a “real presence” of those 
institutions has delimited the “we-feeling” among Central American societies 
and negatively affects the mass of the population’s perception of those 
institutions (PP50).  
A member of the Guatemalan Congress indicates that the “common” 
Central Americans, who have a fair degree of knowledge about the process, 
support regionalism; however, they do not support certain regional institutions as 
they do not comprehend their usefulness (PP37). Another Guatemalan 
Congressman agrees and points out that in this respect the Parliament “is the 
regional institution most misunderstood and thus the people cannot perceive how 
it benefits them” (PP40). In reality, however, the Parliament, this participant adds, 
is of “great potential benefit” for the region as it is the political forum with the 
“largest political representation” in Central America incorporating about 50 
political parties (PP40). Such a “democratising dimension is clearly overlooked 
by members of the media who attack and undermine the Parliament” (PP40). The 
media’s “destructive” stance, however, “points to the frustrations and conflicts 
that exist among certain Central American societal segments” despite “the 
common history of these societies” (PP40). Another interviewee concludes that 
such a stance overlooks a significant fact: supranational institutions are merely 
“the reflections of the policies of the states” that participate in the process and 
thus it is important to analyse and question the depth of the participation and 
commitment of those states (PP46). Table 4.1 presents a summary of the 
interviewees’ discursive representational practices.  
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Table 4.1. Summary of “Representational” Findings 
The Process is 
Fundamental/Imperative/Vital
The Process is 
Relevant for 
Party
Party 
Contributes to 
the Process 
Regional Institutions 
have Limited Capacity 
for Action
Total number of participants 56 54* 54* 56
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support 
this dimension 
56 42 23 51
Percentage of the sample 100 0.78 0.43 0.91
*= Question not relevant for members of SICA
 
 
In the subsection that follows, I assess the political elites’ discursive 
characterisations of the regional process.  
 
Discursive Valuation of Regional Integration 
The majority of the interviewees (47) characterise regional integration as a 
centralised process that has not reached the Central American society. The 
process is perceived to be almost exclusively in “state hands” (PP17). 
Specifically, it is indicated that integration is overtly “dependent on the 
Executives” (PP2). Such dependence is observable in the central role of the 
“Presidential Summits” in the process. The Summits, however, are perceived as 
“non-democratic” and to an extent against the functionality of the System of 
Integration as they are fairly perfunctory (PP3). As we have seen, other 
participants indicate that the lack of progress that the process experiences, 
originates in the “prevalent attitude” (e.g. “minimum importance, if any”) among 
the leadership of the region’s political parties which in turn influences that of the 
Presidents (PP7). 
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As a result of such a centralised nature, the great majority of the 
participants (53) underline the fact that regional institutions lack binding powers 
and, hence, proposals originating at the regional level do not have any impact at 
the national level. It is indicated that supranational institutions do not “intervene 
in local issues” (PP7). More concerning, according to a Panamanian Deputy, 
such a trend maintains supranational institutions isolated from the people (PP51). 
Regional institutions are, thus, too far apart from Central American societies; 
they must strive to converge with the people and to offer solutions to the 
problems these societies experience:  
 
“Regional institutions have been too isolated from the people. Regional institutions 
must “touch” the people and must draw closer among themselves... Political leaders 
must prioritise integration through actions and not just with words... Solutions must 
be given to the people through integration...” (PP16). 
 
In addition, some participants indicate that there is limited knowledge of 
the activities of supranational institutions; hence there is not “recognition” about 
“any effective work” done by those institutions for the “benefit” of the region’s 
peoples (PP43). Furthermore, as a result of the invisibility of the process, in 
Panama, for example, the people do not “think” about Central America as a 
“logical frame to confront” socio-economic problems (PP54). Another 
participant indicates that in the rest of the region the trend is similar and the 
general population remains focused on the issues that directly afflict them (e.g. 
migration, insecurity, poverty); this is partly the result of the centralised nature of 
the process (PP6).  
This limited knowledge leads the Central American people to “misuse the 
institutional spaces available for their participation” (PP8). Indeed, according to a 
Costa Rican Deputy (PP18), such a centralised process limits the impact of 
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popular participation on the process. She argues, for example, that the spaces that 
exist for the civil society’s participation (i.e. SICA’s Consultative Committee) 
have not had an impact on the integrative process (PP18). In addition:  
 
“The obstacles to integration are excessive individualism, the countries’ short-
sightedness, the inability to understand the process, the total lack of knowledge 
about the process which leads to negative stereotyping (ignorance) and the emphasis 
on economic aspects which excludes the ‘integration’ of the Central American 
people from the regional process” (PP18). 
 
The overwhelmingly economic focus of the process thus isolates the people and 
the organisations that represent them. Civil society remains at the fringes of 
regionalism. If this societal basis of integration is not articulated the process 
itself would remain peripheral for the Central American people. Regional 
institutions can only develop into “real” institutions (i.e. “acquire a degree of 
identity”) in the people’s perspectives, if they become the vanguard in a social 
dialogue that connects the people with regional integration through socio-cultural 
spaces:  
 
“… [Current] issues can be solved by generating a Central American culture and 
transform the integration process into a development agenda… A ‘social dialogue’ 
is needed in order for integration to move forward. In such dialogue the Parliament 
becomes indispensable. It could establish hearings with the Central American 
society in general in order to reduce the existing breaches [between the process and 
society]… The region’s people must acquaint themselves with other Central 
Americans, so as to realise all the commonalities that exist among them, only 
then can the Central American people be integrated… An integrationist 
campaign is needed in order to generate a higher Central American 
consciousness. Also, the region needs a political-cultural strategy parallel to 
the economic schemes, one in which the region sees itself as a region…” 
(PP18). 
 
In order to further reduce the gap between themselves and the society 
they are supposed to represent, regional institutions need first, to “divulge 
information about the process” (PP18); and second, to concretise a “product” 
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(PP51) or “material results” (PP52) visible for the common Central American 
individual. Integration, for example, can be employed to “level the Central 
American societies:” regionalism should aim at social and economic 
development in order to reduce the socio-economic differences among and 
within the region’s societies (PP26). If strategies (e.g. the education budget) that 
begin to move the process toward this aim are established, integration would 
become “visible” for the people, which may “force” reluctant political actors to 
further current integrative schemes or begin new regional initiatives (PP26). 
With this in mind, in Guatemala UNE members have proposed the creation of an 
“agency for the promotion, divulging and development of integration” which 
could disseminate information about the activities of supranational institutions, 
especially PARLACEN (PP8). Such an agency could work together with the 
Central American media which would facilitate a “direct channel of 
communication with the region’s civil society” (PP8). A member of the 
Honduran Liberal party suggests that a further and related decentralising strategy 
is to employ such an agency to “incorporate integration as a topic of debate” in 
political campaigns and in the internal agenda of political parties (PP46). In other 
words, an information campaign should be employed to give the process and its 
institutions a fair degree of visibility.  
Fifty participants employ in their narrative elements that advance 
regionalism’s new meanings (e.g. social meaning); and 43 interviewees consider 
education and training as means to achieve integrationist success. It is indicated 
that regional integration and the supranationality that presupposes means 
prosperity for the peoples of the region (PP5). Obviously, integration will not 
solve all the problems that the region experiences but would set a “solid basis” to 
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begin working towards a “greater degree of prosperity” for the people (PP6). 
Supranational actors and institutions, however, have not been able to widely 
disseminate “the idea that integration opens a wide horizon of new possibilities 
that could be used to solve the region’s current problems” (PP6). Unfortunately 
regional integration in Central America does not “parallel the social issues” that 
the region experiences (PP14). It is overwhelmingly focused on the economic 
dimension which, alas, it is not “perceptible” to the Central American peoples 
(PP9). For example, despite the increasing economic integration that is taking 
place between the traditionally considered Central American countries and 
Panama, the common Panamanians are not “conscious” of the “other” Central 
Americans because that economic integration does not affect them directly 
(PP54). Political actors should diffuse the “social and cultural messages” 
simultaneously to the economic counterpart they currently emphasise (PP16). 
Integration must be shifted from its current focus on the acquisition of private 
profit to the acquisition of public welfare (PP13, PP14 and PP34). 
According to a Guatemalan Deputy, regionalism “must be global, it must 
begin from the minimum” or by enabling “ignored groups, for example 
minorities, to obtain a regional space” (PP37). “Minority issues, especially 
women’s rights” should be at the top of the agenda as those issues would bring 
integration closer to the general population (PP37). For a Member of Parliament 
(PP9), it is the advancement of such socio-political dimensions that could 
become the nucleus on which integration in Central America would become a 
reality:  
 
“Economic integration is not perceptible to the Central American people. The socio-
political aspects of the process should be the backbone of the process. The political 
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should be the spine of integration. Therefore, the development and strengthening of 
the [regional] political institutions are important for the process...” (PP9). 
 
A high ranking official of the Honduran Liberal party (PP45) indicates that 
indeed it is fundamental to bring the social in parallel to the economic side of 
integration. He suggests that this is achievable through the synchronisation of a 
space little discussed within regionalism in the isthmus; namely, legal integration. 
The Central American Court of Justice, for example, should be given “binding 
powers” in order to act as a truly integrative mechanism advancing legal reforms 
that could benefit the general population (PP45). In this sense, considering that 
laws are “social,” another participant argues that regional integration could 
“become a social development plan” through the region’s national “legislative 
bodies” and by doing so, the region’s societies can be socially “homogenised” 
(PP19). A Costa Rican member of the National Assembly points out that 
although the “economic dimension integrates,” regionalism requires the 
“synchronisation of the process with social policies” that can underpin 
integration with a degree of “reality” in the peoples’ perception (PP21). In short, 
first the process must be explained to the common Central American, and second, 
integration can emphasise economic factors because these eventually generate 
integrative trends but political actors should strive to parallel such emphasis with 
social issues (PP22).   
It is thus imperative to develop programs that “level the social issues” 
(e.g. health coverage and the education budget) in the region (PP3). Members of 
Guatemala’s UNE agree, and argue that Central American regionalism must be 
all encompassing: 
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“It is important to integrate all the comparative advantages of the region’s countries. 
Yet, the process must be broad and include all dimensions, not only the economic. 
Integration must not be merely economic but become inclusive. This means that it 
must comprise the social, political, cultural and economic aspects” (PP43). 
 
It is thus fundamental to focus on the development of certain segments of society 
barely affected, at best, by integration: “the local communities” (PP43). Such 
development can be achieved through support from regional institutions for 
educational opportunities available to those communities (PP43). For instance, 
regional institutions could promote “training programs on integration topics for 
community leaders” who, in turn, would become “integrationist agents” 
disseminating the message of integration (PP43). In this respect, a PARLACEN 
member (PP4) has conducted informative campaigns regarding integration 
among Guatemalan indigenous communities; he was quick to indicate that those 
campaigns were carried out in the communities’ native languages. Current efforts, 
however, are “too isolated” from these societal segments and it is imperative that 
integration strives for the “social development of those communities” as well as 
their economic advancement (PP43).     
Limited knowledge about integration results in a narrow vision of the 
process (PP4). An integrative vision can be elaborated through educational 
programs that emphasise an integrated Central America (PP11). In Honduras, 
members of PARLACEN have initiated one such program which has “generated 
interest in integration” among that country’s youth (PP11). The same members 
have been able to advance a “proposal to the region’s ministries of education” 
who agreed to include in their respective school curricula a “peace and 
integration content” (PP11). In this respect, in the Dominican Republic, political 
actors have obtained authorisation from the country’s Ministry of Education to 
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offer “talks about regional integration” in schools and universities, and have 
proposed the establishment of integration modules at university level (PP1). 
Education is thus perceived as fundamental to the advancement of regional 
integration: it can be “used” to “encourage” the emergence of “regional 
consciousness” among Central American societies (PP5). What is needed is the 
development of a “consistent educational program;” that is, uniform regional 
curricula that emphasise Central America as a unit in socio-economic, political 
and cultural aspects (PP33). 
Regionalism needs an “integrationist campaign” to diffuse information 
about the process which can become a point of convergence between political 
actors and the general public and thus generate a “Central American 
consciousness” (PP18). More importantly, the objective of this campaign should 
be that the “region learns to see itself as a region” through a socio-political and 
cultural strategy (PP18). Such a campaign is fundamental for the empowering of 
integration: to transform it into a “topic of discussion” (PP19). An increased 
“consciousness” about the process is also important among political actors: a 
greater Central American “consciousness” among the general population 
“requires” a greater “consciousness” among political actors (PP43). The latter 
thus must be “trained” in integration issues in order to fully comprehend their 
tasks; only then they “could act as true agents of regional consciousness 
promotion” (PP43). It is thus recognised that lack of “training” is also an issue 
among political actors as many among them “do not know about integration” 
(PP4). Members of Guatemala’s UNE assent and indicate that “educational 
programs” targeted at political actors, including members of PARLACEN, are 
essential (PP43). Importantly, it is observed that political actors need to 
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“empower themselves on integration issues” in order to “generate” the degree of 
“Centroamericanism” needed to strengthen the process (PP4). In this sense, 
supranational institutions could be employed as “socialisation mechanisms” for 
national political actors with limited regional identity (PP23 and PP54).  
 It is also important to incorporate the “work of the people” into 
regionalism (PP18). The success of the process requires the incorporation of “the 
ideas and proposals” of the common Central Americans (PP24). With this in 
mind, regional institutions, particularly PARLACEN, could develop a type of 
public “audiences” (PP18) or “socio-economic councils” open to the public 
(PP25) thereby opening spaces wherein a “popular Central American identity” 
can be expressed and sustained (PP40). By designing such participatory 
mechanisms, first, the “gaps” that exist between the political and the social 
spaces of the process could be reduced; and second, the people would 
“appropriate” the process and by doing so could begin further integrative trends 
(PP24).      
A high ranking official of the Honduran Liberal party concludes that 
whatever form the process assumes, economic or otherwise, it needs regional 
institutions with “binding powers” in order to be able to sustain integrative trends 
emerging from any level of society (PP47). In short, the degree of consolidation 
of the process works parallel to the reinforcement of the institutional framework:  
 
“The functionality of regional institutions is deficient. The process’ consolidation 
must be accompanied by institutional strengthening, which would be demonstrated 
through its consolidation” (PP47). 
 
In this sense, it is necessary that political actors “further promote activities that 
involve governmental officials and members of civil society thus they can [first,] 
   
 172 
generate greater consciousness about the importance of the process;” and second, 
reinforce the “existent Central American identity” (PP35). Regional institutions 
thus can become “socialisation mechanisms” in which political elites can “teach” 
reluctant socio-political groups to be “regional.” It is to the representation of that 
“other” that I now turn.  First, however, table 4.2 summarises the discursive 
characterisations of regionalism. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of “Valuation” Findings 
The Process is 
Centralised
Regional Institutions Lack 
Binding Powers
Social/ Cultural 
Meanings
Education/Training as 
Means to Integration
Total number of participants 56 56 56 56
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support this 
dimension 
47 53 50 43
Percentage of the sample 0.84 0.95 0.89 0.77
 
 
 
Self and “Other” Discursive Identification 
Constructing “otherness:” executive powers and private sector  
According to a Member of Parliament, in the Central American context regional 
integration has entered a purely economic dialogue wherein the executives 
become the vanguard of integration (PP12). The process has been centralised as 
the region’s presidents and certain economic groups control regional policies and 
information flows regarding regionalism (PP25). For a Costa Rican deputy, the 
“parliamentary diplomacy” that integration entails has been “reserved for the 
executives” (PP23). In this centralisation process, the social and political 
dimensions become supplements of the economic dimension and thus the 
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institutional spaces (e.g. PARLACEN) in which to advance the socio-political 
process are not utilised:  
 
“In the new context of integration, [the process] enters an economic, social and 
political dialog. In economic aspects, [the process] advances at the executive level 
and not within political parties. As a consequence, the executives become the 
vanguard excluding the political aspects from the process. The social becomes an 
appendix of the economic. An evaluation and reform of the treaty of social 
integration is needed. In the political, we have squandered the Parliament as a space 
to elaborate true integration proposals which would project the region as a unit and 
with a clear direction” (PP12). 
 
This detracts, thus, from the possibility of establishing a clearly delineated 
institutional direction which, in turn, contributes to the “jealousy” among 
regional political actors (e.g. increased competition for “available resources”) 
and the lack of regionalising “ideological development” (PP12). In the words of 
a Member of Parliament, the current “regional vision is generated by exogenous 
factors, such as the FTA with the US,” 148  that conversely delimits first, a 
regionalising “vision” and second, the emergence of a “communitarian 
sentiment” (PP12).     
The region’s Presidents and the governments they represent have 
advanced integrative processes that “develop and strengthen certain economic 
groups and the existent private capital” (PP14). The issue is, more specifically, 
that all the “Central American Presidents are linked to the same private capital 
and this capital is speculative” which in turns “does not need integration and 
much less supranational institutions that may delimit the financial space for 
speculation;” for example, a Central American Court of Justice with 
comprehensive binding powers could enact regulation that would affect 
investments in the region (PP32). A member of Guatemala’s Congress (PP36) 
                                                 
148
 FTA refers to the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) reached in 2004. 
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underlines a similar interconnection between the Central American Presidents 
and certain overwhelmingly powerful economic groups:     
 
“The region’s political systems are not independent from powerful economic sectors. 
This financial dependency enables those sectors to control the political spaces. 
Therefore, politicians do not have the liberty to develop politics. The political is 
subordinated to the economic. The region’s Presidents lack the political freedom to 
develop a truly integrationist agenda. We must think as nations and not as economic 
interests. Because of this dependency and way of thinking the regional institutions 
never achieve the binding power they should have” (PP36). 
 
Thus, the region lacks an in-depth integrationist initiative (PP36). 
A member of the Salvadoran National Assembly states that he is highly 
“pessimistic about the integrationist attitudes of the region’s governments” and 
indicates that the Presidents “do not accept anything that smells like 
supranationality” (PP32). There is not “predisposition among the Presidents” 
toward the process (PP42). “Intergovernmental sectors and specially the 
executives perceive supranational institutions as rivals” (PP17). The delegation 
of “binding powers” to supranational institutions, for example, is perceived as 
the “executives’ loss of power” (PP16). At one point or another, certain “political 
groups” including “some of the region’s Presidents” have wanted to “disappear” 
regional institutions such as the Parliament because “they are the ideal forum 
wherein integration can truly take-off” (PP42). Those individuals believe that by 
empowering regional institutions they would be “letting go of their power” 
(PP42). Therefore, the attitude among the Presidents of the region “slows down,” 
and occasionally, “blocks” the regional process (PP5).  
A Member of Parliament, thus, argues that the process depends on the 
“whims” of the region’s executives (PP11). A high ranking official of Honduras’ 
Liberal Party agrees and suggests that there is a high level of “resistance” among 
the Presidents which in turns detracts from the institutionalisation of the process 
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(PP47). Some participants indicate that the region’s Presidents and Governments 
“lack an integrationist identity” (PP13). Other interviewees point out that there is 
a lack of “truly regional leadership” among the executives (PP46). This is 
observable in the “contradiction” that exists between the “willingness exhibit” by 
the region’s governments and the rhetoric they employed, and the 
“implementation of the process” (PP46). For example, a member of the 
Honduran National Party attests that agreements reached at regional Presidential 
summits are not followed-up at the national level by the same officials attending 
the meetings (PP49). For this reason, a Nicaraguan Deputy argues that regional 
integration is “merely a rhetorical exercise used by the region’s governments” 
(PP50). In such a context, the region’s Presidents create regional institutions but 
then they abandon those institutions (PP31). Also, integration becomes an issue 
through which the upcoming Presidents “get revenge on outgoing Presidents” 
(revanchismo); that is, newly elected executives see integration policies as a way 
of “discrediting” their predecessors which results in “high degrees of instability 
within the process” (PP30). For a Guatemalan Deputy, it is more concerning that 
some of the executives “do not comprehend the process and lack a vision of what 
it means to be a unified Central America from which to build integration 
according to the region’s reality” (PP42). 
It is hence necessary to “create” regional consciousness among the 
Presidents and their Cabinets:  
 
“The process’ relevance depends on the role of the political parties. Depending on 
the level of awareness about what is needed for the success of the process, the level 
of influence on the [region’s] legislatives and executives could increase, which in 
turn would strengthen the process and make it more effective... Intergovernmental 
sectors consider the supranational as a rival; for this reason the process is slowed 
down. Therefore, it is necessary to create an integrationist consciousness among 
the Presidents and their cabinets. This could be achieved through the political 
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parties. In any case, the process must not be exclusively in intergovernmental 
hands” (PP17). 
 
As noted previously, some interviewees indicate that it is important that 
regionalism be taken seriously by the executives and other high ranking party 
officials. Considering its importance for the region, it must be a topic of debate 
beyond its current status of an appendix to electoral campaigns (PP16). In the 
short run, it is argued that for integration to be successful, the region’s Executive 
powers must “acquire” a “communitarian vision” (PP7). In the long run, the 
System of Integration itself must become a “communitarian system” without 
“dependence on the executives” and incorporate wide popular participation (PP2). 
A Nicaraguan member of PARLACEN concludes that the region’s Presidents 
“must assume the political responsibility” of giving the Central American 
societies “a much-deserved unified patria” (PP16).   
As mentioned previously, it is indicated that regional institutions are but 
“the reflections of the region’s government policies” and as such they “lack an 
identity” that may generate integrative impulses among the general population 
(PP46). In this sense, the lack of binding power that the regional institutions are 
experiencing is not the result of these institutions’ “limited productive activities” 
as some “members of the media” point out but the direct outcome of policies 
implemented by the region’s Presidents (PP34). It is highly concerning, for this 
participant (PP34), that the media “does not know nor understand the System of 
Integration [SICA] and go about presenting it as [a group of] unproductive 
institutions.” In short, the media has developed a “destructive spirit towards 
integration” (PP40). A member of the Guatemalan Congress (PP44) who was 
directly involved in the founding of PARLACEN, agrees with this assessment 
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and argues that there is a “negative attitude” among the region’s Presidents 
towards regional institutions, especially the Parliament. He indicates that the 
Central American societies are not against integration, rather there has been a 
“good degree of opposition” among some of the region’s Presidents (e.g. former 
Guatemalan President Serrano and former Honduran President Maduro) who 
resist the consolidation of regional institutions; and in some cases, the executives 
have “initiated negative press campaigns against supranational institutions” 
(PP44). The relation between the media’s representation of integration and the 
executives’ lack of support for regionalism, thus, becomes “a mutually 
reinforcing process” (PP34). This situation is taken advantage of by other groups 
(i.e. the private sector) that do not support certain aspects of the process by 
feeding the media with “discrediting campaigns” against regional institutions; 
especially, PARLACEN (PP34). According to this participant, it is at this point 
where the Central American process reaches an “impasse” and the resulting 
“stagnation” is embedded in the System (PP34). One of the main issues that the 
process faces, it seems, is the “myopic criterion of certain producers [forjadores] 
of public opinion” (PP53).     
In this context, integration as a “political” process is declining because 
the economic dimension of the process is overwhelmingly highlighted by 
economic elites who possess a great degree of political power (PP9). The 
economic dimension, as argued previously, has limited impact on the lives of the 
majority of Central Americans (PP9). Governments have planned the process 
according to the interests of the region’s “social hierarchies” who largely belong 
to powerful economic sectors (PP1). According to a former high ranking official 
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of the Guatemalan government and later Member of Parliament (PP5), certain 
powerful groups within the private sector do not want regional integration: 
 
“… powerful groups in society do not wish for Central American integration to take 
place. Those who sell chicken, cement, and beers, prefer to have their own ‘farm’ in 
each country so as not to share and compete at the Central American level” (PP5). 
 
It is suggested that the Central American “economic class” is “afraid of the 
integration process” (PP39). The issue is that certain economic groups have a 
great degree of power over the regional agenda and are able to make the region 
think almost exclusively in terms of economic interests; thus regional institutions 
are not able to obtain the binding powers they should have because these 
institutions are perceived as potentially detrimental for economic interests (PP36). 
For a high ranking official (PP34) of the Guatemalan Social Democratic 
Party, the region’s private sector prefers an integration process with relaxed 
regulations under their control and thus they strive to control the Central 
American States: 
 
“The greatest obstacle to integration is the business groups that want to control the 
state and participate in an economic integration process with minimal regulations, 
which means an integration controlled by them. PARLACEN with binding powers 
would elect the executives of SICA, SIECA and BCIE; which would result in strong 
regional institutions able to regulate the integration process, particularly the 
economic process; [for business groups] it is not an economic matter but one of 
control” (PP34). 
 
Strong regional institutions able to enforce regional regulation imply increasing 
limitations to the type of integration sought by the regions’ powerful elites. 
A Guatemalan deputy (PP35) wonders that if Central America shares 
solid cultural and historical bases for integration why is it, then, that the process 
stagnates so often? He goes on to indicate that the answer lies in the actions of 
the powerful economic groups of the region’s societies: 
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“The ones who oppose the process are the private sector groups, the powerful 
economic groups, the local oligarchies. Due to their objectives, the Central 
American oligarchies want to integrate without integrating. Which means they want 
to integrate, have bank alliances, for instance the Cuscatlan bank. Such [business] 
alliances must be carried out according to the oligarchies’ own conditions, without 
regulations or laws, and without obligations towards the region’s countries. A 
formal integration implies the creation of powerful binding institutions. Such 
institutions would limit the informal integration (the Parliament would legislate 
binding regional norms). For this reason [i.e. potential threat] the oligarchic groups 
discredit even the national congresses. The private sector, because of their 
objectives, oppose formal integration, they also criticise local congresses because 
they do not want norms… Banks are integrated, businesses are integrated; then, is a 
strengthened regional integration needed?” (PP35). 
 
In this view integration has been informal and has facilitated the emergence of a 
kind of regional multinational corporation. The process, however, advances as 
long as powerful societal groups set the conditions for that progress and as long 
as the process remains without strong laws and regulations, and without serious 
commitment from the region’s countries to achieve these. Others argue that 
historically the Central American oligarchies—with which the private sector is 
interconnected—have been “anti-integrationist” and have tended to “parcel” the 
region for their economic interests; this is a “simplistic explanation” for the 
repeated failures of the process but “it is a historically real explanation” (PP13). 
A Guatemalan deputy member of the Unionist Party indicates that the 
lack of a definitive regionalist position on the part of the executives generates a 
political vacuum that creates an ideal space for anti-regionalist segments to 
exploit (PP41). The powerful economic groups, for example, “occupy the 
regional space and attempt to discredit regional institutions” because they are not 
able to “control those institutions” (PP41). The private sector, thus, attempts to 
“discredit regional institutions” through negative press (PP35 and PP41). 
According to a Guatemalan deputy (PP40) there are “frustrations and conflicts” 
in the region; he indicates:  
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“Despite all our history we do not consider ourselves as a region. The coffee 
growers’ attitude towards integration is not positive. A culture of integration is non 
existent; the benefits of integration are not perceived nor understood… The greatest 
obstacle is the lack of credibility of the regional institutions and the confrontation 
between the economic sector and the political class. The economic sector has 
developed its links, for instance they interact through the chambers of commerce or 
industry. The economic elites do not believe that the political class is capable of 
articulating their interests. Therefore, they do not use integration’s institutional 
channels. These groups control the media; they feed it with arguments which 
discredit regional institutions. For instance, they argue that national representations 
to the Parliament are too large. Destroying in that manner something they do not 
understand” (PP40). 
 
The private sector thus detracts from the potential spillovers that may originate 
from the actions of regional integrationists actors and institutions.  
Other participants have a positive outlook toward the “otherness” of the 
private sector. For instance, a member of the Honduran Liberal Party indicates 
that despite the political stagnation that the process seems to permanently 
experience and “the existence of conflictive economic interests, the private sector 
integrates itself” and by doing so, contributes to “regional integration’s survival” 
(PP48). Yet, interviewees are concerned about the path that economic integration 
has followed. They assert, for example, that the private sector supported Central 
America-Dominican Republic-US Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) of 2004 
has halted the integration process. CAFTA-DR, they indicate, was bilaterally 
negotiated by the US with each of the region’s countries which created divisions 
among those countries (PP16). It is argued that the CAFTA-DR obstructs Central 
American regionalism:  
 
“There are members of the dominant private sector who are linked to the interests of 
the United States. This relation has allowed for the process of integration to be 
subordinated to the Free Trade Agreement because integration must be consistent 
with that treaty. As a result the treaty divides the Central American region limiting 
integrationist tendencies… Therefore, it is necessary that the process reflects a 
balance between the private sector and the state.” (PP3). 
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CAFTA-DR hinders integration by breaking existent integrative impulses such as 
the customs union (PP3). Moreover, through such agreements the private sector 
increases its links with international interests (e.g. multinational corporations) 
which makes regional integration indirectly dependent on those interests (PP13 
and PP14).  
 
Political norm entrepreneurs: ideational struggle in the socially constructed 
state structure 
A foremost concern among the interviewees is that lack of “regional and 
communitarian vision” at the “state level” which is readily observable in the 
limited follow up given to regional treaties (PP7). The “parochial” approach 
towards integration assumed by segments of the political elites which entails a 
limited regionalising commitment has delimited the possibilities for achieving a 
long-term regional vision (PP41):  
 
“Political will is fundamental in this respect as long as it is preceded by a solid 
cultural apparatus and we have not built a Central American culture; not among 
labour unions, guilds, student groups, or artists and sports associations. This is due 
to integration’s focus on economic matters which requires a great degree of 
competition and rivalry among the Central American countries…” (PP41).  
 
On the one hand, according to this participant (PP41), despite the lack of regional 
culture, economic integration is fairly advanced among members of the private 
sector. On the other hand, economic integration has led to a “localist vision” 
(vision de aldea) among other sectors of the Central American society thereby 
limiting the integration of spaces beyond economic regionalism (PP50). In such a 
context, regional institutions have not been able to generate the dynamics to 
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become the vanguard of integration which has detracted from the continuity of 
the process (PP50).  
To overcome such limitations, it is suggested that economic integration 
must aim at “reforming” the region’s markets “giving buying power to all 
Central Americans;” it must not “integrate small markets” which could 
exacerbate the current “delicate social balance” in the region (PP46). A 
Guatemalan Congressman emphatically states that “regional integration means 
political, social and economic union” (PP36). Integration must begin from the 
“social” and it “must provide answers to the people” (PP10). Some participants 
propose to include the “social” in the regional agenda through issues that affect 
the great majority of the Central American societies. For example, programs of 
regional “social security” coverage (PP2) and “citizen safety” (PP3) could be 
incorporated. A Member of Parliament elaborates on this point and states that the 
“social” can be “attacked” through the “educational” (PP1). Others, conversely, 
perceive economic integration as a launching platform for a successful regional 
process. According to a member of the Honduran National Party hierarchy 
(PP49), it is “necessary that Central America integrates as an economic bloc.” In 
turn, the economic would lead to the integration of “judicial, political and social” 
matters. In any event, leaders of the Guatemalan Congress indicate that the 
“process’ stages should be paced out gradually selling the idea of integration to 
all of society’s sectors” (PP38 and PP39).   
With this in mind, political actors should strive to develop a more 
“belligerent regional agenda” around issues beyond economics which would 
“generate a regional sentiment” among them promoting further cooperation and 
thus, at the same time, would facilitate “changing the image of regional 
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institutions” in peoples’ perceptions by giving those institutions more “presence” 
(PP50). For such an integrative impulse to occur, however, it is necessary that 
political actors assume greater regional “consciousness and identity” and that 
they conceive of their role and that of the institutions they represent as 
“fundamental stances” for the development of the region (PP50). A Guatemalan 
member of Congress furthers this argument by indicating that “the most 
important thing for integration is” that members of regional institutions “perceive 
themselves as regional actors on charge of Central America’s destiny” (PP44). 
For instance, PARLACEN members should “assume a sense of historical 
responsibility” and strive to be “closer” to their national counterparts and their 
respective societies” (PP44). It is also important that regional political actors 
“court” those individuals who hold ultimately “regional agenda powers;” that is, 
“the Presidents’ and Foreign Affairs Ministries’ advisers” (PP44). The role of the 
latter is highlighted by a member of the Guatemalan Congress (PP35) who was 
directly involved in the establishment of PARLACEN. He indicates that the 
region’s Presidents “lack regional leadership” because they “do not understand 
the process” and thus “they are against the process;” importantly, they are anti-
integrationist, “precisely because their advisers are against the process” (PP35). 
The trend, nevertheless, can be reversed: regional political actors must “insist to 
the Presidents;” they must constantly “work on the executives” through their 
advisers (PP44). A Nicaraguan Deputy agrees that there is lack of willingness 
among the region’s executives; however, he strongly argues that it is the duty of 
the members of regional institutions to act as motivators and have the Presidents 
become involved in the process (PP50). He notes, however, that there is a limited 
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“dynamism” among regional officials in this respect and concludes that the 
executives cannot be “blamed” for such passiveness.   
For other participants, the reality is that, in general, there is a “limited 
regional identity” (PP40).  It is thus imperative to begin “working on the identity 
of the region’s youth” (PP40). It is fundamental to strive to increase the Central 
American peoples’ “consciousness” about integration in order to generate greater 
levels of a shared identity (PP1). In the same manner, other interviewees indicate 
that regional political actors “should develop programs that increase the 
awareness and identity of the general population,” and by doing so, “the people 
would become diffusers of integration” (PP38 and PP39). Members of 
supranational institutions and “pro-integration” national political actors thus must 
“work on the regional consciousness of the Central American peoples” (PP10); 
they “need to converge in order to develop educational programs about 
integration” (PP7). Education can be employed to “irrigate the regional 
consciousness among the general population” but also that consciousness can 
grow through the convergence of “all political forces in the region” on the 
importance of integration as an issue of debate (PP46). In short, it is important to 
promote a regional identity among the mass of the population through 
“consciousness raising activities targeted to the understanding and acceptance” 
of an integrated Central America (PP43).      
A former PARLACEN President indicates that it is the “duty” of regional 
political actors to “work” on the level of awareness about the process among the 
Central American societies (PP15). Politics is about “symbols” and that is 
precisely what the regional process lacks (PP50). Regional symbols that lead to 
integrative trends can be generated through “regionalising ideas” (PP13). With 
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this in mind, the “media” can be employed to “disperse integrationist ideas” 
(PP15). The media could “reposition” the integrative discussion in the official 
agenda (PP3). Approaching the general public in this way will “generate an 
attitudinal change” toward regional institutions because the latter would acquire 
“a better image” by making public their activities and thus enabling Central 
Americans to “feel” the impact of integration (PP6). In the Dominican Republic, 
for example, PARLACEN members carry out such a task through the media 
(PP1). It is thus important that pro-integrationist actors rethink their approach to 
the “social producers of information” in order to challenge the prevailing views 
of the process (PP9).  
For a Nicaraguan Member of Parliament, institutional “binding powers 
are not necessary” if the regional political actors and the institutions they 
represent “know how to sell the idea of integration” (PP12). The lack of those 
powers, however, has become “an extraordinary pretext” for the limited 
institutional dynamism in the region (PP12). Members of PARLACEN, for 
example, should “divulge information” through “reports that sell their activities;” 
it is important for the “health of the regional process” that regional actors regain 
their “regionalising motivation” and that they assume “interests, commitments 
and convictions” that could lead to greater regional achievements (PP12). Others 
concur adding that the Central American political elites must begin to think as a 
nation and not confine themselves to economic interests thus reaching a definite 
regional posture that would eventually contribute to the reinforcement of the 
regional institutional framework (PP36). The concern of regionalising actors 
should be to “sell the idea of integration” through “regionalising political 
decisions” that would eventually lead to supranational institutions with “strong 
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binding powers” (PP49). It is acceptable that the executives take the lead through 
the “presidential summits;” what is important is that “adequate follow up” is 
given to the agreements reached at those summits (PP49). This participant 
concludes that “it is necessary to sell the idea of integration” because this would 
“generate willingness” towards integration among reluctant political actors. 
The “control” over the process exercised by the Presidents and which 
delimits the possibilities for regional institutions to obtain binding powers could 
be challenged “head-on” by regionalising political elites (PP41 and PP42). For 
example, in the case of PARLACEN, the “way to binding powers” could be 
facilitated by promoting greater interplay among the Parliament and the National 
Assemblies (PP42). Regionalism, in other words, requires first, the “integration” 
of the “political forces” (i.e. the political elite) of the region (PP25). The 
Parliament and SICA’s General Secretariat could be employed as the basis to 
build a “regional entity with political personality” that establishes a “symbolic 
regional president who would not be the head of state” but who “would begin 
overcoming barriers and who could begin to generate a common foreign policy” 
for the region (PP41). Through legislation the region could do away with the 
executive support; “fortunately” and more importantly, it is indicated that the 
private sector does not have control over legislative decisions (PP41). It is 
fundamental, however, that integrationist political elites clearly convey the idea 
that integration does not mean to surrender sovereignty and national identity 
(PP47):  
 
“The process has an enormous potential with innumerable benefits for the region. 
Therefore, we need to speed it up with increased political will, we must not think 
that to bestow power to integration means to surrender power, our sovereignty and 
national identity; on the contrary, it means the search for greater possibilities of 
social and economic development, which would be beneficial for all the region’s 
countries” (PP47). 
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Rather, the process is about synergy: the common search for the possibility to 
achieve a degree of development for the region. It is thus essential to “make 
others aware of the importance of regional integration” and to look for 
“consensus as to what path the region should follow” (PP3). Regional actors can 
facilitate convergence by becoming agents of discussion and regional 
consciousness promoters (PP2, PP3 and PP43). In the end, it is the pro-
integration political elites that should “learn to take advantage of the regional 
institutions” to advance the process (PP40). Regionalising political actors should 
develop a further “forum of cooperation” within the current institutional 
framework that could lead to greater integration (PP34). Such a forum must be 
based on the idea that regional integration is a “development vehicle” which 
requires that political elites—regionalising or otherwise—“learn” integration: 
greater understanding about the process, in turn, would “reduce the current 
disintegration of the national and the regional” (PP34). Table 4.3 sums up the 
findings regarding the self/other construction.  
 
Table 4.3. Summary of “Identification” Findings 
Executive 
Powers as the 
"Other"
Private 
Sector as the 
"Other"
Political Elites as 
‘Norm 
Entrepreneurs’ 
Total number of participants 54* 54* 56
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support 
this dimension 
30 19 52
Percentage of the sample 0.56 0.35 0.93
*= Question not relevant for members of SICA
 
 
 
The data presented in this section seems to corroborate my conception of 
the existence and role of Central American normative elite networks, and the 
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enmeshment of the state within those networks. First, it points to the private 
sector’s close relation with other social elite groups and their interconnectedness 
with the political elite: regional preferences and policies seem to emerge from the 
struggle and/or convergence among the different groups. Second, it implies the 
ability of those groups to delimit the spaces in which political actors can 
construct the region. Third, it denotes the ability of elite groups to control the 
construction of knowledge, “making” other actors “think” in terms of those 
groups’ interests; fourth, and thus, it reveals their normative power. In the 
following section, I turn to these narratives’ implications for the existence of 
political will in the isthmus.    
 
Discourse Analysis: Second Phase 
In this stage of the analysis I focus on the key events or turning points employed 
by the participants to reorder their reality along a given meaning. Turning points 
subsequently become discursive patterns that give essence to the intersubjective 
structure from which the construction of the region’s reality materialises. It is 
within these discursive turning points and patterns that the dimensions of 
political will (i.e. ideas, identity and interests) could be better identified. I begin 
the section with a discussion of the key events of the participants’ narratives and 
the consequences of their willingness to support regional integration. 
 
Syntagmatic Analysis: Implication of Discursive Turning Points 
In the data presented in the previous section, the participants employ certain key 
elements or events that enable them to construct a particular Central American 
reality in which those elements become turning points that allow the interviewees 
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to construct the “self” as the saviour of integration. To put it differently, through 
discursive turning points, the participants construct a “self” who engages in a 
particular social role taking as redeemers of first, the Central American political 
elite which has allowed other elite groups to control integrative impulses, and 
second, of regional integration. From this self construction thus the participants 
can propose ideas to overcome the stagnant nature of the regional process often 
conceived of as natural and inevitable. And hence they offer alternate paths for a 
successful integrative process. In so doing, they initiate the ideational drive of 
socialisation I elaborated in chapter three: political elites propose alternative 
policy choices to other social elites which begin an ideational struggle that 
concludes once willingness is achieved, modified or halted. 
The first of such turning points is that of integration as a centralised 
process. The centralisation of regionalism occurs at two levels, that of the 
executive powers and that of the private sector. Importantly, this centralisation 
enables the participants to distance themselves from the unsuccessful record of 
integration in that region; I will return to this point subsequently. It is noteworthy 
that the centralised nature of regionalism leads to a second discursive turning 
point: the focus of the process; namely, economic integration. It is interesting 
that for the interviewees the economic characteristics of regionalism detract from 
the legitimacy of the process. Economic integration is perceived to be 
constructed in such a way that promotes the limited interests of the business elite 
rather than moving forward the integration of the Central American societies. In 
this conception, the particular construction of the private sector “otherness” is 
significant as implies that that “other” can “impede” through its influence on the 
executive powers trends that may lead to further integration, or alternatively, 
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imposes policies in the direction of national development rather than 
supranational. The concern among participants about the current focus on 
economic integration seemingly arises from the competition that the exploitation 
of comparative advantages entails. Resources in the region are limited. It is 
perceived that economic agreements supported by the private sector (i.e. 
CAFTA-DR) lead to competition for those resources rather than to the regional 
complementarity of the latter. Such agreements, thus, lead the region’s 
governments to develop national economic policies rather than regional thereby 
limiting the spaces in which a popular regional identity or consciousness can 
emerge and hence delimiting the integration process.    
The economic nature of the process and thus the limited popular 
participation is the result of the links between the executives and the private 
sector. Arguably, the region has developed a process tailored to the interests of 
the economic elite. More importantly, only four interviewees argue that the 
private sector has a positive influence on the regional process. And another 
participant (PP41) argues that fortunately the region’s legislative bodies are not 
controlled by the economic sectors. What seems to be overlooked in the 
construction of the private sector as “other” is the relationship among the 
participants as members of both the political and economic elites: several 
interviewees are directly involved in businesses, some have stakes in the media 
and industrial sector, and others are well known to have links with members of 
powerful business groups such as that led by former Guatemalan President 
Álvaro Arzú. In this respect, it is noteworthy that only 23 participants 
commented on the “otherness” of the private sector of whom nineteen 
constructed the economic sector as a negative “other.” Several others (e.g. PP38 
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and PP39) overtly opted not to comment on the issue. Another issue to 
contemplate in this respect is campaign funding which could be a mechanism to 
lock-in political elites into normative networks.149    
Another key element in the narrative that arises from the centralised 
nature of the process is the lack of “binding powers” among the regional 
institutions. In this respect, the regional institutional framework is not able to 
function as a platform from which to secure and launch emerging popular 
integrative impulses: the process is thus without Central Americans as it has not 
been able to fully incorporate the region’s peoples. In this respect, it is notable 
that the interviewees implicitly have adopted the notion that multilevel 
participation, more specifically popular participation, is a fundamental variable 
in the process. This is more remarkable because traditionally the popular sectors’ 
participation in the region has not been granted much importance among political 
elites. It seems thus that regional integration is contributing to a “democratising” 
trend in the ideational structure of the political elites. In any case, without 
binding powers regional institutions cannot offer “palpable products” to the 
Central American societies and thus regional integration does not resonate in 
peoples’ perception. By arguing so, the political elite here represented suggest 
that the regions institutions lack “entitativity;” that is the power of action in the 
mind of the general population. No entitativity, in other words, implies a limited 
psychological existence of regional institutions which partly curtails the 
emergence or strengthening of a shared identity.  
This leads to a further turning point which is that of the lack or limited 
regional consciousness or identity. As we have seen, it is recognised by a few 
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 Garcia (2005: 26) indicates that “undoubtedly” the main funding for political parties comes 
from the “private sources” of the region’s elite.  
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participants that there is limited consciousness among certain members of the 
political elites including members of the Parliament. The bulk of such criticism 
falls, however, on the region’s Presidents. Arguably, the executives lack regional 
consciousness and an in-depth knowledge about the process as they depend on 
their advisors for regional policy options. This particular construction of 
otherness makes the Presidents vulnerable to external influential forces such as 
the private sector. Also, however, it makes them accessible to the influence of the 
participants. As we have seen it is suggested that the integrationist actors could 
“insist” on the Presidents through their advisers. It is also concerning for the 
participants that the Central American people lack a regional identity. For this 
reason they see it as their “duty” to work on the consciousness and identity of the 
mass population. In this respect, the participants perceive that they need to 
“learn” to “sell” the idea of integration through educational and informative 
programs though which they can empower integrative norms. The participants 
suggest that a shift in the structure of regional power would be possible through 
the advancement of ideas that lead to a greater regional consciousness, especially 
among the common Central Americans. Implied in this line of argument is the 
conception that an increase in regional popular identity would impose constraints 
on the regional policies that the executives pursue. Such a democratic conception 
of regionalism is indeed a radical shift in the ideational structure of the region’s 
political elites. 
An additional important trend in the narrative is the discursive 
construction of “otherness.” As can be deduced from the preceding discussion, 
that construction enables the participants to construct the “self” as a 
transformative regional agent capable of working on the regional identity or 
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consciousness of the people and on that of the Presidents. The participant can 
thus transform “common” Central Americans into agents of integration. In turn, 
this transformation could limit the overwhelming tendency of the process to 
focus on the economic space and shift attention to the social space in which 
integration could positively affect the Central American societies. That is to say 
that the participants can engage in the production of norms which could change 
the direction of the “whims” of the Presidents. The construction of the 
executives’ and the private sector’s “otherness” as the delimiting factors for the 
success of integration, projects the interviewees as actors who grasp what 
changes are needed to uncover the Central American “nation” hidden beneath the 
surface of economic integration. They perceive themselves as capable of carrying 
out those changes in order for the people to take charge of their own destiny as a 
unified region. The participants, thus, become norm entrepreneurs generating a 
series of ideas that initiate an ideational struggle within normative elite networks.    
It is worth noting that the participants favour further integration. There is, 
in other words, a political elite initiative to advance integration. More remarkable 
is the fact that this willingness exists across political parties, ideological stances, 
and regional and national levels. Although ideology could be an element of 
friction in a regional process, seemingly there is a common understanding among 
the different ideological currents represented in the sample about what tasks need 
to be undertaken to generate integrative initiatives. This intersubjective 
convergence occurs, for example, between such disparate parties as former 
guerrilla fronts FSLN (Nicaragua) and FMLN (El Salvador), and their 
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conservative counterparts the Liberal Party and ARENA respectively.150 To put it 
differently, within regionalism ideology does not seem to lead to conflicts. 
Rather, some participants (PP11 and PP17) indicate that ideology can be used as 
a vehicle for regional integration. Ideology, for instance, could be used by pro-
integration actors to generate party commitment towards the process (PP13 and 
PP34). The current ideological harmonisation could be the basis for a Central-
Americanist ideology (PP4). This elite complementarity across potentially 
“political conflict lines” has great significance as an “indicator” of a shared 
identity. Seemingly, thus, the political elites’ loyalties and interests are 
subordinated to the construction of regional norms and policies that they believe 
could challenge the current status quo. This implies a shared commitment to the 
construction of the region based on a common set of values and objectives. In 
turn, such commitment points to a common identity among the majority of 
participants: the regional complements (rather than competes with) the national 
identity. I will return to the significance of this finding subsequently. First, I turn 
to the implications of the discursive regularities in the narratives here analysed.  
 
Paradigmatic Analysis: Implications of Discursive Regularities   
In this section I analyse the implications of the argumentation patterns or 
discursive regularities employed in the interviews to construct Central American 
regional integration. Several interesting patterns emerge. It is noteworthy the 
discursive overlap of the interviewees centres on the idea that increased regional 
consciousness would lead to further integration. This view rests on the 
conception that they through the dissemination of information and the 
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 It is interesting to note that ARENA (ARENA: prin. 12) and the FMLN (FMLN: art. 5) both 
include in their party platform or principles, pro-integration articles. 
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educational system can generate a broader sense of community that would, in 
turn, facilitate the process. The participants perceive that greater engagement in 
the process has the capacity for constructing a regional or supranational identity 
among the Central American mass population which in turn would generate 
integrative impulses. Such construction, they perceive, would socialise reluctant 
members of the political elites leading to a reshuffle of the process’ emphasis 
from an economic focus to a socio-cultural and political one. In this process, 
constant interaction among elite members would form socialising bonds that 
eventually would turn reluctance into a regional identity. Although not at one 
instance the participants indicate that the attitudes of the normative elite can be 
transformed, implicit in their line of reasoning is that, perhaps by proxy (e.g. 
supporting presidential initiatives), the normative elite would also enter the 
process and support new regionalising trends that may affect the benefits that 
they obtain from the economic spaces of integration.   
In such argumentation patterns, proposals to disseminate ideas and 
information about regionalism imply an ideational struggle to diffuse norms 
conducive to higher levels of integration. This struggle resembles the Ideational 
Drive model of socialisation and the Circumscribed-statist model of norm 
diffusion I elaborated in the previous chapter. For example, what we observe in 
these narratives is that political elites are acting as producers or filters of norms 
in an ideational struggle; and, at the same time, they seem to be searching for 
“support” from an “unnamed” societal sector. Furthermore, it seems reasonable 
to assume from their narratives that the state is experiencing a fair degree of 
enmeshment within networks I have conceptualised as normative, which are 
conformed by the different social elite groups that the participants label as the 
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“economic class,” “private sector” or the “oligarchies.” In addition, the channel 
that the participants propose to be employed to disseminate integration, namely 
the media, fits the theoretical elaboration of the aforementioned models. The 
media, for example, is admitted by the participants to be under the control of the 
economic class who, according to the participants, is also directly involved with 
the region’s Presidents in the “management” of the region. The proposed use of 
the media as a regionalising mechanism depends in the last instance on those 
who control it; that is, the private sector. It seems, thus, that the employment of 
the media by political elites presupposes a consultation process wherein the 
“social producers of information” support (i.e. publish information related to) a 
particular regionalising norm.  
It is also salient with respect to the dissemination and construction of 
regional norms that in the majority of interviews (43), there is a discursive 
regularity that proposes educational strategies as a diffusion mechanism; for 
example, the use of education through the development of regional integration 
modules at all stages. This approach has two striking implications. First, it seems 
that the consultation process with the normative elites indicated in the preceding 
paragraph is paralleled by further ideational struggle. The use of education for 
integrationist purposes entails the generation of ideas through which the Central 
American political elites have entered a process of redefining their understanding 
of integration towards a more socio-political meaning which would detract from 
the economic focus on the process thereby affecting the interests of the 
normative elite. Second, it suggests that there is a fair degree of willingness 
among these political elites towards the advancement of integration. Their 
predisposition towards regionalism is readily observable in their willingness to 
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cede, albeit perhaps minimally, authority over educational matters to regional 
institutions in an area traditionally related to the transmission and redefinition of 
the “national” identity. I will return momentarily to the discussion of this point.  
First, however, it is important to highlight that in the participants’ 
discourse there is a practice which runs as a connecting thread through almost all 
the interviews: the success of regional integration depends on their normative 
entrepreneurship. As such entrepreneurs, they will transform supranational 
institutions into integrative “catalysts” wherein regionalising norms would be 
empowered. Political elites, thus, must engage in a process of social engineering 
through which they can construct a regional identity that eventually will drag the 
region’s Presidents into entering higher levels of integration and that would 
balance the normative elite’s influence on the process. By doing so, in other 
words, the political elites would first construct a regional pluralist system, and 
the entailing multilevel participation, conceived of as a prerequisite for success; 
and second, as norm entrepreneurs, they would directly enter an ideational 
struggle with their “others” in an attempt to challenge the current normative 
structure. Additionally, we cannot ignore the normative dimension of the “data” 
here presented. The members of the political elite interviewed position 
themselves as “exogenous” to the “circles of power;” for example, outside the 
family and kinship networks in which I previously argued the state has been 
enmeshed and through which the region’s normative elite exercise their power. 
Regional integration, it seems, opens spaces which, in turn, generate possibilities 
to overrun the “barriers” that keep them outside those circles. 
In this “outsider” conception of the self, in addition, the participants have 
embedded the idea that they are removed from the political structure: distant 
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from political parties, the state, the government and more emphatically the 
executives. Specifically, they construct themselves as possessing limited, if any, 
political influence. For this reason they have become norm entrepreneurs striving 
to construct a new set of regional “cultural” values and symbols in an attempt to 
further integration. In this construction of the self there is a fact being overlooked 
by the interviewees: they are—in the same manner as the executives they so 
acutely criticise—members of the political elite and of political parties, and an 
essential part of the state and governments; and that hence they do influence the 
regional process through the policies they propose, advance or otherwise.  
Returning to the existence of political will, it is important to underscore 
the support that is observable in the “data” here presented. When asked directly 
about the existence of political will in the region, only 20 participants expressed 
a positive reply. This outlook, I argue, arises from the interviewees’ self 
construction as outsiders. In other words, when the participants as “exogenous 
elements” of the political structure reflect on political will they do so in terms of 
the willingness of the Executive, the state, the government or party leaders. Their 
discursive practices indicate otherwise. From the latter, it is conceivable to argue 
that despite such an “outsider” self construction there is in Central America a fair 
degree of political will toward integration among the region’s political elites. 
Here political will is understood as the predisposition of political elites to 
advance or support integrative trends in a given region. Such predisposition 
emerges from the convergence of integrative ideas, regional identity and interests. 
In the first instance, from the regularities among the discursive practices of the 
participants, integrative ideas are advanced by the majority (51) of interviewees. 
The ideas proposed range from “teaching integration,” to developing “social 
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programs” to level the region’s societies, to creating diffusion mechanisms, 
among others. Such ideas are shared, as could be expected, by all the 
interviewees who are members of regional institutions. This trend is all the more 
striking as it is deeply ingrained in the discourse of national political actors who, 
conventionally in the study of regional integration in Central America, are 
conceived of as halting the process through their control of the regional agenda 
(e.g. Grugel and Payne, 2000). Specifically, integrative ideas are also shared and 
proposed by 32 of the 37 national political actors interviewed in this study.  
With regard to the second dimension of willingness, that of a shared 
identity, from the findings I have discussed, it seems that there is a fair degree of 
regional identity. For instance, there are discursive regularities that employ “we 
Central American” expressions. In addition, in those discursive practices one 
easily detects that in the participants’ ideational underpinnings their nations are 
encompassed by a greater construction; that is Central America. As a high 
ranking official of Panama’s PRD puts it, the region’s “Political Borders are not 
equivalent to its social realities” (PP53). Furthermore, among those participants 
from countries traditionally considered as Central America, their discourse 
indicates that the shared history of integration generates a significant common 
identity (PP7). References to historical figures (e.g. Morazán 151 ) who have 
struggled for the region’s union are made (e.g. PP7 and PP11). In the words of 
one of the participants (PP46):  
 
“The possibility for integration does exist, but we need political leadership. What is 
needed is the formation of a legal entity, for instance, to create again the Greater 
Republic of Central America. The historic vision among our countries is ever 
present. The realisation of the need for a larger market gives rise to the need for 
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 General Fracisco Morazán, a central figure in the history of union in the region, was one of the 
early leaders of the Central American Federation. He was President of the United Provinces of 
Central America during the 1830s; on Morazán see Karnes (1961) and Woodward (1999).  
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political union, which means it conjugates material interest with the unionist ideal… 
Contradictions exist between the political will and the execution of the process. 
There cannot be a prosperous future without integration. Political parties must 
assume the initiative… In Central America we are striving to re-establish Union; we 
are not initiating the process as is the case in other regions. Morazán is important” 
(PP46). 
 
Forty-six participants employ discursive practices that signal such a shared 
regional identity; among these there are 30 national political actors. Importantly, 
this identity is shared by six of the nine Costa Ricans interviewed; this is notable 
because the Costa Rican political elite traditionally has striven to remain aloof 
from integration (e.g. Costa Rica is not a PARLACEN member). There are, in 
addition, signs of a Central American identity in the countries relatively “new” 
members of the region which are included in the study (i.e. Panama and 
Dominican Republic). In the case of Panama, four of the five participants 
identify with the idea of Central America; in that of Dominican Republic, three 
of the four interviewees do likewise.    
There are also notable findings that point to the existence of the final 
dimension of political will; that is, shared interest among political elites. 
Considering the nature of the sample, it would be largely redundant to state that 
the participants share political interests; although it is noteworthy that there are a 
few exceptions to this redundancy as two interviewees emphatically argue for 
reforms that protect only economic interests. It is more striking that the evidence 
from the discursive regularities I identified points to the convergence among 
interviewees around socio-cultural interests which are understood to potentially 
lead to successful integration. Fifty participants employ in their discourse 
arguments in support of reforms that entail: the participation of the general 
population in the process, the incorporation of ideas emanating from the common 
Central Americans, the need to generate a Central American culture and the use 
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of education as a socialisation mechanism, among others. The following table 
summarises the discursive findings regarding political will.  
 
Table 4.4. Political Will in Central America 
Ideas Identity Interests
Total number of participants 56 56 56
Number of participants whose discursive 
practices support this dimension 51 46 50
Percentage of the sample 0.91 0.82 0.89
Dimensions of Political Will
 
 
 
Political will towards regional integration, therefore, exists in the 
intersubjective structure of Central America as the ideas, identity and interests of 
the region’s political elites included in this study interplay positively in the 
direction of regionalism. Such interplay has led to a normative “spillover:” while 
the political elites generate integrative ideas the focus of their interest is modified 
(e.g. from the political to the cultural) and, at the same time, their shared identity 
is strengthened; while this process occurs they propose alternative strategies to 
further integration and by doing so they become normative entrepreneurs. To put 
it differently, from the discursive evidence I have uncovered in this chapter, it 
seems that there is a fair predisposition among the Central American political 
elites towards the advancement of regional integration.   
Disagreement may arise about the significance of my findings. It could be 
argued, for example, that perhaps due to the presidential nature of the region’s 
political system, the political will that the participants display has relatively 
limited weight in the conduct of politics. This is because my sample is composed 
largely of members of legislative bodies and high ranking party officials. 
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However, if we are to accept the presidential system argument, perhaps it is not 
lack of predisposition among the presidents that delimits integration as they are 
members of the same political parties and come from the same societal circles as 
the interviewees. In this sense, conceivably, they share the participants’ 
discursive and intersubjective elements through which they construct the region. 
This is especially so when the link between the executives and the private sector, 
and the negative effect that such relation has on regional integration, is most 
strongly emphasised by an interviewee who is a former President of one of the 
region’s countries and who was involved in the reactivation of regionalism in the 
early 1990s. Perhaps, then, it is in the interactions of political and social elites 
within networks that the predisposition of normative elites is superimposed. In 
other words, it is within that interplay that social will delimits what is regionally 
possible. The findings presented in this chapter, to conclude, seem to empirically 
corroborate the conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and 
normative networks, the normative power of the latter, in addition to the 
socialisation models and norm diffusion mechanisms; that is, the Central 
Americanised model of regional integration I propose.  
 
Conclusion 
Regional integration in Central America materialises in an ideational struggle 
within normative networks. The members of the political elites here interviewed 
seem to be actively involved in a process of norm elaboration and contestation: 
they propose a redefined conception of the region. The ideas offered by the 
participants point to attempts at generating new regional norms underpinned by 
the belief that integrative impulses originating from popular sectors are the key to 
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a successful regional process. To materialise such impulses, it is necessary that 
political elites strive to transform integration into a true agenda item; they must 
attempt to empower integrative ideas and norms. Seemingly, the participants 
have grasped the idea that by empowering new regional norms they can redefine 
the distribution of power in the region. In this context, national political actors 
increasingly converge with their regional counterparts. And in this convergence 
they perceive themselves as the redeemers of the region’s political elites who 
have failed to consolidate a unified Central America; they can generate the 
dynamics needed to do so. In addition, the discursive practices of the 
interviewees suggest that this normative reconstruction is opposed by the 
region’s executives and the normative elites. Through such construction of the 
“other” the participants construct themselves as the key integrationist actors who 
could “teach” others to be Central Americans. They are the vanguard of the 
process and as such they can design and implement a “real” regionalising 
strategy. This construction of the self as redeemer of the political elite and of the 
regional process signals the existence of political will in Central America.  
At the outset of this chapter, I proposed that the counterfactual exercise 
here employed was beneficial because it would allow us to “test” assumed 
dictums and current hypotheses about the nature of integration in Central 
America. From the empirical findings of this chapter, Haas’ (1967: 341) classic 
assertion that integration in the region is deprived of an integrative strategy and 
the political will to execute it, can be challenged. As we have seen, there is 
evidence of a latent integrative strategy and a significant convergence among the 
participants with regard to the three dimensions of “willingness;” namely, ideas, 
identity and interests. It is hence possible to argue that there is a considerable 
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degree of political will towards regional integration in Central America. What is 
more, there is a nascent integrative strategy among the participants; one that 
employs uncommon mechanisms to disseminate the process. With regard to the 
“unwillingness” (Sánchez, 2003b) and the “imposing vision” (Sánchez, 2003a) 
hypotheses, it is difficult to detect evidence in support of their premises. I have 
argued above that there is a fair degree of willingness among political elites. 
Based on the opinions expressed by the interviewees, it seems adequate to argue 
that their vision is not reflected by the current economic nature of the process: 50 
interviewees assign a socio-cultural meaning to integration. Others may argue 
that the “unwillingness” and “imposing vision” propositions refer to the role of 
the presidents in the process and that some of the interviewees (30 participants) 
support that claim as they point to the overwhelming role of the region’s 
presidents. And yet, it is crucial to indicate that nineteen interviewees contend 
that there are other groups with the power to influence, if not outright determine, 
the presidents’ regional positions. Perhaps, then, the study of what I label social 
will can further our understanding of the process nature in that region. With this 
in mind, in the following chapter I assess social will in Central America. 
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Chapter 5. Counterfactual Exercise Part II: Social Will 
and Regional Integration in Central America  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I assess the “existence” of social will, or the predisposition of 
normative elites to support or not support the regionalisation process. I do so 
through the study of the ideas, identity and interests of the Central American 
normative elites. As I argued in chapter two, business groups, and the 
organisations that represent them, are an important segment of normative elite 
networks. Their dominance of society’s economic space does not mean that they 
are isolated or separated from social elites. They are interconnected within the 
normative elite networks. For example, as I pointed out (see table 2.1), six 
Central American presidents in the last ten years have had direct links with some 
of the regional business organisations studied in this chapter. To refer to those 
organisations, in this chapter I employ terms such as “private sector” or 
“business elites” which may seem to go against my critique of the use of such 
functional terms. And yet, I deem that their use is necessary in order to “respect” 
the discursive practices of the participants as they use those terms recurrently. In 
a sense, such internalisation of a functional identity sheds light on the 
embeddedness of the modernity/corporatism discourse I have striven to question. 
To compensate for the employment of such terms, I assess if the participants in 
this study construct themselves as “normative.”     
 In the previous chapter we learned about the existence of political will in 
Central America and about the limited fit between the ideas, identity and 
interests of the interviewees and the nature of regional integration. Considering 
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those findings, I argued that perhaps as a background condition social will had a 
greater determinant role in the integration process. Indeed, the discursive patterns 
among normative elites identified in the present chapter parallel strategic shifts 
or trends that the process has experienced. The social will proposition is thus 
reinforced.      
The first section of the chapter describes the normative elite sample. I 
subsequently divide the chapter into two further sections. One section traces 
social will in the “reactivation” of regional integration in the early 1990s. It 
argues that indeed, at that period, there existed a degree of social will in the 
region as the ideas, identity and interests among Central American normative 
elites converged. In the second section, I employ a discourse analysis (discussed 
in the introductory chapter) to assess the existence of social will in the isthmus 
during the period 2005-08. I identify a significant discursive difference in the 
construction of the region. One discourse conceives of the region inwardly or 
from a “Central Americanist” view: the end of integration is the development of 
the region, more explicitly, of the Central American people. The other discourse 
is outward-looking or “instrumentalist:” it aims at improving the region’s 
positioning in the global economy. This difference, I argue, points to a limited 
social will. I conclude by arguing that the determinant influence of regional 
business organisations (RBOs) as representatives of normative elite networks in 
the regionalisation process and their interplay with the region’s political elites, 
can be best understood by employing the Central Americanised model of 
integration developed in chapters two and three. 
 
   
 207 
Central American Social Elites: A Note on Sources and Sample152 
The reactivation of regional integration in Central America in the early 1990s is 
considered by observers as a defining instance in the emergence of new 
regionalism in that area. In the following section, I argue that such reactivation 
could be further understood through the existence of social will. With that 
objective, I trace such existence through a detailed reading of available RBOs’ 
position papers and proposals. For the assessment of social will in the 2005-08 
period, the subject of the third section of this chapter, I conducted interviews in 
person and via telephone, and circulated a questionnaire among members of 
Central American RBOs. There are sixteen participants. This sample may seem 
“weaker” when compared to that of the analysis of political elites in the previous 
chapter. The sample is to an extent limited for two reasons. First, RBOs are 
“reticent.” For example, the majority of them and their national member 
associations do not publish contact details of their high ranking officials; others 
do not have websites in which one can identify their officials or members. 
Despite repeated attempts (in written form and via telephone) to invite their 
members to participate in this study, some organisations simply did not respond 
to the invitations. Second, the sample is somewhat limited due to the availability 
of resources to further carry out my field research. It is also important to note that 
the individuals who preside over or who command these organisations are 
limited in numbers, and that perhaps to an extent this is reflected in the sample 
number.153  
                                                 
152
 All interviews and questionnaires were conducted and completed in August and October, 
2005; February-April, 2007; and January-April, 2008. They were conducted in Spanish, and all 
printed sources from RBOs were also in Spanish; where textually quoted, they are my translation. 
The same caveat offered for the interviews in chapter four applies to this chapter (see fn. 26).   
153
 Nonetheless, I have tried to compensate for the number of participants by “triangulating” their 
discourse practices with published reports, speeches and studies. These attempts, however, have 
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For those RBOs’ members who accepted my invitation, I offered 
anonymity to entice them to be “open” in their opinions. For this reason and 
continuing with the practice of the previous chapter, I have assigned a code to 
each participant (e.g. SP1 refers to “social participant number one”). The sample 
includes current (at the time of writing) presidents, board members and executive 
directors of RBOs and of their associated national business organisation 
(NBOs).154 It also includes “powerful” members of those NBOs: one participant 
is a former vice-president and congressman of his country while another is a 
close relative of a former president of his country, and of a former PARLACEN 
president. The sample includes, in addition, a chief economic adviser and a 
market adviser to RBOs. I have attempted to include at least one participant from 
each country member of SICA; see appendix VIII for the RBOs and countries 
represented in the sample. And appendix IX presents excerpts of the interviews 
(in Spanish) carried out in the development of this chapter. 
 
Social Will and the Reactivation of Regional Integration  
In this section, I intent to shed light on the existence and role of social will in the 
Central American region during the reactivation of the process in the 1990s. 
Observers have argued that the re-launch of integration in that region was not a 
process brought about by the end of the Cold War or by changes in US 
preferences, but in the historical integrationist patterns of the isthmus (Sánchez, 
                                                                                                                                    
been frustrated by the availability of those publications. Some RBOs and their national members 
do not make public their position papers, proposals or other documents. When I contacted their 
“librarians,” in the majority of cases my requests were at best accepted and never given follow 
up, or they were simply ignored. 
154
 Regional business federations, or what I refer to as RBOs, are composed of the national 
federation of each Central American country, or what I labeled NBOs. For example, FECAMCO 
is the regional federation of Chambers of Commerce and it is composed of the Chambers of 
Commerce of each of the region’s countries.     
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2003b: 34; Fawcett, 2005: 41). Regional integration, however, became an 
essential component of the liberalisation and privatisation programs implemented 
in the region and in the long run it became a “scapegoat” to deflect the political 
pressures that emerged from the implementation of those programs (Phillips, 
2003: 329). Regionalism facilitated the region’s state participation in the global 
economy and hence reduced, if not eliminated, the possibilities of becoming 
isolated and also increased the state’s leverage (Grugel and Hout, 1999: 6). The 
aim of the process was the integration of the region into the international 
economy; hence integration became a process purposively structured by the 
region’s attempts to integrate itself into the global market where it conceived that 
its growth possibilities lay (Sánchez, 2003b: 35). I argue that in the background 
of such pursuit, was social will.  
Indeed, RBOs’ integrative proposals, published commentaries by their 
members and those of NBOs point to the functioning and fundamental role of 
social will in the region during that period. After the decline of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), efforts at reenergising the scheme during 
the 1970s were unsuccessful. There is evidence that the RBOs that represented 
the Central American normative elites such as FECAICA were not able to 
present a definite unified position regarding the restructuring of integration 
(Mariscal, 1983: 223). Those elites who benefited most (i.e. Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran) from CACM were reluctant to support reforms that would endanger 
their regional benefits (Mariscal, 1983: 204-216).155  
By the mid-1980s, however, a degree of social will was emerging: 
conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala were evolving positively towards the 
                                                 
155
 On the unequal distribution of benefits within CACM see also Fagan (1970) and Greiner 
(1991).   
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re-launching of regionalism. El Salvador’s FUSADES, proposed a new regional 
economic model. The scheme would develop a diversified and efficient 
production structure, and generate higher profits through increased exports. It 
also proposed to increase the region’s import capacity, level of employment, and 
expand its market (FUSADES, 1986: 4). Tellingly, the model required CACM’s 
reactivation. As a FUSADES’ official asserted, interdependence among the 
Central American states deepened to such an extent that when solutions to 
national issues could not be found independently, they had to be found 
regionally.156 Such proposals marked a shift in the Salvadoran position, and some 
of El Salvador’s NBOs proposed similar views. The Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, for example, in its proposal for economic reforms indicated that it was 
essential to reactivate integration. Central America, according to the Chamber, 
was El Salvador’s “natural market,” to which a high percentage of Salvadoran 
products were already destined (CAMARASAL, 1995). With the decline of 
CACM, the role of the Central American RBOs had declined. The new 
integrative impulses emerging in El Salvador, however, led FUSADES to 
attempt at revitalising those RBOs (Lungo-Uclès, 1996: 135). 
Social will was also evolving in Guatemala where the Chamber of 
Industry established that its essential purpose was to consolidate the regional 
market and to increase its negotiation leverage in the international market 
through the region’s integrated action. It was argued that accomplishing this 
objective would allow the Guatemalan industrialists to increase their exports. In 
turn, such an achievement would produce economic growth for the country (CIG, 
1999). According to Jacobo Tefel (1999), Director of the Chamber, the strategy 
                                                 
156
 Roberto Murray Meza, quoted in Lungo-Uclès (1996: 136). This inclination to search for 
regional solutions seems to point in the direction of the binary identity I proposed in the 
introductory chapter.  
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was directed at the attainment of “larger markets for a larger number of industrial 
and agro-industrial products with a greater local content;” the aim was to 
“strengthen the development of the integration process” and the modernisation of 
its institutions.  
In the past, the reluctance of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elites 
concerning integration reforms did not allow RBOs to produce a solid position 
regarding the process. Therefore, the existence of social will in the region should 
have reversed this condition and enabled those organisations to present such a 
position. Indeed, in a key position document, two RBOs, FEDEPRICAP and 
FECAICA (1991: iv-v), declared that the regional private enterprises 
organisations are working “in the same direction.” Their objectives in this joint 
endeavour were the improvement of regional productivity, export-led 
development, the exploitation of the region’s comparative advantage, increased 
regional competitiveness, and access to larger markets 
(FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 1991: ii-iv). The end product of this process was the 
formation of “business clusters” through which enterprises could take advantage 
of shared resources (e.g. large scale purchases of material) and increase their 
competitiveness (FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 1991: ii-iii). The “strategic 
objective” of regional integration was the “achievement of the global goals of 
development” of “each” country (FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 1991: 5). 
Importantly, the successful re-emergence of regionalism required that the old 
“totalising, linear and technocratic” traditional strategies and theories of 
integration be substituted by a “pragmatic” approach based on business 
entrepreneurship (FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 1991: 6). In addition, 
FEDEPRICAP (1990: 87-91) established that Central America must improve 
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regional efficiency and cooperation to obtain “greater penetration and 
participation in larger economic blocs.” These goals, according to FEDEPRICAP, 
could be accomplished through the utilisation of regional integration’s 
mechanisms. It was an “imperative necessity” that the private sector and the 
region’s governments begin joint efforts to confront the challenges presented by 
the international economy; if this convergence did not take place, the region’s 
future was to be limited and exacerbated by harsh economic conditions 
(FEDEPRICAP, 1990: 89). The strategic mechanism to ensure a regional  
success, for FEDEPRICAP (1990: 90), was the establishment of a “national 
inter-sectoral” mechanism in each country which would “elaborate the diagnosis 
and formulate regional proposals according to their conditions and 
particularities.” The objective of this—we may call—normative networks was to 
“strengthen and consolidate” the Central American “economic community” 
(FEDEPRICAP, 1990: 89). 
Another RBO, FECAMCO, suggested that in order to achieve 
development (economic, political and social) it was necessary to facilitate deeper 
integration (FECAMCO, 1990: 95). FECAMCO expressed concerns about the 
levels of efficiency and quality control in the region; and it also advocated 
industrial modernisation and the promotion and diversification of exports 
(FECAMCO, 1990: 96). Moreover, FECAMCO underlined the need for an 
adequate level of competitiveness in the region. According to the Federation, 
these objectives could be accomplished through exports as the foundation for 
economic growth which would enable the region to better participate in the 
international economy (FECAMCO, 1990: 97-98). To this end, FECAMCO 
proposed CACM’s reactivation, and it emphasised the benefits of negotiating as 
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a bloc; it concluded that it was necessary to advance toward higher integration 
levels (1990: 98-99). It was fundamental, then, to dismantle the import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) structure put in place during the early phases 
of CACM in order to exploit the productive potentials facilitated by the “new 
economic rules” of the international economy (FECAMCO, 1990: 97). The 
establishment of a “coordination and consultation” instrument between the public 
and the private sectors must “secure the adequate participation of the private 
sector in the design and formulation of Central American policies” (FECAMCO, 
1990: 99).  
Similarly, FECAICA (1990: 104) argued that economic integration must 
be one of the bases for economic growth. Integration had to be based on the 
increase of exports which would lead to larger markets. It was of vital 
importance that integration fomented free trade and that it established a common 
external tariff (CET). To this end, it was necessary to elaborate the “adequate 
legislation and financial support system” (FECAICA, 1990: 105). Integration’s 
“central objective” must be the equal development of all the Central American 
countries (FECAICA, 1990: 105). Subsequent treaties to reactivate regional 
integration in the isthmus expressed similar positions regarding development. For 
example, the Tegucigalpa Protocol (SICA, 1991: art. 3; emphasis added) 
established that Central America’s “fundamental objective” was to achieve its 
integration in order to “constitute itself as a region of peace, freedom, democracy 
and development.” Article 4:e of the Protocol (SICA, 1991) went one step 
further in development and attempted to address the issues about the unequal 
distribution of benefits that had hindered regionalism previously. In this sense, it 
assigned “special treatment” to the region’s relatively “less” developed countries. 
   
 214 
SICA, in short, was to promote a “harmonious and balanced” sustainable 
development (SICA, 1991: 3:h). 
From this examination three points must be highlighted. First, it is 
significant to note that proposals reviewed here predate (i.e. FUSADES, 1986) or 
are contemporaries (e.g. FEDEPRICAP and FECAMCO, 1990) of President 
Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas (launched in mid-1990) and NAFTA (1994). 
The latter two are considered as the fundamental catalyst for the reactivation of 
regionalism in the Central American area.157 This reinforces the argument that 
the re-emergence of integration was partially produced by the historical 
integrative tendencies in the region and not exclusively by the hegemony of the 
US.  
Versions of such “innate” argument (see Sánchez, 2003b) take the 
position that the reactivation reflected the governments’ preferences which were 
constrained by domestic and international forces. From the previous discussion—
and the “data” presented in the preceding chapter—it seems difficult to sustain 
this position. Seemingly, RBOs were not restraining government actions per se 
but were defining government preferences, strategies and policies. The RBOs 
studied in this section were rather influencing normatively the shape, extent and 
aims of regional integration through normative networks with which 
governments were to “consult” regarding regional policies. It is one of 
FECAICA’s proposals (1990: 106) that best illustrates this point: “The 
governments must set in a precise manner and immediately the modalities and 
deadlines for the restructuring” of the regional integration system, “taking into 
account the points of views of the industrial sector” and other sectors (e.g. 
                                                 
157
 See for example, Grugel and Payne (2000) and Gamble and Payne (2003). On the Enterprise 
see Payne (1996). 
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commerce) that participate in the process. The proposal continues, “Your 
Excellencies, Mister Presidents, this document presents our fundamental position 
regarding regional integration, and in any moment we can specify, discuss and 
negotiate the consolidation of our position into policies and measures leading to 
Central American development” (FECAICA, 1990: 107).      
The third point to emphasise is that the discussion identifies the 
convergence of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan normative elites and how this 
convergence was articulated by the regional organisations that represent them 
around the three dimensions of social will: ideas, identity, and interests. 
Ideationally, these elites assigned an economic meaning to integration: 
integration is economic development. In addition, the documents examined 
reveal a high degree of awareness about a Central American “self:” they all 
perceive that the national and regional are inextricably linked. Regarding 
interests, these were underpinned by a common economic core: larger markets, 
increased exports, and economic efficiency; capitalizing these interests would, in 
turn, through regional integration, produce economic growth for country and 
region. It is interesting to note, in addition, that the evidence presented in this 
section suggests that Central America is being conceptualised as an “entity” that 
could be transformed into a competitive unit. In any case, causal relations among 
the components of social will are difficult to determine. It is possible, however, 
that as the Central American identity interacted with the interests dimension they 
generated integrative ideas among the members of normative elites leading to the 
reactivation of the process. Table 5.1 summarises this section’s findings.  
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Table 5.1. Social Will During the Reactivation of Regionalism, 1990s 
Ideas Identity Interests
Economic meaning assigned to 
integration → integration is 
economic development
Awareness of Central 
American “self” →  the 
national and regional are 
inextricably linked
Underlined by common economic 
core: larger markets, increased trade 
and economic efficiency
Articulated through neo-liberal 
model
It points to the existence of a 
binary identity
Lead to economic growth for country 
and region
 
 
Bull (1999) has noted that following the reactivation of integration, there 
emerged “two competing regionalisms:” one obedient to internal integrative 
impulses (e.g. historical links) and one responding to global and hemispheric 
integrative demands. Indeed, as I argue in the next section, these competing 
regionalisms have led to the strategic modifications and the stagnation of the 
process; the inability to establish an institutional framework with binding powers 
is a good example of the stagnant phase that the region is experiencing. I argue, 
in addition, that the competing regionalisms are the result of the decline of social 
will: discursive fault-lines have emerged in the narrative of normative elites. On 
the one hand, there is a pragmatic discourse, the “instrumentalist construction” of 
regionalism in which regionalisation leads to an improved position in the global 
economy for the region’s countries through the exploitation of competitive 
advantages, and ultimately to more profitable Central American enterprises. This 
construction seems to underpin the discourse employed in the RBOs’ documents 
and positions analysed thus far in this section. On the other hand, there is a 
“Central Americanist construct” in which regional integration does indeed 
facilitate and improve the participation of the region’s countries in the global 
market but its stated aim is the sustainable development of the people: it brings 
the region to Central Americans. I identify these constructs in the following 
section. 
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Social Will and Regional Integration, 2005-08—Discourse Analysis: First 
Phase 
Discursive representations, valuations and “self” and “other” constructs enable 
individuals to build a particular reality. More specifically, from these 
intersubjective elements, individuals determine key events from which the 
“meaning” of their reality emerges. It is thus the identification of these discursive 
elements in the participants’ narrative that this phase of the analysis targets. In 
the first subsection, I concentrate on the participants’ discursive representations 
of the process and its institutions (e.g. institutional capacity). The second 
subsection traces the participants’ “valuations” (e.g. social meaning is assigned 
to integration) about the process. The third subsection analyses the construction 
of “self” and “other.”  
 
Discursive Representations of Regional Integration 
All participants represent the process as vital, important or fundamental. The 
space in which integration is significant is the economic one. In that sense, all 
participants agree that regionalism is economic integration. The process brings 
increased competitiveness for the region as its economies can complement each 
other within regional integration (SP5), and also harmonises laws that facilitate 
investment (SP6 and SP7). The participants differ, however, in what the “end” of 
that economic space should be and who the major beneficiary should be; I will 
return to this point subsequently. 
Integration is an intergovernmental process of cooperation in economic 
aspects which leads to the delegation of political power to regional institutions 
(SP16). For a Honduran member of FEDEPRICAP (SP6) the Central American 
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market is a “nostalgic market:” regional integration should become a mechanism 
to “increase and channel” foreign investment toward “productive and profitable 
projects,” and thus enable Central America to compete more efficiently in the 
international market. For others (SP8 and SP9) integration is simply equivalent to 
a common market. Regionalism is fundamental because it is an economic process 
that aims at achieving economies of scale leading to the successful participation 
of the region in the international economy (SP4). This is achieved by facilitating 
competitiveness:  
 
“The most important fact is that [regional integration] facilitates the free 
movement of goods and services, improving the competitiveness of regional 
businesses through the coordination of norms and laws, and also facilitating the 
growth of businesses, improving their competitive position outside the region... 
The CAFTA is a multilateral treaty. For this reason, it is important to design 
regional integration to complement it but not to affect it” (SP4). 
 
Integration, thus, must be structured in a manner that complements and does not 
interfere with trade schemes that lead to the region’s participation in the global 
market. A Guatemalan participant (SP5) agrees with such complementarity and 
adds that integration is an important process for the private sector but 
unfortunately, the process has been hindered by inefficient institutions and the 
lack of political will.  
For a Panamanian member of FEDEPRICAP (SP13), integration is a 
process based on “democratic principles, poverty reduction and historical ties.” 
This process, however, has purely economic aims: it will lead to an improved 
regional infrastructure and to a better negotiating position for Central America in 
the global economy. The process is, nevertheless, limited by inefficient regional 
institutions (SP13). A Costa Rican FEDEPRICAP member (SP12) adds that 
integration is the “free exchange of goods and services” which aims at improving 
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the region's participation in the globalisation process. In this conceptualisation, 
integration is a “pragmatic” process (e.g. access to greater markets) and not an 
“institutional” process: existent regional institutions have achieved little and in 
any event, supranational institution should not influence the “destiny” of the 
region's countries; this participant concludes that political integration is not 
“convenient” (SP12). FECAICA members (SP1 and SP2) agree that integration 
is “pragmatic,” and add that its objective is eliminating economic “distortions” 
such as tariffs and quotas (SP1). Integration is about achieving “economies of 
scale” in order to better participate in the international system (SP10). Another 
member of FECAICA adds that integration goes beyond economics to political 
and social issues (SP3).  
Eleven participants, however, indicate that regional institutions in Central 
America have limited capacity for action and hence are not capable of fully 
articulating integrative impulses originating from the ideas advanced by the 
private sector. Institutional limitations arise from the influence that certain 
groups exercise on those institutions and the lack of political will to empower 
them. The issue with Central American regionalism, simply put, is that 
governments have other interests directly linked to certain “sectors” that favour 
“certain tariffs” and thus the process is led to specific spaces from which 
integration is “kept” as a purely “economic dialogue” (SP1). Governments are 
reluctant, for example, to delegate the necessary political power to enable 
regional institutions to become the “binding and guiding political framework” for 
regionalism (SP16). Regional institutions are limited because they are overly 
dependent on the executives’ power for developing or implementing regional 
policies (SP14 and SP15). More to the point:  
   
 220 
“Currently, regional institutions depend on the presidents’ power; institutional 
strengthening is necessary to move integration forward. Political will in the 
region must be constant. The process experiences disruptions with presidential 
changes which affects the regional agenda, or when the presidents ‘use’ 
integration to discredit their political opponents. A definite regional strategy 
must be put forward and promptly executed it” (SP15). 
 
Other participants (SP8 and SP9) argue that regional institutions should 
not have capacity for action at all. Regional institutions are infringing the 
sovereignty of the region’s countries (SP8). There are limits as to what is 
desirable and what can be achieved institutionally:  
 
“The integration process must respect the idiosyncrasies of each society and also 
how far we want and can go as a region; that is economic integration. Certain 
regional institutions are not feasible. The Central American Court of Justice is 
not viable, Costa Rica already has a Court and this type of institution is not 
viable; neither is the Central American Parliament. There are certain activities 
that tend to manifest themselves through integration, such as the case of freedom 
of movement, which are not viable...” (SP9). 
 
For Costa Rica, they (SP8 and SP9) argue, greater integration would cause a fair 
degree of instability in its national social protection system. Therefore before 
integration could take place there is a need to bring the other countries “up to 
speed” in social matters (SP8). Regionalism is a “voluntary” process and should 
not be imposed by other regions or countries, and much less by regional 
institutions (SP12). “Supranational bodies,” a FEDEPRICAP member concludes, 
“should not dictate the destiny of the region’s countries” (SP12). 
 Despite institutional shortcomings or undesirability, all participants 
indicate that they use those institutions or find other channels to contribute to the 
regionalising process. A member of FEDEPRICAP indicates that her 
organisation attends “every possible” meeting in which the different integration 
aspects are analysed and discussed (SP5). According to a Salvadoran participant 
(SP15), his organisation contributes to the process by analysing and 
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incorporating into the national agenda integration-related issues through 
proposals to his country’s government. Those proposals range from measures 
designed to increase or to reinforce the competitiveness levels of the private 
sector, to proposals arguing for the “humanisation” of regional integration: to 
balance economic issues with the social issues implicated in the process. Another 
Salvadoran indicates that her organisation develops economic plans that are 
submitted to the government and which aim at increasing the country’s 
intraregional and extra-regional exports (SP16). In addition to such proposals, 
they support initiatives and projects that promote regional integration in general 
(SP15 and SP16). 
Other RBOs have been able to directly contribute to the “design” of the 
process. FECAICA members (SP1 and SP2) indicate that they directly 
participated on the panel that negotiated the common tariffs during the 1990s. A 
FEDEPRICAP member (SP11) indicates that during the same period, they were 
actively involved in the process, and that more recently, his organisation was part 
of a “consultative body” formed by private sector members to participate in the 
CAFTA-DR negotiations. The findings of the discursive representations 
identified in this subsection are summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 5.2. Summary of “Representational” Findings 
The Process is 
Fundamental/Important/Vital
The Process is 
Relevant for 
Organisation
Organisation 
Contributes to 
the Process 
Regional Institions 
have Limited Capacity 
for Action
Total number of participants 16 16 16 16
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support 
this dimension 
16 16 16 11
Percentage of the sample 1 1 1 0.69
 
   
 222 
Discursive Valuation of Regional Integration  
According to a Guatemalan participant (SP4), the “motivating principle” behind 
integration is “economic;” even if this is not “openly accepted.” He quickly 
indicates that “other” factors cannot be neglected: the “social” becomes 
important to the extent that it facilitates the socio-economic stability needed by 
successful economic integration and for the private sector’s improved position in 
the global economy (SP4 and SP10); for example, through “a better trained 
labour force” (SP6). Integration is an “economic matter” that could be advanced 
only through an increased participation of regional organisations that represent 
the region’s private sector (SP5). Although this participant does admit that 
economic integration could lead to a degree of political integration which may 
bring the social and cultural aspects into the process (SP5). Integration, however, 
is negative for Panama (SP13) as the labour force of that country is more 
“expensive” than that of other Central American countries which, in turn, makes 
Panama less competitive. A Costa Rican participant (SP12) points out that 
integration should only be economic. This is because the social, economic, 
commercial and cultural differences among the region’s countries should be 
“respected” (SP12). For another Costa Rican member of FECAMCO (SP9), 
integration becomes social in order to avoid “distortions” to that country’s 
“stable social system.” Regionalism should address social issues such as better 
public schools and education, medical coverage, a “fair” minimum wage and 
improved workers’ benefits in general (SP9). 
Others (SP1, SP2 and SP3), however, give a “different” social meaning to 
integration by arguing that the social aspects of regionalism are vital for the 
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successful and “sustainable development of Central Americans” and that, in this 
sense, the process should be “decentralised.” That is,   
 
“Economic integration should lead to social integration. Integration is important 
for the sustainable development of the Central American society and this must be 
the force behind the process’ decentralisation. It is necessary that the process 
delivers a ‘product’ to the Central American people” (SP2). 
 
Regionalism then should be “un-captured:” regional institutions should become 
independent from the “power groups” that delimit them in order to reach the 
region’s people (SP15). For a member of FECAMCO (SP7) integration is a 
political and economic process that “must be perceptible, especially the latter 
process, for the people of Central America.” Integration should mean a “better 
quality of life” for all Central Americans (SP15). Integration and its institutions 
articulate the historical links and identity shared by the region’s countries: within 
the process, Central America functions as a unity (SP7). The process is overtly 
focused on economic matters (SP7). Indeed, the political must become the 
“force” of that process, if the latter is to “impact” the people (SP7). The private 
sector together with the political elites must bring the process to the people (SP7). 
Regionalism, in short, goes beyond economic integration: it is social and it must 
aim at the welfare of the common Central American through sustainable 
development (SP7). Solutions to the region’s “social problems” should be 
“regional” not “national” (SP7). For a Salvadoran FEDEPRICAP member 
(SP15), leaders of the private sector should bring “real” social aspects to the 
regional agenda. Education, for example, could be used to increase the people’s 
awareness of the process. Education, in other words, can be used to “educate” 
people to become “true Central Americans” (SP7). This will eventually reinforce 
the economic side of the process (SP15). It will be, however, an economic 
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integration with a “face.” This participant (SP15) points out that only by 
pursuing such strategies, will regionalism lead to “better quality of life” for all 
Central Americans (SP15).   
For an influential member of FECAMCO (SP8) the decentralisation of 
the process (e.g. bringing integration to the common Central American who is 
not represented in the process) is not an issue. To speak of the under-
representation of civil society in the process, for example, is meaningless 
because of the vagueness of the meaning of civil society. He states:  
 
“I do not understand what or who the civil society is. Nobody can define it. What 
is civil society? Who represents it? We are the civil society, the one that matters. 
We live in a regime in which we elect, we vote, democracy means to elect the 
people who represent us. But in civil society, of which we are all members, some 
individuals appropriate for themselves the representation role without going 
through any type of election process. Therefore, to talk about civil society lack of 
representation in the integration process does not make any sense...” (SP8). 
 
If there are groups under-represented in the process it is because they have not 
used the electoral and democratic means available to obtain proper representation. 
Another participant admits that under-representation is an issue but that it could 
be tackled through education and the media (SP16). Educating the population to 
be Central Americans will increase their awareness of the process and thus their 
perceptions of the need to participate which could eventually lead them to search 
for institutions that would adequately represent them (SP7 and SP16). The media, 
through this strategy, could become an integrative agent by generating a regional 
“debate” among Central Americans (SP15).   
Proposals advanced by the private sector, however, face a stifling 
institutional framework. Regional institutions are constrained by their 
dependency on the executives’ power and the lack of political will to give those 
institutions a degree of power as regards independent decision-making and 
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implementation (SP7, SP11 and SP15). The institutional performance is thus 
limited at best (SP14 and SP15). Another participant (SP7) adds that this is the 
case because there are powerful groups that benefit from an inefficient 
institutional framework, whom through their links with the presidents are able to 
influence the process: 
 
“Unfortunately, the political will is generally deficient. It is sufficient to observe 
the consulting, non-binding, role of regional institutions to realise the existing 
level of political will in the region. Power groups with links to the region’s 
presidents benefit from this type of institution, and they are able to influence the 
presidents in order to maintain regional institutions in such consulting roles...” 
(SP7). 
 
What is concerning about the institutional inefficiency is that it slows down the 
process and hence limits the development of the competitiveness necessary for 
the full exploitation of the opportunities offered by global markets (SP10).  
Other participants indicate that there are certain institutions that do 
perform efficiently. For a member of FECAICA (SP3), SICA’s Council of 
Economic Ministers (COMIECO) has been highly efficient regarding customs 
union issues. Similarly, SICA’s Consultative Committee for Economic 
Integration meets regularly—occasionally meeting “seventeen times in a 
month”—while considering proposals and policies that COMIECO has submitted 
to the Committee for consultation (SP3). A Guatemalan member of FECAMCO 
agrees, and points out that the danger is the tendency to “overload” institutions 
such as COMIECO and the Committee because overloading may lead to their 
excessive bureaucratisation (SP10). In regional institutions, in short, the sources 
of disintegrative trends can be identified. Those sources are constructed in the 
participants’ narratives as the “other,” and in the next section, I trace that 
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construction. The following table summarises the finding of the discursive 
valuation of the process.   
 
Table 5.3. Summary of “Valuation” Findings 
The Process 
should be 
Decentralised
Social 
Meanings
Educationg as 
Means to Integration
Regional 
Institutions are 
Efficient
Total number of participants 16 16 16 16
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support this 
dimension 
4 7 5 4
Percentage of the sample 0.25 0.44 0.31 0.25
 
 
Self and “Other” Discursive Identification 
Constructing “otherness:” political elites and the private sector 
For a Costa Rican participant (SP8) the political elite, and in particular the 
region’s presidents are the facilitators of the process; and accordingly, it is the 
private sector that knows how to “make” integration: they constitute the 
integrative engine. The region’s bureaucracy, he continues, is a “problem.” 
Certain members of the political elite are in agreement with integrative factions 
of the private sector as to what path the process should follow (SP9). Their 
conception of “region” and “integration,” however, is instrumental: both 
concepts are channels to improve their market position internationally (SP15). 
Put differently, they followed the instrumental view of regional integration I 
discussed earlier in this chapter. For a Guatemalan (SP4), there is a group—
which remains unspecified—within the political elites that makes the process 
ineffective. For a FECAMCO member (SP5), the “others” are those who limit 
the process: the presidents, technocrats and the bureaucracies who do not give 
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proper follow up to the process at the national level. A FECAICA member 
elaborates the point by indicating that there is political will among presidents but 
other functionaries or governmental institutions do not “execute” regional 
agreements (SP3). The “others” are thus government officials in charge of 
implementing regional policy. Another participant (SP5) disagrees and indicates 
that there is no political will on the part of the governments and thus the process 
does not fully enable the private sector to take advantage of current, nor to 
generate further, integrative trends. A member of FEDEPRICAP (SP13) concurs 
and adds that the lack of a “clearly defined regional policy” negatively affects the 
process and specifically the competitiveness of the region’s economic elites.  
Another FECAMCO member (SP7) is more specific: regionalism and its 
institutions are “only” partially functional because the region's presidents and the 
“power groups” behind them are reluctant to empower them. In this sense, a 
FECAICA member (SP1) indicates that some of the region’s governments in 
conjunction with “certain” groups of the private sector limit the process to a 
particular economic (or what I previously referred to as instrumental) space . He 
indicates, for example, that during the CAFTA-DR negotiations one of the 
region’s governments assenting to the pressures of a private sector group decided 
to unilaterally engage the US which in turn weakened the position of the other 
countries and led to competition within the region. For another member of 
FECAICA (SP2) the main constraint on the process is the lack of planning on the 
part of the governments. He adds that economic integration is limited by the 
focus with which different groups approach it: 
 
“The private sector is divided about its focus on the internal or external market: 
Should we focus on the Central American market or on the global market? 
Honduras considers the external market more important while El Salvador 
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emphasises the Central American common market. This division benefits the 
legitimacy of local governments that are supported by business groups with local 
interests, as a result anti-integrationist groups remain in power...” (SP2). 
 
In Panama, the inward view is perceived as negative. Private sector organisations 
in that country are overly focused on the national rather than on the regional 
which detracts from the “resources” that could be invested on regional initiatives 
(SP13).    
A final point worth noting in this subsection is the inclination of 
FEDEPRICAP members from Costa Rica and Panama (SP12 and SP13) to 
represent Central Americans as their “others:” An integrated Central America 
means increased immigration of a “cheaper labour force” constituted by 
individuals looking to take advantage of more comprehensive social programmes. 
In a sense, those Central Americans become a disintegrative element for the 
regionalising private sector strategy.  
 
Social elites as “Normative Elites”  
Despite the preceding construction of political elites (eleven participants) and 
certain sectors of the economic elite (six participants) as the disintegrative 
“others” who possess a fair degree of power over regionalism, thirteen 
participants—albeit to various degrees—conceive of themselves as normative 
elites. And in so doing, they enter into an ideational struggle with those powerful 
“others” and thus are able to propose alternative integrative venues.   
Integration must be refocused on the development of the Central 
American market as a means to reach “sustainable development” for the region’s 
peoples (SP2). In this sense, some of the participants have directly “discussed” 
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the necessary regional reforms to achieve such redirection of the process with 
their countries “presidents” and other members of the governments (SP1, SP8, 
SP14 and SP15). In some instances, the participants or other members of their 
organisations have been directly involved in the negotiations regarding the 
integration process (SP1 and SP11); or have participated in the formulation of 
particular regional policies (SP1). Other participants indicate that their NBOs 
have “forced” certain regional issues onto the “national agenda” (SP14). Some 
participants contend that their national business organisation compelled their 
country’s political elites (e.g. members of the National Assembly) to resolve a 
conflictive situation with a neighbouring country:  
 
“In time of crisis, it is the business groups that defend the process; the private 
sector leads regional reforms. During the crisis between Honduras and Nicaragua, 
it was us who were able to build a coalition of deputies [in the national 
Congress] in order to solve the problems that were exacerbating the situation” 
(SP1). 
 
Thus, to a fair extent, the private sector occasionally salvages the integration 
system. 
Five participants argue that regional integration survives because the 
private sector promotes and encourages it (SP1, SP2, SP3, SP8 and SP9). They 
“know about doing business and thus about integration.” In this view, presidents, 
and governments become the “facilitators” of the process to the benefit of the 
private sector (SP8). Business organisations, regional and national, interact with 
governments during policy formulation (SP5). Moreover, private sector 
organisations maintain constant consultation exchanges regarding regional 
matters with governmental institutions such as COMIECO (SP3 and SP6). Those 
organisations, also, constantly interact with other “homologous” business 
organisations in order to coordinate ideas and proposals (SP14 and SP15) and 
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“exchange opinions and alignment strategies” (SP4). According to a Panamanian 
member of FEDEPRICAP (SP13), in that country the private sector has urged 
the government to define the country’s position regarding regional integration. A 
member of FECAICA (SP3) indicates that that organisation, since the process 
began in the late 1950s, has pushed regional integration. He adds, “the Central 
American industrial sector has been present during the entire process.” Regional 
integration thus has become a “synonym of industrial development.” This is 
justifiable because those organisations “make” integration (SP3). Hence, regional 
institutions need “input” such as “technical criteria” from the private sector 
which “shapes and advances” regionalism (SP12). 
The private sector integration, for example, has had a series of by-
products that “facilitate and dictate further integration” (SP2). Their integrative 
“demands and needs” have generated a type of spillover: a regional consortium 
of law firms that facilitates investment and in the end produces further 
integration by demanding from the region’s legislatives “homogeneous regional 
laws” and by “informally” modifying “investment norms” (SP2). Regional 
integration at all levels (e.g. SICA and CAFTA-DR) is to a large extent a 
“mechanism” to “channel investment” (SP6). For this reason, certain groups of 
the Honduran private sector associated to FEDEPRICAP have “lobbied” for a 
“true” stock market integration (SP6). They propose, however, that the necessary 
legislation be channelled through PARLACEN in a manner that signals the 
empowerment of that institution (SP6).   
It is interesting to note that the entrenchment of “dominant” factions of 
the “other” private sector and the normative power of the participants is evident 
in the narrative of one of the members of FECAICA (SP1). He points out that: 
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“During the CAFTA negotiations, one of the region’s governments, under pressure 
from a segment of the business sector focused completely on the domestic market, 
decided to negotiate unilaterally with the US and was willing to accept all of the US 
demands... it was pointless to debate with these groups despite the fact that they 
weakened our position and increased the competition among our countries. Our 
organisation approached the US negotiator directly contending that the unilateral 
proposition would complicate negotiations by forcing the rest of the region’s 
countries to take similar positions and consequently damaging the integration 
process. The US negotiator was persuaded by our position and opted for a stance 
that forced the Central American countries to negotiate as a group. Despite the fact 
that integration is essential, such disintegrating tendencies exist in our region...” 
(SP1). 
 
For this participant (SP1)158, thus, it is much easier to influence a US negotiator 
than to discuss the issues with “entrenched” Central American “others.” It is also 
interesting how a member of the private sector can directly contact a US official 
without the need to consult with his country’s government officials who were 
supposed to be in charge of the negotiations and who are conventionally assumed 
to determine regional policy. I summarise this section’s findings in the following 
table. 
 
Table 5.4. Summary of “Identification” Findings 
Political 
Elites as the 
"Other"
Private Sector 
as the "Other"
Social elites as 
"Normative 
Elites" 
Total number of participants 16 16 16
Number of participants whose 
discursive practices support 
this dimension 
11 6 13
Percentage of the sample 0.69 0.38 0.81
 
 
The discursive analysis presented in this phase of the analysis seems to 
support my argument concerning the existence of two discourses in the region: 
an instrumental discourse that focuses on the global economy as the end of 
                                                 
158
 Interestingly, SP1 also indicates that his organization “forced” his country’s government to 
establish relations with Cuba. 
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integration and a Central Americanist discourse that emphasises the importance 
of “sustainable development” for the Central American people. The data thus far 
also suggests that the level of social will in the region is limited. A faction of the 
social elites, for example, conceives of other factions as the “others” who have 
captured the process directing it to exploit the region’s competitive and 
comparative advantages neglecting along the way the development of the 
region’s people. I elaborate these points in the second phase of the analysis. 
 
Social Will and Regional Integration, 2005-08—Discourse Analysis: Second 
Phase 
This stage of the analysis aims first at identifying the key turning points in the 
participant narrative from which they organise and elaborate the meaning of their 
reality. And second, it aims at uncovering discursive patterns that form the 
intersubjective architecture from which the region is constructed. Social will is 
articulated in this architecture.    
 
Syntagmatic Analysis: Implications of Discursive Turning Points 
The key elements from which normative elites construct their regional reality 
seem limited. There is the “competing in the global economy” turning point and, 
related, the negotiations leading to the CAFTA-DR. This limited narrative, I 
argue, is because of the instrumental view underpinning the participants’ 
discourse. All participants agree that it is important for regional integration to 
enable the isthmus to compete from a better position in the international system. 
In such a construction, members of the private sector are in the vanguard of 
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society as they are the people who know business and hence know how to 
“make” integration. If the process stalls, it is because of the limitations imposed 
on integration by certain groups. This leads us to another key point; that is, 
institutional inefficiency. For the participants, this inefficiency is the result of the 
actions of “certain” groups who have “captured” the process through their links 
to political elites. The process advances to the extent that those groups achieve 
the sought benefits from regionalism. For example, lower tariffs for certain 
sectors while maintaining a high tariff for others.   
Interestingly, a related fundamental point, albeit implicit, in the 
participants’ narrative is that the process demands to be centralised for the sake 
of efficiency. Regional integration must be managed by the governments and the 
private sector. For example, mention of decentralising the process in order to 
enter into a “dialogue” with the common Central American or civil society is 
limited at best. Furthermore, one of the participants (SP8) goes as far as arguing 
that civil society is the private sector; thus by implication that the process should 
only concern the participation of the private sector. As we have seen, it is the 
private sector that has achieved regional spillovers which in turn lead to further 
integrative trends. According to one participant (SP4), the decentralisation of the 
process, if necessary at all, would mean that the region’s governments should 
play the role of “facilitator” for the private sector’s participation in the process. 
For others (SP1 and SP2) it is the private sector that “defends and pushes” the 
process because it encompasses the groups with the highest level of regional 
consciousness. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the participants’ 
construction of “otherness” the Central American identity of “others” is not 
questioned. The “others” may limit the process but they are assumed to be 
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Central Americans. Similarly, the presidents and political elites are presupposed 
to be Central Americans: they may be constrained by certain segments of the 
private sector and in the worst cases, members of the political elites and 
bureaucrats may be inefficient but they are Central Americans nonetheless.  
Another key discursive point is that the Central American private sector 
is divided as to which market is their focus. As we have seen, for Hondurans it is 
the global market that matters and for Salvadorans the Central American market 
(SP2). This division seems to underline the instrumental and Central Americanist 
construction that I identified previously. However, it is important to indicate that, 
contrary to what the participant states, the Central Americanist position is upheld 
by Honduran members of the RBOs and that in the sample there are Salvadorans 
who follow an instrumentalist strategy towards integration. In short, it is difficult 
to pinpoint where the discursive fault-lines between instrumentalist and Central 
Americanist run.   
The CAFTA-DR is important for the participants because it epitomises 
the events for which integration is necessary. Fifteen participants point out that in 
order to enter successfully into multilateral negotiations and treaties, their 
countries must do so as an entity. Only then, would they adequately “position” 
themselves in the global economy. FTAs, in addition, provide a degree of 
legitimacy to their proposals and policies. Acceptance in international circles, 
also, grants the region a “modernity” dimension: an improved position as 
members of the “first” world (SP15). One last interesting point to emphasise in 
this regard is that contrary to the opinion of the members of the political elites  
(see previous chapter) who argue that FTAs delimit the vision and the 
communitarian sentiments of the region, only one the participants in this chapter 
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indicates that the CAFTA-DR “somewhat threatens” integration (SP7). For 
others, FTAs are support mechanisms for the process (SP4), FTAs bring the 
region closer (SP13) or, importantly, integration should be designed to fit those 
schemes (SP4). 
 
Paradigmatic Analysis: Implications of Discursive Regularities 
In this section, I look at the discursive regularities employed by the participants 
to construct regional integration. Those discursive patterns and the ideas that 
underpin them are to a fair extent limited to the “classic” economic discourse, for 
example, of the lower tariffs and increased competitiveness necessary to 
successfully access and compete in international markets. In this sense, it seems 
redundant to discuss the existence of shared ideas and identity, or common 
economic interests among the participants. First, ideas originating in the 
economic discourse to increase global competitiveness are limited; for example, 
strive for economies of scale and technological learning and you will increase 
your opportunities to succeed. Second, membership in RBOs implies a degree of 
common regional identity, and third, it presupposes that they all share interests 
on regional economic matters. It is, however, fundamental to trace, in the 
ideational realm, if the participants go beyond textbook ideas. In the case of the 
shared identity, if the participants make any use of a “historical identity:” do they 
use images, events and symbols of the region’s history of integrative efforts or do 
they make reference to a common culture? In the case of interests, it is important 
to contemplate whether the participants’ interests go beyond those of a purely 
economic nature. 
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 In the realm of ideas, some participants do not exhibit ideational elements 
beyond the “formal” discourse on economic integration (i.e. textbook definitions 
of international trade). They indicate for example that integration is “economic 
integration” and efforts to entice them to elaborate leads to an explanation of, for 
example, “lower tariffs” and “free movement of goods and services” and their 
importance for “competitiveness.” Recurrent ideas beyond such “formal” 
economic matters are, in other words, sparse. Eight participants endeavour to go 
somewhat beyond the increasing competitiveness narrative. Two of them do so 
out of their concern for the stability of their countries (i.e. Costa Rica and 
Panama). It is suggested that to strengthen economic regional integration, the 
social safety net in the region must be “coherent” to avoid overloading those 
countries with stable social protection systems. The state, for example, should 
provide improved childcare in public schools in order to free a “good proportion” 
of the labour force which in turn would generate economies of scale for certain 
sectors; or public schools should provide subsidised dinners for students (SP7). 
Other participants perceived the importance of identity for the process and 
contend that integration could advance if the region’s people become Central 
Americans. To this end, as we have seen earlier in the chapter, they propose to 
use the media and the educational system. Educating people to become Central 
Americans could eventually lead to improved economic integration but it would 
be a process with a “face” (SP15). Nevertheless, those participants indicate that 
by becoming “Central Americans” the people could greatly gain because they 
would be, at least, aware of the process and its benefits. In turn, such awareness 
could lead to an increased popular participation which would grant the process 
and its institutions a much needed degree of legitimacy.  
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Similarly, discursive regularities that point to a historical identity are 
scant. Participants implicitly discard the elements of such identity. Some 
participants indicate that the “traditional unionist” Central American market is a 
“nostalgic market,” if the success of the region depends on economies of scale, 
for example, that “romantic” market is not sufficient (SP6). More generally, all 
unionist symbols are “romantic” and with limited “conductivity” to “deeper” 
levels of integration (SP14). Other participants do not consider the Central 
American unionist experience at all and indicate, for example, that “regional 
integration began in the 1960s” thereby making regionalism equivalent to 
economic integration and purging any romanticism from the process (SP3). 
When cultural aspects of integration are discussed, they are conceived of as 
possible outcomes of economic integration (e.g. economic integration may lead 
to a common culture) not as an underpinning element of the economic dimension 
(SP5). Or, cultural aspects are accentuated because they are employed to 
construct differences among the region’s countries. There are significant 
“cultural differences” between Costa Rica and the other countries from the 
region: 
 
“Regional integration cannot go beyond the economic aspects because of the 
extensive social, political, economic and cultural differences among the region’s 
countries, [differences] which must be respected” (SP12). 
 
Therefore regionalism must be measured or restricted to the economic space 
(SP12). Those participants who have recourse to a historical identity in a more 
positive manner, do so implicitly by arguing that regional integration articulates 
the unionist experiences of Central America and that those experiences are 
sufficient foundations to generate “strong impulses” toward integration; for 
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example, that “our economies could truly become complements to each other” 
(SP15). Specifically integration:  
 
“… is also a continuation of the ‘Morazánico’ project to integrate Central 
America as the Union of Central America; we have customs, language, [and] 
ethnicities in common, it is the political and economic interests that divide us, if 
we can overcome these obstacles we can achieve it...” (SP14). 
 
 
Importantly, a participant emphatically concludes that “our national history is 
history” but the unionist experiences cannot be “erased or ignored by those 
overtly focused on the economic dialogue,” he adds integration will not change 
our national history; on the contrary, “it will enrich it” (SP1).  
Regarding the interest of the participants, they all exhibit economic 
interests but only seven show non-economic interests (e.g. are interested in the 
social dimension of integration), and some of those who are, perceived that social 
dimension as problematic. It may seem redundant—because of their “advanced” 
level of socio-economic development vis-à-vis that of others Central American 
countries—to point out that for Costa Ricans and Panamanians in the sample, the 
social dimension of integration is problematic. The social is incorporated in those 
participants’ narratives as a “concern” (SP9, SP12 and SP13). Integration means 
increased immigration from other Central American countries which in turn, they 
argue, will negatively affect their social “achievements” (e.g. in public education 
and health). As we have seen in the previous section, in those narratives the 
majority of the Central American people is constructed as the “others” allowing 
the participants to build integration in an economistic, logical and efficient 
discourse. Others perceive the social as instrumental; as a support mechanism for 
the private sector’s strategy for competing in the global market. And in this 
strategy, the common Central American becomes a support agent for the private 
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sector in the global economy. People are important not as beneficiaries of 
integration but as a valuable asset that can be trained (and this is their gain from 
integration) to assist the private sectors in reaching greater levels of 
competitiveness. The private sector, in other words, is a job creator. This 
presupposes that with more and better jobs available integration will benefit the 
Central American people who will also have access to better and more products 
and services. The “social” that, for example, refers to economic inequality and 
access to education is the concern of the governments and is represented by 
poverty indices which occasionally influence the sought-after investment in the 
region (SP15). And thus, sporadically, the social dimension becomes part of the 
agenda. The private sector is “there to take the ‘economy’ not the people into 
modernity” (SP16). Only three (SP2, SP7 and SP14) participants propose to 
bring integration to the Central American people. They expand the idea of the 
“social” to encompass the welfare of the people through a sustainable economic 
development as the “end” of regionalism.  
The findings here presented suggest that currently the level of social will 
in Central America is limited. Although all the participants exhibit common 
economic interests and their participation in the regional process presupposes a 
shared identity, such commonalities seem “pragmatically” undertaken: interests 
in achieving better terms of trade could lead to membership in regional 
organisations in which individuals internalise a particular set of ideas that may 
lead to integrative impulses. These commonalities, of course, in some cases may 
be sufficient to generate successful regionalising tendencies. The instrumentalist 
construction of the region which seems to underline the reactivation of the 
process during the 1990s may have resulted from such pragmatic commonalities. 
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Once the binary identity implicated in the reactivation of the process went deeper, 
reaching the historical dimension, an additional competing discourse emerged, 
the Central Americanist construction which is exhibited in some of the narratives 
studied in this section. Discursive fault-lines along the global and Central 
American market constructions, in other words, led to the decline of social will 
present at the reactivation phase and the limited levels exhibited by the 
participants in this section. Roughly, the number of participants is divided by half 
along the social will dimensions: eight participants make use of ideas that go 
beyond the “formal” economistic discourse, six of them recourse to elements of 
historical identity employing traditional unionist images, and seven participants 
are inclined towards non-economic interests. The following table summarises 
these findings.  
 
Table 5.5. Social Will in Central America, 2005-08 
Ideas (Beyond 
Economics)
Identity 
(Historical) 
Interests (Social 
Matters)
Total number of participants 16 16 16
Number of participants whose discursive 
practices support this dimension 8 6 7
Percentage of the sample 0.50 0.38 0.44
Dimensions of Social Will
 
 
Interestingly, those participants who make reference to the historical integrative 
process or to its cultural aspects present a Central Americanist approach to 
integration. Those who employ a “pragmatic” identity (i.e. the process is 
generating the identity) are inclined towards the instrumentalist view. Historical 
and cultural aspects, in short, seem to be “correlated” with the emergence of the 
Central Americanist construction.  
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 The participants in this chapter, just like the political elites interviewed in 
the previous chapter, point to the existence of “powerful groups” within the 
private sector which have “captured” the integration process. Such groups seem 
to exercise a fair degree of normative power over the process and, more generally, 
over the state. However, we cannot neglect the fact that the participants are 
members of the same social networks as those constructed as the negative 
“others” within the integration process. That otherness, to put it differently, is 
perhaps to a fair extent a “misconstruction” of reality; one that, nevertheless, 
sheds light in the existence of normative elite networks in the region. The 
interplay of the normative elite networks and the political elites is best depicted 
in a report released by a Salvadoran organisation member of FEDEPRICAP, the 
National Association of Private Enterprises (ANEP): 
 
“The integration experience in Central America shows advances and relapses… 
When the private sector advances most determinedly, certain governments have felt 
threatened because they think they could lose power quotas and [thus] have blocked 
the integration process. Also, when governments have advanced swiftly, some 
[private sector groups] who have seen their markets threatened, have transformed 
themselves into pressure groups in order to maintain those markets captured, 
generating a vicious circle which has blocked the effective integration process…” 
(ANEP, 2002).   
 
It is difficult to make sense of such normative interplay through the 
presidentialism argument or the intergovernmental preference explanations of the 
process. Based on the evidence I have traced, it seems difficult to simply assume 
that the integration process in the isthmus is an intergovernmental matter. There 
are normative groups with which the region’s presidents are linked and with 
which they consult on regional matters. It seems more helpful to approach this 
interplay through the role of the normative networks within the Central 
Americanised model of integration I developed: the interplay of the state and 
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political elites in general with social elites within networks could be further 
understood through the ideational drive model of socialisation in conjunction 
with the circumscribed-statist norm diffusion mechanism.    
 I have stated that the participants in this chapter come from the same 
social circles as those they, the participants, construct as the negative “others.” In 
this sense, and in the way the participants construct themselves as normative, it 
seems that the differences between both groups with regard to regional 
integration lay in the instrumentalist and Central Americanist divide. Those with 
an instrumentalist view seem to be in “command” of the process. Occasionally, 
however, Central Americanists come to the fore and the process experiences a 
strategic shift. These shifts, for example, may lead to what Phillips (2003: 348) 
calls “multi-thematic regionalism:” an all-encompassing  process including 
environmental and social policy. Nevertheless, the process may remain within 
the “market-making strategy” that aims at positioning the region in the global 
economy (Phillips, 2001: 565 and 580). Occasionally, there are attempts at 
bridging these discursive fault-lines. It is worth noticing that on one of those 
occasions, it was one of the Central American Presidents (Saca of El Salvador) 
who attempted to do so. I have identified (see table 2.1 and appendix III) former 
President Saca’s links to one of the RBOs I have studied, and also to El 
Salvador’s ANEP and FUSADES. Interestingly, in one of Saca’s early speeches 
as President, he stated: 
 
“Just as our regional history has demonstrated, Salvadorans’ destiny is to contribute 
with determination to the integration of Central America… We have [now] a realist 
vision and we comprehend the integration process pragmatically… [it is important] 
to globalise [our countries] outwardly and become cohesive inwardly… our 
integration must come out of the bureaucratic offices and reach the common 
individual… if the benefits of integration do not reach the people, there will emerge 
scepticism, and nationalisms and local visions will re-emerge…” (Saca, 2004; 
emphasis added).  
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One does not need to “push” the evidence in order to imagine whose attention 
Saca is attempting to draw: the pragmatically oriented instrumentalist group and 
its Central Americanist counterpart. It is also interesting, to wonder in what role 
this speech was presented: as the President of the country or as a member of the 
region’s normative networks. In any event, the evidence I have uncovered in this 
chapter points to the important role of social will in the Central American 
integrative process.      
 
Conclusion 
During the reactivation phase of the process, the existence of social will enabled 
the normative elites to construct a particular region based purely on economic 
premises. The process, in turn, experienced the proliferation of institutions 
unheard of in the region (e.g. consultative committees). Subsequently, however, 
discursive fault-lines surfaced among the normative elites. This split has led to 
limited levels of social will. In the ideational realm, one half of the participants 
propose ideas that go beyond economic matters. Roughly, only one third (six out 
of sixteen) of the participants share an identity based on historical elements. The 
rest of the sample assumes a regional identity exclusively in instrumental terms 
(e.g. economic region). With regard to interests, less than half (seven out of 
sixteen) of the participants give the process a social meaning. This lack of 
convergence about the region is indicative of the limited levels of social will. In 
turn, partial social will has led, for example, to the stagnation of the regional 
institutional framework identified by the majority of the participants in this study, 
political and social elites.   
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Within the instrumentalist construction of the region, the market “logic” 
that the underlying common interests among the normative elites implies, it 
seems, redefines the ideational meaning of the region (e.g. Central America) and, 
at the same time, overpowers the dimension of identity. Because the economic 
logic points to the search for greater markets, the “region” must be redefined as a 
greater region (e.g. multilateral agreements) and several “others” become “self-
images” as the regional identity is reconstructed in order to encompass the 
region’s new meaning. In this space, the social interacts with the political but the 
former imposes its discourse on the latter. As the process occurs, the normative 
elites’ economic interests become preponderant and the social is articulated in an 
overarching economic discourse. Thus the political is devoid of meaning 
restricting the integration process to a limited economic space. The integrationist 
discourse is then seen as an “emptied” rational exercise employed to obtain 
economic benefits. Integration in the region seems a set of “dead words or 
hollow institutions” (Marques Moreira, 2000: 159) or “cognitive dissonances” 
(Malamud, 2005a). Considering the evidence of the existence of political will in 
Central America, and the evidence of the role of social will, it seems that such a 
phenomenon can be best understood by the interplay of the social and the 
political; a struggle in which the former superimposes itself on the latter. 
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Concluding Remarks: Main Contributions and 
Implications for Future Research 
 
In this thesis I have striven to challenge a commonly held position in the study of 
regional integration in Central America. It is often argued that integration reflects 
the governments’ preferences and that it is limited by overly zealous political 
elites not willing to lose their political clout. By implication, what the 
regionalisation process lacks is political will. When the political will argument 
cannot be sustained, it is conceived that the power of the political elites or the 
state is constrained by analytically ambiguous “social relations” particular to the 
society in question, or by equally ambiguous “real sources of power.” After 
considering the history of integration based on the well-known commonalities 
among the region’s countries, and the survival of the idea as embedded in the 
national constitutions, it seems somewhat inadequate that political will was 
lacking. This consideration led me to hypothesise about the constraining social 
relations and real sources of power by historically problematising the process. I 
quickly came to the realisation that disciplinary knowledge “bounds” our subject 
of study and that by abiding by these boundaries my study would have been 
“fruitless” (i.e. would conclude that the lack of political will was the all-
important factor for the process). I therefore turned to multidisciplinarity as it 
allowed me to broaden my analytical horizons. 
 I uncovered the existence of what I labelled constitutional regionalism or 
the constitutional granting of special citizenship status to other Central American 
nationals, and specific provisions conducive to the integration of the region. This 
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constitutional regionalism, I contended, articulates the binary identity of the 
region and to an extent detracts from the lack of political will argument. 
 In this context, I argued that the concept of social will allows for a better 
understanding of the regionalisation process. Social will refers to the 
predisposition or disinclination of normative elites to support the integration 
process. This statement begs some elaboration. Social will is generated by the 
interplay of three intersubjective elements: ideas, identity and interests. When 
these elements converge positively toward integration, for example, normative 
elites “influence” governments leading to integrative impulses. I developed this 
social will concept building on the conditions for “community sentiment” 
proposed by Haas (1958) and on Schmitter’s (1971b) concept of “elite value 
complementarity.” In this sense, I attempted to underline the continuing 
analytical value of neo-functionalism.  
 While surveying the classic and new regionalism literature, I identified 
the tendency, often implicit, to assume certain premises of modernisation theory. 
Central American elites are conceived of as functional groups (e.g. business, 
industrial and technocratic elites) vying for the “attention” of the state. This 
presupposition analytically weakens the power of these elites vis-à-vis the state, 
and is undertaken, in spite of evidence pointing to membership overlapping 
among the different elite factions. Technocrats, for example, could also be 
members of the industrial elite. Building on existing analyses, I argued—by 
taking the seemingly “anti-modern” position—that this overlapping could be 
understood through the existence of family and kinship networks in the region. I 
traced the importance of such social institutions for the political culture of 
Central America and identified several ways (e.g. marriage and business 
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alliances) in which those networks have been able to endure. In addition, I 
pointed out evidence that suggests that family and kinship networks, despite any 
modernising predictions, are still relevant for the political life of the region. This 
fact has been unduly neglected by integration studies. I went on to argue that 
these networks have become “modern” in the manner in which they exercise 
their power. Coercion may still be an option but the networks’ possession, albeit 
to a varying degree, of material, political and ideational power sources enables 
them to behave normatively towards the state. In this sense, I maintained that the 
state has been enmeshed.    
I thus identified the need for a “Central Americanised” model of regional 
integration: one that revisited the interaction between the state and normative 
elite networks, and the channels wherein these interactions occur culminating in 
the articulation of the networks’ normative power through social will. To develop 
this model, I conceptualised the state as possessing a double structure: first, the 
de jure structure in which formal power (i.e. that obtained through electoral 
means) is exercised through state institutions; and second, a socially constructed 
structure in which normative power is articulated within informal mediums. This 
conceptualisation led me to focus on the interplay between normative elites and 
political elites within the socialisation and norm diffusion processes. While 
attempting to make sense of such interplay, I identified the inability of current 
norm socialisation models and norm diffusion mechanisms to adequately address 
the particularities of the region. I thus elaborated on those models by developing 
the “ideational drive” (ID) model of socialisation in which political elites look 
for the normative (social) elites’ sanction of particular policies through a 
“consultation” process that takes place in the socially constructed state structure. 
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In that process, ideas are gradually internalised as norms, which in turn must be 
diffused throughout society. To make sense of such a diffusion process in Central 
America, I elaborated the “circumscribed-statist” mechanism of norm diffusion. 
In this mechanism, political elites diffuse norms that have been empowered by 
normative elites. This is not to argue that political elites are mere “instruments” 
of normative elites. Rather, it is to argue that they and other elite members 
converge in networks from which normative power delimits state preferences and 
options. Political elites, for example, could generate new norms independently. If 
those norms, however, have the possibility of affecting other normative elite 
members’ positions, then ideational drive is activated and the “consultation” 
process begins. 
To empirically assess this social construction, I employed a constructivist 
approach that followed a discourse analysis methodology. In so doing, first, I 
strove to overcome the limitations of neofunctionalism as regards 
operationalising intersubjective factors that underpin the discursive practices of 
the actors involved in the process; and second, to add to constructivist analyses a 
modified view of economic actors who are often overlooked and thus have their 
impact on social processes underestimated by that approach. I conceived 
economic actors as normatively active. They are part of the normative elite 
networks and provide material power to those networks and simultaneously, 
economic actors acquire political and ideational power within the networks. 
Through such methodology, I set out to trace the role and existence of political 
and social will in the regional integration process of Central America. 
To “test” existing hypotheses and more traditional views of the Central 
American process, and the different elements of the Central Americanised model 
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of integration, I engaged in a counterfactual exercise by observing political will 
independently from social will. Evidence to substantiate the “lack of political 
will” view and the “unwillingness” hypothesis was difficult to find. First, the 
majority of the political elite members interviewed in this study offered evidence 
that supports the existence of political will in Central America. Ideationally, the 
interviewees share and propose ideas that could lead to integrative impulses (e.g. 
the design of educational programmes to include regional integration). With 
regard to identity, political elites converge around discursive practices that imply 
a shared identity. The observer can readily identify the tendency of those elites to 
talk about their countries and simultaneously, to refer to a greater underlying 
concept, that of the region. Political elites in Central America, in addition, often 
argue that they are not initialising an integrative process rather they are 
attempting to reunify a broken “whole.” Unionist historical experiences, put 
differently, greatly impact the identity of political elites. In the dimension of 
interests, the majority of interviewees converge around socio-cultural interests 
(e.g. construct a Central American culture) which they conceive of as conducive 
to further levels of regional integration. I concluded, based on this three- 
dimensional convergence, that indeed there is political will towards regional 
integration in Central America. Second, from this willingness emerges a vision 
of Central America that counteracts the dominant trends occurring in the process. 
Interviewees agreed about the need to take integration beyond the economic 
space and that, for this purpose, it is essential to reform the current framework so 
as to grant binding powers to regional institutions. Third, interviewees 
emphasised the existence of a non-state “other”—directly linked to members of 
the state—capable of shaping and delimiting what is politically possible; that is 
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normative elites. In this sense, it seems that my state enmeshment proposition 
and normative network concept have a fair degree of validity. 
In the case of social will, I found evidence that suggests that in the 2005-
08 period, the level of social will in that region was limited. Social will, however, 
offered a second space in which to analyse its role and existence: the reactivation 
of regionalism in Central America during the early 1990s. At that time, I argued, 
there were high levels of social will as normative elites converged in the 
necessity of finding solutions to national issues (e.g. civil conflicts and extreme 
poverty) at the regional level. Ideationally, normative elites shared the “meaning” 
of regional integration: the process was equivalent to economic development 
which was articulated through a neo-liberal model. In the identity dimension, 
normative elites shared a degree of awareness about a Central American “self.” 
They conceived, through that “self,” that the national was inextricably interlinked 
with the regional. The normative elites’ interests were underpinned by an 
economic core: larger markets, increased trade and competitiveness. It is 
important to note that in the economic construction, the region was being 
conceptualised as an entity that could be rendered competitive. The existence of 
such a degree of social will, for example, led to the establishment of several 
regional treaties that resulted in multi-thematic regionalism and subsequently led 
to the proliferation of regional institutions such as the Consultative Committee. 
Subsequently, however, discursive fault-lines among normative elites arose and 
two competing regionalisms emerged: the “instrumentalist” construction aiming 
at the efficient participation of the region in the global economy, and the “Central 
Americanist” construction whose direct objective is the development of the 
Central American people. In the participants’ discursive patterns, I identified 
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such fault-lines leading to limited social will in the current Central American 
process.  
I uncovered that in the 2005-08 period, only about half of the participants 
shared ideas that go beyond economic matters; for example that the regions 
people could be taught to become Central Americans. The other half of the 
sample remained ideationally within textbook economic ideas, such as those of 
increased competitiveness through lower tariffs. In the identity realm, I identified 
a division among normative elites: one group undertakes a pragmatic identity for 
which the integration process is something relatively recent (i.e. it began with 
CACM in the 1960s) and the other group fixes its identity in the historical 
unionist efforts of the region. In the dimension of interests, normative elites are 
also divided in, for example, what they conceive of as being the beneficiaries of 
the process. Roughly, half of the participants show interest in social matters 
beyond the mere “job creation” function they perform. These factions seemed to 
be correlated with the “instrumentalist” and the “Central Americanist” 
constructions of the region, but it was difficult to determine where the fault-lines 
ran because members from different organisations that represent the normative 
elites shared certain dimensions while diverging in others. I concluded that in 
this period social will was limited in Central America and that that has led to 
institutional and strategic shifts in the process, and to periods of stagnation. For 
example, as the majority of the participants from both the political and social 
elites indicate, the regional institutional framework despite the early proliferation 
has reached a phase marked by the lack of institutional capacity to act.  
The discursive patterns I uncovered in both levels of analyses (i.e. 
political and social) substantiate my argument about the existence of normative 
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elites and their role through “consultation” in the regional policy formulation 
process. One third of the members of the political elites and one third of the 
members of the normative elites indicate that there are certain groups within the 
region’s private sector who are able to influence, control and—in the words of 
one of the participants—have “captured” the integration process. In addition, 
over a quarter of the participants from the normative elite discursively construct 
themselves as “normative,” occasionally indicating that they may not be able to 
compete with the power of other rival normative factions. Simultaneously, 
however, they indicate that they are able to influence their governments, and on 
one occasion, to influence the decisions of high ranking US officials.  
The interplay between social and political will cannot be conceptualised 
through a theoretical framework underpinned by economistic and modernisation 
premises as they may not be able to capture such elite interactions. Moreover, 
social will and the normative power that it articulates cannot be conceptualised, 
as noted previously, by employing the current norm socialisation and diffusion 
models. It is thus important to interpret my empirical findings in the light of the 
Central Americanised model of regional integration I developed in the first part 
of this thesis. This brings me to the issues of comparability. Is Central America 
an “N=1” case? I argue that it is “not” but why the qualified “not”?  
The perils of comparative regional studies have been underlined by 
Breslin (2006: 27-28). First, there is the “temporal” issue: one must find a 
moment in time in which the subjects of comparison are similar in a particular 
dimension (e.g. the “evolution of regionalism”). Second, experiences from one 
region could be universalised into benchmark cases. Third and related, 
comparative regionalism may generate “archetypal” cases that set the “norm and 
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expectation that other cases will emulate.” Finally, there is the risk of “biased 
theories” elaborated on the experiences of those benchmark and archetypal cases. 
These perils are indeed latent and worrisome for those aspiring to compare. In 
this regard, Rosamond and Warleigh (2006: 3) indicate that comparative regional 
integration “is not a search for uniformity” but “the search to uncover such 
general principles and practices as exist in a particular issue area, undertaken in 
the knowledge that divergence between systems and contexts can be practically 
significant and heuristically important.” It is then possible to “make generalising 
statements that take account of variations” (Rosamond and Warleigh, 2006: 4). 
In this conceptualisation the “N” becomes “plural.” 
It is then my contention that the theoretical framework I have developed 
can be employed in the study of regions beyond Central America. It is difficult to 
establish a priori the symmetries among case studies; doing so “is an 
assumption” (Jackson and Nexon, 2002: 94). There are of course symmetries 
among regions involved in integrative processes. It is probable that they are 
implementing similar institutional frameworks. There are, nevertheless, many 
more differences in the contexts in which those institutional frameworks have 
developed. The political culture of Central American countries differs from that 
of other regions, for example. Dissimilarities, however, need not be regarded as 
irregularities unsuitable for comparative analyses (Stretton, 1969: 246). The most 
common use of dissimilarities is to “put questions to each other, to start a search 
for the causes of dissimilar effects and to measure the effects of dissimilar 
causes” (Stretton, 1969: 246). Comparative studies are “strongest as a choosing 
and provoking, not a proving, device: a system of questioning, not for 
answering” (Stretton, 1969: 247). Social will, for instance, has had an important 
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role in the construction of regional integration in Central America. Arguably, 
such a role is the result of certain particularities of the region’s political culture 
(e.g. the socio-political impact of family and kinship networks). Political cultures 
differ even within countries. And yet, social will seems to possess strong 
analytical currency for comparison as a questioning mechanism. Why do certain 
factors play a significant role in political processes in one region and not in 
others? Do processes such as consultation between government officials and 
members of important social groups (elites) occur in other regions? If yes, should 
we dismiss the analysis of those processes because the political culture of that 
region differs from that of Central America?   
Within such a comparative regional integration framework, I suggest two 
avenues for future research. First, my framework can readily be extended to 
empirically study other regions of Latin America; that is, to assess the existence 
and role of social will in the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. It is evident 
that, at least among the Spanish-speaking countries of the region, there are strong 
historical and cultural ties and hence some common ground from which a 
comparative framework could be developed. For example, there is evidence of 
the existence of family and kinship networks in those regions. In Chile, it is 
interesting to point to the role of the Frei, Aylwin, Valdés families and their 
interconnections with other families such as the Subercaseaux and Errázuriz (see 
appendix X). In Uruguay, the Batlle family and their long history in the politics 
of that country is also worth noting (see appendix XI). Second, in other regions 
in which elites “act” in a similar manner to the elites of Central America, my 
theoretical framework seems applicable. In Korea, for example, Kim (2007) has 
indicated that business elites have formed tight communities based on, among 
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other factors, marriage and kinship, which have established complex relations 
with state elites that impact policy making. In such a context, it seems 
analytically promising to endeavour in the assessment of the possible role of 
those networks in integrative processes.  
An additional avenue for further research that is strongly suggested by my 
findings is the role of constitutional regionalism. Interestingly, its existence is not 
limited to Central America. Throughout the region, constitutions put special 
emphasis on the citizenship status of nationals from other Latin American 
countries. The emphasis ranges from assigning shorter time requirements (vis-à-
vis nationals from other regions) to obtain citizenship by naturalisation (e.g. 
Venezuela), to establishing that those requirements for citizenship depend on 
reciprocity with other Latin American countries (e.g. Colombia). This emphasis, 
on occasion, is extended to Spanish citizens (e.g. Bolivia), and to citizens of the 
Caribbean (e.g. Colombia). Reference to the process of integration is also 
included in constitutions beyond Central America. For example, Colombia’s 
constitution establishes that the country’s foreign policy is oriented towards 
“Latin American and Caribbean integration” (ANRC, 1991 [2005]: art. 9). In 
Peru, it is the “duty of the state” to promote the region’s integration (CRP, 1993 
[2005]: art. 44). Cuba’s constitution speaks of a “common identity” and declares 
the country’s willingness to support regional integration (ANPPRC, 1976 [2002]: 
art. 12.c); while that of Uruguay asserts that the country strives for the “social 
and economic integration of the Latin American states” (PROU, 1967 [2004]: art. 
6), and Ecuador’s constitution declares that that country “advocates” the 
integration of the Andean region and that of Latin America (ANCE, 1998: art. 
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4).159 What is the impact of such regionalism? Has it led to integrative tendencies 
in those countries? Is constitutional regionalism a vestige of the colonial or 
immediate post-independence period? If so, can we use it as a “measure” of the 
importance of history and culture for regionalism? Or, are the provisions of 
constitutional regionalism a recent development or inclusion? If that is the case, 
could we consider it to be indicative of increasing regionalising ideas among 
elites in the region?  
At the outset of this thesis I stated that its aim was to “localise” regional 
integration theory to better reflect the Central American context and that in order 
to do so the analysis would revisit and adapt neofunctionalism to the Central 
American context. As regards the first aim, I strove to remain aloof from simply 
importing theoretical concepts to the analysis of Central America and thus 
remain attentive to specificities or area specific conditions; that is, cultural 
continuities. I did so by revisiting the interactions between the state and social 
elites, and the normative channels through which those interactions occur. To 
conceive of the power implicated in those interactions, I elaborated the social 
will concept by building on Haas’ “community” concept and Schmitter’s “elite 
value complementarity.” In so doing, I attempted to highlight the adaptability of 
neofunctionalism to current phenomena and its ability to exchange ideas and 
achieve constructive dialogue with other more recent understandings of political 
phenomena. Finally, I must emphasise that the Central Americanised model was 
developed to overcome analytical rigidity by questioning the negative heuristics 
that current studies assume. In turn, such practice enabled the model to capture 
the region’s unionist foundation beyond what statist and economistic approaches 
                                                 
159
 Appendix XII maps the existence of constitutional regionalism throughout Latin America and 
also presents the year when the national constitutions were written and, if applicable, when they 
were last amended. 
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are able to assess. The model, in addition, strove to avoid uploading “external” 
meaning (i.e. characteristics of other regions) by incorporating variables—that is, 
putting the elites back into the analysis—that others may consider non-modern. 
In so doing, it attempted to emphasise that the study of Central American elites is 
not necessarily adverse to contemporary analysis. Such study, however, requires 
relaxing the set of assumptions that prevents us from achieving a synergistic 
account of the region’s process. Only by doing so, could we develop a 
hermeneutical toolkit that is able to more accurately “process” the regionalisation 
experiences emanating from Central America. I hope to have successfully 
achieved these aims.     
One final thought. At the onset I also declared that my study was about 
Central American integration and about its regionalisation. On the regionalisation 
point, I remain steadfast: despite failed integrative experiences and disruptions to 
the process, Central America seems reluctant to abandon the ideal of integration; 
and in this sense, it remains on the path to regionalisation. On the integration 
point my view has been somewhat amended. Originally, by integration I meant 
the process of delegating power to a regional core which implied that regionalism 
encompassed the region’s people. A careful examination of the process has led 
me to conceive of integration as a form of “integrative inequality” in which some 
social groups (e.g. normative elites) enjoy a fair degree of integration (e.g. 
regional businesses) while other groups remain ingrained in notions of 
nationalism that preclude them from articulating the construction of their region. 
I hope that my study has shed significant light into the socio-political dynamics 
that underpin and hence make possible such processes of exclusion. 
 
   
 258 
Appendix I. Regional Initiatives in Central America: 1823-2008 
 
Date Decree, treaty, event or actions to promote integration Entity Established Participants Nations 
Panel A: Sovereignty Protection 
July 19, 1823 to May 
30, 1838 
Decree of the Absolute Independence of the 
Provinces of Central America 
Provincias Unidas de Centroamérica Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
April 11 to July 17, 
1842 
Dieta de Chinandega   National Government  El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
July 27, 1842 to 1945 Treaty of Chinandega Central American Confederation El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
July 1846 Sonsonate Conference  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras 
October 7, 1847 Pact of Nacaome Provisionally established a federal government El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
November 8, 1849 Treaty of León The National Representation of Central America El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
September 14, 1850 Honduras' Decree calling for a Central 
American Congress 
  
October 9, 1852 Dieta Nacional The Republic of Central America El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1858 Costa Rica and Nicaragua's Proposal for a 
new federation 
 Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
July 10, 1862 National Reorganization Covenant The Republic of Central America El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1862 Unionist project  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua 
   
 259 
Date Decree, treaty, event or actions to promote integration Entity Established Participants Nations 
February 1872 The Agreement of La Union  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras 
October 9, 1873 Unionist Decree of the Government of 
Nicaragua 
  
1876 Unionist Congress in Guatemala  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
February 28, 1885 Decree of the Union of Central America A unionist attempt by Guatemalan President Justo Rufino 
Barrios using military force; Barrios declared himself as 
supreme military commander of all of Central America and 
established the Central American Union 
Guatemala and Honduras 
1885 Initiative by Costa Rica Defensive alliance Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua 
September 12, 1885 Exploratory Treaty of Union  El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras 
January 20,1887 Peace and Friendship Covenant  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
October 15, 1889 Pact of the Provisional Union of the Central 
American States 
The Republic of Central America Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1892 San Salvador confederate meeting Dieta de Centroamérica Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras 
June 1895 to 
November 1898 
Treaty of Amapala The Greater Republic of Central America El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
June 15,1897 Treaty of the Central American Union The Republic of Central America Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
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Date Decree, treaty, event or actions to promote integration Entity Established Participants Nations 
Panel B: Consolidation of the State - Peace and Political Stability 
1902 Corinto Pact The Tribunal of Central American Arbitration Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua 
September 1906 San José Conference International Bureau of Central American and The Central 
American Pedagogical Institute  
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras 
November 14 to 
December 20, 1907 
Central American Peace Conference In 
Washington DC 
Central American Court of Justice, International Office of 
Central America (Protect the Region's Interests), the 
Communication Convention.  
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1919 Unification Treaty The Morazán Republic El Salvador and Honduras 
January 19, 1921 Pact of the Central American Union The Federation of Central America Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras 
September 9, 1921 Federal Congress of Tegucigalpa (Political 
Constitution of the Central American 
Republic) 
The Central American Republic El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras 
1923 General Treaty Peace and Friendship 
(Washington DC)  
Conventions on the Unification of Labour Laws, Exchange of 
Central American Students, Trade of Natural and 
Manufactured Products, Establishment of Permanent 
Commissions on Economic and Social Issues 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
May 1934 Treaty of the Central American Fraternity  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
September 12, 1946 Pact of Santa Ana Permanent Commission to Study the Conditions for and the 
development of projects for the Political Union of the region 
El Salvador and Guatemala 
April 8, 1947 Pact of the Confederate Union of the Central 
American States  
Confederate Union of the Central American States  El Salvador and Guatemala 
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Date Decree, treaty, event or actions to promote integration Entity Established Participants Nations 
October 14, 1951 Letter of San Salvador The Organization of Central American States Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
Panel C: Economic Integration 
1960 General Treaty of Economic Integration Of 
Central America 
The Central American Common Market Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1993 Treaty of Tegucigalpa System of Central American Integration Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
 
Sources: Adapted from Karnes (1961), Mata Gavidia (1969) and ODECA (1956).   
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Appendix II. Mapping El Salvador Family Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Paniagua (2002).  
Families 
1. Ricardo Poma / Florence Kriete 
2. Archie Baldocchi / Angelita Kriete 
3. Patricia Baldocchi /Mauricio Borgonovo 
4. Manuel  Meza Ayau / Alicia Hill 
5. Roberto Palomo / Loly Meza Hill 
6. Francisco Llach /  Maria  Hill Bernal 
7. Alfredo Cristiani / Margarita Llach 
8. J. Elías  Bahaia/ Eillen Siman  
9. Miguel Ángel Salaverría Alcaine /Rosa  García Prieto 
10. Juan Federico Salaverría Prieto / Lucila Quirós  
11. Marta Sol / Escalante Arce 
12. Roberto Quiñónez Meza / Clelia Sol 
13. Emma Meza / Quiñónez  
14. Meza Ayau / Álvarez  
15. Belismelis Sandoval / Álvarez Vidaurre 
16. Poma / Ana Coralia Belismelis 
17. Armando Araujo / Sonia Eserski  
18. R. Llach Hill / L. Guirola  
19. Ernesto Regalado Dueñas / Hellen O’sullivan Hill 
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Appendix III. FUSADES Founding Members (excerpt)  
 
FUSADES Founding Members  
……Cristiani Burkard, Alfredo Félix Simán, Teofilo Jose 
Cristiani, Héctor Simán  Dabdoub, Mario Alberto 
Cristiani Llach, Alejandro Félix …… Simán  Dada, Alberto Jose 
Quiñónez Caminos, Eduardo Simán  Dada, Guillermo Jose 
Quiñónez  Meza, Roberto Simán  Dada, Javier Ernesto 
Quiñónez  Sol, Claudia Simán  Dada, Miguel Ángel 
Quiñónez  Sol, Raúl Ernesto Simán  Dada, Silvia Inés 
Quirós, Antonio Simán  Jacir, Jose Jorge 
Quirós, Samuel Simán  Jacir, Roberto Jose 
Quirós Céspedes, Arnoldo Simán  Siri, Gerardo Jose 
Quirós Céspedes, Román Simán  Siri, Roberto F. 
Quirós Noltenius, Jose Ángel …… Simán  Zablah, Jorge Jose 
Saca, Elías Antonio Sol, Ana Cristina 
Saca, Rosa Maria Simán de Sol, Carmen Elena Díaz Bazan de 
Safie Hasbun, Oscar Antonio Sol, Roberto Reynaldo 
Sagrera, Edwin Sol Bang, Guillermo 
Sagrera Bogle, Ricardo Sol Meza, Enrique Alberto …… 
Salaverria, Jose Antonio Valencia, Joaquín 
Salaverria Alcaine, Miguel A. Valiente, Eduardo 
Salaverria Borja, Ana Maria Valiente, Guillermo 
Salaverria Prieto, Juan Federico Valiente, Luis Alonso 
Salaverria Prieto, Miguel Ángel …… Valiente, Manuel Arturo 
Salume, Adolfo Valiente, Mario Eduardo …… 
Salume Artinano, Adolfo …… Yarhi, David 
Santamaría Rojas, Jose Mauricio Yarhi, Nassin …… 
Santamaría, Oscar Alfredo …… Zablah Kuri, Jose Arturo 
Schildknecht, Alfredo Zablah Siri, Ana Teresa 
Schildknecht, Rodolfo …. Zablah Siri, Jaime Roberto 
Simán, Abraham Zablah Siri, Jorge Alfonso 
Simán  Jacir, Félix Jose Zablah Siri, Lucia Beatriz 
Simán, h., Félix Jose Zablah Siri, Paola Maria 
Simán, Jose Eduardo Zablah Siri, Rodrigo Jose 
Simán, Ricardo Zablah Touche, Eduardo A. 
Simán, Rolando Jorge Zablah Touche, Jorge 
Simán, Salvador Zablah Touche, Jose 
Simán  h., Salvador Jose Zablah Touche, Jose Luis 
Simán  Jacir, Teofilo Zablah de Rieger, Maria Pilar 
Source: FUSADES (2003) 
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Appendix IV. An Intertwined Family Network in Central 
America: Presidents in Alfaro Family Tree  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stone (1990).  
Guatemala 
1. Laugerud García, Kjell Eugenio 
 
El Salvador 
3. Barrios Espinoza, Gerardo 
2. Guzmán Ugalde, Joaquín 
 
Honduras 
4. Bonilla Vázquez, Policarpo   
 
Panamá 
5. Porras, Belisario 
 
Nicaragua 
6. Carazo Aranda,  Evaristo 
7. Sacasa Sacasa, Juan Bautista 
8. Sacasa Sarria, Roberto 
12. Solórzano Gutiérrez, Carlos 
11. Somoza Debaile, Anastasio 
9. Somoza Dabaile, Luis 
10. Somoza García, Anastasio 
. 
Costa Rica 
21. Acosta García, Julio 
23. Alfaro Zamora, Jose Maria 
28. Aguilar Barquero, Francisco 
37. Aguilar Chacón, Manuel 
50. Arias Sánchez, Oscar 
39. Calderón Guardia, Rafael Ángel  
30. Carazo Odio, Rodrigo 
41. Carranza Ramírez, Bruno 
42. Carrillo Colina, Braulio 
44. Castro Madriz, Jose Maria 
36. Cortes Castro, León 
49. Echandi Jiménez, Mario 
27. Esquivel Ibarra, Ascensión 
31. Esquivel Sáenz, Aniceto 
43. Fernández Chacón, Manuel  
47. Fernández Orea muño, Prospero  
26. Gallegos Alvarado, Jose Rafael 
19. Gonzáles Flores, Alfredo 
20. Gonzáles Viquez, Cleto 
17. Guardia Gutiérrez, Tomas 
32. Herrera Zeledón, Vicente 
15. Jiménez Oreamuno, Ricardo 
14. Jiménez Zamora, Jesús 
33. Monge Álvarez, Luis Alberto 
48.Montealegre Fernández, Jose M. 
38. Mora Fernández, Juan 
18. Mora Porras, Juan Rafael 
25. Oduber Quirós, Daniel 
13. Oreamuno Bonilla,  Francisco 
16. Orlich Bolmarcich, Francisco 
35. Picado Michalski, Teodoro 
40. Rodríguez Zeledón, Jose 
24. Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 
29. Tinoco Granados, Federico 
34. Trejos Fernández, Jose J. 
22. Ulate Blanco, Otilio 
45. yglesias Llorente, Demetrio 
46. yglesias Castro, Rafael 
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Appendix V. The Arenales/Skinner-Klée Family 
(Guatemala) 
 
Name Post and Dates 
Jorge Skinner-Klée Member of Congress, Guatemala, 1986-1994; Member 
Constitutional Assembly of Guatemala and Member of the 
commission that wrote the project of Guatemala's Constitution, 
1955 and 1964. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala, 1956-
1957. Member and Past President, Guatemalan Delegation to the 
United Nations (UN), 1964 and 1985.  
 
Alejandro Arenales 
Catalan 
Member of Congress, Guatemala, 1960-1963. Former Delegate, 
Ministry of External Affairs of Guatemala to the United Nations 
(UN). Former Member of the Board of Directors, Institute for 
Development of Production of Guatemala. Former Chairman, 
Board of Directors of Guatemalan Maritime Enterprises 
(FLOMERCA). 
 
Alfredo Skinner-Klée Former member Board of Directors of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Centre of the Chamber of Commerce of Guatemala. 
Former Member, Central American Parliament, 1990-1995. 
Currently Director (Guatemala) of the Central American Bank of 
Economic Integration -CABEI. Member: Guatemalan Bar 
Association. Member of the Board of Directors of several leading 
corporations. Party Reform Movement (MR) Secretary General.  
  
Jorge Skinner-Klée 
Arenales 
Minister Counsellor and Alternate Delegate of Guatemala to the 
Organization of American States, OAS 1985-1986; Minister 
Counsellor, Embassy of Guatemala to the USA, 1987-1988; 
Guatemalan Delegate to the UN and OAS General Assemblies, 
1985-1990. International Counsel and Alternate Delegate, 
National Coffee Association of Guatemala, 1990-1993. 
Ambassador of Guatemala: to Germany, 1993; to Canada, 1998; to 
Belize, 2002; to Honduras, 2003; Vice Minister of Foreign 
Relations of Guatemala, 2004. Currently Permanent 
Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations, New York.  
 
Alejandro Arenales 
Farner 
Arbitrator: Commission for Resolution of Disputes and Arbitration 
of the Chamber of Industry of Guatemala; Arbitration and 
Conciliation Centre of the Chamber of Commerce of Guatemala; 
Member of the Board of Directors of several leading corporations. 
 
Pablo Arenales Farner Representative and First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of 
the Republic of Guatemala in the United Nations (UN), New York 
City, USA (1994-1995).  Legal Counsel to UNESCO 2001, 2002, 
2003. Former Consul of the Guatemalan Embassy in Paris, France 
and Rome, Italy. 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from http://www.Arenales.com.gt/our_people.htm 
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Appendix VI. The Political Elites Sample 
 
Participant 
Code Country Political Party or Institution 
Spanish 
Acronym 
Panel A: PARLACEN Members 
PP1 Dominican 
Rep. 
Party of Dominican Liberation  PLD 
PP2 El Salvador Nationalistic Republican Alliance ARENA 
PP3 El Salvador National Liberation Front Farabundo 
Marti 
FMLN 
PP4 Guatemala Guatemalan Revolutionary Front FRG 
PP5 Guatemala Guatemalan Revolutionary Front FRG 
PP6 Guatemala National Action Party PAN 
PP7 Guatemala Unionist Party PU 
PP8 Guatemala Party of National Unity of Hope UNE 
PP9 Honduras Liberal Party PL 
PP10 Honduras National Party PN 
PP11 Honduras Party of Innovation and Unity-Social 
Democrat 
PINU-SD 
PP12 Nicaragua Sandinista Front of National Liberation FSLN 
PP13 Nicaragua Sandinista Front of National Liberation FSLN 
PP14 Nicaragua Sandinista Front of National Liberation FSLN 
PP15 Nicaragua Liberal Constitutionalist Party PLC 
PP16 Nicaragua Liberal Constitutionalist Party PLC 
PP17 Panama Revolutionary Democratic Party PRD 
Panel D: National Political Actors 
PP18 Costa Rica Party of Citizen Action  PAC 
PP19 Costa Rica Party of Citizen Action  PAC 
PP20 Costa Rica Party of National Liberation PLN 
PP21 Costa Rica Party of National Liberation PLN 
PP22 Costa Rica Party of National Liberation PLN 
PP23 Costa Rica Libertarian Movement PML  
PP24 Costa Rica Party of Social-Christian Unity PUSC 
PP25 Costa Rica Party of Social-Christian Unity PUSC 
PP26 Costa Rica Party of Social-Christian Unity PUSC 
PP27 Dominican 
Rep. 
Party of Dominican Liberation  PLD 
PP28 Dominican 
Rep. 
Party of Dominican Liberation  PLD 
PP29 Dominican 
Rep. 
Party of Dominican Liberation  PLD 
PP30 El Salvador Nationalistic Republican Alliance ARENA 
PP31 El Salvador Nationalistic Republican Alliance ARENA 
PP32 El Salvador United Democratic Centre CDU 
PP33 El Salvador National Liberation Front Farabundo 
Marti 
FMLN 
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Participant 
Code Country Political Party or Institution 
Spanish 
Acronym 
PP34 Guatemala Guatemalan Christian Democracy Party DCG 
PP35 Guatemala Guatemalan Christian Democracy Party DCG 
PP36 Guatemala Party of Authentic Integral 
Development 
DIA 
PP37 Guatemala Guatemalan Revolutionary Front FRG 
PP38 Guatemala Grand National Alliance GANA 
PP39 Guatemala Grand National Alliance GANA 
PP40 Guatemala Party of National Advancement PAN 
PP41 Guatemala Unionist Party PU 
PP42 Guatemala Party of National Solidarity PSN 
PP43 Guatemala Party of National Unity of Hope UNE 
PP44 Guatemala Party of National Unity of Hope UNE 
PP45 Honduras Liberal Party PL 
PP46 Honduras Liberal Party PL 
PP47 Honduras Liberal Party PL 
PP48 Honduras Liberal Party PL 
PP49 Honduras National Party PN 
PP50 Nicaragua Liberal Constitutionalist Party PLC 
PP51 Panama Revolutionary Democratic Party PRD 
PP52 Panama Revolutionary Democratic Party PRD 
PP53 Panama Revolutionary Democratic Party PRD 
PP54 Panama Solidarity Solidaridad 
Panel C: SICA Officials 
PP55 NA SICA NA 
PP56 NA SICA NA 
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Appendix VII. Interview Excerpts-Chapter Four 
 
PP1 
Los presidentes de la región deben concientizar al pueblo acerca de la integración. 
Se debe concientizar e informar a la gente acerca del proceso por medio de los 
medios de comunicación así como también por medio del sistema educativo… 
Existe en la Republica Dominicana un programa educativo en las universidades 
sobre integración el cual posiblemente se extienda a la educación media. 
También se trabaja con las municipalidades para acercarse al pueblo. La 
televisión nacional habilitó espacios para desarrollar programas donde informa a 
la población sobre el tema. Además, existe un acuerdo con el ministerio de 
educación (superior y media) para llevar charlas sobre integración y hay también 
una propuesta sobre cátedra universitaria sobre integración… El proceso es muy 
lento y parece demasiado lejos del pueblo. Para su éxito los países deben ceder 
soberanía. Nuestros países están obligados a integrarse… La concientización del 
pueblo se ha descuidado. Debe entonces haber un compromiso de concientizar a 
la ciudadanía común y no solamente a la clase alta, para que entienda, acepte y 
trabaje en pro de la integración. 
 
 
PP2 
El Presidente Saca de El Salvador es el “abanderado” de la integración 
regional… La integración debe ofrecer soluciones a la problemática del  pueblo 
centroamericano. El proceso debe entonces dar mejor calidad de vida a la 
población en general… El Parlamento debe convertirse en un sistema 
comunitario sin depender de los poderes ejecutivos de la región… Los diputados 
salvadoreños han desarrollado una iniciativa de ley para dar mayor poder 
legislativo a los miembros del Parlamento… Se debe establecer contacto con 
contrapartes dentro de las comisiones de los parlamentos nacionales… Es 
imperativo incluir lo social en la agenda regional, por ejemplo la cobertura del 
seguro social a nivel centroamericano.  
 
 
PP3 
Se debe dar pleno respaldo a las instituciones regionales de tal manera que 
existan mecanismos de ejecución de los procesos de integración. Es clave 
fortalecer el marco institucional centroamericano. También concientizar sobre el 
tema a nivel nacional buscando consenso entre los diferentes partidos… 
Instituciones regionales con poder vinculante pueden llevar a la práctica 
recomendaciones en el ámbito económico social... Existen propuestas para 
nivelar los asuntos sociales que incluyen los gastos de educación… Las cumbres 
presidenciales son peligrosas ya que no son democráticas, y por lo tanto el 
sistema regional no opera... Es necesario fortalecer aspectos de opinión pública 
que reposicionen el tema de la integración; la estrategia ha estado demasiada 
volcada a los temas de reforma institucional no al fortalecimiento… Hay actores 
dentro del sector privado dominante que están ligados a los intereses de los 
Estados Unidos. Esto ha permitido que el proceso de integración sea subordinado 
al tratado de libre comercio ya que la integración debe ser consistente con el 
tratado. El tratado entonces divide a la región centroamericana llevando a la 
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reducción de tendencias integracionistas… Por lo tanto, es necesario que el 
proceso refleje un equilibrio entre el papel del sector privado y el del estado. 
 
 
PP4 
La integración es una  “piedra pesada” para nosotros por la ausencia de visión a 
nivel partido. Hay ausencia de preparación a los miembros del Parlamento previo 
a su ingreso a éste. Nuestros países no se deben encerrar en lo doméstico, sino 
buscar y desarrollar una estrategia real hacia la integración. La integración 
comienza en casa por eso debemos de predicar para convertir, los 
integracionistas electos popularmente no saben de integración, por lo tanto van se 
sientan, reciben salario y no comunican… En Guatemala el idioma de las 
comunidades es importante. Como primer paso se ha visitado el interior del país 
no con bandera de partido si no con bandera de integración a través de los 
medios locales y con la lengua de las comunidades. Los medios de información 
son importantes para difundir ideas integracionistas. El acercamiento con la 
prensa genera espacios fundamentales para la integración de nuestros pueblos… 
Nosotros como diputados centroamericanos debemos tomar la iniciativa 
señalándonos a nosotros mismos para salir a las comunidades para informales de 
la existencia de las instituciones regionales como espacios de dialogo. 
Empoderarse acerca de que es la integración, que hacen los miembros del 
Parlamento y que podrían hacer. Éste [el Parlamento] debe ser el interlocutor 
entre los congresos nacionales y las comunidades, es entonces necesario darle 
facultades vinculantes. Debemos trabajar por la centroamericanidad, hasta ahora 
solo hablamos de la integración pero no actuamos. 
 
 
PP5 
La integración centroamericana es lenta por la falta de voluntad política y de 
disposición de parte de los sectores dominantes. También el pueblo no conoce el 
proceso de integración. Esto es incomprensible ya que la supranacionalidad 
significa el bien común de la región, el bienestar de nuestros pueblos. Los 
partidos de la región tienen conciencia limitada sobre la integración por lo que se 
necesita la participación de la dirigencia de los partidos en las instituciones 
regionales. Se puede usar programas educativos para incentivar la conciencia 
regional. Existe cierto temor entre los ejecutivos de la región de ceder parte de 
sus facultades y soberanía a las instituciones regionales, y por otro lado los 
grupos de poder no desean que se integre Centroamérica. Los que venden pollo, 
los que venden cemento, los que venden cerveza prefieren tener su propio 
“gallinero” en cada país para no compartir y competir en ese gallinero a nivel 
centroamericano. 
 
 
PP6 
El proceso de integración debe fortalecerse. Los partidos se enfocan en la 
temática nacional no en la regional. Al mismo tiempo, la gente se enfoca en 
problemas nacionales. Las instituciones regionales no han logrado transmitir la 
idea que la integración genera un horizonte nuevo de posibilidades para poder 
superar los problemas actuales. La población no ha visto  beneficio real de la 
integración… Los problemas reales del pueblo centroamericano son la 
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inseguridad, la pobreza y el desempleo. La integración no va a solucionar estos 
problemas inmediatamente pero puede sentar las bases para que en el futuro 
podamos alcanzar un grado de prosperidad… Las instituciones regionales deben 
ganar protagonismo ganar imagen… No hay consistencia en políticas internas de 
los partidos políticos. Los partidos deben ser el vehículo para llevar propuestas 
regionales a los congresos nacionales. Carecemos de mecanismos para proponer 
agenda regional... La gente puede apreciar los beneficios de la integración pero 
debemos trabajar en la voluntad política. Las instituciones regionales como el 
Parlamento se "esconden" por la falta de facultades vinculantes… Se debe 
acercar a la población con temas de impacto social como temas de migración. 
Estratégicamente si hay programas y proyectos que impacten a la población 
nacional, estos generarían un cambio de actitud en la población lo cual mejoraría 
la imagen de las instituciones… Debemos tratar de llegar a quienes debemos de 
llegar, a la gente porque la gente no conoce el proceso. Nuestra meta debería ser 
dejar sentadas las bases, un esquema básico establecido y ejecutándose para 
allanar el camino al fortalecimiento de la postura centroamericanista. 
Necesitamos acciones regionales concretas. 
 
 
PP7 
Los problemas de la integración se originan en la actitud de “no importancia” de 
los partidos políticos hacia el proceso lo cual repercute en la actitud de los 
gobernantes… No existe visión comunitaria a nivel estado… se debe dar 
seguimiento a los acuerdos regionales a nivel nacional…  Existe una oficina para 
la integración en el partido y se le ha recomendado a otros partidos de la región a 
adoptar dicha medida institucional… Lamentablemente algunos miembros del 
Parlamento no son miembros “de primera fila” dentro de los partidos, lo cual 
reduce la importancia que los partidos le dan al Parlamento… Grupo 
parlamentarios multipartidarios son importantes para el desarrollo de políticas 
regionales, éstos pueden ser ideológicos pero no cave la visión nacionalista. Se 
debe fomentar la integración en lo interno de los partidos. Al Parlamento le han 
“cortado las alas.” No tiene facultades vinculantes en temas regionales y carece 
de intervención en lo local… Es importante desarrollar programas de contenido 
sobre integración a nivel educativo, así como también proyectos comunitarios 
que expliquen al pueblo centroamericano el proceso, sus logros y beneficios. 
 
 
PP8 
En Guatemala la población no sabe lo que es la integración, no sabe que hacen 
las instituciones regionales, desconoce totalmente lo que es integración, y los 
espacios que la gente puedan tener por medio de las instituciones regionales… 
He presentado una iniciativa de ley para la creación de una agencia de promoción, 
divulgación y desarrollo de la integración en Guatemala y después propondré 
replicar agencia en todos los países miembros del Parlamento. También se debe 
trabajar con lo medios de comunicación directamente para lograr que la sociedad 
civil tome en serio al proceso y sus instituciones, se debe trabajar en la idea de 
que el Parlamento esta sirviendo las necesidades del pueblo… En el Parlamento 
no se debe votar por estado, lo cual lleva a un separatismo estado sin avanzar la 
conciencia regional. Se debe votar desde otra perspectiva. 
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PP9 
La integración económica no es perceptible para el pueblo centroamericano. El 
proceso socio-político debería ser la vértebra del proceso. Lo político  debe ser la 
columna vertebral de la integración. Entonces el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de 
las instituciones políticas es importante para el proceso… Centroamérica 
funciona como conjunto desde siempre. Siempre ha existido una política 
centroamericana, aun entre dictaduras militares existió coordinación regional… 
El Morazanico fue un esfuerzo político con incidencias militares, el error fue el 
establecimiento de la federación política carente de una federación militar… La 
percepción en cuanto a la integración política es que esta retrocediendo aun 
cuando la integración económica avanza… El pueblo de Honduras es hondureño 
pero se siente centroamericano ya que tiene una vocación centroamericanista. Es 
mas, los pueblos centroamericanos tienen vocación integracionista. El problema 
es cuando se entra a la praxis del estado, del manejo del estado. Los gobernantes 
conceptúan que  la integración lleva a la disminución de poder. Por lo tanto se 
desarrollan modelos al interior del estado, es decir de integración 
intergubernamental que no tienen la capacidad de crear instituciones que 
conlleven a la unidad centroamericana si no que allí, en las instituciones, cada 
quien defiende su nicho… Se necesita presentar soluciones de región no de país 
para evitar la falta de estabilidad en Centroamérica… Existe problema de 
representatividad en lo político y también con los medios de comunicación. Se 
debe prestar mayor atención a la producción social de la información.  
 
 
PP10 
Los problemas que afrontan los países de la región son similares. La integración 
es entonces necesaria para resolverlos. El Parlamento es la institución que estudia 
y propone solución a los problemas de la región… Sin embargo no goza de 
poderes vinculantes. Se debe tratar que los congresos nacionales acepten las 
proposiciones del Parlamento. Unidad entre los miembros de éste es fundamental 
para el éxito de sus propuestas. No se debe permitir que ciertos sectores políticos 
y económicos interfieran con nuestro trabajo… Debemos trabajar en el desarrollo 
de la conciencia regional a nivel del pueblo. La integración debe empezar en lo 
social. Se debe dar repuestas a los problemas que afrenta el pueblo 
centroamericano a través de programas sociales, y el Parlamento es clave en este 
tema… la inseguridad ciudadana puede incluirse en la agenda… Existe en 
Honduras un canal directo con la gente en el cual se tratan temas de la 
integración llevando así aunque sea de una manera inicial el proceso al público 
en general. 
  
 
PP11 
La integración trae crecimiento económico a la región. Nuestra visión es 
recuperar el terreno perdido para alcanzar una Centroamérica única y unida para 
que no existan fronteras entre estos países hermanos… Existen diferencias de 
grados de conciencia regional entre lo estratos populares. En El Salvador el 
pueblo es integracionista, el más integracionista de la región. Por otra parte 
hablar de integración en Costa Rica es hablar de algo que es enemigo del pueblo, 
en Honduras la clase media alta está interesado y Guatemala hay bastante interés, 
en Nicaragua es limitado. Por lo tanto no parece existir una conciencia 
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integracionista entre nuestros pueblos… La integración no ha avanzado como  
debiera porque el proceso pasa por las manos de los presidentes y en la medida 
que hayan presidentes que nos les interese, la integración va a estar en precario. 
Hemos realizado una propuesta a través del Parlamento de formar un comité 
especial de ministros de educación (incluido el de Costa Rica) quienes firmaron 
un acuerdo de incluir en el currículo escolar el contenido de paz e integración, en 
Honduras ya se esta dando. Legalmente los ministros de educación sentaron las 
bases para estos programas. 
 
 
PP12 
En el nuevo contexto de la integración se entra en dialogo económico, social y 
político. En materia económica el avance es a nivel de los Ejecutivos no a nivel 
partido y los Ejecutivos toman la batuta del proceso y dejan de lado lo político. 
Lo social se convierte en un apéndice de lo económico. Falta evaluar y reformar 
el  tratado de integración social. En lo político se ha desperdiciado el espacio que 
el Parlamento puede proporcionar para construir propuestas de integración 
verdaderas que muestren la región compacta y clara en su dirección. Sin embargo 
estamos marcados por los celos políticos. La integración necesita del desarrollo 
político e ideológico del pueblo centroamericano. Los partidos no han tomado 
con responsabilidad la delegación centroamericana y ser miembro del 
Parlamento se ve como turismo político… En el Parlamento debemos dejar de 
actuar como bancada nacional porque así se mantienen los localismos 
característicos de nuestros gobiernos. Se debe votar como bancada ideológica 
para generar un mayor sentimiento comunitario y generar una visión de región. 
Nuestra visión actual es generada por factores exógenos como el plan Puebla-
Panamá y el tratado de libre comercio. Falta compromiso de parte de los 
miembros del Parlamento de dar seguimiento a las acciones de éste dentro de los 
partidos políticos… Falta una estrategia adecuada de comunicación de parte del 
Parlamento, no se necesitan factores vinculantes si se sabe vender ideas. La falta 
de facultades vinculantes se ha convertido en un extraordinario pretexto para la 
falta de dinamismo dentro del Parlamento, para que éste no se dinamice ni 
cumpla con la función que debería estar cumpliendo… Se debe divulgar 
información para vender la integración. Las actividades y debates regionales 
generalmente no se incluyen en las agendas de discusión de los partidos, se 
necesita un mecanismo que cumpla esta función… Existen secretarías 
interparlamentarias o de relaciones exteriores dentro de algunos partidos, pero no 
tienen relevancia. Éstas podrían ser los vínculos entre los partidos y las 
instituciones regionales en especial el Parlamento. La integración necesita 
cambio de actitud, un mayor interés, compromiso y convicción. 
 
 
PP13 
La integración centroamericana no debe seguir patrones de intereses extranjeros 
como los de las empresas multinacionales. La tragedia de Centroamérica es 
depender de los intereses extranjeros. Esta es una tragedia ya que los beneficios 
son también extranjeros. Los beneficios de la integración deben ser públicos, en 
el sentido de ser públicos para los centroamericanos… La colaboración y 
cooperación entre los estados es fundamental para la integración… En nuestra 
visión geográfica del mundo, primero debe ser el “sur.” Nuestra visión debe ser 
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la defensa del “sur.” La integración debe hacer propuestas concretas a 
Centroamérica. Puede haber apertura de mercado entre Centroamérica pero no 
hacia el “norte” si no al “sur”… No hay debate o discusión sobre la integración 
en el seno del partido… y los presidentes y el gobierno de nuestro país carecen 
de una identidad integradora. 
 
 
PP14 
Las ideas son fundamentales para el proceso de integración. Por esta razón es 
necesario que se generen al seno de los partidos políticos, ideas acerca de como 
fortalecer el proceso. Los partidos deben crear secretarías para la integración, de 
esta manera se lograría canalizar de una manera eficaz la información sobre el 
proceso… Nuestro partido tiene una posición integradora a nivel 
Centroamericano y Latinoamericano… El proceso hasta ahora ha sido paralelo a 
lo financiero y comercial pero no es paralelo a lo social, lo cual no le permite 
“hablar” con la mayoría del pueblo Centroamericano. La integración debe de 
salir de la fase de privatización en la que se encuentra… Las oligarquías 
centroamericanas son anti-integracionistas. Esta es una explicación simplista 
pero históricamente real. 
 
 
PP15 
Las facultades vinculantes de las instituciones regionales como el Parlamento 
deben aumentar de acuerdo con las iniciativas y recomendaciones que éstas 
hacen… Es necesario concienciar a los partidos políticos y al pueblo sobre la 
integración regional… El Parlamento representa una cooperación basada en 
intereses regionales… Se ha realizado una propuesta para que se incluyan 
estudios de integración en los estudios primarios de la región. Centroamérica 
debe entender la importancia de la unión. Los partidos políticos no difunden 
información regional ni tampoco tienen programas de capacitación sobre 
integración para sus miembros. Por lo tanto hace falta concienciar a los partidos 
políticos sobre el tema… La Comisión de Educación y Cultura del Parlamento 
logro que los ministros de educación se comprometieran a incluir el tema de 
integración en los programas educativos… La integración es una necesidad y la 
concientización del pueblo es necesaria. Se debe usar los medios de 
comunicación para darle publicidad al Parlamento y al proceso regional en 
general… Debemos asumir responsabilidades regionales.   
 
 
PP16 
Con la historia integracionista en la región y las características que unen a estos 
países, la unión aduanera debería de existir… Hay tendencias en la región que 
limitan la lógica del proceso, por ejemplo el tratado de libre comercio debió 
haber sido negociado en conjunto para aprovechar ventajas comparativas. 
Debemos darnos el valor como una patria, la cual  merecemos… Para facilitar el 
proceso, necesitamos establecer el pasaporte único centroamericano. No importa 
si los Estados Unidos están de acuerdo, debemos pensar en si el pueblo 
centroamericano esta de acuerdo… A la institucionalidad regional le faltan 
facultades vinculantes. Se cree que instituciones regionales sólidas significa una 
pérdida de poder para los presidentes. Los presidentes deben asumir una 
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responsabilidad política... Todo partido político debe comprometerse a incluir la 
discusión sobre la integración entre los temas más importantes en su agenda… 
Los organismos regionales han estado muy aislados del pueblo. Las instituciones 
regionales deben tocar a la gente; también debe haber mayor acercamiento entre 
los organismos regionales… Dirigentes políticos deben hacer de la integración 
un punto prioritario, exigirlo con acciones no solamente por la venta de 
palabra… Se le debe de dar soluciones a la gente por medio de la integración. 
Los dirigentes políticos deben creer en acciones de integración no solamente 
usarlo como tema de campaña. Ellos deben llevar el mensaje no solamente 
político sino también económico, nuestras naciones no van a desarrollarse 
mientras no obtengamos la integración. 
 
 
PP17 
Panamá es la “bisagra” entre Centro y Sur América. Para Panamá la integración 
es el camino hacia la unidad latinoamericana. No todos los sectores productivos 
(industriales, comerciantes y empresariales) de la región participan en la 
integración y por eso no se comprometen más con el proceso… La relevancia 
que se le da al proceso depende del papel de los partidos. En la medida que se 
asuma mayor conciencia acerca de lo necesario para el éxito del proceso, se va a 
influir en los órganos legislativos y ejecutivos de cada país lo cual llevará a 
mayor rapidez y fortalecimiento del proceso… El proceso es lento porque los 
sectores intergubernamentales ven a lo supranacional como un rival. Por esta 
razón se necesita crear conciencia integracionista entre los presidentes y 
gabinetes a través de los partidos. Pero el proceso no debe estar exclusivamente 
en manos intergubernamentales. 
 
 
PP18 
El consejo consultivo dentro del SICA es un espacio que no ha sido articulado ya 
que es difícil llevar el trabajo de las bases a lo regional. Entonces se debe trabajar 
las bases de otra manera, ya que el proceso tiene poco impacto. La sociedad civil 
ha tenido poco impacto para incidir en la integración centroamericana… Para 
avanzar la integración se necesita un “dialogo social” en el cual el Parlamento se 
convierta en un agente primordial al establecer audiencias con la sociedad en 
general y así disminuir las brechas que existen. Pero antes el Parlamento debe de 
reconstituirse ya que al no ofrecer ningún “producto” definido a la sociedad se 
convierte en un costo demasiado alto… Los obstáculos que limitan la integración 
son el exceso de individualismo, miopía de los países, incapacidad de entender el 
proceso, el desconocimiento total del proceso que lleva al estereotipo negativo 
(ignorancia) y el enfoque en los aspectos económicos sacando así de la 
integración la “integración” de los pueblos. Estos problemas se pueden 
solucionar al generar una cultura centroamericanista y constituir el proceso como 
una agenda de desarrollo… Los partidos políticos pueden servir como “punta de 
lanza” para tratar de cohesionar el proceso en lo político, y aquí el Parlamento es 
clave, y la integración de los pueblos o sea de la gente centroamericana. La gente 
de la región debe conocer más a la otra gente centroamericana para que se de 
cuenta de todas la coincidencias que existen, solamente así se podrá integrar a los 
pueblos centroamericanos… Se necesita una campaña de información 
integracionista para que a partir de esta información se genere una mayor 
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conciencia centroamericana. También es necesaria una estrategia político-
cultural paralela a la económica en la cual la región se vea como región… La 
integración regional es una herramienta de desarrollo. Para lograr el 
fortalecimiento del proceso, en el consejo de ministros deberían de existir 
mecanismos de diálogo con la sociedad civil, como por ejemplo una audiencia en 
la que participen directamente el pueblo centroamericano. El Parlamento puede 
funcionar como este mecanismo si se acerca al pueblo. Se requiere de 
profundizar más la participación del pueblo y tratar de disminuir las brechas en el 
interior de las sociedades que generan las propuestas regionales. Si no se logra 
esto el pueblo no apoyará el proceso… El Parlamento no tiene legitimidad. La 
concepción de éste no ha causado un cambio en las relaciones políticas de los 
países miembros. Al contrario ha significado costos altos y ha dado privilegios a 
un segmento de la clase política; se ha generado una burocracia que no funciona 
ni produce. Las discusiones que allí se dan no tienen eco ni resonancia a nivel 
nacional, el Parlamento entonces no tiene credibilidad política para su 
funcionamiento. Se debe crear un espacio legislativo regional… Se debe tomar la 
integración como la agenda de desarrollo nacional pero esto requiere un gran 
compromiso… El pueblo desconoce la integración y el único conocimiento que 
tiene esta basado en los estereotipos de la clase política tradicional local que 
dicen “somos mejores” que el resto de Centroamérica. Muchas veces el pueblo 
toma partida en contra de la integración sin saber que es lo que están 
confrontando. 
 
 
PP19 
A través de una campaña de información la integración podría convertirse en 
tema de discusión y debate en Costa Rica. El obstáculo principal para dicho 
cambio estratégico es el “malinchismo” existente en este país y el  
desconocimiento de la población acerca de las raíces del país… Costa Rica no es 
indispensable para la integración del resto de los países del istmo pero es un 
elemento importante… La integración económica con institucionalidad 
económica renovada son urgentes, fundamentales; estas pueden generar la 
profundización del proceso. 
 
 
PP20 
La problemática de la integración está en las diferencias con respecto a avances 
educativos y de salud. Lo económico integra pero es necesario aprovechar la 
integración de una manera global. Se trata de alcanzar la cohesión de todas las 
sociedades de la región y no de afectar negativamente los logros sociales de 
algunos de los países. La integración debe democratizarse llevándola a todo el 
pueblo… Existe una visión positiva del proceso con respecto a los términos 
comerciales ya que estos son percibidos como foráneos a otros aspectos de la 
sociedad. La percepción en Costa Rica de temas como el migratorio es negativa.  
 
 
PP21 
Por su importancia Centroamérica penetra la mentalidad de los países de la 
región… Se debe de sincronizar las políticas sociales de todos los países del 
istmo. La percepción de las instituciones regionales, especialmente el Parlamento 
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es negativa. Éste es considerado una “isla” de impunidad para políticos 
“retirados.” Por esta razón debe de procederse con una reforma institucional que 
lleva al marco regional a ser efectivo y trascendente para todos los 
Centroamericanos… En Costa Rica no hay conciencia regional, todo se concibe a 
la “tica” ya que algunos sectores políticos solidifican la imagen nacional y se 
crea así un sentimiento diferente al de Centroamérica. Se debe explicar al pueblo 
lo que la integración significaría para el país. Se debe también aclarar nuestra 
posición en la región… El aislamiento de Costa Rica es ilógico. 
  
 
PP22 
Debe explicársele a la población centroamericana el tema de integración… El 
proceso puede tomar la perspectiva económica ya que es una realidad que lo 
económico integra… Lo esencial es que la integración debe de esforzarse por 
llevar la problemática social paralelamente a los aspectos del mercado. 
 
 
PP23 
Soy un unionista pero anti-PARLACEN, la diplomacia parlamentaria debe ser 
conservada para los congresos y asambleas nacionales… Diputados nacionales 
deben socializar con sus contrapartes en los países de la región… La integración  
se puede avanzar por medio de proyectos que faciliten el comercio como por 
ejemplo un ferrocarril centroamericano así como también proyectos culturales 
como de fútbol… La diplomacia parlamentaria necesaria para avanzar el proceso 
esta reservada para los ejecutivos. 
 
 
PP24 
Se necesita descentralizar el proceso. Instituciones regionales como el 
Parlamento podría establecer un mecanismo para incorporar en sus propuestas las 
ideas de las bases, es decir, el pueblo debe participar en el proceso para que de 
esta manera se “apropie” del proceso y por ende lo impulse… Se deben encontrar 
puntos de coincidencia entre los países. 
 
 
PP25 
El pueblo no conoce los logros las instituciones regionales... Los diputados 
nacionales no saben que hacer con la integración, las asambleas nacionales están 
atomizadas lo cual aumenta la falta de control sobre el Ejecutivo. En Costa Rica 
se creó una imagen del Parlamento basada en las percepciones que se tenían del 
resto de los países del área caracterizadas por conflictos internos, por ejemplo. 
Esta percepción ha generado recelo en la sociedad costarricense. Costa Rica 
puede aprender de la integración regional de los otros países centroamericanos. 
El proceso se puede fortalecer a través de la distribución de información de lo 
logrado. La falta de información acerca de las “bondades” de la integración, ya 
que los ejecutivos no informan, afecta negativamente. Se debe habilitar procesos 
que aumenten la interacción entre la clase política centroamericana... Los 
diputados nacionales están desconectados de lo que están haciendo los ejecutivos 
a nivel regional, los congresos nacionales están atomizados, excepto en El 
Salvador y Honduras. Por lo tanto la integración debe pasar por una integración 
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de las fuerzas políticas y de allí ser llevado a un proceso amplio que incluya al 
pueblo por medio de consejos económico-sociales que representen a los 
diferentes sectores de la sociedad. Estos podrían generar interés y conciencia 
regional en el pueblo… Se necesita dar ejemplos de éxito en la integración para 
poder fortalecer el proceso; ya hay acuerdos exitosos pero que son desconocidos 
por la población. Si se dan a conocer se entendería que la integración genera 
beneficios. No se han divulgado las bondades de la integración. 
 
 
PP26 
Se debe encontrar la manera de transmitir e impulsar las propuestas regionales a 
lo nacional. La clase política de algunos países renuentes a fortalecer el proceso y 
el electorado de estos países se preguntan ¿que hacen las instituciones 
regionales? Sin embargo, esta percepción de falta de efectividad es el resultado 
de la falta de información que existe. La integración debe convertirse en una 
estrategia de desarrollo para los países del área: se debe tener como objetivo el 
nivelar los países en los aspectos sociales y económicos; y dentro de cada país se 
debe nivelar las sociedades, es decir, reducir las diferencias sociales. El empezar 
a trabajar hacia la conquista de dichos objetivos hará a las instituciones 
regionales más visibles para los pueblos quienes al tener un beneficio tangible 
apoyarán el proceso de integración, lo cual obligará a la clase política, y por ende 
a los ejecutivos, a profundizar el proceso… La integración regional representa 
problemas para Costa Rica,  por lo migratorio y el sistema de protección social, 
los cuales podrían ser puestos en peligro si Costa Rica se convirtiera en un 
miembro completo del sistema regional. Por lo tanto, es difícil que Costa Rica 
entre al sistema y se mantendrá como un actor pasivo en la región. 
 
 
PP27 
Algunas instituciones regionales como el Parlamento no tienen una agenda que 
lleve al fortalecimiento de la integración, se necesita de una agenda dinámica. Se 
debe dotar de recursos a las instituciones para mejorar su eficiencia, pero lo más 
importante es determinar si ese mejoramiento de la eficiencia se refleja 
igualmente en un aumento de su eficacia, lo cual no está determinado solamente 
por la capacidad de gestión institucional sino que, sobre todo, por la voluntad 
política de los países y el grado de cumplimiento de los compromisos acordados, 
así como por la visión y actuación de las instituciones regionales sobre la base de 
la visión de sus máximas autoridades. 
 
 
PP28 
Se debe cambiar la forma de elección para los representantes ante el 
PARLACEN. Se debe informar al pueblo de la existencia de estos puestos y se 
debe explicar al electorado las funciones de los parlamentarios regionales… El 
sistema educativo puede servir para socializar el proceso. Podemos generar así 
una conciencia integracionista que allane las dificultades que enfrentamos al 
proponer la integración. Tenemos que proyectar el proceso hacia toda la sociedad. 
Es cierto que la integración es económica, pero esto no significa que no pueda 
ser democrática. 
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PP29 
La integración es global, parte de una decisión política y se desarrolla en los 
ámbitos político, económico, social, ambiental y cultural debiendo existir una 
adecuada correspondencia entre los avances de un ámbito con los otros, las 
prioridades las determina en forma necesaria el proceso mismo… La 
participación de la sociedad en el proceso de la integración se debe de 
incrementar, la proyección del proceso hacia la mayoría es prioridad… Lo 
económico y otros aspectos sociales como la educación dentro de la integración 
regional no son políticas excluyentes entre sí, se puede desarrollar conocimiento 
y a la vez incrementar el comercio, en ambos casos se pueden desarrollar. 
 
 
PP30 
El contexto nos obliga a la integración. Las necesidades de supervivencia  llevan 
a la integración regional. El tratado de libre comercio ha venido a forzar la región 
a unirse. Cualquier tratado, por ejemplo con la Unión Europea, nos une más, ya 
que nos lleva al diálogo. Lamentablemente algunos de los presidentes de nuestros 
países no piensan en Centroamérica como región capaz de acciones puntuales. 
En nuestros países no hay continuidad en los gobiernos y nuevos gobernantes 
piensan con revanchismo hacia el gobierno anterior, esto le resta estabilidad a la 
integración. Como región debemos entrar en áreas más palpables para el pueblo, 
como la temática migratoria. Deberíamos de hablar como Centroamérica con 
Estados Unidos sobre el tema migratorio. 
 
 
PP31 
Centroamérica va caminando hacia la integración. El tratado de libre comercio 
favorece la integración. Debe de haber más integración en materias palpables 
para la sociedad centroamericana en general los cual le dará más relevancia a las 
instituciones regionales... En temas de política exterior los consulados deberían 
de conformarse como Centroamérica y no como países individuales. 
 
 
PP32 
La integración no es un tema de discusión en los partidos políticos, ni siquiera se 
logra que sea tema de la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores e Integración 
centroamericana. Aquí el PARLACEN puede ser clave… Existen divergencias 
sobre el análisis que hacen otras personas. El Parlamento es 100% eficaz porque 
no esta obligado a hacer nada: Votaciones  no son importantes solamente se 
genera camaradería. El PARLACEN se ha convertido en “ente” extraño, las 
resoluciones de los presidentes sobre el número de diputados del Parlamento son 
las importantes. Por eso no importa la representación que exista allí, y esto quita 
atribuciones al Parlamento… El Parlamento se ha convertido en el “patito feo” 
de la integración pero el peso no cae solamente sobre el parlamento sino también 
sobre los presidentes quienes no aceptan nada que “huela” a supranacionalidad. 
Los parlamentarios centroamericanos no tratan de convencer a sus partidos sobre 
la importancia de la integración. Por ejemplo, en El Salvador ARENA no acepta 
la supranacionalidad, sin embargo sus miembros del parlamento son 
“centroamericanistas.” El PARLACEN no puede acercarse a la gente porque sus 
propios partidos bloquean cualquier intento… El tratado de libre comercio no 
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tiene espíritu de integración real. Existe pesimismo sobre la actitud 
integracionista de los gobiernos. Por otra parte, necesitamos crear interés sobre la 
integración dentro de los partidos políticos. Los “centroamericanistas” cuando 
llegan a los gobiernos no incluyen el debate sobre la integración en sus agendas. 
Además el proceso no tiene diseño, no existe un plan de como generar la 
supranacionalidad en la región. Existe mucha retórica sobre lo vital de la 
integración regional, pero no responde a una pregunta fundamental: ¿que forma 
va a tener la integración? Se necesita determinar un ente con personalidad 
centroamericana, por ejemplo una confederación centroamericana. 
Desgraciadamente no existe un pensamiento integracionista agresivo, creativo y 
que asuma lo que somos como región. Se debe de pensar en otras dimensiones 
como la de sociedades “desterritorializadas.” Las nacionalidades existentes no 
son explicables desde el espacio territorial. La integración debe ser construida 
sobre la realidad de nuestra gente… La integración regional es vital para la 
sobre-vivencia de Centroamérica, se debe pensar en la integración política… Una 
confederación es más aceptable ya que su efecto en ciertos poderes es menor. 
Necesitamos dar los primeros pasos, dar funciones vinculantes a los órganos 
regionales. El PARLACEN debe generar debate real sobre el tema… Todos los 
presidentes de Centroamérica están ligados al mismo capital, este capital es 
especulativo el cual no necesita integración, muchos menos órganos que posean 
supranacionalidad como la Corte Centroamericana. 
 
 
PP33 
Existe una visión favorable para la integración dentro de la Asamblea Nacional 
de El Salvador. Pero se necesita mayor acercamiento entre el las instituciones 
regionales y el pueblo, se deben proyectar las oficinas regionales hacia la 
comunidad… El futuro de Centroamérica esta en la integración pero no es 
suficiente lo que se ha hecho. En el Parlamento no debería de haber votación por 
país o ideología, sino mejor por una identidad de región… Falta una buena 
campaña de comunicación que impulse la integración en todos los países, que 
informe al pueblo sobre el proceso. También, se necesita un programa educativo 
sobre integración que sea consistente, es decir que tenga el mismo contenido en 
todos los países. Si no hay integración, no hay desarrollo, no hay bienestar, no 
hay felicidad para nuestros pueblos de Centroamérica. 
 
 
PP34 
Se debe buscar un foro de cooperación que lleve a la integración. El mayor 
obstáculo para la integración regional son los grupos empresariales que quieren 
controlar el estado y participar en un proceso de integración económica con el 
mínimo de regulaciones; o sea una integración controlada por ellos. El 
PARLACEN con poderes vinculantes elegiría los ejecutivos de SICA, SIECA y 
BCIE; lo cual resultaría en instituciones regionales fuertes que regulen el proceso 
de integración, en especial el económico. Los grupos empresariales no quieren 
tales instituciones, no es una cuestión económica si no de control. Al mismo 
tiempo la relación de las instituciones regionales con la prensa es deficiente. Los 
medios de comunicación no conocen o entienden el Sistema de Integración y se 
dedican a representar al PARLACEN como un ente no productivo. Ellos no 
conocen la realidad. Por ejemplo desconocen que el Parlamento inicia procesos 
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que serian beneficiosos y que son los Ejecutivos que deberían de hacer de esos 
proyectos leyes. Sin embargo es en este punto en el que el proceso llega a un 
callejón sin salida y sufre de estancamiento. Esta situación es aprovechada por 
los grupos empresariales que desprestigian al Parlamento… Debemos de 
reconocer que no esta institucionalizada la importancia de la integración como 
vehículo de desarrollo. Para esto necesitamos aprender a ser región y así reducir 
la desintegración de lo nacional y lo regional. 
 
 
PP35 
La integración existe pero es histórica, es una tradición buscar la integración 
Centroamericana. Pero no existe una conciencia clara sobre la integración como 
un mecanismo para el desarrollo de nuestros países.  Aún las dictaduras buscaban 
la integración, por ejemplo fueron ellos quienes fundaron ODECA y CONDECA. 
Las dictaduras siempre tuvieron una vocación integracionista… Los partidos 
políticos están demasiado enfocados en problemas de la vida diaria de sus países 
y los conflictos internos. Por ejemplo, se espera de Guatemala un liderazgo 
regional. Sin embargo el Presidente Berger no tiene liderazgo regional, no 
entiende el proceso. Por eso él esta en contra de la integración  precisamente por 
que sus asesores se oponen a lo regional… Existe en la región un compromiso 
histórico pero no es “militante.” Si existe una base sólida para le proceso… Si 
conocemos los beneficios de la integración, si somos centroamericanistas, pero 
entonces ¿porqué no se consolida el proceso de integración?... A los Estados 
Unidos no le importa la integración regional de Centroamérica, no la apoyan 
pero no están en contra; a ellos les interesa negociar bilateralmente esa es su 
política hacia la región, aun con la Unión Europea eso es lo que buscan entonces 
no es problema hegemónico. Los que se oponen al proceso son los grupos 
privados de empresas, los grupos económicos poderosos, las oligarquías locales. 
Por razones objetivas las oligarquías de Centroamérica quieren integrarse sin 
integración. Es decir quieren integrarse, tener alianzas de bancos, por ejemplo el 
Banco Cuscatlán. Dichas alianzas deben de realizarse bajo sus condiciones y sin 
regulaciones y leyes, sin compromiso con los países. La integración formal 
implica la formación de organismos con poderes vinculantes. Si existe este tipo 
de instituciones entonces se limitarían la integración informal (el Parlamento 
establecería normas vinculantes de carácter regional). Entonces los grupos se 
dedican a desprestigiar aun a los congresos nacionales. La empresa privada se 
opone por razones objetivas a la integración formal, ellos también critican a los 
congresos locales porque ellos no quieren normas…. Los bancos están integrados, 
las empresas se están integrando, ¿se necesita entonces instituciones regionales 
fuertes? Este es el dilema pero depende de los políticos quienes deben de tomar 
la decisión de integrarse y funcionar como una confederación con leyes locales 
para ciertos temas y leyes regionales para otros, con una autoridad central (como 
la autoridad suiza). Concibo la integración regional de Centroamérica (para los 
próximos 20 años) con un comité ejecutivo colegiado entre los presidentes (como 
el suizo), un parlamento centroamericano que establezca normas, que reciban 
iniciativa de los presidentes y que sean ratificadas por los presidentes, los 
congresos locales legislarían temas que no son regionales sino locales y la Corte 
Centroamericana de Justicia fuerte. Se necesita un sistema de integración fuerte 
para fortalecer el desarrollo de la región. El  camino para el desarrollo es la 
integración. ¿Cómo lograrlo? La Unión Europea puede motivar, propiciar 
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actividades a través de entidades gubernamentales y de la sociedad civil para ir 
generando conciencia acerca de la importancia de la integración para el 
desarrollo de la región… Se deben tomar decisiones independientemente de 
Costa Rica, esto no significa pelear, es simplemente tomar decisiones 
independientes. 
 
 
PP36 
Instituciones regionales como el Parlamento no son vinculantes y por lo tanto no 
pueden afectar o cambiar las políticas internas de los diferentes países… Los 
sistemas políticos de la región no son independientes de los sectores económicos 
poderosos. La dependencia financiera que existe lleva a esos sectores a ser 
dueños de los espacios políticos. Por lo tanto los políticos no tienen la libertad de 
desarrollar la política. Existe una dependencia de lo político en lo económico. 
Los presidentes de la región no tienen la liberta política de desarrollar una 
verdadera agenda integracionista. Debemos pensar como naciones y no como 
intereses económicos. Por dicha dependencia y pensamiento los organismos 
regionales no llegan a tener el poder que deberían. El vínculo entre lo local y lo 
regional se pierde en el momento en que los representantes de los partidos 
políticos llegan al  Parlamento... Oficinas regionales debería de existir dentro de 
los Comités Ejecutivos de los partidos políticos. Dicha oficina debería de ser la 
encargada de los temas regionales… Los políticos usan las instituciones 
regionales como chivo expiatorio lo cual debilita los organismos regionales 
porque la gente empieza a percibirlos como una carga que no es útil y los 
gobernantes amenazan con remover la representación regional… Se necesita la 
creación de un ente centroamericano con personalidad política que establezca de 
una vez la región como unidad.  
 
 
PP37 
La integración regional debe ser global, debe de empezar en lo mínimo, como 
por ejemplo en el asunto de mujeres o minorías. Se debe dar espacio a estos 
grupos… El obstáculo para la integración es la falta de compromiso, se debe 
dejar el romanticismo por un lado y tener una mayor pro-actividad… Se debe 
revisar el acta constitutiva del PARLACEN. Se debe de ir limando los aspectos 
negativos del Parlamento para irle dando un poco de factores vinculantes. Es 
preocupante que en las votaciones de Guatemala la papeleta más anulada es la 
del Parlamento… Los partidos políticos deben revisar la manera en que eligen 
sus representantes al Parlamento… La gente que conoce un poco sobre el tema si 
apoyan al proceso, pero si se les mencionan las instituciones regionales no las 
apoya… El obstáculo mayor es la falta de compromiso dentro de las instituciones 
regionales. 
 
 
PP38 
La integración centroamericana sigue su proceso y parece encaminarse hacia la 
unión aduanera. Pero, considerando la globalización de los mercados, Centro 
América ya debería pensar en trabajar hacia el mercado común. La liberalización 
de los factores productivos es un hecho, además ya hay un CA4 [pasaporte] que 
permite un libre tránsito de personas… Por definición, la integración es parte de 
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un proceso de descentralización funcional de los gobiernos pero éste debe ser 
paulatino. Hay casos en que funciona solamente a nivel nacional, y en el plano 
regional se manifiesta frágil. La normativa “supranacional” es una condición 
esencial para eficientizar el proceso descentralizado regional y lograr así la 
participación de la mayoría de los miembros de nuestras sociedades. 
 
 
PP39 
No hay comunicación entre lo local y lo regional en lo absoluto. Los miembros 
del Parlamento deberían de desarrollar un programa para concienciar a las bases 
y convertirse así en difusores de la integración… La clase económica tiene miedo 
del proceso. Entonces, el proceso debe ser escalonado vendiendo la idea a los 
diferentes sectores sociales paulatinamente… La integración es una herramienta 
para enfrentar la globalización. 
 
 
PP40 
La comunicación entre lo regional y lo local no es buena. La velocidad en los 
procesos es diferente: en los congresos nacionales es un proceso diario en el cual 
el rol de la política partidaria es más fuerte. El PAN tiene un capitulo de 
integración en su constitución, tiene una secretaria de integración, el partido ha 
hecho sus avances en la materia, es uno de los partidos políticos mas progresistas 
en la materia de integración… La prensa de la región tiene un espíritu destructivo 
hacia la integración. Ellos no entienden el proceso, no salen de las últimas 
décadas del siglo pasado… El Parlamento es una de las instituciones que no es 
comprendida en Centroamérica ya que la gente no percibe su utilidad. La prensa 
ha tildado y señalado al Parlamento como un nido de políticos sin darse cuenta, 
como resultado del subdesarrollo político nuestro, que el Parlamento es el 
organismo con mayor representatividad política en la región (unos 54 partidos 
políticos son miembros, mientras que en el Congreso Nacional de Guatemala hay 
diez partidos representados, por ejemplo). El Parlamento tiene en sus miembros 
un gran potencial ya que en su mayoría son gente con una gran experiencia. 
Lamentablemente el Parlamento ha sido atacado y socavado por la prensa. En el 
caso de Guatemala la prensa presenta al Parlamento como un gasto, mientras que 
en realidad el Parlamento trae ingresos al país debido a que su sede se encuentra 
en Guatemala. La prensa solo destruye, actitud que demuestra todas las 
frustraciones y conflictos que existen en lo regional… A pesar de toda nuestra 
historia no nos vemos como región todavía. La actitud de los cafetaleros no 
refleja ninguna voluntad hacia la integración. No existe cultura de integración, no 
hay percepción ni comprensión  de los beneficios de la integración… Existe una 
gran falta de identidad, se debe trabajar la conciencia regional de la juventud… 
El gran obstáculo es la falta de credibilidad de las instituciones y el 
enfrentamiento entre el sector económico y la clase política. El sector económico 
ha desarrollado sus lazos, por ejemplo ellos se comunican entre cámaras de 
comercio o de industria. El poder económico cree que la clase política no pueden 
ser sus interlocutores. Por lo tanto no utilizan los canales institucionales de la 
integración. Como son estos grupos quienes controlan la prensa, la alimentan con 
argumentos que tiende a desprestigiar a los organismos regionales. Por ejemplo, 
se argumenta que el Parlamento tiene demasiados diputados. Destruyen así algo 
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que no entienden. Depende entonces de la clase política saber aprovechar las 
instituciones regionales. 
 
 
PP41 
Las instituciones regionales son organismos ideales pero no tienen “dientes” y 
algunas de ellas se han convertido en “cementerios” para políticos retirados. Los 
medios de comunicación tratan de descalificar las funciones de las instituciones. 
El Parlamento por ejemplo cumple función de intermediación en la sociedad. Al 
no actuar, el Parlamento esta generando un espacio que es ocupado por otras 
fuerzas… El poder económico llena este espacio tratar de alguna forma de 
descalificar aquellos órganos de los cuales ellos no tienen el control.  
Afortunadamente los grupos económicos no tienen el control de las decisiones de 
los Parlamentos… La integración es de proceso y evolución. Pero falta 
compromiso para lograr integración… El mayor obstáculo para avanzar el 
proceso es el “paroquialismo,” la imposibilidad de tener visión amplia y el 
subdesarrollo cultural… Por las condiciones que existen entre ellos, se debe crear 
un ente político por lo menos entre El Salvador y Guatemala. Estos países deben 
tener la audacia de declarar su unión declarando un punto de partida y  
estableciendo una presidencia simbólica. Esta seria constituida por el  Presidente 
de Centroamérica pero no por el jefe de estado el cual seguiría siendo el 
presidente de cada país. Pero estaríamos rompiendo así barreras y estableciendo 
una sola política internacional. La voluntad política es clave es este aspecto pero 
siempre debe estar precedida por un sólido aparato cultural y nosotros no hemos 
hecho una cultura centroamericana, ni entre los sindicatos y gremios, ni entre los 
grupos estudiantiles, deportivos y artístico. Esto se debe a que lo que ha 
prevalecido en la integración es lo económico lo cual implica un grado de 
competencia y rivalidad entre los países centroamericanos pero que a pesar de 
ello el proceso ha avanzado. Los líderes políticos en general gozan de muy poca 
integración. 
 
 
PP42 
Los gobiernos se abstienen de aprobar resoluciones que dan poder vinculantes a 
las instituciones regionales ya que perciben que al hacerlo estarían “soltando” el 
poder. Cada “cacique en Centroamérica quiere ser el gallo en su rancho”… Costa 
Rica ha sido un freno difícil de penetrar, pero debemos seguir adelante sin ellos... 
No hay comprensión acerca del tema, no existe la visión de lo que puede ser la 
integración trabajando desde una realidad centroamericana, o sea de lo que 
significa y seria la unidad de nuestros países… Algunos círculos políticos, 
incluyendo algunos presidentes, quisieran “desaparecer” instituciones regionales 
como el Parlamento a pesar de que este es el organismo ideal para la integración, 
que ya esta formado con una gran inversión es su establecimiento, por lo tanto es 
necesario darle “dientes.” La falta de facultades vinculantes es lo más importante 
a enfrentar. 
 
 
PP43 
Las instituciones regionales están lejanas de la población. Para ellos es claro que 
si no se logra la integración se experimentará la “distorsión” en los niveles 
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económicos, políticos y sociales. Es importante unificar todas las ventajas 
comparativas de los países de la región pero el proceso debe ser integral y 
abarcar todas estas dimensiones no solamente la económica. La integración no 
debe ser solamente económica sino integral. Esto significa que debe acaparar 
todo lo social, lo cultural, lo político y lo económico... Es necesario que la 
integración continúe desde el siguiente punto: debemos capacitar a los líderes 
comunales sobre lo que son los temas integracionista a si ellos pueden 
convertirse en actores diseminadores de la integración. Los esfuerzos regionales 
son muy aislados, entonces no se ha sentido el efecto, el fruto de la integración…. 
Una oficina para la integración regional eliminaría el aislamiento de los partidos 
políticos dentro del proceso, eliminaría la posibilidad de quedarse fuera del 
entorno regional. UNE tiene dicha oficina la cual tiene enlace directo con el 
comité ejecutivo nacional del partido a través de su Secretario General Colóm… 
La integración significa competitividad. Existe una ideología de consenso entre 
los países en este respecto… Se debe buscar el traslado de los beneficios que 
genera la integración hacia el pueblo en la forma de desarrollo económico y 
social. Guatemala debe ser el pivote, la cabeza, la punta de lanza regional. 
Guatemala debe dar la pauta… El Parlamento es un grupo de personas que esta 
allí, algunos creen en el proceso y están preparados, pero lamentablemente esto 
no es suficiente. Se necesita apoyo de programas que capaciten a los políticos. 
Con este fin se necesitan proyectos de educación a nivel regional, pero tenemos 
que saber canalizarlo. Se debe avanzar a nivel gobierno. Solamente ellos  pueden 
implementar la integración a corto plazo. Si no hay integración habrá distorsión 
regional lo cual traerá problemas sociales serios. Tenemos un analfabetismo 
tremendo en el tema de integración. Para hacer conciencia en el pueblo se 
necesita conciencia a nivel político entre los partidos políticos quienes son lo que 
generan el proceso… Los diputados no saben a que van al Parlamento. Entonces, 
aun los miembros del Parlamento deben ser capacitados en materia de 
integración, para así crear conciencia entre ellos… No existe un reconocimiento 
del trabajo efectivo que las organizaciones regionales como el Parlamento hayan 
hecho por los pueblos centroamericanos. La conciencia regional se debe trabajar 
a nivel político primero para que posteriormente los señores diputados del 
Parlamento actúen como agentes concientizadores a nivel de la población… Con 
todos lo elementos culturales que nuestros pueblos comparten entonces ¿cómo es 
posible que todavía estemos debatiendo como avanzar de integración? Es posible 
que existan otros intereses a quienes no les interesa la integración… Las 
organizaciones regionales deben tener poderes vinculantes. 
 
 
PP44 
Nos fue muy difícil la consolidación del Parlamento centroamericano en 
Guatemala. La oposición del gobierno del Presidente Serrano lo hizo dificultoso. 
Los pueblos no se oponen pero algunos gobiernos y en especial algunos 
presidentes han tenido una actitud negativa hacia el Parlamento y la integración 
en general; ellos han propiciado que los medios de comunicación social se dirijan 
agresivamente en contra del Parlamento. La población no veía mal al Parlamento 
en Costa Rica… Se necesita trabajo constante de los directivos hacia los 
ejecutivos, los partidos políticos olvidan a sus representantes en el Parlamento, se 
les ha olvidado que ellos son miembros de los partidos por lo tanto estos deben 
estar pendiente de sus representantes y es a través de los partidos que se puede 
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lograr la presión sobre los Ejecutivos para lograr poderes vinculantes para las 
organizaciones regionales… Los obstáculos para el proceso empiezan al no haber 
una persona interesada verdaderamente en darle apoyo a las organizaciones 
regionales. Los ministros de relaciones exteriores de cada país tienen su propia 
agenda y no existe un vínculo entre el Parlamento y los asesores de los ministros 
quienes tienen poder de agenda. Tenemos entonces que “enamorar” a esos 
asesores por lo tanto el Parlamento debe tener constantemente dos o tres personas 
en cada país íntimamente vinculados con estos asesores. Se necesita que los 
diputados aporten, que participen (antes no lo hacían cuando era miembro) y aun 
así eran reelegidos. Algunos diputados no tienen conciencia regional, ni tienen el 
deseo de mejorar. ¿Cómo mejorar la actitud pasiva en el Parlamento? Se puede 
crear sentido de responsabilidad… El Presidente Maduro [de Honduras] usó al 
Parlamento para fines personales. Él se había peleado con el presidente del 
Parlamento y en cada reunión proponía eliminar dicha institución... Se puede 
desarrollar volantes cortos con información sobre las tareas de las instituciones 
regionales en general. Lo más importante es que los miembros del Parlamento se 
perciban como actores regionales encargados del destino de Centroamérica… Se 
debe de insistir mucho en los ejecutivos. Se requiere de muchos esfuerzos para 
que no se cercene lo logrado hasta ahora.  
 
 
PP45 
Existe una gran falta de entendimiento con respecto al proceso de integración… 
Se necesita una moneda centroamericana y el libre movimiento de recursos. La 
legislación regional debe ser vinculante. La integración legal es importante 
incluyendo la regulación de bolsas bursátiles y monitoreo bancario… Existe 
descontento entre la gente pobre y clase empresarial porque se percibe que la 
integración (representada por el CAFTA- DR ya que este es el entendimiento) 
beneficia a las empresas multinacionales. Es necesario entonces explicar a la 
gente que la integración es diferente al dicho tratado. 
 
 
PP46 
La integración ya no es un sueño, es una exigencia. Hay compromiso de parte de 
los partidos políticos hondureños sobre la inclusión de la integración en el debate 
de la campaña política en el país. La unidad política de los partidos de Honduras 
toma la iniciativa en esta dirección… La integración es una necesidad política, 
social, económica y cultural. La integración económica debe reformar mercados, 
por ejemplo, debe dar poder adquisitivo a toda la economía. No debe unir 
mercados pequeños y pobres. Las instituciones regionales necesitan un giro. 
Éstas no son sino la política de los estados que las forman por lo tanto dichas 
instituciones carecen de identidad. Necesitamos cambio de actitud en los estados. 
Necesitamos órganos con potestad legislativa… La integración es imperiosa. La 
unidad política es la meta. El Tratado de Nicaragua así lo establece pero el 
proceso debe ser gradual y sucesivo, aun Costa Rica lo ratificó… Necesitamos 
unidad política. Tenemos que “irrigar” la conciencia centroamericana para 
cosechar frutos ya que el proceso ocupa un segundo plano en nuestras 
preocupaciones; irrigar por medio del encuentro de todas las fuerzas políticas 
para abordar el tema. En Honduras todos los partidos están de acuerdo… Aun 
cambios en el sistema educativo necesitan unión política. La posibilidad para ésta 
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existe pero necesitamos liderazgo político. Se necesita la creación de una persona 
jurídica, por ejemplo, volver a crear la Republica Mayor de Centroamérica. La 
visión histórica entre nuestros países existe. El convencimiento de la necesidad 
de un mercado mayor nos lleva a la necesidad de la unión política, es decir que 
se conjuga el interés material con el ideal unionista… Existen contradicciones 
entre la voluntad política y la ejecución del proceso. El futuro no se puede 
concebir brillante y prospero fuera de la integración. Los partidos políticos de la 
región deben tomar la iniciativa... En Centroamérica estamos tratando de 
restablecer la unión, no estamos iniciando el proceso como en otras regiones. 
Morazán es importante. 
 
 
PP47  
Existe mayor deseo por la integración a través de los volúmenes comerciales, 
aranceles y unión aduanera. Sin embargo, hay falta de voluntad política y 
resistencia en el campo político. La funcionalidad de lo órganos regionales es 
deficiente. El grado de concreción del proceso debe ir acompañado del 
fortalecimiento de los órganos de integración, lo cual se demuestra por medio de 
dicha concreción. El proceso tiene un gran potencial con muchos beneficios para 
la región por lo tanto necesitamos agilizarlo con más voluntad política, no 
debemos pensar que ceder poder a la integración es renunciar al poder, nuestra 
soberanía e identidad nacional, sino que significa la búsqueda de posibilidades 
mayores de desarrollo económico y social conjunta la cual seria beneficiosa para 
todos los países de la región. 
 
 
PP48 
La integración es generalmente mal entendida, y entre ciertos segmentos de 
nuestra sociedad, desconocida completamente. Sí se conocen los aspectos 
históricos que nos unen pero estos deben ser fortalecidos por las fuerzas 
integracionistas del presente. Lo económico del proceso aísla a muchos 
centroamericanos ya que no les beneficia… Ciertos sectores económicos de la 
región condicionan el proceso y por esta razón la integración es percibida como 
algo ajeno por la mayoría de centroamericanos… La difusión del conocimiento 
sobre el proceso es clave para el fortalecimiento de la conciencia histórica 
centroamericana. Tenemos que dejar a un lado la retórica y actuar regionalmente. 
Debemos asumir la responsabilidad histórica de reunir a nuestros pueblos. Sí 
articulamos y proponemos adecuadamente la integración, y hacemos evidentes 
los beneficios que se pueden derivar de ésta, aun los sectores dominantes más 
renuentes apoyaran el proceso. 
 
 
PP49 
Centroamérica debe integrase como bloque económico, se necesita una mayor 
voluntad dentro de los partidos para fortalecer los órganos regionales. Esto nos 
llevará, en las instituciones regionales, especialmente el Parlamento, a tratar 
asuntos judiciales, económicos y políticos. Se debe vender la idea de integración 
por medio de las decisiones políticas… Representaciones centroamericanas como 
consulados ante países amigos serian más representativas y dignas. La 
integración implica más capacidad económica y de negociación, con mayores 
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beneficios para Centroamérica… Las Cumbres Presidenciales deben recibir el 
debido seguimiento. Debemos ser centroamericanos respetando la identidad de 
cada uno de los estados miembros. Necesitamos vender la idea de la integración 
para generar voluntad. Por eso las organizaciones regionales deben socializarse 
entre los grupos organizados de Centroamérica, entre los partidos políticos, para 
llevar adelante la integración. Se necesitan alianzas entre los órganos 
complementarios regionales y nacionales, es decir una verdadera integración 
institucional con mayor vinculación a través de objetivos comunes para facilitar 
decisiones que generen mayor integración. 
 
 
PP50 
Centroamérica es latente. Lamentablemente la visión de “aldea” tan común en 
nuestros países frena la integración. Se habla sobre integración del “diente al 
labio.” La falta de ahínco de parte de algunos de los países de la región limita las 
posibilidades de integrarnos. Préstamos culturales, como adaptar elementos de la 
experiencia Europea, tratan de imponer el ritmo a nuestro proceso lo cual reduce 
aun mas las posibilidades de éxito… Algunas de las instituciones regionales se 
han desvirtuado. Necesitamos ser sinceros y dejar aun lado los intereses 
personales. Las instituciones, en particular el Parlamento, no han sabido generar 
la dinámica para convertirse en abanderados del proceso, deben darle 
continuidad al proceso. Los gobiernos usan solamente la retórica de la 
integración. Los instrumentos regionales más visibles, como el SICA, son 
simplemente mecanismos para recomendaciones. Falta beligerancia departe de 
los miembros del Parlamento, de que le den seguimiento dentro de sus partidos a 
las recomendaciones del parlamento para que nosotros, miembros de congresos 
nacionales, las incorporemos como leyes para ir dando la razón de ser a una 
legislación centroamericana auque sea embrionaria. De la pasividad de los 
miembros del Parlamento no podemos culpar a los ejecutivos. Se puede orquestar 
un enchufe por medio del Parlamento Centroamericano con otros órganos 
legislativos sobre legislación uniforme, por ejemplo en lo ambiental, lo cual 
podría establecer las bases para avanzar la integración real. Podríamos ir 
estableciendo talvez una agenda legislativa que vaya creando un marco jurídico 
centroamericano… La política es de símbolos, y la integración necesita símbolos. 
Muchos políticos se desmotivan porque la integración es solamente retórica, 
conferencias y seminarios; nuestros pueblos necesitan agendas más beligerantes. 
Se necesita presencia real de las instituciones regionales en Centroamérica, lo 
cual generará un sentimiento regional. Tenemos que cambiar el rostro de las 
instituciones. Se podría tener representación centroamericana ante organismos 
internacionales, para dar imagen de región pero para esto se necesita voluntad 
política. Los gobiernos solamente usan la integración por lo tanto a decaído el 
proceso. Hay que motivar a los gobiernos… Se necesita conocer sobre las 
acciones de las instituciones regionales y crear mecanismo de información 
directa entre estas y los órganos nacionales, por ejemplo entre el Parlamento y 
los congresos nacionales.  
 
 
PP51 
Se necesita beligerancia, documentar el proceso para distribuir el conocimiento 
hacia el pueblo centroamericano. El pueblo quiere un producto, pero las  
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instituciones regionales no pueden ofrecerlo ya que no existe vocación 
integracionista entre algunos de sus miembros. Algunos de estos no tienen ni 
idea del concepto de integración, y representan un retroceso para el proceso… Es 
necesario que se cree un sentido de responsabilidad, se podría establecer un 
informe a la nación cada determinado tiempo en el cual miembros de 
instituciones regionales presenten sus actividades ante los congresos o asambleas 
nacionales. Lo cual daría mayor visibilidad al proceso. 
 
 
PP52 
El Parlamento debe de articular el proyecto de integración primordialmente. El 
proceso tiene diferente sentido para los partidos políticos de la región, pero en 
general no tiene incidencia para le pueblo o la clase política; se necesitan 
resultados materiales, asentar lo sustantivo… El pueblo no percibe ventajas 
derivadas de ciertas  instituciones regionales o de la integración en general… Si 
el proceso es económico el pueblo panameño lo rechaza. Se debe aprovechar la 
complementariedad entre Centroamérica y Panamá, no se trata de repetir el 
comportamiento de los otros países de la región en Panamá. 
 
 
PP53 
Las instituciones regionales tienen las suficientes capacidades para generar 
resultados positivos para la sociedad centroamericana y así empezar a reducir la 
percepción negativa que se tiene del proceso. No se ha sabido “vender” la 
integración  y así se ha contribuido a tal percepción… Los partidos políticos son 
fundamentales para el proceso ya que si pensamos a éstos como entes racionales 
que velan por el beneficio de los países, entonces dados los beneficios de la 
integración deben trabajar dentro del proceso… La velocidad de algunas 
instituciones regionales es muy lenta pero el marco institucional existente es el 
adecuado para el proceso… Entre ciertos sectores existe una actitud 
irresponsable que ha llevado a un proceso condenatorio hacia algunos aspectos 
del proceso, como por ejemplo el establecimiento y papel del Parlamento 
Centroamericano. Dicha actitud puede ser el resultado del criterio miope de 
algunos forjadores de opinión. No hay instituciones perfectas pero debemos 
trabajar hacia la efectividad de estas… La imagen del proceso y sus instituciones 
se pueden mejorar con resultados para lo cual si hay potencial… Normalizar las 
reglas de transito en el área como proyecto para la integración podría 
contribuir… También se debe avanzar en los aspectos sociales como los de salud 
y seguridad ciudadana.  
 
 
PP54 
Las instituciones regionales sirven como mecanismo de socialización para 
políticos. En Panamá la gente no piensa en Centroamérica, la  integración no 
tiene eco. No existe un plan educativo para crear conciencia centroamericana. 
Pero estoy interesado en dicho programa educativo… El comercio ya existe entre 
Panamá y Centroamérica pero la gente no esta conciente acerca de la integración. 
La consolidación de acuerdos políticos es fundamental para que el pueblo se de 
cuenta de la importancia del proceso. Las decisiones deben ser tomadas a largo 
plazo, no se debe buscar capitalizar, es decir pensar en las siguientes elecciones, 
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las decisiones regionales. La decisión de Panamá de entrar en la integración es 
pragmática, alguna gente piensa que es más rentable entrar en esquemas 
regionales de Suramérica que en el proceso de Centroamérica. La socialización 
de políticos miembros de las instituciones centroamericanas ayuda a influenciar 
las decisiones que se toman dentro del gobierno con respecto a la región. 
 
 
PP55  
Para avanzar en la integración centroamericana se requiere por sobre todo un 
pleno interés y compromiso de las más altas autoridades del conjunto de países 
miembros, convencidos que la integración es una forma adecuada para, en 
conjunto, atender las necesidades de desarrollo sustentable de la región. Dando 
lineamientos claros y precisos tanto a las instituciones regionales como a los 
entes nacionales responsables de la ejecución de los mandatos y resoluciones.  El 
instrumental jurídico de la integración establece quiénes son los que participan 
directamente del proceso… La integración marcha hacia donde los tomadores de 
decisión la impulsan, en este momento es claro que hay prioridades claramente 
identificadas como la unión aduanera en el ámbito económico, la cooperación 
regional para los temas de seguridad, la atención de los riesgos a desastres 
naturales y a la preservación de los recursos naturales, el fortalecimiento del 
sector turístico, el desarrollo del sector pesquero sobre la base de una política 
regional de pesca, la coordinación y desarrollo del sector energético, etc.  Siendo 
ese el marco en el que se identifican las iniciativas y actividades para avanzar en 
la integración… El conocimiento de lo que es un proceso de integración entre la 
población general es determinante para generar empatías hacia el mismo, no 
puede esperarse que sea exitoso si no se conoce y dirige con suficiente propiedad. 
 
 
PP56  
La debilidad de la SG-SICA en su papel de coordinador general resulta de la 
autonomía funcional de las instituciones del SICA... Lo intergubernamental del 
SICA dificulta su accionar inmediato y también hay dificultad para la coherencia 
institucional del SICA debido a otros programas regionales, como por ejemplo el 
Plan Puebla Panamá… Falta de mayor claridad de los objetivos de la integración 
regional, cuando los hayan habrá una mayor incidencia de las instituciones 
regionales… SICA ha contribuido mediante la facilitación de recursos para los 
encuentros convocados a través de instrumentos de trabajo como la matriz de 
seguimiento de los Acuerdos Presidenciales y Ministeriales los cuales han 
permitido el vínculo intersectorial con ejes temáticos asociados a la agenda 
común… Contribuiría a concienciar a estas instituciones en la importancia del 
modelo integracionista como un valor agregado en el PIB de cada país, resaltar 
valores de solidaridad, cooperación, complementariedad entre la 
institucionalidad regional, el facilitar la fluidez de lo regional a lo nacional e 
incluso local. Hay necesidad de un mayor acercamiento con los diversos sectores 
de la sociedad civil y del sector público clave, como las asambleas y órganos de 
justicia, para un debate abierto y franco y sus implicaciones… Trabajar en una 
homologación de leyes laborales afines a los países miembros y una reforma al 
Tratado de Tegucigalpa para delimitar de mejor manera las competencias en los 
órganos superiores, la necesidad de acomodar la normativa regional al plano 
nacional con el fin de dar certeza jurídica, y que la Corte Centroamericana de 
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Justicia aborde con propiedad su quehacer. El Parlamento como el principal 
interlocutor de los ciudadanos centroamericanos debe velar por que la población 
mejore su calidad de vida a través del proceso de integración… En la dialéctica 
del desarrollo humano, el intelecto y la producción de satisfactores materiales 
están íntimamente vinculados. De tal manera que las políticas deben comprender 
la totalidad de un proceso, en este caso, “la integración regional”, razón por la 
cual vemos que los programas de cooperación abarcan múltiples temas. Desde 
una tríada: derechos humanos, libertad, democracia, pasar a la integración 
económica, sin omitir las características del regionalismo abierto que trae 
consigo nuevas políticas en materia exterior, de lucha contra el narcoterrorismo, 
de justicia, etcétera. Pero, una sociedad disminuida en conocimientos, máxime 
hoy día con la tecnología de la información, su capital humano se torna no 
competitivo ante la globalización del mercado mundial y, sus efectos negativos 
en el marco del capital social, y por ende, en el capital productivo. Por lo tanto, 
los gobiernos centroamericanos deben definir claramente que se pretende con “la 
integración regional” y sobre esta base establecer prioridades resaltando aquellos 
intereses de orden intrínseco conforme a la ruta trazada. Porque no es el 
comercio por el simple comercio, de nuevo, hay que verlo como una totalidad… 
La participación del pueblo centroamericano se torna cada vez más imperativa. 
La credibilidad de los gobiernos es cada vez más cuestionada. 
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Appendix VIII. The Social Elites Sample 
 
Participant 
Code  
Regional 
Organisation Country 
SP1 FECAICA Honduras 
SP2 FECAICA Honduras 
SP3 FECAICA Guatemala 
SP4 FECAICA Guatemala 
SP5 FECAMCO Guatemala 
SP6 FECAMCO Honduras 
SP7 FECAMCO Honduras 
SP8 FECAMCO Costa Rica 
SP9 FECAMCO Costa Rica 
SP10 FECAMCO Guatemala 
SP11 FEDEPRICAP Guatemala 
SP12 FEDEPRICAP Costa Rica 
SP13 FEDEPRICAP Panama 
SP14 FEDEPRICAP Nicaragua 
SP15 FEDEPRICAP El Salvador 
SP16 FEDEPRICAP El Salvador 
 
   
 292 
Appendix IX. Interview Excerpts-Chapter Five 
 
SP1 
El sector privado es el agente de integración. La integración en Centroamérica es 
una forma natural, Centroamérica desunida no es más que un grupo de países 
rebeldes. Nuestra historia nacional es nuestra historia pero la historia unionista de 
Centroamérica no la debemos ignorar. Mucho menos podemos permitir que los 
que vuelcan la integración hacia un dialogo puramente económico ignoren o 
borren nuestras experiencias unionistas. La integración de Centroamérica no va a 
cambiar nuestra historia nacional por el contrario la enriquecerá... Los 
industriales Centroamericanos se han apropiado del proceso de integración. La 
integración real es la integración de la inversión y de la banca. Los grupos 
centroamericanos grandes de negocios están mas concientes sobre la integración 
regional, la apoyan y empujan. La empresa privada gana con la integración por 
eso la apoya pero necesitan y quieren mecanismos de resolución de conflictos a 
nivel regional. La integración económica en Centroamérica es informal y está 
pasando; por ejemplo, la banca centroamericana está integrada. Nosotros 
generamos propuestas como la de establecer un salario mínimo centroamericano 
que seguramente llevarán a un mayor grado de integración... En los momentos de 
crisis son los grupos de negocios quienes defienden el proceso, es la empresa 
privada que lidera la reagrupación regional. Durante la crisis que surgió entre 
Honduras y Nicaragua, fuimos nosotros quienes logramos formar un bloque de 
diputados para solucionar los problemas que ahondaban la situación... El CAFTA 
no es enemigo de la integración ya que obliga a los países de Centroamérica a 
adoptar las mismas reglas y regulaciones. El CAFTA sin embargo es conflictivo 
para Centroamérica ya que estos países producen los mismos productos lo cual 
los lleva a competir entre ellos, creando entonces diferencias artificiales entre 
nuestros países. Durante las negociaciones del CAFTA, uno de los gobiernos  de 
la región, urgido por la presión de cierto segmento de la empresa privada 
totalmente enfocado en el mercado local, decidió negociar unilateralmente con 
los EEUU estando dispuesto a ceder a todas las demandas de los EEUU... era 
inútil debatir con dichos grupos a pesar de que ellos debilitaban nuestra posición 
y aumentaba la competición entre nuestros países. Nuestra organización interfirió 
directamente con la negociadora en jefe estadounidense argumentando que la 
propuesta unilateral complicaría las negociaciones al forzar al resto de nuestros 
países a tomar posiciones similares y que paralelamente se estaría causando 
serios daños a la integración. Ella persuadida por nuestra posición optó por una 
posición que nos forzaba a negociar en grupo. Tendencias desintegradoras como 
esta existen en nuestra región a pesar de que la integración es indispensable… 
Por otra parte, a través de la integración regional estos países pueden optar por la 
complementariedad de sus industrias y economías en general... La integración es 
lógica pero la falta de uniformidad, como por ejemplo la arancelaria y de tarifas, 
favorecen a ciertos sectores que se encuentran ligados directamente a los 
gobiernos de la región. Los gobiernos tienen intereses diferentes a los de la 
integración y sus estrechas relaciones con sectores económicos mantienen la 
integración en un nivel específico de diálogo económico y paralelamente, los 
aspectos relacionados al desarrollo de las comunidades centroamericanas son 
descuidados.  
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SP2 
Los  industriales avanzan la integración y asumen la lógica del proceso. El sector 
privado elimina o absorben las “distorsiones” del proceso. Los industriales de 
Centroamérica quieren que se incorpore en la agenda regional el tema de la 
monedo única... El sector privado esta dividido en el enfoque del mercado 
interno con relación al externo: ¿se debe enfocar en el mercado centroamericano 
o en el global? Honduras considera más importante al mercado externo mientras 
El Salvador enfatiza el mercado común centroamericano. Esta división favorece 
a los gobiernos locales ya que éstos, apoyados por empresarios con intereses y 
enfoque local, ganan legitimidad y los sectores anti-integracionistas mantienen el 
poder... Es dignificante que la integración del sector privado ha generado 
resultados que fortalecen, facilitan y dictan la pauta a la integración como por 
ejemplo nuestras demandas y necesidades de inversión han llevado al 
establecimiento de consorcios de abogados con alcance regional los cuales instan 
a los parlamentos nacionales a instituir la homologación de leyes regionales de 
inversión. La inversión en Centroamérica esta siendo facilitada por dichas firmas 
de abogados quienes trabajan directamente con sectores industriales y a través de 
esta colaboración informalmente se modifica las normas de la inversión... El 
sector industrial centroamericano apoya el establecimiento de un pasaporte único 
para los países de la región. Lamentablemente algunos de los gobiernos de la 
región bloquean dicha propuesta. Uno de los mayores obstáculos es la falta de 
planificación de los gobiernos y su falta de voluntad la cual se refleja en el papel 
meramente consultivo de las instituciones regionales y su renuencia a reformar el 
sistema... La integración económica debe llevar a la integración de lo social. La 
integración es importante para el desarrollo sostenible de la sociedad 
centroamericana y esto debe ser causa para la descentralización del proceso. Es 
necesario que el proceso de un “producto” a la población Centroamericana en 
general.  
 
 
SP3 
La integración de los países, tanto económica, como política y social, no es un 
fin en si misma,  tiene un solo objetivo, ser un instrumento de apoyo al desarrollo 
del los países que se involucran en un proceso de esta naturaleza. Esta 
aseveración es valida para cualquier grupo de países que emprendan esta tarea 
(tal el caso de la Unión Europea), pero es mucho mas importante y significativa, 
cuando el proyecto se realiza por un grupo de países  de un menor grado de 
desarrollo de sus economía, (el caso de los países situados en el istmo 
centroamericano)... Los fenómenos políticos, económicos y sociales, no pueden 
encasillarse en modelos rígidos, la región como fortaleza desde mediados del 
siglo pasado a incrementado su comercio intra-centroamericano... Esto estuvo 
acompañado también de muchos logros, suscripción de convenios, facilitación 
del comercio fronterizo, facilitación de movilidad de personas, facilitación de 
transporte terrestre y aéreo, avances en infraestructura, homologación de normas 
de fitosanitarias, medicamentos, alimentos, agroindustria, y seguridad entre otros. 
El proceso es debilitado por el hecho de que si bien ya se ha firmado por los 
cinco gobiernos de la región el Convenio Marco para la Unión Aduanera, no se 
ha desarrollado la institucionalidad que pudiera hacerla funcionar 
adecuadamente... FECAICA promueve el diálogo entre el sector industrial 
centroamericano y los Gobiernos de los cinco países, instituciones regionales e 
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internacionales, para encontrar soluciones válidas y duraderas a los problemas en 
el Mercado Común Centroamericano y en las relaciones económicas externas, a 
fin de salvaguardar los intereses del aparato productivo centroamericano. 
Impulsa, fortalece y plantea el perfeccionamiento del proceso de integración 
económica centroamericana, vigilando el cumplimiento de los compromisos 
internacionales adquiridos, con los plazos establecidos y la correcta aplicación de 
los convenios y protocolos suscritos... FECAICA, desde su fundación en 1959, 
siendo la federación regional empresarial más antigua, ha sido la organización 
privada regional que mas ha impulsado la integración regional, el sector 
industrial centroamericano ha estado presente en todo el proceso, y se ha 
identificado el crecimiento de la industria a la integración... Dentro del sector 
público, el funcionamiento regular del Consejo Económico (COMIECO) ha 
contribuido grandemente a la integración. De los entes consultivos puedo 
mencionar especialmente al Comité Consultivo del Sistema de Integración 
Centroamericana (CC-SICA); el Comité Consultivo de la Integración Económica 
Centroamericana (CC-IE); y  de las entidades regionales del sector privado, a las 
Federaciones Centroamericanas del Sector productivo. Ya que estas son las 
entidades diseñadas para ese objeto y porque son quienes hacen la integración 
regional... En los últimos años, ha habido voluntad política expresada por los 
Presidentes de Centroamérica en las Cumbres Presidenciales, especialmente en 
cuanto a la constitución de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana. Lo que ha 
faltado es ejecución por parte de los funcionarios, Ministros de Finanzas y 
autoridades fiscales, par ejecutar con prontitud los mecanismos de armonización 
fiscal... Tanto en el Protocolo de Tegucigalpa como en el Protocolo de 
Guatemala, instrumentos internacionales vigentes, se conviene en como objetivo 
central el constituir una unión económica, lo que conlleva una armonización de 
diversas políticas, entre las que se significan las políticas, comerciales, sociales, 
ambiéntales, de derechos humanos, etc... El proceso de integración regional 
centroamericana, se considera un proceso irreversible que ya lleva casi medio 
siglo. Los logros obtenidos por Centroamérica son considerables, aunque luego 
de la etapa de normalización del proceso, ha seguido con alguna lentitud el de 
perfeccionamiento de la infraestructura legal e institucional... El CAFTA-DR, no 
se considera otro esquema de integración regional, es un acción regional, es un 
acuerdo eminentemente comercial, que si bien con respecto a la integración 
regional tuvo la virtud de que se negoció por Centroamérica, como un conjunto, 
pero en su formalización y en la elaboración de listados, se hizo por cada país de 
Centroamérica por separado, tal el caso de Costa Rica cuyo parlamento lo aprobó 
varios meses después que los otros cuatro países. Se estima que el Acuerdo de 
Asociación con la Unión Europea, con sus tres pilares el político, el de 
cooperación y el Comercial, y los condicionamientos de una Unión Aduanera, de 
una Vocería Única y la constitución de un órgano jurisdiccional de resolución de 
controversias, se acercan mas un apoyo a la integración, pero mas que un 
esquema de integración, es un Acuerdo de Asociación... Si se desea avanzar en el 
proceso regional, no debería de descuidarse ninguno de los aspectos, ya que tanto 
el político, el social, el desarrollo sostenible, ambiental deben de mantenerse en 
la Agenda regional para poder ir perfeccionando el sistema de integración 
centroamericano. No obstante el enfoque es el económico, puesto que por este 
aspecto se han iniciado los procesos de integración. En una zona de libre 
comercio, no se consideran los otros aspectos, pero al avanzar hacia etapas de 
mayor integración, como la Unión Aduanera, se debe como parte esencial incluir 
   
 295 
aspectos políticos, jurídicos e institucionales... Al hablar de las instituciones de la 
integración regional es muy difícil incluir a todas las instituciones en un mismo 
análisis. Dentro de las instituciones del sistema de integración, le daría una 
mayor calificación a las Cumbres Presidenciales y al Consejo de Cancilleres. En 
el Subsistema Económico, le daría una mayor calificación al Consejo de 
Ministros de la Integración Económica (COMIECO), a los grupos técnicos que 
han avanzado en temas específicos de la Unión Aduanera y muy especial a la 
Secretaria General (SIECA)... El Comité Consultivo de la Integración Económica, 
(CCIE), desde su constitución se ha reunido mensualmente, habiendo llevado a 
cabo 17 reuniones mensuales, y ha evacuado la consulta de todos los 
Reglamentos que ha sometido a su consideración el COMIECO, por lo que se 
considera un órgano que merece una calificación alta, por la eficacia en las 
labores que ha desarrollado.  
 
 
SP4 
Entendiéndose integración regional como el logro de una región económica, ésta 
aumenta las probabilidades que Centroamérica se inserte en la economía global 
con mayores probabilidades de éxito. Centroamérica integrada presenta una 
región con un tamaño de mercado más interesante, mayor diversificación, 
mejores economías de escala para la producción de bienes y servicios y mayor 
eficiencia en general. Implica que cada país de Centroamérica adopte y acepte 
instituciones supraregionales para la toma de algunas decisiones, muy similar a la 
Unión Europea con lo que se minimizan los riesgos de politización de las 
decisiones económicas y técnicas. La integración implica la descentralización del 
poder político hacia instituciones regionales y un conducto para la inserción de 
Centroamérica en la economía global... Lo más importante es que facilita el libre 
movimiento de bienes y servicios, mejorando la competitividad de empresas 
regionales en cuanto a homologación de normas y leyes y también facilitando 
que las empresas puedan alcanzar mayor tamaño, lo que las coloca en una mejor 
posición para competir afuera de la región... El CAFTA constituye un tratado 
multilateral. En este sentido es importante diseñar la integración regional para 
complementarlo y no para afectarlo. La integración regional es un acuerdo mutuo 
entre los países y que cada país analiza y compara con los otros acuerdos y 
tratados que ha firmado... La integración es de muy alta importancia debido a los 
múltiples beneficios que el sector industrial de la región obtendrá al poder mover 
libremente los productos por la región y tener al alcance un mercado mucho más 
grande que sólo el de Centroamérica... Aunque no sea aceptado plenamente, el 
motivador principal de cualquier acuerdo es el económico. Como ejemplo, hay 
que comenzar con la unión aduanera y la homologación de normas y tarifas. Sin 
embargo, es importante tomar en cuenta los demás factores pues no pueden 
descuidarse... La Cámara de Industria de Guatemala ha sostenido reuniones con 
los sectores productivos de otros países para el intercambio de opiniones y el 
alineamiento de estrategias regionales… El Protocolo de Tegucigalpa y muchas 
veces la cantidad de participantes en las instituciones regionales las vuelven 
inoperantes. Diría que la institución más eficiente ha sido SIECA, seguida, 
aunque no muy de cerca por el COMIECO. El Comité Consultivo de la 
Integración se ha reunido frecuentemente y con alguna eficacia. El Parlamento 
Centroamericano está aislado y pareciera que sin responsabilidades específicas 
en el tema. Al final, mi evaluación institucional se relaciona con la lentitud del 
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proceso, la percepción de avances lentos, la politización del proceso y muchas 
veces la búsqueda por parte de los países de sus propios intereses sobre los 
regionales (poca flexibilidad a la hora de ceder)... El proceso debe llevar a una 
unión más allá que sólo la económica. La integración política será difícil de 
alcanzar pero es importante que sea un objetivo. Lograr la integración social es 
de vital importancia para la sostenibilidad de la integración económica... La 
lentitud en el avance es preocupante. Esta integración debió estar lograda antes 
de negociar el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre México y el Triángulo Norte 
(Guatemala, El Salvador y Honduras), el CAFTA- DR y el Acuerdo de Libre 
Asociación con Unión Europea. Centroamérica hubiese podido negociar mejor 
ya integrada y mejorar los beneficios obtenidos.  
   
 
SP5 
La integración regional centroamericana, es un proceso político- económico que 
lleva más de 40 años de estar en fase de negociación, teniendo por etapas 
avances sustanciales y en otras que se mantiene detenida… Integrarnos como un 
territorio único, nos ofrecería muchas ventajas ante el resto mundo, en cuanto a 
negociaciones comerciales e intercambios de productos. A partir de la 
integración económica nos convertiríamos en un territorio único, lo que conlleva 
conjugar muchos aspectos y condiciones los cuales podrían ir alcanzado una 
cultura centroamericanista... Mientras no haya voluntad política de los gobiernos 
de los 5 países de Centroamérica, va a ser imposible concluir la integración 
Centroamericana. La falta de voluntad política limita los espacios en los que la 
empresa privada puede actuar para avanzar el proceso... Las instituciones 
regionales de la empresa privada (como FECAMCO y FECAICA) son 
fundamentales en este proceso, porque se fija una única posición en los temas, lo 
que facilita las negociaciones así como también los diversos foros y mesas de 
trabajo en donde se analizan los diversos componentes de la integración... Uno 
de los aspectos que afectan en forma negativa la integración es la falta de 
voluntad política de los gobiernos y la falta de continuidad del proceso de 
negociación, cuando existe cambio de gobierno en cualquiera de los países de la 
región centroamericana... La integración centroamericana se ve complementada 
por otros esquemas de integración económica como el CAFTA-DR... A nivel 
centroamericano se deben fomentar la armonización arancelaria (unificar arancel 
externo común) y aspectos jurídicos así como también la homogenización de 
documentos únicos de identificación... El avance del proceso es obstruido por un 
marco institucional escasamente eficaz. 
 
 
SP6 
La integración regional debe ser comunicada a todo nivel. Necesitamos 
incrementar la competitividad y el conocimiento en materia de integración. El 
sistema educativo se vuelve importante para estos objetivos… La integración no 
es entendida, se trata de canalizar la inversión. Los empresarios no tienen acceso 
completo a los mercados de la región. La integración “tradicional” representa un 
mercado “nostálgico.” El proceso debe de atraer y canalizar la inversión 
extranjera. La integración es en términos generales un mecanismo para canalizar 
esa inversión. Si queremos mejorar nuestra posición en el mercado internacional 
la inversión debe dirigirse a proyectos regionales productivos y rentables. Dentro 
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del proceso nuestras organizaciones interactúan con los gobiernos en la 
formulación de políticas regionales... El Tratado de Libre Comercio no 
representa una mayor dependencia de la región centroamericana en los Estados 
Unidos. Si no más bien significa incremento de capital para la inversión el cual 
llevará a un mayor desarrollo y mayor conciencia regional... Nosotros hemos 
presionado por la realización de una verdadera integración de las bolsas de 
valores. Nuestra propuesta es que se le de al PARLACEN poder de vinculación y 
derecho a legislar lo cual agilizaría la integración legal de la región y por ende 
contribuiría a la integración de los mercados de valores... La integración es 
económica y precisa un eficiente flujo de recursos pero también una fuerza 
laboral capacitada que sepa encarar los retos de la economía mundial. 
 
 
SP7 
Hemos tenido, y este ha sido en general ajeno a la sociedad centroamericana, el 
proceso de integración económica y comercial. Pero la voluntad política de los 
gobernantes, generalmente es deficiente. Es suficiente observar el papel de 
consulta, no vinculativo, que juegan las instituciones regionales para darse cuenta 
del grado de voluntad política existente en la región. Grupos de poder ligados a 
los presidentes de la región se benefician de este tipo de instituciones y logran 
influenciar a los presidentes para mantenerlas en ese papel de consulta… La 
conciencia regional entre la población en general es débil. Programas educativos 
que nos enseñen a ser verdaderos centroamericanos pueden medrar esta situación. 
Pero tampoco ha existido entre los políticos conciencia que la base principal del 
proceso de integración es lo político, es decir la integración es política, y 
entonces los gobernantes consideran que lo económico es la fuerza de la 
integración. Esta percepción fue la causa del colapso del mercado común 
[CACM]. Cuando lo económico necesitó de la base política para resolver sus 
conflictos, dicha base no existía… El proceso del mercado centroamericano debe 
marchar paralelamente sobre aspectos económicos, sociales y políticos. Para 
impactar a la gente centroamericana, a nuestra sociedad, los aspectos políticos 
deberían convertirse en la fuerza principal del proceso. El sector privado puede 
colaborar con los gobiernos en la proyección de la integración hacia la sociedad. 
El objetivo del proceso debe ser el desarrollo sostenible de la región. Los 
problemas sociales debemos enfrentarlos como región no individualmente.  
 
 
SP8 
La integración es importante, tenemos que ir abriendo más nuestras fronteras… 
El libre comercio representado en tratados como el CAFTA-DR y otros 
convenios como el de asociación de Centroamérica-Unión Europea, son 
importantes para la inserción de la región en el orden mundial, en el mercado 
global. En este proceso el papel del sector privado es crucial, otros sectores de la 
sociedad evidentemente participan, pero es la empresa privada la que da la 
pauta… No entiendo que o quienes son la sociedad civil, nadie lo puede aclarar 
¿Qué es la sociedad civil? ¿Quién representa a la sociedad civil? Nosotros somos 
la sociedad civil, la sociedad civil que importa. Vivimos en un régimen en el cual 
nosotros elegimos, nosotros votamos, la democracia es elegir quien nos 
representa. Pero en la sociedad civil, la cual esta compuesta por todos nosotros, 
algunos individuos se arrogan la representación sin haber pasado por ningún tipo 
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de votación, ni nada parecido. Entones hablar de falta de representación de la 
sociedad civil en el proceso no tiene ningún sentido… La empresa privada lleva 
el peso de la integración. En primer lugar son los gobiernos los que negocian y 
facilitan el proceso, pero nosotros en los “cuartos adjuntos” somos los que 
conocemos y sabemos de los negocios, nosotros somos los que hacemos la 
integración. Cada una de las compañías que están asociadas a las diferentes 
cámaras lleva y desarrolla los negocios con otros países y estas actividades son la 
materia prima de la integración. En última instancia, son las cámaras como 
FECAMCO las que llevan el proceso, porque es la empresa privada la motora de 
todo esto, de todo el proceso… El enfoque de la integración, es decir el mercado 
centroamericano o el global es determinado por cada convenio que se firma. Lo 
importante es que los tratados favorezcan a todas las partes involucradas, las dos 
partes de un convenio tienen que ganar. Nosotros somos un mercado pequeño y 
al entrar en convenios con otros mercados mucho más extensos como la Unión 
Europea no podemos perder de vista el mercado regional y actuar conjuntamente 
en las negociaciones para maximizar los beneficios derivados del acceso a 
grandes mercados… Las instituciones regionales son muy burocráticas lo cual es 
un problema, pero entiendo que cada una de esas instituciones contribuye al 
proceso dentro de lo que permiten sus recursos, y espero que a nuestro lado, al 
lado del sector privado, que cabe recalcar es el motor del proceso, podamos 
llegar a los acuerdos necesarios para el éxito de Centroamérica. La burocracia 
regional debe de actuar y hacerse sentir en la región, pero algunas instituciones 
regionales como el Parlamento infringen la soberanía política de nuestros países. 
Todos estamos de acuerdo que el proceso requiere abrir nuestro mercado, 
entonces tenemos que seguir caminando.   
 
 
SP9 
La integración es un proceso económico el cual es impulsado por el sector 
privado. Sin embargo, la integración puede expandirse a aspectos políticos y 
sociales. La empresa privada junto algunos miembros de los gobiernos entiende 
cual es el camino hacia la integración… En Centroamérica la parte política del 
proceso debe de ir haciendo a los países del área más similares ya que existen 
grandes diferencias entre éstos. Costa Rica va muy adelante del resto de 
Centroamérica en los aspectos sociales, entonces otros países tienen que irse 
poniendo a tono… En el pasado Centroamérica tuve un mercado común sólido y 
debemos recuperarlo. Pero nosotros no hablamos de integración, hay cosas que 
no son posibles como la libre migración. Entonces hay aspectos que nosotros no 
podemos abrir lógicamente hasta que los otros países centroamericanos vayan 
avanzando en éstos. Porque si no tendríamos, por ejemplo, un caso de migración 
masiva y el proceso no se trata de eso, no se trata de crear desequilibrios enormes 
en nuestras sociedades… Tenemos buena voluntad así que el proceso tendrá 
éxito a largo plazo, nos falta mucho por lograrlo especialmente en lo social. 
Costa Rica tiene una red social fuerte. El proceso de integración debe de respetar 
las idiosincrasias de cada sociedad y también hasta donde podemos y queremos 
llegar como región, es decir lo económico. Ciertas instituciones regionales no 
son factibles. La Corte de Justicia Centroamericana no es viable, Costa Rica ya 
tiene su corte de justicia, este tipo de instituciones no es viable. El Parlamento 
Centroamericano tampoco es posible. También existen actividades que tienden a 
manifestarse a través de la integración las cuales no son viables, tal es el caso de 
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la libre movilidad de personas… FECAMCO esta interesada en el comercio 
regional porque es la manera de superar nuestras industrias. FECAMCO es un 
facilitador del proceso. Otras organizaciones que representan al sector privado se 
dedican a proteger los productos de sus miembros arguyendo que el mercado 
regional es reducido y por lo tanto debemos enfocarnos exclusivamente en su 
desarrollo. Este es un detrimento para la región y limita los beneficios que 
obtenemos de la integración porque nuestro objetivo debe ser el mercado global. 
 
 
SP10 
La Federación  tiene el tema de integración entre sus principales prioridades. 
Además, se han sostenido reuniones con los sectores productivos de otros países 
para el intercambio de opiniones y el alineamiento de estrategias… Considero 
que el COMIECO es importante, especialmente el CC-SICA que es el Comité 
Consultivo del Sistema de Integración y en general las federaciones 
centroamericanas del sector productivo pues son entidades que ha sido formadas 
principalmente para el objeto de la integración. Hay que tener cuidado de no 
sobrecargar a las organizaciones con participación excesiva de instituciones. 
Instituciones deficientes frenan el proceso y afectan el desarrollo de la 
competitividad regional necesaria para aprovechar el mercado global, la 
burocratización del marco institucional no es la solución... Voluntad política ha 
habido, especialmente en Guatemala y El Salvador. Sin embargo, algunos países 
defienden en exceso puntos de beneficio específico para ellos o intentan revisar 
temas sobre los que ya se ha avanzado. Ha faltado ejecución por parte de 
funcionarios de los gobiernos como ministros y autoridades fiscales.  
 
 
SP11 
Las instituciones regionales al no poseer poder de decisión son deficientes. Hasta 
cierto punto falta voluntad política para fortalecerlas… La federación ha creado 
instituciones que ayudan a facilitar una estructura empresarial que sirva de 
contraparte a los funcionarios oficiales encargados de negociar y aplicar las 
políticas de negociaciones comerciales regionales e internacionales de forma 
ordenada y eficiente... Para el logro de este objetivo es necesario la efectiva 
participación y comprensión de la comunidad empresarial de la agenda de las 
negociaciones. Así como también que los empresarios, pero sobre todo las 
instituciones y asociaciones empresariales, manejen pleno conocimiento de los 
temas y los alcances de los acuerdos regionales, y una vez estos son logrados que 
la empresa privada pueda aprovechar al máximo los beneficios de esos acuerdos... 
El objetivo es integrar constructivamente los puntos de vista de la empresa 
privada en la formulación de las posiciones nacionales, y que los empresarios 
con la información apropiada y oportuna pudieran tomar las decisiones de corto, 
mediano y largo plazo concerniente a su empresa.  
 
 
SP12 
La integración es el proceso mediante el cual un grupo de países se han puesto de 
acuerdo para el libre intercambio de bienes y servicios. La integración se debe 
fundamentar sobre  los principios de respeto entre los países pero con un objetivo 
claro de facilitación de comercio. La integración facilita la libre circulación de 
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bienes y esto aumenta el flujo comercial tanto dentro como fuera de la región. 
Sin embargo la falta de infraestructura adecuada (física, aduanas, controles 
fitosanitarios, etc.) en los países de la región limitan el desarrollo pleno del 
proceso... Trabajamos de cerca con criterios técnicos y proporcionando insumos 
con las entidades públicas que lideran el proceso para avanzar la integración... El 
tema de la integración es analizado en una comisión de la Federación la cual 
tiene representación de todos los sectores productivos... Para reforzar la 
integración debe fomentarse la participación de los ministerios de Hacienda, 
Salud, Seguridad, Comercio Exterior y Agricultura en el proceso... La 
integración es negativamente afectada por la falta de infraestructura institucional 
adecuada y un acuerdo regional sobre los diversos e importantes aspectos de la 
integración, por ejemplo, controles fiscales... Debido a las grandes diferencias 
sociales, políticas, económicas, comerciales, culturales de cada uno de los países 
de la región, las cuales se deben respetar, la integración regional no puede ir más 
allá de lo económico... El proceso de integración es una consigna propia no por 
imposición de terceros... La integración la concebimos con un enfoque 
pragmático no institucional.  No creemos en  entidades supranacionales que rijan 
los destinos de cada uno de los países de la región. Además, debido a las 
diferencias existentes en la actualidad, principalmente en legislación, no es 
conveniente una integración política. Hasta la fecha las organizaciones del 
sistema de integración centroamericano han tenido pocos resultados. 
 
 
SP13 
El proceso de integración centroamericano se basa en varios principios y 
propósitos económicos. Entre ellos, el de la democracia, la disminución de la 
pobreza y los lazos de historia que nos unen como región. Entre sus ventajas, 
están las de poder fortalecernos entre nuestros países, al igual que regionalmente 
frente a los otros países... En la realidad, fuera de los gobiernos, los organismos 
privados en Panamá, están algo distanciados del proceso, pues no se percibía 
hasta hace muy poco, y es conocido por pocos, el respaldo decidido a este 
proyecto por parte de Panamá... La integración ofrece la posibilidad de negociar 
como bloque de países ante naciones más poderosas o llevar a cabo 
negociaciones y/o acuerdos ante instancias internacionales en forma unificada 
tomando en cuenta que nuestros votos conjuntos tienen un peso relativo más 
importante. En lo macro económico, nuestras economías pueden ser grandemente 
fortalecidas, utilizando el centro de logística que tiene Panamá y sus facilidades y 
frecuencia de buques para llevar los productos de la región al mercado global, 
entre otros... Históricamente, Panamá no ha dado suficiente apoyo a la 
integración, tal vez por no haber definido su estrategia internacional con claridad 
y no haber sido hasta ahora que se compromete con la firma del protocolo de 
Guatemala. En consecuencia, nuestra organización, tampoco le ha dado la 
relevancia del caso. Adicionalmente, en algunos sectores, se percibe que la 
integración, sobre todo económica, desfavorece a Panamá por tener mayores 
costos de salario que los otros países centroamericanos, lo que nos hace menos 
competitivos y esto podría afectar a nuestra industria.  Por otro lado, la economía 
de servicios de Panamá, bastante desarrollada, contrasta con la economía de 
varios de los otros países y la protección que le dan a ciertas áreas como los 
seguros. No habiendo una política clara, nuestra organización, tampoco ha 
definido presupuestos relacionados con la integración... El tema de la integración 
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tiene mucho que ver con la empresa privada. Sin embargo, las organizaciones 
privadas, que generalmente están inmersas en los problemas nacionales, no 
hemos destinado recursos para participar en las distintas reuniones que se dan, 
sobre todo en Centroamérica. Es probable que un mayor apoyo en este aspecto 
permita una participación más frecuente y dedicada con las organizaciones 
privadas de Centroamérica en que se trabajan estos temas de integración con 
mayor fuerza... Hemos instado al gobierno a definir su participación en este 
proceso ya que la falta de definición política clara sobre la integración, afecta, 
definitivamente el proceso y limita el grado de competitividad que la empresa 
privada puede alcanzar... Tenemos que avanzar en la integración aduanera y en la 
normalización de procesos de transporte de productos y mercancías. La 
protección de los países a los medios de transporte nacionales no favorece al 
proceso. La exclusión de entrada de vehículos de carga de uno u otro país o 
restricciones, hacen más difícil el comercio. Por tanto, debemos trabajar en un 
sistema que facilite el intercambio en forma más eficiente. El temor de la 
migración por parte del sector laboral panameño es percibido claramente, por la 
posible contratación de mano de obra más barata y el consecuente 
desplazamiento de trabajos por los nacionales... El tratado de libre comercio 
Centro América-República Dominicana y los Estados Unidos tiende a acercarnos 
más como región. 
 
 
SP14 
Creo que la integración facilitará una mejor perspectiva económica para 
negociaciones como región Centroamericana, de cara al mundo. Centroamérica 
tiene mucho potencial como región, no como países individuales. Es también una 
continuación del proyecto Morazánico de integrar a Centroamérica como una 
Unión Centroamericana, tenemos costumbres, idioma, etnias comunes, lo que 
nos separa son los intereses políticos y económicos, si logramos vencer estos 
obstáculos lo lograremos... La integración dará una mejor oportunidad a la región 
y a los países que la integran para potenciar sus posiciones de negociación ante 
terceros y también ayudará a limar asperezas y diferencias entre países... La 
integración complementa los tratados de libre comercio, aunque éstos hayan sido 
negociados individualmente, tendrán que redefinirse éstos tratados a la luz de una 
integración económica. El Tratado de Libre Comercio con la Unión Europea, 
potenciará la integración puesto que se hace como región y no como países... No 
se le ha dado la dimensión correcta a la integración por falta de apoyo político de 
los gobiernos Centroamericanos, no se ha visto como algo factible, debido a los 
intereses políticos creados a nivel de la región. Ejemplo de ello es el Parlamento 
Centroamericano, la Corte Centroamericana de Justicia y la Secretaría de 
Integración Centroamericana, que no tienen mayor incidencia en el desarrollo de 
las políticas integracionistas... Hay que fomentar la integración y unificación de 
los factores políticos, económicos y sociales, de forma tal que se logre una 
unidad de criterios alrededor del tema integración, para poder lograr los objetivos 
de unificar la región y hacer ver la importancia que ésta tiene de cara al futuro... 
Las instituciones del Sistema de integración no realizan su objetivo por trabas 
burocráticas y políticas. Las instituciones de integración centroamericanas son 
más vistas como un refugio de políticos pasados de moda y de tiempo que 
utilizan estas instancias para sus propios intereses... Por lo antes mencionado, 
estas instancias no tienen mayor incidencia en el desarrollo de la región y mucho 
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menos como instancias que promuevan la integración, carecen de autoridad 
moral y autoridad real, nadie les da oportunidades, ni ellos las promueven, ni se 
dan el lugar que deberían de tener y mucho menos jugar el Rol que les 
corresponde... Desde la empresa privada no se tiene mayor oportunidad de incidir 
en las políticas de gobiernos... Se manifiesta la falta de verdadera voluntad 
política y de intereses regionales, siempre se ven los intereses particulares como 
los más importantes, menospreciando aquellos intereses regionales, que al largo 
plazo podrían traer mayores beneficios a la región y a los países 
individualmente... Ayudaría al avance del proceso el desarrollar más conciencia 
de región y mayor integración social de nuestros pueblos, los cuales tienen raíces,  
costumbres e idioma comunes. 
 
 
SP15 
La empresa privada es la vanguardia de la integración centroamericana. Los 
símbolos integracionistas actuales son históricos y románticos, no tienen gran 
conductividad hacia una mayor integración. Pero pueden servir como base para 
una integración verdadera. La integración es un proceso económico conducido 
por medios intergubernamentales. El proceso necesita de una buena dosis de 
voluntad política. Lo político debe de ofrecer bases sólidas a los aspectos 
económicos. Actualmente las instituciones regionales dependen del poder de los 
presidentes, se necesita el fortalecimiento institucional de la integración para que 
ésta se encamine adecuadamente. La voluntad política en la región debe ser más 
constante. El proceso sufre cuando cambios en administraciones repercuten en la 
agenda regional, o si los gobernantes “usan” la integración para desprestigiar a 
sus rivales políticos. Se debe plantear una estrategia regional definitiva y 
ejecutarla puntualmente. Es evidente, y esto los señores gobernantes no lo 
pueden negar, que la integración permitiría que nuestra región aproveche las 
ventajas competitivas de que disponemos. Con respecto a las  negociaciones en 
bloque son sin lugar a duda necesarias ya que nos permiten alcanzar mejores 
términos de intercambio comercial y nos posicionan mejor en la arena 
internacional como miembros del primer mundo... Las organizaciones regionales 
como FEDEPRICAP son importantes porque ayudan a la inclusión de temas 
regionales en las agendas nacionales así como también al planteamiento de la 
agenda integracionista. Hemos propuesto medidas que nos ayudan a explotar 
nuestras ventajas competitivas, pero también medidas que buscan un balance 
entre los económico y social, que humanicen a la integración, que le den un 
rostro a la integración económica. Las instituciones regionales sirven de vínculo 
entre los actores gubernamentales y el sector privado. Éste es el dialogo que 
debemos de sustentar, sin él la integración se convierte en un “náufrago” en las 
“aguas” burocráticas de nuestros países. La integración debe ser des-capturada, 
las instituciones regionales deben independizarse de los grupos de poder a los 
cuales están ligadas para poder acercarse a la población en general. La 
integración regional debería convertirse para todos los centroamericanos en una 
mejor calidad de vida. Una vez la integración sea fortalecida, sus beneficios 
podrán ser llevados a la sociedad en general. No se puede compartir algo que no 
se haya alcanzado. El proceso no debe politizarse en este sentido. No podemos 
permitir que la integración sea usada como herramienta retórica, empleada desde 
un punto de vista ideológico, para acusar a la empresa privada de explotar a 
nuestros trabajadores. La integración debe ser a-ideológica, si cabe una ideología 
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en el proceso pero esta debe ser el “centroamericanismo”... La conciencia 
regional debe fortalecerse. Es preocupante que mientras algunos actores políticos 
acusan a la empresa privada de instrumentalizar la integración, ellos carecen de 
una conciencia regional y por lo tanto no contribuyen al proceso. La conciencia 
centroamericana debe enraizarse en nuestras sociedades a través de los sistemas 
educativos y medios de comunicación. La prensa puede hacer de la integración 
un debate entre la población. Hasta entonces podremos hablar de integración 
social y cultural.  
       
 
SP16 
La integración regional es la cooperación gubernamental en aspectos económicos 
y la descentralización del poder político hacia instituciones regionales. La 
integración facilita la movilidad de personas, el transporte terrestre y aéreo, 
avances en infraestructura, y la homologación de normas industriales entre otras 
y también proporciona a la región un mayor poder de negociación ante terceros, 
y complementa otros esquemas de integración económica como el tratado de 
libre comercio con los Estados Unidos... El proceso recibe una gran relevancia en 
el seno de nuestra organización... Los aspectos económicos de la integración se 
deben fomentar para avanzar en el proceso regional, por eso debemos determinar 
los costos que tiene no integrarse, determinar si se obtendrían mejores volúmenes 
para la exportación... Las instituciones del sistema (especialmente SICA, 
PARLACEN, y la Corte de Justicia) de la integración centroamericana no son 
eficaces o adecuadas ya que no son vinculantes sus decisiones en la mayoría de 
los casos. El proceso tiene “demasiada cabeza para un cuerpo tan pequeño”... No 
son vinculantes sus resoluciones en el ámbito Ejecutivo, Legislativo y Judicial. 
En el caso gremial se participa activamente por parte de El Salvador coordinando 
proyectos regionales financiados por organismos financieros... Como el gremio 
que aglutina a los exportadores, en la parte productiva, pues en realidad son 
nuestras empresas las que venden a los mercados regionales. En el aspecto 
gremial, estamos como vigilantes del proceso de integración y participamos 
como miembros en algunas organizaciones como son el CC-SICA, proponiendo 
iniciativas de apoyo regional al sector. Nuestra organización también propone 
iniciativas y lleva a cabo proyectos para incentivar, promover y promocionar las 
exportaciones... La integración no avanza porque hay certeza de costo de 
oportunidad al no hacerlo, poca cobertura en el sistema educativo y de los 
medios de comunicación del enfoque regional y falta de verdadera decisión 
política... También no todos los sectores están representados adecuadamente ya 
que muchas personas no conocen la integración. La prensa y el sistema educativo 
pueden ser útiles para resolver estas cuestiones… La integración se beneficiaría 
si se garantizan las cuotas por nacionalidad en los organismos de la integración, y 
se racionaliza la superestructura de la institucionalidad. Solamente entonces las 
instituciones regionales obtendrán poderes vinculantes y se convertirán en un 
marco político guía. El sector privado podrá en ese contexto liderar la 
modernización de la economía regional. 
 
 
 
 
   
 304 
Appendix X. Example of a Chilean Family Network  
Name Post and Dates Relationship
Ramón Subercaseaux Mercado Merchant; owned hacienda El Llano y Colmo, currently 
el Llano Subercaseaux; one of the main stockholders of 
Ferrocarril de Valparaíso 
Ramón Subercaseaux Vicuña Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cult y Colonization 1915-
1916; Deputy 1879-1882; Senator 1906-1912
Son of Subercaseaux Mercado
Gabriel Valdés Subercaseaux Minister of Foreign Affairs 1964-1970; Senator; Sub-
secretary General of the UN on charge of UNDP
Grandson of Subercaseaux Vicuña
Juan Gabriel Valdés Soublette Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1999-2000; Embassador to 
Spain, 1990-1994; permanent representative to the UN 
under Pre. Lagos, 2000-2006. 
Son of Valdés Subercaseaux 
Blanca Subercaseaux Errázuriz Link between Subercaseaux and Errázuriz families Daughter of  Subercaseaux Vicuña; 
Mother of Valdés Subercaseaux;
Fernando de Errázuriz y Aldunate    Regidor of Cabildo of Santiago 1810; Vice-President 
1831; provisional President Mar 1831 - Sep 1831
Federico Errázuriz Zañartu        President, 1871-1876 Nephew of Pre. Errázuriz y Aldunate
Federico Errázuriz Echaurren    President, 1896-1901  Son of Pre. Errázuriz Zañartu
Germán Riesco Errázuriz           President, 1901-1906 Cousin of Pre. Errázuriz Echaurren
Jorge Errázuriz Tagle  Deputy 1915-18 & 1918-21; Senator 1921-27 Grand-grand son of Pre. Errázuriz y 
Aldunate
Jorge Errázuriz Echenique Deputy 1945-49, 1949-53, 1953-57 & 1957-61 Son of Errázuriz Tagle  
Eduardo Frei Montalva      President, 1964-1970 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle            President, 1994-2000; Senator, 2006-2014 Son of Pre. Frei Montalva
Carmen Frei Ruiz-Tagle Senator, 1990-1998 & 1998-2006 Sister of Pre. Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
Erwin Arturo Frei Bolívar Deputy, 1970-1973; Senator 1990-1998 Cousin of Pre. Frei Ruiz-Tagle
Francisco Ruiz-Tagle Portales     Deputy, 1811; Senator 1812-1814; Minister of Hacienda; 
provisional President, 1830
Uncle of Pre. Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
Patricio Aylwin Azócar President, 1990-1994
Mariana Aylwin Oyarzún Deputy Florida 1994-1998; Minister of Educación Daughter of Pre. Aylwin
Andrés Aylwin Azócar Deputy 1965-1969, 1969-1973, 1973-1977, 1990-1994 
& 1994-1998
Brother of Pre. Aylwin
Guillermo Eliseo Azócar Alvarez Deputy 1921-1924; Senator 1926-1930; Minister of 
Agriculture 1931; Senator 1933-1937 & 1937-1945
Uncle of Pre. Aylwin
Panel A: Subercaseaux/Valdés Family
Panel B: Errázuriz Family
Panel C: Frei Family
Panel D: Aylwin Family
Sources: Adapted from Cahoon (2008) and Pilleux Cepeda (2007). 
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Appendix XI. The Batlle Family of Uruguay  
 
Name Post and Dates Relationship 
Lorenzo Cristóbal 
Manuel Batlle y Grau 
President, 1868-1872    
José Batlle y Ordóñez President, 1903-1907 & 
1911-1915   
Son of  President Batlle y 
Grau 
Luis Batlle Berres         President, 1947-1951; 
President of National Council 
of Government, 1955-1956  
Nephew of President Batlle 
y Ordóñez; grand-son of 
President Batlle y Grau 
Jorge Batlle Ibañez  President, 2000-2005; 
Senator; presidential 
candidate 1966 & 1971 
Son of President Batlle 
Berres; grandnephew of 
President Batlle y Ordóñez        
Cesar Batlle Pacheco  Member of the quincenistas 
majority in the colorados; 
opposed Luis Batlle faction 
(list 14) within the colorados 
Son of President Batlle y 
Ordóñez 
Lorenzo Batlle Pacheco Member of the quincenistas 
majority in the colorados; 
opposed Luis Batlle faction 
(list 14) within the colorados 
Son of President Batlle y 
Ordóñez 
Jorge Pacheco Areco                President, 1967-1972   Member of Battle Berres' 
List 14; former editor of "el 
Dia" newspaper owned by 
the Batlle Family 
Cesar Rodriguez Batlle President of the Central Bank, 
2001- ? 
Cousin of President Batlle 
Ibañez 
 
Sources: Adapted from Alexander (1982) and Cahoon (2008).   
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Appendix XII. Mapping Constitutional Regionalism 
 
Special Mention 
of Citizenship 
Support/Promote/Favor Latin American 
Integration
Bolivia Article 37* 1967 - 2002
Colombia Article 96.9.b** Article 9** 1991 - 2005
Costa Rica Article 14.2* 1949 - 2007
Cuba Article 12.c** 1976 - 2002
Ecuador Article 4.5 1998
El Salvador Article 92* Article 89 1983
Guatemala Article 150 (support for Central American 
Union)
1985 - 2002
Honduras Article 24.2* 1982
Nicaragua Article 9** 1987 - 1995
Panamá Article 10.3* Preamble (mentions "regional integration," no 
mention of Central or Latin america)
1972 - 1994
Perú Article 44 1993 - 2005
República 
Dominicana
Article 3 ("in favor of economic solidarity 
with the countries of America")
2002
Uruguay Article 6 1967 - 2004
Venezuela Article 33.2*** Preamble (article 102 mentions "Latin 
American vision")
1961 - 1999
*
 = also applies to Spanish citizens
**= also mentions the Caribbean
Article in National Constitution
Year of 
Consitution and 
Last Amendment 
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